

Working Paper No. 7

Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations
on behalf of the World Bank / UNDP and BMZ




Case Study Timor Leste: In-Country Study

Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
GmbH

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Needs Assessment in Timor Leste – Lessons Learnt and Good Practices

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Dili / Timor Leste
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Preface

The following work has been developed in the context of a consultative study carried out by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) on behalf of UNDG/UNDP and The World Bank. In July 2003 these multilateral organizations contracted GTZ in order to develop a practical guide for future Needs Assessments in post-conflict settings, based on a review and analysis of past experiences as well as research on other assessment methodologies in the context of humanitarian aid and development cooperation. The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation, BMZ, additionally supported the in-depth analysis of the four case studies in Afghanistan, Timor Leste, Liberia and Sri Lanka by co-financing the work of GTZ, with a particular focus on the involvement of bilateral donors in post-conflict needs assessments (PCNA).

We would like to thank our interview partners from the Government of Timor Leste, the World Bank, the EU, UNMISSET, UNDP, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WHO, GTZ, USAID, CIDA, local and international NGOs.

Executive Summary

Timor Leste is from many perspectives an exceptional case: the violent aftermath subsequent to the vote for independence, which was announced in early September 1999 created a big stir of violence and led to a bloody pull-out of the Indonesian forces, which was answered with a high international response for immediate support. The international community especially UN, donor countries and institutions and East Timorese population involved quickly in reconstruction of the country, the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) and the subsequent mission UN Transitional Peace Keeping Force (PKF) were rapidly deployed.

The country faced many challenges in its post crises process such as the massive brain drain of highly skilled Indonesian descendents after the violence in September 1999 brake out, vacuum for legitimate government representative, the Babylonia of languages spoken, vast destruction of infrastructure and large-scale displacement.

On the other hand, the country also found some opportunities that make this case different from other violence-ravaged countries: Timor Leste found almost unlimited attention of the world in 1999 and it can build on the high consensus among the Timorese population to focus on reconstruction and development rather than to be dragged in prolonged post war period like other countries in Africa or Southeast Europe. The relatively calm internal security situation unlike in other countries provides a good climate for reconstruction and reconciliation among the East Timorese population.

The World Bank-led initiative, the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) and the UN-led inter-agency Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) as well as the subsequent United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET) shaped the entry point for reconstruction and development. While the CAP focused more on immediate intervention in the situation of crisis, the World Bank relied on its early preparation and fulfilled a very important role in designing the programme for reconstruction and development with focus on short-term priorities, with some of the outlined activities having a link to a midterm and long term perspective.

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The CAP and the JAM both followed a sectoral approach. The following sectors were handled by both missions: health, education, infrastructure. The CAP also included the sectors food aid and food security, return and reintegration, water and sanitation and focused all and above on humanitarian assistance. The JAM included sectors such as judiciary, community development, macroeconomics, civil administration.

The findings suggest the following major lessons learnt with regard to the process and content of the assessment missions:

Content

- The use of an overall planning framework, such as applied in the JAM, is a good approach to keep goals, objectives, activities transparent during different implementation stages;
- Integration of cross cutting topics from the beginning assures long term relation in planning and implementation;
- Sensitive issues such as language need to be carefully handled in the planning process and require extensive public consultation on it.

Immediate humanitarian assistance was one of the main achievements and success stories of the CAP in combination with the flexible on the ground coordination of experienced experts. The donor conference in Tokyo in December 1999 agreed on the main funding mechanisms: the Consolidated Fund for East Timor, UNTAET administered and the TFET (US\$ 166 million), managed jointly by Asian Development Bank and World Bank. The TFET turned out to be a very effective financing and coordination instrument. Secondly, the CFET (US\$ 51) million, an UNTAET administered fund, which was transferred later to a government budget provided core funding to government related sectors such administration, power sector and judiciary.

The necessity to have one mission focusing on immediate humanitarian assistance and one mission focusing on more medium and long-term reconstruction and development needs may be a useful approach to secure that immediate humanitarian aid is delivered in the crisis situation. The implementation (about nine months) on the ground of the CAP was considered as successful in terms of logistical achievements, however even some sectors such as food security and clear criteria for distribution were lagging behind. On the other hand, implementation within a mid-term approach (planned for three years, now modified accordingly to five years) had to suffer some drawbacks in sectors where training and skilled labour and import of material and create local capacities were differing pairs.

The major lessons learnt and good practices are outlined below according to financial mobilisation and coordination and implementation.

Financial mobilisation and coordination

- TFET could be model for regular donor coordination and planning along defined criteria, if its specific role within the process of reconstruction and development is agreed upon and government responsibilities are determined;
- Internal and external regular monitoring enhances exchange with counterparts and civil society and provides transparency to beneficiaries;
- Role of NGOs should be complementary with government functions, but not supplementary.

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Implementation

- Capacity building and quick visible result on the ground need a careful balance and fine planning, deep intercultural understanding and excellent communication skills among international experts. In addition, it is essential to conduct briefings on findings and handing of data during the mission and especially at the end of a mission employment;
- Steady communication and coherent consultation creates transparency and promotes participation on the local level;
- An organised policy for recruitment of national and international staff plays a vital role where national capacity suffered;
- Different perception on emergency (relief) and development by different aid agencies can contribute to contradictions in implementation on the ground.

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1 Objective of the country case study Timor Leste

War and violent conflict have devastating impacts on a country's physical, economic and human capital, as well as on the social fabric, posing major constraints to development. In view of the increasing number of violent conflicts worldwide, UNDP and World Bank want to assess their past experiences in post-conflict reconstruction. Needs assessments are an essential entry point in post-conflict situations to identify causes of conflict and social and economic needs of target groups for long-term recovery and development. The purpose of this study is to document good practice in post-conflict needs assessment in a number of conflict-affected countries (Timor Leste, Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia). In the next step a practical guide will be developed. The Crises Prevention and Conflict Transformation Programme (financed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), attached to German Technical Cooperation – GTZ) has been commissioned with this task.


More specifically, the objective of the mission is to document good practice and lessons learned in post-conflict needs assessment regarding the

- conflict-sensitivity of process and content;
- needs assessment process;
- (technical) quality and relevance of its content.

This document analyses the context, process, content and impact of the needs assessment missions conducted in Timor Leste in the aftermath of the 1999 violent. In the case of Timor Leste two different needs assessment missions have been undertaken and were the starting point for further actions in emergency and development actions:

- The United Nations Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) is an UN-led mission, coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – OCHA. It was conducted in October 1999. It laid focus on the assessment of the humanitarian situation in East and West Timor and proposed immediate strategies to overcome acute emergency.
- The World Bank led Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), was carried out in late October 1999 until mid November 1999. The JAM focused on assessment of the current situation and proposed medium and long-term strategies for recovery and reconstruction in Timor Leste.

Both missions will be tackled. Follow-up mission are covered where it was feasible such as the missions on Civic Education and Health.

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2 Methodology

2.1 Semi-structured interviews

Several stakeholders have been interviewed. The groups are listed below:

- Multilateral agencies: World Bank Country Director, UNDP Country Co-ordinator, other multilateral staff involved in NA;
- National government (sectoral ministries involved);
- National mission members;
- Bilateral donors;
- National civil society;
- Agencies implementing programmes deriving from Needs Assessment Process.

It was feasible to conduct interviews with most of the listed persons. However, due the preparation of the Donor Meeting in Dili, 3- 5 December 2003 and other constraints, it was impossible to arrange meetings with the respective line ministries such as the Ministry of Planning and Finance. On the other hand, this limitation could be partly overcome by interviewing a number of East Timorese nationals working in donor agencies and non-governmental organisation who, in their personal capacity, either participated in or observed the respective missions.

2.2 Review of literature.

The main documents analysed were the needs assessment documents:

- The United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)
- The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)

There are a number of reports from review and lessons learnt missions available that could be used for the current lessons learnt / good practices mission. The most important documents are listed below:

- An internal Lessons Learnt Mission was led by a World Bank team and draws the most important conclusions and lessons learnt from the experiences gathered in Timor Leste, focusing on the possible forthcoming missions.¹
- A sequence of related review missions of the CAP that have been conducted in three phases in May 2000
 1. Self-Assessment by the Humanitarian Community;²
 2. Humanitarians Programmes in East Timor from the Beneficiaries Perspective, May 2000;³

¹ Rohland, K. / Cliffe, S., 2002

² HAER, 2000a

³ HAER, 2000b

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3. External Review of the Humanitarian Response.⁴
- Review Mission by the Joint Inspection Unit, UN evaluated the response of the United Nations System to the crises in East Timor, 2002. The study focuses on Coordination in the UN active agencies in Timor Leste as well as its effectiveness.⁵
 - The King's College undertook an external study. The King's college study reviews the planning for and work of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). It furthermore focuses on the key characteristics of UNTAET in terms of its mandate, structure, strategy design and implementation, as well as its impact on the people and the governance of the newly independent Timor Leste.⁶

Due to the high staff turnover within the UN-system, only few people could be interviewed that were directly involved in the various missions, and most of the agency staff members arrived in Timor Leste at a later stage. Their own knowledge and information often refers less to the actual implementation of the mission and more on the follow-up activities. The available literature is therefore an important source of information on which the results of this study are based.

