



# UN/WB PCNA Review

## January 2007

### ***Annex IV: Security Sector Issues***

#### **Disclaimer**

The following report was developed during a consultative review of Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) carried out by UN Development Group Office (UNDGO) and the World Bank's OPCFS. This report has been prepared by Adriaan Verheul, a consultant hired within Phase Two of the PCNA review to look specifically at the subject of Security as it relates to PCNAs (additional technical experts covered the areas of Cross-cutting issues, Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding, and State-building).

Under the guidance of the Core Review Team, the author has drawn upon the stocktaking work from Phase One to contribute to the strategic guidance of Phase Two in his substantive area, including making specific recommendations for PCNA stakeholders. This was done through a comprehensive review of the Phase One case studies and past guidance, in-depth consultations with HQ and field based UN and WB staff, national partners, bilateral donors, civil society and other relevant actors. Findings and recommendations were reviewed, then selectively abridged and incorporated into the UN/WB PCNA Review Report *In Support of Peacebuilding: Strengthening the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment* and into the revisions of the PCNA Guidance and Tools, where relevant. This report, presented as an annex to the UN/WB PCNA Review Report, represents the author's own views as an individual with specific technical expertise. It does not represent the official views of the World Bank or the UNDGO, and should be viewed as an unofficial document.

## Security/Development Nexus\*

### Introduction

Phase one of the review of Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) indicated that a significant gap is perceived to exist where security issues and the security sector is concerned. This perception is based on the fact that in post-conflict settings physical security and access are nearly always an important constraint for PCNA activities - from early assessment to implementation. At the same time, most PCNAs do not include the security sector as a substantial sector or cluster in itself, but mostly place it under a governance heading.

This gap is linked to the lack of clarity with regard to the concept of peacebuilding, which will be a lead concept for future PCNAs. As noted in the 2006 inventory of United Nations capacity in peacebuilding:

“Some actors associate peacebuilding with ‘security’ and therefore differentiate it from ‘development’ activities. Others regard peacebuilding as a ‘transitional’ set of activities and distinguish it from the ‘security’ field. ‘Crisis’ (combining natural disaster and conflict-related situations), ‘humanitarian,’ ‘peacekeeping,’ and ‘development’ remain the dominant conceptual frameworks and funding channels, in large part as a result of existing organizational mandates and interests. This lack of a common understanding on the meaning of peacebuilding has operational consequences, as donors and UN entities hold differing views as to how it should be approached and funded. In the absence of a well-articulated paradigm, the tendency [...] is also to adopt a supply-view of what is needed, thereby overlooking critical areas for effective peacebuilding which to date may be weakly conceptualised or ignored by the international community.”

Implicit in this description of conceptual confusion is that security may well fall between the cracks. Indeed, given that the organizations that manage and take part in PCNAs do not “supply” security sector expertise, it is often not given the attention it may otherwise deserve in an objective assessment of post-conflict stabilization and transformation needs. The apparent reluctance to take on security sector issues is a reflection of the prevailing systemic ambivalence towards the security sector in a majority of international organizations that deal with socio-economic development. A better integration of security sector concerns into PCNAs will require major policy shifts on the part of these organizations as well as the creation or designation of an organization that would serve as a focal point for security sector expertise.

This report will look at and make recommendations with regard to:

- § Concepts of security and security sector reform;
- § Current guidance and recent practice with regard to security issues in PCNA context;
- § The structuring of security issues on PCNA; and
- § Linkages between PCNAs and security processes.

The reports’ main conclusion is that PCNA and security processes will likely continue to take place in parallel. It will thus be important that steps are taken as soon as feasible to establish the contacts and procedures across processes to ensure exchange of information, synchronization of interventions, and more realistic planning. Decision makers or process managers on both sides, regardless which one starts first, should plan and make space for strong linkages between, if not full integration of the two processes.

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\* By Adriaan Verheul, consultant.

## What is Security?

Today's understanding of what constitutes security is multidimensional. The central concept of human security, as widely used within the UN system, is freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety or lives, which encompasses the twin objectives of "freedom from fear" (referring to the threat of violence, crime and war) and "freedom from want" (referring to economic, health, environmental and other threats to people's well being).