3 Post-conflict context

3.1 State of the post-conflict situation


After 24 years under Indonesian rule, the agreement between Portugal and Indonesia on the 5th of May 1999 opened the way to conduct a referendum of the Timorese population on the option on "special autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia" or the rejection of the autonomy, which means transition to independence. The United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) arrived in Timor Leste in May 1999 to organise and carry out the referendum. Indonesia and Portugal agreed that Indonesia would assure secure conditions for the referendum. The ballot was held on the 30th of August 1999. 78.5% of the Timorese population voted for the transition to independence. The announcement of the results 4th of September 1999 triggered an orchestrated campaign of violence. It resulted in a destruction of 70% public and private assets and massive internal and external displacement of an estimated two thirds of the population. After the two weeks of violence and vast destruction by Indonesian military and militia the Indonesian forces retreated unexpectedly rapidly and left back a ravaged country. On 10 September 1999 UNAMET local staff and most international staff evacuated to Darwin; 80 volunteers remained with internally displaced persons in the UNAMET compound.

The overall security situation had significantly calmed down, after the pullout in September. Militia from West Timor still penetrated the border area; snipers (by the militia members) were a problem at that time in Dili. UN Security Council mandated a multinational force (INTERFET) under a unified command structure headed by Australia, on 15th of September and INTERFET entered Timor Leste on 20th of September, and was accompanied by several humanitarian agencies. That gave the UN a long time to prepare and deploy the PKF. The

⁴ HAER, 2000c

⁵ Gonzales, A. / Mezzalama, F. / Othman, K. 2002

⁶ King's College, 2003

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PKF assumed a defensive posture on Timor Leste's land borders, which successfully deterred militia incursions from West Timor

On 25th of October 1999, the Security Council authorised the formation of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and thereby replaced UNAMET. In short its mandate was to:

1. Guarantee Timor Leste's security and handle the humanitarian emergency resulting from the Indonesian occupation and the devastation of 1999.
2. Prepare Timor Leste for self-government after the transitional period ends.
3. Govern Timor Leste during the transitional period.⁷

As a transitional government, UNTAET had total sovereignty and absolute power to govern Timor Leste in every aspect and this included that no local accountability was required.

The assessment missions were confronted by a scaring humanitarian situation. The following indicators can describe the situation:

- **Presence of Indonesian Forces until the deployment of INTERFET:** The CAP Team had limited access to Timor Leste because of the precarious security situation. In addition all UN representatives evacuated to Darwin, no formal UN presence was accessible.
- **High Number of Displacement:** 650.000 up to 750.000 people (about 75 % of the whole population) have been displaced during the two weeks of violence in September 1999. 250.000 people fled or were deported to West Timor (displaced people). About 500.000 were internally displaced and were living in the hills waiting to return to their homes as soon as INTERFET is able to establish a security presence.⁸
- **Vast destruction of infrastructure:** about 70 % of all private residences, public buildings and essential utilities were destroyed. This includes basic services such as water and road, which have been broadly eradicated.⁹
- **Non-functioning health services:** The high brain drain of professional staff to Indonesia and the wide destruction of physical health facilities led to a situation, which seemed highly uncontrollable.
- **Food shortage after 09/1999:** Because farmers got displaced and could not cultivate their fields, rural households could not make use of the most important cultivation season that ranges from December until March. This situation led to serious food shortages, some sources even speak of famine, in particular in the year 2000 when rural household could not rely on the harvest of this particular season (Dec 99 – Mar 2000).
- **Vacuum of government functions:** The regular government functions especially public services and law and order came to a standstill with the retreat of the Indonesian administration.

3.2 Challenges

In the aftermath of the violent periods, Timor Leste faced a number of challenges of which some are still a major constraint to reconstruction and development, for example the

⁷ UN Security Council, Resolution 1272, passed 25 October 1999

⁸ UN, 1999

⁹ World Bank Group, 1999a

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administrative vacuum, the vast physical destruction and the language problem. The major challenges are described below.

Vacuum of legitimate representative of the Timorese government

The pro-independence movement could rely on a relatively unified platform at the time of the referendum in August 1999. The pro-independence parties hand in hand with several NGOs and church organisations combined their forces in the National Council for the Timorese Resistance (CNRT), under the presidency of Xanana Gusmao, the current President of Timor Leste. The UN could not accept the CNRT as the primary legitimate Timorese representative body without elections having taken place. However the CNRT took over an active role in the JAM; and it was furthermore consulted in the CAP. Some members of the CNRT participated also in the JAM.

Newly independent country without national capacity for take over

When the UN and World Bank started their work in Timor Leste, they could not refer to any prior model, because the case of Timor Leste was to some extent exceptional and differed in comparison to other cases of post-conflict recovery. The major two reasons are:

1. By voting for independence, the Timorese population rejected two historical models: the Indonesian rule and the Portuguese colonial rule 25 years ago.
2. Under Indonesian rule, only few Timorese were allowed into the higher level decision making structures. Most of the few highly qualified Timorese obtained their qualifications outside the country.

The Indonesian residents who possessed most of the decision-making posts left the country after the vote for independence. Thus, Timor Leste faced a complete brain drain. For example: in 2000, only 20 Timorese doctors and one dentist were available to assure medical treatment. The judicial system was defunct and qualification of personnel remains a serious problem, because of the time span that is needed to qualify judges (ten years experience is needed to qualify as an officially recognised judge). Engineers and teachers were just not available. The gap between education and qualification will prove as one of the most important challenges for the future.

Pool of languages

Besides around 30 local languages Tetum is the most common language amongst the Timorese. According to the 2001 Suco Household Survey about 82 % of the population speak Tetum, while 43 % speak Indonesian. About 5 % speak Portuguese, while only 2 % speak English¹⁰. The younger generation has grown up with Indonesian as language used in the education and public administration. The major impediment in the current situation is that Tetum is not a written language. As a result, in both assessment missions, communication between Timorese and international team members was rather limited to the knowledge of the involved mission members, than to be tied to one common language. Up to the present day, the language complexity has created a situation where Indonesian is often the mostly used language in documentation even in the government sector, although Portuguese and Tetum are the official languages and English and Bahasa Indonesia are working languages.

¹⁰ ETTA et al., 2001

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Consultation with civil society

Since a large number of people had been displaced and the road network largely been destroyed, it was difficult or impossible (as in the case of the CAP mission) to consult the population directly.

The same picture holds true for consultations with national NGOs. An official mentioned a number of 200 national NGOs working in Timor Leste in 1999, an intensive network between the NGOs. After the violent aftermath this network became even more scattered, some NGOs complain that they have not been invited. In addition lack of mobility to travel to district sites, where some NGO resided, made the consultation with NGOs very difficult.

Composition of teams

The teams of both missions had the opportunity to include members with different sectoral backgrounds, and some prior relation to the history and development of Timor Leste. While the CAP team had no Timorese involved, the JAM team also incorporated members of different nationality, including residents, exile Timorese and international professionals. This situation posed a serious challenge for the management of the team in view of the large diversity of the members involved, especially when working out development strategies and process inclusion under high time pressure.

Unavailability of reliable data

When the Indonesian military forces pulled out of Timor Leste, almost all important data was destroyed. The JAM could nevertheless make use of data (staffing of administration) which was traced before the August 30th 1999. Additional basic data, such as the gross regional product of every district, were either found on the spot (JAM) or could be traced in Indonesia (CAP).

3.3 Opportunities

Although Timor Leste faced a large number of challenges, there are also some opportunities that may ease future development and that place Timor Leste apart from other crises states:

Consensus among the Timorese Population

With the high approval for independence most of pro-autonomy (i.e. pro-Indonesia) supporters pulled out to West Timor or the rest of Indonesia. Unlike other countries in Africa or Southeast Europe Timor Leste had therefore not to suffer from a prolonged and divisive period of civil war. There was a consensus among the Timorese population on the initial decision to develop the country along the line of independence. The question was rather *how* to recover from the crisis.

Focal point of public attention

At the time of the Timor crisis, no other international crises attracted the attention of the media and international community. Therefore, Timor Leste received unlimited attention, which also facilitated the mobilisation of immediate intervention after the breakout of the crisis in 1999.

4 The needs assessment process

The United Nations Agencies and the World Bank were the two main institutions involved in the needs assessment process. The UNTAET as UN-led Transitional Government was preceded by the UN and World Bank initiatives. The three main initiatives are listed below.

Institution	United Nations Agencies	World Bank	UNTAET
Focus	Humanitarian assistance in East and West Timor	Development and reconstruction activities	Governance and capacity building
Funding period	1999 – 2000 Nine month	2000 – 03 three years	2000-03 three years
Planning Mission	Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)	Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)	-----
Duration of the planning mission	Preliminary assessments based on assumptions (undertaken outside East Timor) 30 on site assessments in 10/99	Field phase: 29.10. – 9.11.1999	Three weeks in 10/99
Start of follow-up	12.09.1999	Planning 03/00 Implementation 06/00	Establishment of UNTAET by Security Council Resolution 1272 on 25.10.99
Request for funds	27.10.1999 in Geneva / UN 17.12.1999 in Tokyo / Donors' Conference	17.12.1999 in Tokyo / Donors' Conference	17.12.1999 in Tokyo / Donors' Conference
Sectors of activities and follow-up activities	Assistance in fields of food and water, security, basic shelter, and access to basic health services Rehabilitation projects in agriculture, fisheries, health, water and sanitation, infrastructure, micro-enterprises and credit, skills training, education, programs for women and children, and capacity building for civil society (see note above under "World Bank")	Development projects in sectors such as: infrastructure, agriculture, health, education, macroeconomics, community empowerment, civil administration, and judiciary.	Governance and capacity-building projects including administration

Table 1: Focus of the different missions, funding period and main activities

The United Nations-led as well as the World Bank-led initiatives will be discussed along these lines. Because the transitional government structure UNTAET has thoroughly been analysed in the King's College study, further analysis is not part of this document.

4.1 United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal Process

4.1.1 Background and process management

The most important appraisal tool for the UN-led initiatives in situations of crises, disasters and conflict is the Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal (CAP). The Secretary General

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understands CAP as “a key coordination tool for humanitarian assistance”¹¹. The Timor Leste case largely shows that the CAP seeks to function as coordination mechanism for UN agencies and INGOs.

The CAP for Timor Leste proposed emergency and transitional programmes for a nine-month period from October 1999 until June 2000, which refer to the humanitarian situation in Timor Leste and West Timor.

Given the impossibility of conducting on-site assessments, humanitarian agencies in Darwin and Jakarta drafted a preliminary assessment based on the projections of interlocutors as well as aerial surveys for inaccessible areas in September 1999. In October 1999, more than 30 on-site assessments were conducted throughout Timor Leste. The preliminary assessment, which had been drafted outside Timor Leste, was modified accordingly. The final appeal contained 48 projects in Timor Leste for US \$ 183.065.299,- and 16 projects for US \$ 15.980.800,- in West Timor. In addition, significant sources were already pledged based on the preliminary assessment presented in September. The preparation of the mission has been carried out in close coordination with agencies who have been working in Timor Leste before the crisis in 1999, such as OCHA, UNHCR and ICRC and NGOs, as well as with the CNRT, the East Timorese resistance group.

The situation analysis described in the CAP focuses on the following aspects:

- security situation according to three geographical sectors (eastern, north-western and south-western) and its accessibility for humanitarian aid organisations;
- degree and location of displaced population and its expected decrease according to three emergency situations (acute crises, returning phase and transitional phase to normalcy);
- the sequencing of support is described according to the change of displacement;
- humanitarian activities currently undertaken by humanitarian aid organisations;
- humanitarian priorities.

The proposed post-conflict strategies focus on a short and mid-term perspective. During the nine-month planning period the aim was to assist the population in overcoming acute emergency while laying the framework on the ground for full-scale reconstruction and development. The document did not include a specific strategy to address social tension and potential violent conflict.

Accordingly, humanitarian agencies have agreed to pursue the following six overall strategies:

- meet acute needs first;
- stabilise at-risk populations before their condition becomes acute;
- reintegrate displaced persons;
- enhance livelihood strategies;
- repair essential infrastructure;
- help to re-establish key institutions essential for economic recovery and good governance.

As lessons learnt from recent the operation, UN Agencies and NGOs have set up the following strategies:

- defining early exit strategy;
- integrating humanitarian principles;
- establishing inclusive coordination structures to ensure East Timorese participation.

¹¹ Gonzales, A. et al, 2002

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In the further sections, sector-wise strategies are formulated. The main sectors of involvement, coordinating agencies are listed below.

Sector	Coordinating Agencies
Return and reintegration (including shelter)	UNHCR
Food aid and food security	WFP (food assistance) and FAO (agriculture)
Health	WHO (technical) and UNICEF (implementation)
Water and sanitation	UNICEF
Infrastructure and economic recovery	UNDP
Education and community action	UNICEF
Humanitarian principles	UNICEF
Coordination and logistics	OCHA (coordination) and WFP (logistics)

Table 2: Sectors covered by the CAP and coordinating agencies¹²

Each sector is defined by one sector strategy. The Timor Leste section is divided into three programme and operational sub-sections. A sector strategy appears at the start of each sub-section. These strategies were drafted in the sectoral coordination committees in Dili and represent the collective view of all agencies working in the sector. Two of these sub-sections—"Return and Reintegration" and "Coordination and Logistics"—also cover activities in West Timor. All international NGOs currently operating in Timor Leste participated in the sectoral coordination committees. NGO programmes are either incorporated directly into the umbrella projects of UN Agencies or listed as separate projects.

Table 3 shows all important areas of priorities.

Return and reintegration
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Facilitate the re-entry into East Timor of all displaced persons who choose to participate in a voluntary return programme.2. Provide protection for returnees during their return journey and reintegration.3. Assist returnees to reintegrate into civil society by providing appropriate humanitarian assistance and information.4. Provide special assistance for vulnerable returnees including unaccompanied children, women and elderly.
Food Aid and food security
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Save lives in the immediate term through timely response to acute needs.2. Avert famine in the immediate and medium terms by improving the status of malnourished people and providing sufficient food to at-risk populations.3. Provide emergency food relief to displaced persons and returnees until they can achieve food security.4. Repair essential infrastructure through food-for-work programmes.5. Restore food security and improve nutritional status of rural and urban populations through renewed agricultural production.
Health
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Re-establish and develop the health infrastructure.

¹² UN, 1999

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2. Strengthen and ensure health service delivery.
3. Build capacity among national counterparts, partners and humanitarian staff.
4. Conduct Information, Education, Communication (IEC) activities and social mobilisation.
5. Develop effective systems of supervision, monitoring and evaluation.

Water and sanitation

1. Assess the damage to urban and rural water systems.
2. Provide minimum standard drinking water and washing facilities to displaced persons and those returning to their homes, or to temporary settlements or camps where people are concentrated.
3. Create a healthy physical environment in order to minimise health risks.
4. Involve communities in identifying water and sanitation related health risks, and to build the capacity of these communities to take action to reduce their impact.

Infrastructure and economic recovery

1. Restore essential infrastructure rehabilitation works with employment and income opportunities for the local population. Wherever possible labour-based construction and maintenance methods.
2. Recruit professional and managerial staff for the infrastructure agencies if possible East Timorese specialists. If not possible NGOs, international consultants and public utility specialists, or private organisations.
3. Provide on-the-job training for local workers, technicians and specialists who will be involved in the works and appropriate interim institutional arrangements.
4. Structure power and telecommunications systems, with a system of charges for telecommunications services introduced immediately after services are established.

Education and community action

1. Support reunification of unaccompanied children and train interviewers and tracers.
2. Conduct public awareness campaigns.
3. Establish psychosocial counselling services and deploy mobile community counselling clinics.
4. Train primary health workers in mental health and trauma.
5. Treat and counsel victims of sexual violence.
6. Prevent gender and sexual violence and empower groups of vulnerable women.
7. Rehabilitate facilities as safe zones including child safe zones.
8. Establish child protection services.
9. Assess children's physical and psychosocial needs.
10. Implement early child care and development (ECCD).
11. Reconstruct school and community facilities.
12. Produce and use Tetum language materials for primary school, design language materials for secondary schools.
13. Recruitment and training of teacher for primary and secondary school.
14. Develop curriculum for primary and secondary school.
15. Establish a comprehensive community mobilisation.
16. Support of prevention of STD/HIV/AIDS and care for STD/HIV/AIDS patients.