Partly in reaction to 9/11 but also as a result of an increased understating of conflict dynamics, many governments and organizations have broadened their definitions of security to include responses to global, regional and national threats that emanate from radicalism, poverty, the proliferation of small arms, distribution of wealth and access, environmental issues and bad governance. From a development perspective, economic growth, security and governance are widely seen as connected preconditions for poverty reduction.

For the purpose of this report, security is considered from two angles:

- § the actual security situation and measures taken to establish and maintain minimum conditions of security and stability at several levels:
  - safety and security –first and foremost- for the population;
  - as part of the enabling environment for support by the international community;
  - national security, countering both domestic and external threats; as well as regional security, taking into account security concerns of neighboring countries;
  
- § security sector reform and transformation as a contribution to short-term stabilization and medium-term transition.

## Links and firewalls between development and security

Links between security and development are obvious. At a basic level, the costs of doing business go up and the odds of economic growth go down if security worsens. Poor people suffer disproportionately from violent crime and conflict. Insecurity creates risks that can easily cross boundaries. Countries at a high risk of war and conflict may offer safe havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists as well as breeding grounds for mortal diseases. A breakdown in security is generally very expensive to fix. For example, the Africa budget of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations is over US\$ 3 billion a year, or about 50% of annual military expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa. To repair social services and economic infrastructure after conflict requires equally significant investments over a long period to bring post-conflict countries back from the brink.

However, in spite of encouraging developments in policy that seem to recognize the security/development nexus, there appears to remain a sizeable constituency in the US and in Europe as well as within the UN system that would prefer to keep the security sector at arms' lengths when it comes to development assistance. Arguments range from "we have never done this", "let the bilaterals do it", to "this would compromise our impartiality".

Several key donors (e.g. UK, Netherlands, Canada, EU and others) have begun a review of the rationale for the political and organizational firewalls that existed and to some extent continue to exist between development, diplomatic and military strategies and actors. These firewalls are in some cases based in legislation and linked to mandated activities. Such donors are now adopting more integrated approaches to their defense, foreign policy and international cooperation policies.

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<sup>\*</sup> This hasn't always been the case. Post WW II, the US actually had an integrated approach under which military and development programs were administered under a single heading. At present, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 draws a sharp line between

At this stage sustainable funding for security sector work is often difficult because such work falls outside the window of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility, thus limiting the use of development funds for a majority of donor government agencies (including those that are most involved in PCNAs). However, donor consensus has emerged on updating and clarifying what qualifies as ODA in three areas: management of security expenditure, enhancing civil society's role in the security system and providing assistance to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers.

Interestingly, a review of PCNA practice (see Appendix) reveals that none of the three areas received any significant attention. Support to the security sector may therefore be largely dependent on funds dedicated to strategic and military assistance (including counter-terrorism), often controlled by ministries of defense and/or foreign affairs which are rarely engaged in PCNA processes, viewed as the domain of development agencies.

PRSPs –a key instrument in countries' development- have to date rarely included an analysis of the security sector as a development object.

The discussion with regard to the inclusion of security analysis and security sector issues in development work has a direct bearing on participating agencies' mandates, corporate cultures and constituencies. Therefore, progress in this area is to a large extent dependent on the ongoing development of policies on the part of participating organizations.

As a result of the relative isolation from each other, the corporate cultures of the actors involved are such that development and humanitarian actors often have difficulty working with the military, whereas the PCNA is generally viewed as a development tool by defense actors and hence outside their purview. In quite a few cases, PCNA participants view security as an exogenous factor. Security specialist within participating UN organizations tend to look at security as a risk to staff and operations, not as an area for stabilization, development or reform. The latter perspective requires different expertise, which does not appear to be readily available within traditional development organizations or in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. What security sector expertise there is, appears to be scattered across the UN family. In theory, at least, security will have to be taken into account in a coherent peacebuilding approach.

Cross-discipline sensitization and confidence building may be required in advance to improve mutual understanding cooperation and coordination between development and security sectors. In some donor governments, a process of integration of diplomacy, defense and development actors has begun with limited results. Within the UN, such an integration has been proposed through various reports, including the Brahimi report and the Integrated Mission Planning Process in elaboration by DPKO. Yet, it appears that declared policies in these areas, both on the part of the United Nations and donors have yet to be fully translated into practice.