Humanitarian Principles

1. Develop, as appropriate, principles of engagement specifically applicable to the East Timor situation, through workshops and consultations between humanitarian actors and emerging national and local authorities.
2. Promote best practises in governance and civil administration by training public servants.
3. Provide training on the core set of principles for personnel working in the humanitarian sector, including local officials, and for members of UNTAET.
4. Disseminate information about the core set of principles to the general population.
5. Reactivate institutions in civil society including local NGOs through capacity-building and technical assistance.
6. Provide training to local NGOs in peace building.

Coordination and Logistics

1. Create a flexible framework that allows humanitarian organisations to operate in a safe and effective environment.
2. Provide humanitarian agencies with the support they require in order to launch and maintain

their programmes.

3. Provide agencies with a forum for agreeing on humanitarian priorities and is key to ensuring a unified, coordinated operation.

Table 3: Sectors and strategies proposed in the CAP, source¹³

4.1.2 Lessons learnt and good practices

Only one of the interviewed sources took personally part in the CAP. Other persons involved in CAP have already left Timor Leste due to the high staff turnover in the UN system. The following lessons learnt are therefore based on secondary sources, resource persons and own observations.

The use of a overall planning framework is a good approach to keep goals, objectives, activities in overview

The concept to combine overall planning goals with a sector wise planning approach proved to be very promising, however, the relation of the overall goals with the specific sector strategies should be clearly pointed out. In some sections of the report, such as education and community action as well as infrastructure and economic recovery, detailed activities are listed, whereas an elaboration of comprehensive strategies and objectives is lacking. Furthermore, no clear exit strategies are included. Some important topics such as macro economy and security were not included in the CAP document.

Overall planning framework connects to differentiation between short-, mid- and long-term planning

In most of the sectors some activities are listed which seem to have a mid and long-term perspective and are not easily implemented, for example diversification of income sources, capacity building, all activities related to psychosocial reconstruction, re-establish key institutions for economic recovery and good governance, integration of ex-combatants (even within six month). Most of these sector activities face serious constraints in implementation which often remain unresolved up to date.

Inclusion of local capacities facilitates ownership and capacity building

Most sector reports mention the need for local capacity building (including identification and training) of East Timorese personnel, for example, they include training of East Timorese staff in Health and Humanitarian principles. However, a framework agreement was not established between UN agencies or INGOs working with local NGOs and local institutions to ensure East Timorese participation. On the other hand, experiences from the health sector indicate that coordination and inclusion of national partners are essential for good results in the implementation of sector strategies.

Integration of cross cutting topics assures long term relation in planning and implementation

Cross cutting issues, such as gender, conflict, environment, humanitarian principles have partly been included in the CAP document and all mentioned topics have been addressed to some extent within the CAP. Certain shortcomings can, however, be observed:

- Conflict: the integration of veterans is included as project (E/N 05), however further linkage to conflict transformation and a formulated strategy that roots conflict sensitivity into planning procedures have not been included.

¹³ UN, 1999, modified

- Gender: the “psychosocial support and empowerment for vulnerable and traumatised women and adolescents” (E/N 36) has been included as project, which seems certainly justified by the events. However, culturally women are relegated to a secondary role within the family structure. Culturally sensitive empowerment of women as crosscutting task is still to be included in the overall development approach for Timor Leste.
- Environment: has not been addressed within the CAP.
- Human rights have been integrated in the sector strategy on humanitarian principles. With regard to division of tasks, UNICEF and OXFAM proposed within the CAP to work on training in agreed and presented humanitarian principles within the CAP. Most effectively, humanitarian principles may be trained by agencies whose task is clearly linked with a protection mandate (UNHCR, ICRC), which can contribute their experience in terms of protection, however, these agencies may also have a different concept on what protection means.

Refine existing tools for coordination and fund raising

The consulted stakeholders in the external review mission in 2000 stated different opinions on the CAP as a process¹⁴. The CAP seeks to integrate various stakeholders into a joint process, namely donors, UN agencies and international and national NGOs. These stakeholders seem to have different perception with regard to how efficient this has been done.

- NGOs complained mostly that the time frame given to obtain project information was very short.
- Among the donors, satisfaction seemed to be high that CAP proved to be a useful planning and funding tool.
- Among UN agencies, perceptions differed, often depending on the relative share of financial resources obtained within the CAP process (see also 5.2.2).

Agree on broad public consultation for sensitive issues


Language is a very sensitive issue in East Timorese politics, because language knowledge determines the access to many sectors for employment and public participation. The question which language should be introduced and the speed of introduction seems a decisive factor as it might stimulate the fear of exclusion among the certain segments of the population, in particular the rural population. The need to agree on a language, before recruitment and development is very reasonable. The current experience (and the JAM reports) seems to confirm that recruitment of teachers, teaching material and curriculum development as part of education and language development are rather a long-term process.

4.2 The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)

4.2.1 Background and process management

Prior to the JAM the World Bank collaborated with Columbia University on a study of social and economic conditions in Timor Leste, and worked closely with the UN Department of Political Affairs to analyse the economic impact of the referendum. The violence of September required a reorientation of the planning assumptions, but the structures and contacts built in the early period enabled a rapid revision to the approach. The pre-mission readiness and planning by the World Bank were quite progressed in comparison to other assessment missions.

¹⁴ HAER, 2000c

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It has to be noted that parallel to the preparation of the multilaterals even East Timorese began to develop a blueprint for a Development Plan for East Timor¹⁵. The developed plan which was supported by professional friends of Timor Leste from the NGO community, solidarity groups, and universities, was handed over to the CNRT political leadership.

The preparatory missions for World Bank led initiatives in Timor Leste started in April 1999. This mission focused on civil service, commercial sectors and infrastructure. Smooth preparation laid the groundwork for successful endorsement of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) at the Annual Meeting of the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund in late September 1999, where the Friends of East Timor (donors, UN agencies and East Timorese representatives) were invited by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to propose their preliminary assessment. The final JAM proposal for projects including financial estimates for external financing needs was presented at the Donor Conference in Tokyo in December 1999, where funds were pledged. Planning of follow-up activities under the TFET started in March and April 2000.

The mission team deliberately included a mix of about 60 East Timorese and international members. The selection of team members was based on a compromise: internationals and East Timorese members were equally selected. Donor representatives have been accommodated where donor agencies expressed their interest to engage in the follow-up. 23 members were East Timorese comprising 13 from the diaspora (including students living in Diaspora) and ten from the Timor Leste interior. The political composition among the Timorese members was also mixed: eight East Timorese were CNRT members. The team members were grouped into eight sectoral teams: macroeconomic framework (including one member who joined the IMF concurrent mission, public administration, agriculture and resettlement, health, education, judiciary, infrastructure, community empowerment and one coordination team in addition.

Due to a lack of funding, the participation of the East Timorese members of the JAM was not sustainable throughout the process. According to Emilia Pires (2003) this caused problems with the continuity of knowledge gained through the process.

The field investigation required a high degree of logistical efforts. Australian authorities highly supported the logistical part of the mission. In Dili, a camp for a maximum of 30 Persons was established. The field phase took place from 29 October until 9 November 1999. The sectoral teams travelled from Darwin/Australia and stayed in Dili/Timor Leste alternately. Field visits had different length according to sectors. Inaccessible areas were visited by the use of helicopters.

Large parts of the main information collection were based on on-the spot observation (all teams), interviews with various stakeholders (all teams), information gathered during field visits (to high extent civil administration, health, education, agriculture, community empowerment, infrastructure; to a smaller extent judiciary, macroeconomics). Some sectors such as civil administration and macroeconomics profited highly from a careful early preparation: e. g. the number of staff in the civil administration in Indonesian times had been traced by checking the wage receipts in all district administration units.

¹⁵ Emilia Pires (2003)

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4.2.2 Proposed strategies of the JAM

The following table lists the proposed strategies in each of the eight sectors categorized according to short- and medium-term priorities respectively.

Short term priorities	Medium term strategic options
Planning and finance	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restarting the flow of goods and services Establishing a payment system Currency arrangements and exchange houses Assets and liabilities: (re-) establishing bank system Sustainable government finances: incl. fiscal measures such as tax urban services and redistribute revenue to rural areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishing and reinforcing key economic institutions Economic policy making Completion of international agreements on the exploitation of oil, gas, fisheries and other natural resources Legal and regulatory framework: develop transparent ground rules for the functioning of the private sector incl. investment code, property and commercial law, procedures for leasing vacant state land and facilities Gathering baseline economic and social data (Census, price survey, household income and expenditure survey) Credit for small and medium enterprises
Agriculture	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restoration of local seed and development of seed stations Livestock restoration (incl. poultry, smallholder cattle credit scheme) Revolving lease capital for trucks Develop and maintain mapping systems to provide baseline information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Smallholder coffee development initiative (incl. coffee farmer extension service and shade tree nursery) Livestock management incl. weed eradication and pasture improvement Rehabilitation of targeted irrigation systems Small scale fisheries Agro-forestry and tree crops initiative Restoration of meteorological stations Agricultural survey and database development Small holder mechanisation program
Civil administration	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agreement on recruitment policy and processing of civil service Rehabilitation and re-equipment of public buildings Technical assistance for the development of personnel policies Technical assistance for the development of administrative legislation Inventory of East Timorese human resources Design and delivery of management and financial training Design and development of automated records system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analysis and public debate on the role and functions of the civil state Analysis and public debate on the geographical and hierarchical divisions of the public service

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Judiciary	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rehabilitation and re-equipment of judicial infrastructure of judicial infrastructure Rehabilitation and re-equipment of penitentiary and police facilities Selection and appointment of magistrates and judicial agents through a judicial service commission (East Timorese and foreigners) Establishment of a legal training centre Establishment of law commission to identify legislation for amendment and new laws Establishment of a land and property commission Support to local community conflict resolution mechanisms Training for the police force Strengthening NGOs providing human rights education and legal advice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishment of a Bar Association Implementing a consistent system of land registrations Strengthening the independence of judiciary through the establishment of judicial councils Establishment of a legal aid system
Infrastructure	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emergency road maintenance and rehabilitation Emergency rehabilitation of urban water systems Implementation of a solid waste management in urban centres Rehabilitation of electricity distribution systems and drainage system Design a programme for supporting private housing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct a competitive tender for facilities and services on which outsourcing has been agreed Rehabilitation and provision of equipment for public buildings
Education	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recruitment of primary school teachers and the supply of basic teaching and learning resources Rehabilitation of primary schools Mobilisation of secondary school teachers and accelerated teacher training Rehabilitation and re-equipment of secondary schools Vocational training for unemployed youth Provision of bursaries for completion of studies Training for management and administration staff Provision of language courses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Curriculum Development Strengthening the teacher training institute Assessment of education financing option Early childhood care services Conduct education surveys Support cultural conserving initiatives
Community Empowerment	
<p>Short term priorities were mainly taken care by UNHCR, only medium term priorities are listed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishment and building capacity in interim village, sub-districts and district councils Provision of grants and micro credits for the rehabilitation of infrastructure and recovery of economic activities through the councils Support to the vulnerable groups (victims of violence, poor female headed households and ex-combatants) 	
Health	
<p>Only medium term priorities were planned</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restoration of primary care services at sub district levels Re-establishment of in-patient care including the rehabilitation of eight district hospitals 	

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- Re-establishment of public health management capacity
- Establishment of a central supply system for essential drugs
- Laying the basis for a new health system
- Training and capacity building for health workers

Policy suggestion:

During the emergency phase all health service should be free of charge.

Table 4: Sectors and strategies proposed in the JAM¹⁶

As mentioned by S. Cliffe (2003) the JAM had two gaps according to the assessment exercise. First there had been no costing for the policing and security matters and second, there had been inadequate attention to the impact of wage-setting by the UN and other international institutions on the local labour market and civil service recruitment.

Due to the cooperation with OCHA the results of the exercise had been presented in a consolidated funding picture which eliminated double counts between humanitarian and reconstruction appeals¹⁷.

4.2.3 Lessons learnt and good practices

Participation and active role and of national participants increases ownership

The inclusion of East Timorese residing in the country and East Timorese from the diaspora had an significant impact on the outcome and ownership of the mission: The recruitment of East Timorese and the often influential role these persons played in the subsequent political process in Timor Leste supported the follow-up of the results and helped to incorporate many of the proposed strategies into the development framework of Timor Leste. One former mission member stated that the most controversially debated topics during the mission, such as language, currency and market order, while being formally decided in the 2002 constitution, remain controversial until today.

It has to be noted, that national team members need also to be financed during the needs assessment mission in order to assure their participation and continuity during the mission, but also to link the results with the following "governmental" planning.

Best result can be achieved, if participation relates to an active role within the mission and valuable contributions from all mission members regardless of nationality, sector specificity get an equal forum. Therefore a code of conduct is useful (as proposed in the JAM, but maybe not consistently applied during the mission) which gives guidelines for smooth team management, including, for example, statements to


- Agree on one common language to assure inclusiveness;
- Assure sufficient support of interlocutors;
- Hold regular meetings to keep all members in the process;
- Offer possibility for debriefing to relax from stressful situation.

Careful selection of professional staff enhances technical expertise and team management

The mission's outcome depends heavily on the expertise of the members involved in the sector teams. This expertise seems to have been excellent in the section on which members observed in the infrastructure / irrigation sections. For the management of the team process,

¹⁶ World Bank Group, 1999a, modified

¹⁷ World Bank Group, 1999a.

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it is useful to focus more on the involvement of experienced senior staff members (“grey head, self esteem, standing capacity”) that are in a position to fine-tune the refined process management in situation where authority and conceptual overview is required.

Longer and gender balanced consultation time as starting point for continued local participation

The public consultation process in Timor Leste with East Timorese population and stakeholders took between seven (infrastructure, agriculture) and four days (education, health). Although the specific circumstances, the logistical arrangements and the large number of displaced population limited the consultation time available for the mission members on a bearable minimum and only informal community meetings have been held. However, a longer consultation time would have been crucial to allow for more exchange with the population and an incorporation of their ideas and perceptions. To increase gender sensitivity, one senior interviewed in this mission suggested a separate consultation with women. While initial consultation in the aftermath of a crisis may be restricted due to logistical and practical problems (e.g. lack of strong civil society), addition, it would be essential that consultation and beneficiary participation does not remain a one-shot event, but becomes a central part of the planning and implementation process, hence consultation is continued and deepened after the needs assessment. This can also be understood as a contribution to local capacity building and good governance.

Early planning and (conflict) analysis enhances early action

The JAM followed an exemplary model of preparation and planning for the mission, where early signs that the East Timorese population would vote for independence have been interpreted early on as a potential source for violent conflict. It remains speculative whether or not early action could have limited the extent of the political crisis, as one senior official stated. However, even in the immediate aftermath of the violence, a regular conflict analysis as integrated tool is the key to early action for crisis prevention. A conflict context analysis is also highly recommended today due to the volatile political situation in Timor Leste. A conflict related analysis was planned in the JAM, but it has not been realised due to team management problems. Some officials recommended to learn from the riots in December 2002 when road blocks by civil society, drastic power cuts, increased begging on the streets gave a hint for the subsequent civil unrest.

Inclusion of crosscutting topics play a vital role to overcome constraints in implementation

As in the CAP encountered, the JAM included crosscutting topics only to very limited extent. Aspects encountered in the CAP were similarly found in the JAM.

Gender was considered in the community development section, where development councils were planned to be formed gender balanced. Mission members stated that women consultation would have improved the outcome of the mission. In the case of human rights, training of NGOs providing human rights education and legal advice was planned.

Conflict, was also unevenly included in the strategy planning. Demobilisation of veterans and integration of veterans are still remaining topics. The role of the Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste (FALINTIL) was not clear during the mission process and could not be solved during the UNTAET period.

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5 Follow-up to the needs assessment

5.1 The post-violent transition phase

Since early 2000, the security situation has significantly calmed down and provided the way forward for a number of constructive steps towards a peaceful development of the country.

Diplomatic relations to Indonesia are on a good way to become normal

The election in December 1999 of Abdurrahman Wahid as Indonesia's president was a turning point in relations between Indonesia and Timor Leste. President Wahid visited Timor Leste in February 2000 where he expressed his regrets for the tragedy in 1999.