### **What is security sector reform?**

In short, security-sector reform and transformation is a process that involves rebuilding, restructuring and reforming state security services and developing democratic security-sector oversight mechanisms. It can also be called 'security-sector reform,' 'security system reform,' and 'security-sector transformation.'

There are clear problems related to definition in the area of security sector reform. The most widely accepted definition of security sector reform and security actors (that used by the OECD-DAC) is perhaps too broad a concept to be helpful in a post-conflict setting:

'Security system reform/transformation' is used to describe the transformation of the 'security system' or 'sector' – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and

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economic and military assistance and funds for one type of assistance cannot be used for the other. Turning back to an integrated approach, foreign and development assistance is now administered under a single US Government entity.

actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.”

The actors in this definition comprise a large group:


- § Core security actors: armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coastguards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias).
- § Security management and oversight bodies: the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defense, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
- § Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.
- § Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party militias.

More ambition than policy, this definition is in sharp contrast with the capacities and will of the international community to deliver on all aspects of such transformation in post-conflict setting. Yet, some important results have been achieved on parts of this agenda, especially in the area of policing.

Entry points for international support to SSR cover a number of areas, including planning and policy (“rightsizing” following a defense review), constitutional and legal framework, civil and parliamentary oversight, professionalism (while most donors prefer to avoid assistance that involve aspects of lethal means and methods), financial management (Public expenditure/procurement), human resources/corporate culture, civil/military relations, and change management.

A generic process developing policies and programs for the reform of the security sector follows a series of steps: (1) an analysis of the security environment and adoption of a broad national strategy to (2) the development of operational plans and policy papers and (3) culminating in the execution and evaluation of plans and programs (see figure above ). As government agencies move through these steps, they seek input from a variety of agents from both inside and outside government. In addition, the process is normally subject to professional and parliamentary oversight. In Liberia, this process involved a broad cross section of society through a national dialogue on security system reform.

**Figure 5. A Generic Policy Process**



Source: Nicole Ball, Tsjard Boua, Luc van de Goor, *Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment*, The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2003, p. 53.

## Who does SSR?

As it stands, SSR cuts across a wide range of UN and World Bank policy areas from peace and security, to development, human rights, rule of law and fiscal sustainability. While there not yet a common, comprehensive and coordinated UN approach to SSR as a peacebuilding objective, there is increasing interest within the UN system and strong calls from the field for such an approach.

UN Member States have also expressed interest in the development of a UN policy framework for SSR. The Security Council has addressed the question in the context of post conflict peacebuilding and is expected to hold a ministerial meeting on the topic in early 2007. The UN Peacebuilding Commission has highlighted the importance of SSR during its first meetings on Burundi and Sierra Leone in October 2006, noting that a priority task in Burundi would be "reforming the security sector to ensure that it is appropriately sized and effectively managed, under civilian control, and respectful of human rights", while in Sierra Leone the Commission noted that "the security sector, police and army in particular, is in need of further sustained reforms".

The World Bank, while a key partner in PCNAs, is constrained from engaging in security sector reform by its "Articles of Agreement", which prohibit interference in political affairs and decisions based on non-economic considerations. The security sector is out of bounds because it is considered to be both political and non-economic. A more convincing argument is that the World Bank does not have the

\* These arguments do not appear to make much sense in today's world. Few would deny that the World Bank has a major impact on domestic political affairs through its development lending and its opposition to corrupt practices. As to the non-economic nature of the security sector, one could compare it with health and education sectors. By themselves they do not directly create economic growth, but growth will decline if these sectors stop functioning.

expertise in-house to supervise any security sector reform projects and would thus not be able to meet its high standard of fiduciary oversight.

However, in recent years the World Bank has taken an interest in defense spending through its work on public expenditure in countries where high defense expenditures are an obvious and immediate risk to development (e.g. Afghanistan and the Central African Republic.) In addition, the World Bank finances a significant portion of demobilization and reintegration programs around the world, but it needs to rely on partners for steps that create an enabling environment for such programs. Such steps include disarmament, humanitarian support to other war-affected populations, political processes and SSR. In a very interesting project in Liberia, World Bank financing is combined with UNDP program management and spare UN peacekeeping heavy engineering capacity to provide jobs and repair infrastructure. This activity does not target the security sector, but does provide a model of imaginative combining of capability on the ground.