Presidential elections in May 2001

Former CNRT President Xanana Gusmao became President of Timor Leste. The Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN) and other political parties became more open towards other political groups and began to show a high willingness to work together

Independence of Timor Leste

On the 20 May 2002, Timor Leste became an independent country with its own government. Therefore UNTAET was replaced by United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) with the mandate as follows:

1. To provide Assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of Timor Leste;
2. To provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in Timor Leste, the East Timor Police Service;
3. To contribute to the maintenance of external and internal security of Timor Leste.¹⁸

Humanitarian assistance stabilised in early 2000

Humanitarian operations inside Timor Leste faced difficult frame conditions until January 2000, with a focus on emergency food relief and water supply. By the end of January 2000, the emergency situation had been stabilised in most parts of the country and internally displaced persons (IDP) had largely returned to their villages. Emergency shelter was being provided and programmes to assist returnees with the rehabilitation of their houses had begun. Various initiatives were launched to promote trade and economic activity.

Security situation in West Timor not always calm

Despite the smooth integration of the refugees (see also above), the security situation at the border and especially in the refugee camps in West Timor remained dangerous throughout 2000. After the murder of three international UNHCR staff and several West and East Timorese in Atambua in 2000, the international organisations withdrew all international staff members from West Timor. Some NGOs and international organisations (CRS, CWS, JRS, UNICEF, WHO, Oxfam GB and CARE) continued to work in West Timor relying on NGOs and Indonesian staff. UN has classified West Timor as one of the most dangerous places in the world since then. Although the security situation has improved significantly since then,

¹⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1410, passed 17 May 2002

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the situation in the camps, especially along the Timorese border, remains fragile. Most of the remaining refugees are pro-autonomy supporters and integration into Indonesia is still their political demand.

The situation at the border also deteriorated to some extent, because penetration of militia in the border area was still ongoing in the late 1999. Even now, some officials expressed their doubts that the transition after the pull out of the UN in May 2004 would be calm and peaceful because of the activities of pro-Indonesia militia, although the militia seem to experience a lack of funds in more recent times.

Economic crises remains as one of the major threats for internal security

The population of major towns, most notably Dili, has increased dramatically. In the absence of large-scale private enterprises, most employment opportunities are provided by UNTAET, UN agencies and NGOs, while USAID has provided short-term employment through quick-impact schemes. However, as soon as the UN will pull out in May 2004 the economic situation is expected to experience a severe setback. This situation might give vent to the displeasure of the Timorese population. The civil uproar in December 2002 was triggered partly by the perceptions of many East Timorese that they lacked access to such employment and that the gap between the wealth and income of foreigners on the one side and East Timorese on the other was extremely large. Some UN sources fear that activities of hired militia members are responsible for the civil uproar.¹⁹ A thorough analysis of the sources of the civil uproar had not been provided until today.

5.2 Financial mobilisation and coordination

5.2.1 Funding mechanisms

The CAP was launched in October 1999 with total requirements of US \$ 179 million²⁰ covering a planning period from October 1999 until June 2000. Although some agencies received only of small fraction of the funds demanded, 70 % of the overall requirements were covered. Some agencies met full or high coverage of their requests (UNICEF: 100%, UNHCR and WFP: 84 %), unlike other agencies which received none of their requests (ILO and UNDP: 0 %) or only a part (WHO: 55 %, FAO: 26 %).²¹ The evaluation report of Gonzales et al. 2002, analyses the institutional constraints of each of the listed agencies.

Agency	United Nations Agencies	World Bank
Focus	Humanitarian assistance	Reconstruction and development activities
Funds requested (by 17.12.1999)	US\$ 85.970 million (in addition to approximately US\$ 40 million disbursed last quarter 1999)	US\$ 261.705* million for years 2000-02 (3 years)
	US\$ 57.095 (see note above under "World Bank")	*Includes approximately US\$ 57 million also budgeted in UN Consolidated Appeal for the East Timor Crisis (see "United Nations Agencies" below)

¹⁹ ETAN, 2002

²⁰ Numbers for the request differ according to the sources. UN Sources speak of a request of \$US 179 million.

World Bank Sources and Oxfam state different numbers, where disbursement for 1999 is only estimated.

²¹ Gonazales et al., 2002


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Table 5: Agencies appealing, focus of the proposed programmes and funds requested by 17.12.1999²²

The report of the JAM was presented to a donor conference in Tokyo. At the conference it was decided to establish two funding mechanisms, the

- Consolidated Fund for East Timor (CFET) and the
- Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET).

Further existing channels for aid comprise:

- bilateral agencies and NGOs under the CAP;
- non-humanitarian projects implemented by UN agencies;
- bilateral projects (such as Portugal, Japan, Germany) implemented through NGOs, agencies and contractors.

The biggest part of the overall donor contribution is covered by the United Nations which account for US \$ 1.280 million which is 73 % of total international funding until independence of Timor Leste in May 2002.

CFET, run by UNTAET, focuses on the establishment of public administration, including recruitment and payment of civil servants and non-wage costs, rehabilitation of administrative buildings, capacity building for generic management, technical systems and skills in the public administration and the justice sector. It was designed to cover the recurrent costs of core functions of the government, including wages and salaries for civil servants, goods, services, capital investment such as government facilities and urgent infrastructures repairs. From the US\$ 51 million spent through CFET (2000 – 01), 27 % were spent on wages and salaries, 31 % on goods and services and 42 % on capital expenditure. In the period from 2000 until 2001, 56 % of the funds came from a UN-Headquarters administered trust fund, the Trust Fund for UNTAET. The remaining part of 44 % was financed from taxes or other income.²³

TFET is a multi-donor trust fund that has supported reconstruction and development activities since early 2000. US\$ 166 million were initially pledged for a period of three years. Despite initial delays, most projects will be completed by 2005. TFET donors are Portugal, the European Commission, Japan, Australia, UK, Finland, USA, Ireland, New Zealand, Italy and the World Bank Post Conflict Fund. Projects identified in the JAM in the areas of health, education, small enterprise development, agriculture, community empowerment, economics and institutional capacity building, roads, power and water infrastructure and petroleum sector technical assistance are carried out under TFET arrangements.

TFET projects are mainly implemented by corresponding units / ministries under the Timor Leste Public Administration. The World Bank is the trustee of the Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET), which in the last two years has channelled around 30 % of all development aid coming into the country. Grants are disbursed under the general rules of the International Development Associations, which is the World Bank's soft loaner administrator.

In 2002, the Transitional Support Programme has been launched and is administered by the World Bank. The TSP finances an annual program comprising four components: continued poverty reduction planning and improvement in service delivery; governance and private

²² World Bank Group, 1999b

²³ UN, ETTA, Annual Financial Report and Accounts, 2000 - 2001

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sector development; public expenditure policy and management; and power sector management. These components and the supporting actions reflect priorities identified in the Government's National Development Plan. They have been identified through a process of consultation with Government departments, led by the Prime Minister, and endorsed by key external partners. The National Development Plan is considered to become the basis for the formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

5.2.2 Coordination and monitoring

After the post ballot violence in 1999, many institutions left Timor Leste, e.g. OCHA and UNHCR, ICRC, NGOs, such as CARE, Jesuit Relief Service (JRS) and the CNRT as transitional body of an independent Timorese Government, all of which had been active in Timor Leste before the independence vote. After the situation had calmed down, in addition to these organisations which returned to Timor Leste, a large number of new organisations started to work on humanitarian assistance. This large number of aid agencies had to be coordinated. Apparently, in the early 2000, some donors complained about duplication of work and the large number of coordination meetings. It was also mentioned that different perceptions on the strategies to be pursued on the relief-development continuum in the post-violence transition phase, especially, because up heated emotions coincided with the need to jumpstart reconstruction for development.

Various internal and evaluation reports from both, World Bank and UN, seem to indicate that coordination between the two agencies and with other agencies was lacking a smooth hand in the beginning of the transition phase. This observation was also confirmed in several interviews conducted by the consultant. The main question appears to have been which of the two organisations would take over the lead in the reconstruction and development process of Timor Leste. An in-depth analysis is provided by Rohland et al., 2001 from the point of view of the World Bank and Gonzales et al., 2002 from the point of view of the UN.

As mentioned by S. Cliffe (2003), the coordination and communication between UNTAET and DPKO could have been more intensive in order to sustain continuity and to ensure the follow-up of the results of the JAM.

Officially, the four main instruments of donor coordination are the following:

- six-monthly donors meeting, co-chaired by UNTAET and the World Bank;
- monthly field coordination meetings;
- joint donor missions every six months in key sectors;
- agreement on a combined sources for budget based on all funding sources.

Monitoring plays a big role within TFET. World Bank presents monthly updates on progress reports and regular reports. Regular coordination meetings in most of the key sectors are held (health, education, agriculture, community development, water sanitation). Less regular exchange has been in transport and private sector development.

Public consultation was one of the bottlenecks of the initial assessments and several attempts were undertaken to incorporate a stronger consultation component in the follow-up phase. As one of the first follow-up activities of the JAM, UNTAET, CNRT and World Bank engaged in public consultations with the population were held in 18 districts in September 2000. This included a panellist regarding political transition and the format of the Timor Leste Transitional Authority, security reconstruction and development represented at a panellist. The panel was followed by questions and answer sessions with the participating local population.

5.3 Implementation of projects

5.3.1 Follow-up

Most stakeholders do not differentiate much whether or not follow-up activities are based on CAP or JAM, even though some of the interviewed sources could clearly trace success and trade-off back to one of the mission. Since most of the projects have been implemented together, the lessons learnt and good practices of the implementation of follow-up activities will be considered here jointly for both CAP and JAM.

Logistics in humanitarian assistance have been largely successful

The most important result of the follow-up was the successful implementation of humanitarian assistance. The response to the humanitarian situation was, indeed, very effective in terms of assistance provided. In the agriculture sector, 35.000 t of food aid as well as 387 t of maize and 339 t of rice seeds were distributed. In the education sector, school enrolment almost achieved the level prior to the political violence (163.000 children as compared to 167.000). 734 schools (out of 788 existing ones in April 1999) have been re-opened. Within the shelter programme, UNHCR distributed tarpaulin sheets to 250.000 families, in the second phase 9.000 shelter kits (self-build kits) have been distributed (out of 35.000 projected). WFP engaged with tremendous efforts to ensure a large logistical infrastructure and communications equipment. A major success that needs to be mentioned is that no breakouts of diseases have occurred, although the difficult environment in the political turmoil could have easily posed serious health hazards.

This overall success in the logistics of humanitarian assistance can be attributed to the following reasons:

- strong leadership of international and national members and clear objectives;
- excellent on the ground coordination;
- high commitment and dedication of all humanitarian actors;
- quick support by the international community including in selected cases quick pre-disbursement of funds (this counts especially for WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR, where emergency fund systems are in place).²⁴

Some criticism was voiced whether or not the air drops of humanitarian goods and food items were really necessary. Some interviewees questioned whether acute food insecurity is just a matter of distribution or sufficient production within Timor Leste, where the harvest cycle and enough rainfall plays the major role for sufficient production for subsistence. This means some areas had to suffer from food shortages, whereas other areas had enough supplies.

Successful reintegration of internally displaced persons

Another success story is the reintegration and return of displaced persons to West Timor internally displaced people. In 1999, about 250.000 people were deported or fled to West Timor. With some exceptions most of the displaced persons have been reintegrated successfully. Experiences of the GTZ supported Food Security Programme Baucau and Viqueque confirm the impression that the reintegration of displaced persons to West Timor has been, overall, successful for their geographical realm of work. Table 6 shows the return flows of displaced persons from West Timor back to Timor Leste. 28.000 people still remain

²⁴ HAER, 2000c; Gonzales, A. et al., 2002

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in the camps in West Timor. Most of them are regarded as pro-autonomy supporters. In their work to assist displaced persons, all agencies involved, such as UNHCR, CIVPOL, CNRT, the Catholic Church, as well as local NGOs and community leaders made intensive use of the existing coordination mechanisms.

Year	Total (Persons)	Voluntarily (Persons)	Spontaneously / Organised by UNHCR (Persons)
1999	125.966	82.527	43.439
2000	48.539	44.305	4.234
2001	18.189	16.637	1.552
2002	31.882	180	31.702

Table 6: Return of displaced persons from West Timor²⁵

Institutional development and capacity building remains on a weak footing

Most agencies neglected institutional development in the first instance, in order to focus on the provision of essential basic public welfare systems. It appears from the material and sources available, that exit strategies of aid agencies were not properly defined, strategised and implemented due to the weakness or complete absence of organisational structures and institutions, which were not ready for take over. However, it has to be kept in mind that in a context where a country has to be build up from the scratch without any state machinery to build upon, organisational capacities and institutional mechanisms cannot be built up within nine months. Until today, weak institutional capacity of the state remains one major constraint for the development of Timor Leste.

The most dominant and coherent agreement among the interviewees was the perceived lack of interaction and consultation with civil society on all levels. Similarly, involvement of East Timorese government staff appears to have been minimal in some sector strategy development where external experts shape the overall process and documents. In some cases, there were not even assigned counterparts within the government set-up.

Another constraint faced by some departments was the high turn over of staff which negatively affected conceptual coherence and implementation. As a senior donor staff member stated agency hopping and commitment for money were common, which implies that competent personnel easily could be bought out by those who were able to offer superior terms. Some programmes as in the sector of public administration even were developed several times without knowledge of earlier concepts and activities.

Sectoral comparison reveals significant differences in performances and achievements

A sector wise comparison based on the JAM evaluation report (see Table 7) and information gathered from the interviews shows a much differentiated picture of sectoral success and (partial) failure. Some sectors have been very successful, especially health can be considered a success story. Other sectors, such as defence, infrastructure and public administration showed rather mixed results.

Sector	Clear policies	Strong technical management	Rapid physical reconstruction	Rapid restoration	Sectoral planning
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²⁵ Lao Hamotuk, Vol. 4, No. 5, 11/2003

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Education	≈	≈	√	√	x
Health	√	√	x	√	√
Justice	≈	x	≈	≈	x
Defence	≈	≈	√	—	√
Agriculture	≈	√	≈	√	√
Roads	≈	x	≈	√	x
Water	√	√	≈	≈	√
Power	x	x	≈		x
Public Admin.	≈	x	≈	—	x
Comm. Dev.	x	√	√	√	x
Private Sector	x	x	√	—	x
Finance	√	x		√	x

√ strong progress made, ≈ = partial progress made, x = weak progress made, — = not applicable

Table 7: Development sectors and their progress. Source²⁶

Main factors for the success of the health sector were found:

- put East Timorese in front: The so-called “Timoresation” process started early in the Health ministry, East Timorese early took over responsibility;
- flexible coordination mechanisms with all involved institutions;
- early preparation and rapid deployment of staff;
- high individual commitment.

Temporary stability has been achieved in all sectors over the time. However, basic health, water and sanitation have not been secured within the short timeframe given for activities in these sectors as they are rather medium and long-term tasks. NGOs have been a good medium to tackle bottlenecks experienced by donors. The set-up of the Interim Health Administration may provide a good success story for institutional capacity. In some cases, UNTAET asked NGOs to remain and exit strategies were a bit delayed, because there were no institutional structures for takeover. However, later on, the exit strategies were implemented.


Some of the proposed activities such as in the infrastructure sector have been taken over by ADB and some other bilateral organisations (Japan, Portugal).

A rather mixed picture is found in the security sector. Many of the interviewed stakeholders expressed their concerns with regard to internal security. This corresponds with La'o Hamotuks impression that insufficient training, language barriers between expatriate trainers and trainees and lack of knowledge of the local culture were the main hindrances for successful capacity development in the security sector.²⁷

In the infrastructure sector, the high expectations with regard to rapid reconstruction and training could not be met due to the lack of local skilled labour and material. The planning phase took about 3.5 month, implementation of infrastructure projects started in March / April 2000. Importing skilled labour and material obviously do not coincide with a long term

²⁶ World Bank, 1999a; Rohland et al. 2002.

²⁷ La'o Hamotuk, Vol.4, 2003

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approach of building up local capacities, however, this seemed to be necessary in Timor Leste, because, when the Indonesian forces pulled out of Timor Leste, a new market for construction material and skilled labour had to be formed from scratch.

With regard to the rule of law, some senior officials were unhappy with the current state of affairs: Laws are often not enforced in case of minor crimes. One senior government official perceived this as a major failure and threat for the process of state building.

In the agricultural sector, some of the proposed projects that were discussed in detail, were not followed by implementation, for example the projects in irrigation and an agro meteorological data collection station. The government considers the extension service as vital service in a less developed country. In the case of livestock development, some drawbacks were experienced: the distribution of chicken was partly a failure, because the number of animals distributed (five) was small and because of a misleading sex determination of the distributed animals (five males and no female animal).