A high number of UN institutions is involved in some aspects of SSR, but a common definition or approach is missing (see Appendix II). UN SSR activities tend to focus on rule of law, justice and police or “legacy of conflict issues” (DDR, child soldiers, mines/UXO). UNDP has developed a “Justice and Security Sector Reform” JSSR concept and has done a significant amount of operational work in certain dimensions of SSR (e.g., community policing, police reform, security reviews, parliamentary oversight of the security sector, etc.), though not across the entire SSR spectrum. Capacities aimed at strengthening accountability civil management and oversight (which are key to the OECD definition) are near absent within the UN.

Most interlocutors look to DPKO to provide leadership in SSR. However, it has few clear and well-developed SSR standards (except in the case of police) and only a few mandates refer to SSR activities. Yet, it has a clear interest in these issues and is working on strengthening its expertise in this area. DPKO has recently been tasked with chairing a UN working group (DPKO, UNDP, UNODC, OHCHR and others as relevant) that will produce by mid November 2006 a policy submission outlining options for the United Nations’ engagement in SSR in the context of peacebuilding efforts. For the purposes of this working group, SSR is understood as comprising defense reform, law enforcement reform and institution building, and security sector governance. The working group is expected to provide options for structuring and strengthening UN capacity for an effective response to post-conflict operational demands.

The OECD-DAC is in the process of developing a Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR). This (yet to be adopted) framework will provide guidance to donors on how to close the gap between policy and practice and contains a number of good practices related to building political will, entry points, programme assessment, implementation and evaluation, donor harmonization and coordination.

Several donor governments (UK, US, France), as well as some regional organizations (EU, NATO), NGOs, academic institutions as well as private sector organizations have some SSR capacity and may potentially be called upon to play a lead role in the process or second experts to a PCNA. However, this is very much dependent on political factors and cannot be counted on in all cases.

In Liberia, the US Government contributed to the recruitment, vetting, reform and training of the Liberian army through a contractor. From interviews on the ground, it would appear that this was a well-structured and crucial peacebuilding effort. In spite of high degrees of transparency on the part of the US team, several Liberian and international interlocutors felt that not enough information was available about these aspects of security sector reform.

### **Security and national ownership**

Given that security and security structures are often an integral part of both the problem and the solution to post-conflict recovery, the political will of stakeholders may not exist for in-depth analysis and action. (Former) antagonists may welcome recovery support, but not what may be perceived as interference with their security policies in the early stages of a post-conflict situation. In this regard, there may be a

paradox regarding national ownership. The leadership of the institutions that would require transformation may have most to lose in such transformation and can thus not be expected to be the national champions of reform. In Burundi, for example, the Government showed no transparency with regard to defense expenditure in spite of considerable pressure from donors.

Insisting on local ownership may thus lead to stalling and delay on essential reforms. Well calibrated tactical decisions on how and when to engage with security actors in a constructive dialogue may be called for. Political guidance from and active political support by those best placed to provide it is therefore vital. The role of the SRSG or, where appropriate D-SRSG, is vital but has not always seized upon in recent practice, irrespective of whether this is a political or peacekeeping led mission.

### **Security and security sector transformation issues in PCNAs**

Reading current PCNA and TRM guidance documents with a security lens, it becomes apparent that these documents reflect the views and capabilities of the participating development and humanitarian actors. The PCNA guidance note is somewhat ambivalent with regard to security and suggests that – while important- it be considered a cross-cutting issue, whereas the TRM is clear on the need to deal with security as key cluster or sector issue in its own right. This needs to be reconciled.

According to the guidance documents, the current objectives of current PCNAs are to overcome consequences of conflict or war, prevent renewed outbreak and shape the short-term and potentially mid-term recovery priorities as well as articulate their financial implications on the basis of an overall long-term vision or goal. “Recovery” is defined as those priority investments in human, material and social development which a society needs to overcome the roots and consequences of violent conflict and to achieve political stability, security, justice and social equity.

Among the indicative priorities for action listed in the guidance note is security and security sector reform. In fact, security is listed as the number one objective during the crucial first 12 months’ stabilization/transition phase (See PCNA guidance note page 6). Security sector reform, as well as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) are listed as priorities for the transformation and institution building phase (12-36 months).

Security is also seen as an impediment or obstacle to assessment or implementation and, in this regard, is mentioned frequently throughout relevant guidance text. For example, it is suggested that “proposals should be robust enough to be feasible under difficult security conditions and conflict scenarios.” But this begs the question: should the PCNA then also not include a robust analysis of security conditions, dynamics and conflict scenarios?

At the same time, security issues will have real costs attached to it in the sense of providing security to costs of providing security to major installations and projects in addition to reconstruction costs only. Other security factors that need to be considered include wage and price distortions due to the impact of war economies on interventions, consideration of insecure no-go areas, delays in implementation through extended political negotiation and decision-making processes, as well as the planning processes, mandates, costs, timetables and deployment of UN or other military presence on the grounds.

While security is sometimes treated as a sector (as in the Preliminary Needs Assessment for Afghanistan and the JNA in Liberia), the PCNA guidance document suggest that it be treated as a cross-cutting theme.

However, the approach and composition of PCNA teams often do not translate these guidance priorities, objectives and modalities into action. In many cases, the focus of action is more related to the rule of law or human rights and, perhaps for this reason, security is linked to human rights through a rights-based approach. In one case, the PCNA approach was perceived to have led to a broadening of the beneficiary base in a DDR program from an initial targeting of hardcore armed fighters towards the inclusion of those only tangentially involved in or affected by armed struggle. This broadening led to higher costs and more complex program management.



Opening up the debate may need to involve an adjustment of key terminology to include security actors' views for which the stabilization and transformation paradigm may be very helpful.

For example, PCNA guidance note provides as examples for security sector reform such issues as integrating rebels in the national army, establishing civilian police, ensuring accountability of security forces, and arms collection and control. Most of these are available within the current "menu" of PCNA agencies. Not mentioned here, but just as vital, are train and equip programs, defense reviews, and broad security sector analyses.

### **What has been done in PCNAs to date?**

Please refer to the matrix in Appendix I. A key finding is that the approach and composition of PCNA teams often do not translate the priorities, objectives and modalities given in the PCNA and TRM guidance into action. In many cases, the focus of action has been more related to the rule of law or human rights and, perhaps for this reason, security is often linked to human rights through a governance or rights-based approach. At the same time, a review of the extent to which PCNAs have included security provisions of peace agreements indicates that off all major themes in peace agreements security themes were the ones most consistently covered in PCNAs (with the notable exception of Somalia).

An analysis of PCNA practice with regard to their approach to security issues leads to the following findings:

- § The security situation has been a key factor in deciding when to conduct a PCNA; this has mostly been linked to the question of physical security of UN and World Bank staff and assets required to do the assessment.
- § With few exceptions, security considerations impacted on the quality of the assessment and analysis and in some cases on the extent of national ownership as travel by the assessment team was limited, confining the team to a hotel in the capital.
- § In all cases, the responsibility for establishing conditions of security was assigned to or expected to be assigned to a peacekeeping force or international coalition.
- § Rule of law: in most cases, this was part of a governance cluster, focusing on the judiciary and police and not linked to SSR
- § DDR is included in a majority of PCNAs, either under governance or security clusters and in one case as a cluster in itself. However, DDR programs could be better linked to the wider recovery frameworks.
- § The significance of SSR in a broader sense appears to have been recognized in previous and ongoing PCNAs, even though the depth of treatment given to the subject was mostly shallow, with the exception of DDR. In two cases it was excluded from the document. The reasons for this non- or shallow treatment was that either key stakeholders (the parties or external lead nations) insist that it not be covered or that PCNA participating agencies have excluded it as it did not correspond to their mandate or capabilities.
- § Linkages of security policies and planning with economic development, social sector and or political issues: The most remarkable finding is that, when an actor with distinct security responsibilities and capabilities coexist with a PCNA process, only in very few cases explicit or formal links were made between the two processes.