In the community empowerment and local governance project (CEP), gender balanced development councils have been established. The councils are provided with funds to undertake local reconstruction projects. Decentralised decision making on expenditures of funds were in function. However, senior representatives appraised the performance of the CEP quite critical. In general, a comprehensive, well functioning and visibly acting implementation structure was lacking. The implementation structure was not well known, which impaired coordination with other projects in the sector. In addition, the quality of planning of reconstruction projects was poor due to a lack of expertise, in some cases, project proposals included wrong estimates. Some government officials pointed out that availability of skilled labour remained a serious constraint, and proposed that training ought to become a main focus within the community driven reconstruction programme.

Senior representatives found that the councils had been assigned too many responsibilities in a very short time, which may have resulted in overburdening of local structures. This did not necessarily create local ownership. Similarly, the micro credit programme was only partially successful, because, at an initial stage, grants have been distributed and later credits were offered. The differentiation between emergency related grants and development related credits led to confusion about repayment rate among the recipients.

Perceived gaps in the selection of sectoral emphases

Livelihood strategies, which allow people to diversify income, in particular from agricultural activities (e. g. additional income from trading) were enclosed as programme within the CAP, but were not encountered in implementation (to some extent in the CEP). Such strategies to jumpstart the rural economy and to stabilise rural livelihoods were not of any importance within the assessment. Possibly, this is so because livelihood projects are often considered to be rather development and thus longer-term oriented.

Some topics such as currency and market order which were especially discussed during the JAM process within the mission team remain up to present subject to political debate and have not been resolved satisfactorily within the East Timorese polity.

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5.4 Lessons learnt and good practices

5.4.1 Financial mobilisation and coordination

TFET could be a model for regular donor coordination and planning along defined criteria, if its role within the process of reconstruction and development is agreed upon and government responsibilities are determined

In general, the overall coordination by the World Bank and ADB was considered to be successful. It was experienced as a good mechanism for coordination to be continued in future planning. Health planning with indicators was found as model, which is replicable. Joint planning all six months provides a thorough base for sectoral planning and helps to avoid duplication. The World Bank supported key decisions of the Timorese government, such as the size of the civil service, free health care, justifications for import tariffs on agricultural goods, even though these may not always have reflected the preferences or recommendations of the World Bank.

At the same time, the role of a transitional government such as UNTAET, has to be strengthened, when its role as service provider and national sovereign authority becomes blurred. In the interviews conducted in this mission, some debated the World Bank engagement in questions of implementation, which they see as a task of the UN, bilateral agencies and NGOs. Among civil society actors, there was concern that World Bank and other donors may have influenced Timorese decision-making due to the limited capacities of the East Timorese administration.

Internal and external regular monitoring enhances exchange with counterparts and civil society and provides transparency to beneficiaries


Regular monitoring by joint field mission, donor meetings along a comprehensive planning framework with benchmarks was considered important. However, external monitoring might increase awareness on processes and implementation outcome. La'o Hamotuk took over an independent monitoring role. La'o Hamotuk is a joint East Timorese-International organisation that monitors, analyses and reports on main international institutions as they relate to physical, economic and social reconstruction. Regular updates (in English, Bahasa Indonesia, Tetum) are published in the Internet and as hand out. To increase access for all people it might be recommendable to publish its reports in the national newspapers.

Role of NGOs should be complementary with the government, but not supplementary:

Timor Leste is, to some extent, a unique case, since state functions have been built up from the scratch. Government officials expressed the need of a careful selection process of NGOs. Selection criteria should be based on ownership, solid planning, and commitment until completion and integration into an overall network for cooperation and coordination. Otherwise, there may be a large number of projects and activities going on without much interrelation which may lead to a "projectised country". Government officials expressed the concern that this may rather retard the overall development and capacity building of the state and may undermine the government's position to be recognised as leading power. An entry point seems to be the institutionalisation of funding and fund allocation. In the case of Timor Leste, where the government controls only a third of the funds, government officials expressed their concern that the bargaining power (and the "design" of the country) is left in others' hands, while the state may remain weak and may exert only limited influence.

5.4.2 Implementation

Capacity building and visible results on the ground require fine planning, a deep intercultural understanding and excellent communication skill. Briefing on findings

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and handing over of data is essential during the mission and especially towards the end of a mission.

The main challenge in the post-violence transition and probably, the most important lesson learnt from the Timor Leste case study is the complementarity of fast physical implementation and tangible results in reconstruction on the one side and capacity building on the other. The benchmarking exercise conducted in 2000 to develop a consolidated set of results and interim actions for transition and reconstruction was a substantial step forward structured planning and became subsequently a model for the Liberia result matrix.

All interviewed persons expressed the need that the East Timorese experts and bureaucrats should structure, plan and implement on equal pars with the donors and international experts and that there is a need to challenge the preoccupation with quick implementation more often, because capacity building needs to start early on. The argument that tangible results have to be visible quickly is acceptable for a brief emergency phase, but the subsequent more development-oriented phase should emphasise on capacity building. In practice, however, the limited national capacity is often used as excuse for poor implementation of projects or leads to over-engagement of external experts and agencies. Critical points have been raised when it comes to handing over of data and findings at the end of mission. Regular briefings, especially at the end of the mission are essential for knowledge management.

Similarly, some NGOs may directly implement projects with immediately visible results and some of them have been described as great partners, but building capacities of local partners remains a crucial necessity and needs to be integrated in all projects.


Steady communication and coherent consultation creates transparency and promotes participation on the local level

One key lesson of this review is that a coherent strategy for participation and communication seems to be essential in the implementation process. Public consultation as carried out in the follow-up of the JAM are a good starting point, but need to include forums for local participation that are also gender balanced.

Town hall meetings were initiated, in Baucau, for example by the Bishop and conducted weekly or monthly, depending on local circumstances. These were a good entry point for public consultation and were later on taken over by the UNTAET officials working in the Districts. However, some civil society activists from Timor Leste were not convinced of some specific formats of consultation, in particular the form of consultation where a rather rigid question and answer scheme was applied instead of more open discussion.

Furthermore, it is important to consider that local consultation processes must be rooted into an overall planning procedure that is transparent and takes views from local communities into consideration. When contacting villages, the dissemination of planned activities, missions and their purpose, results should be conveyed to a wider community. This includes careful planning and in advance information of villagers about purpose, length of the intended intervention. Within welfare activities, criteria for distribution have to be consistently formulated, communicated and applied to avoid one-sided preference of specific social groups and subsequent political tension.

Furthermore, the distribution of approved funds according to sectors (such as the biggest share for emergency and reconstruction) have to be conveyed in a detailed way in order to avoid misunderstandings regarding the implementation and the priorities set in the planning process.

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An organised policy for recruitment of national and international staff plays a vital role where national capacity has suffered

The national capacity of Timor Leste suffered a heavy drawback and brain drain during the political violence. It was difficult to find staff that fulfils both, professional, technical knowledge and language skills. Recruitment of national staff collides with capacity building when it is primarily based on language skills that are needed to communicate with international donors (English, Portuguese) while professional knowledge lags behind. In addition, it would be helpful if all international agencies would coordinate a common agreement on wages and salaries to preserve a healthy national labour market without creating huge gap between local agency staff and others. With regard to international staff, some interviewees argued that it would also be extremely useful to develop a coherent staff recruitment strategy with an emphasis on longer-term contracts and a higher commitment to the institutional capacity building which would also include the willingness to learn local languages.

Different perception on emergency (relief) and development can contribute to contradictions in implementation

The East Timorese case study illustrates that just a large number of involved donor countries and agencies does not necessarily imply that the output and impact of interventions becomes larger and more significant. Agencies specialised in particular fields, often *either* relief *or* development (not both), create a kind of self-confirming role and neglect cooperation with other aid agencies. This may lead to contradiction in implementation policies on the ground.

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Mission schedule of the JAM

Mission national member list of the JAM

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List of Abbreviations

BMZ	German Ministry for Economic Cooperation
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CEP	Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project
CFET	Consolidated Fund for East Timor
CIVPOL	International Civilian Police
CNRT	National Council for the Timorese Resistance
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CWS	Church World Service
DP	Displaced Person
DPKO	(UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ETTA	East Timor Transitional Authority
FALINTIL	Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FRETILIN	Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
HAER	Human Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JRS	Jesuit Relief Service

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NA	Needs Assessment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PKF	Peacekeeping Force
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
TFET	Trust Fund for East Timor
TL	Timor Leste
TSP	Transitional Support Programme
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor
WFP	World Food Programme of the United Nations
WHO	World Health Organization