### **What aspects of security and security sector reform are relevant to PCNAs?**

Looking at existing practices and aspects when discussing (aspects) of security and SSR, there appears to be no reason to redefine the rule of law area (police, justice, prisons) as being a part of SSR. There is, of course, an overlap. The police is armed and authorized to use force in the discharge of its duties, similar to the army. A practical way of distinguishing SSR from rule of law activities may be to include the professional use of (armed) force by the police as an aspect of SSR, while policing and the role of the police in prosecution and arrest is part of the rule of law area. At the same time, it is important that the strengthening of the police' capacities be seen as part of a package that includes development of the judiciary, access to justice, and prison administration.

For the purpose of a PCNA, it is useful to distinguish and further elaborate on security stabilization and transformation at three stages :

- § *Early security stabilization* measures: deployment of UN and/or other forces, integration of formerly opposing forces, early retirement programs, command and control restructuring, and early capacity (or train and equip) programs for security forces, all often critical steps for the establishment of minimum conditions of security for critical peacebuilding activities, which normally are spelled out in peace agreements.
- § Dealing with the *legacies of conflict*: DDR, mines, child soldiers, reconciliation, arms management etc. Of these, DDR is the most important and costly: it involves a three-pronged, short-term (1-3 years) programme of removing from political and economic discourse weapons belonging to government, militias or opposition forces, dismantling non-statutory forces, and facilitating the integration of ex-combatants into normal civil life. However, it is important that these measures not be designed as stand-alone intervention put as part of a larger recovery framework that also covers humanitarian support to other war affected populations, political reconciliation, security sector transformation and ultimately economic growth.
- § *Longer term security transformation* (closer to SSR in OECD-DAC sense); including "rightsizing", strengthened capacity and professionalism and governance and accountability.
  - "Rightsizing" (originally formulated as an alternative and more positive description of downsizing) is often a key process after conflict to bring down the size of the security sector to a more fiscally responsible size. "Rightsizing" describes the processes whereby a) the 'right' size and composition of security forces is determined in relation to its tasks (derived from an analysis of the external and internal threat environment) and fiscal envelope (taking into account a country's development priorities and b) is reduced or increased to that size. In many cases, it is considered to be closely linked to DDR.
  - Capacity and professionalism: aimed at further restructuring the security sector and the development of capacities related to core operational tasks with a view to improved service delivery to the state and its population. This would also impact on the statebuilding part of the PCNA agenda (see annex 5 on state functions and stabilization).
  - Governance and accountability: activities aimed at strengthening civilian management and oversight of the security apparatus. These SSR activities including the establishment and/or strengthening of civilian oversight and management bodies (including key line ministries, president/prime minister's offices, national security councils, parliamentary committees, human rights commissions, ombudsman offices, etc.)

This distinction creates some clarity, corresponds to current practice and enables a better division of labor in the TRM. Moreover, it conforms to current criteria for ODA, which allow for several of the above activities, including the financing of management of security expenditures through improved civilian oversight and democratic control; enhancing civil society's role in the security system; supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers; security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian control; civilian activities for peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution; and controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of SALW.

Of these three stages, the first two are of immediate relevance to the post-conflict stabilization phase that PCNAs address. The latter phase is generally more relevant to longer term transition and consolidation. At the same time, the process will need to include at the early stages some reflection on the shape of the future security sector in order to guide and inform early stabilization and conflict legacy measures.

### **Linkages between security processes and PCNAs**

In several of the cases studied for this review, a peacekeeping mission planning/deployment process was underway or started shortly after the PCNA (Haiti, Liberia, and Sudan). However, these were prior to the endorsement of DPKO's integrated mission planning process (IMPP) by the Secretary General in June 2006. Yet, the policies of comprehensive analysis and integrated planning had been formulated well before, including in the Brahimi report. As it stands the IMPP has yet to be tested in practice.


DPKO's integrated mission planning process (IMPP) is based on integrated UN missions in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objective of the UN's presence at country level. In its own words:

“The Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) is the authoritative basis for the planning of all new integrated missions, as well as the revision of existing integrated mission plans, for all UN departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes.”  
(emphasis added).

The IMPP envisages a link with other planning processes:

“The IMPP will be consistent with and mutually supportive of other relevant planning processes such as the CHAP/CAP, UN workplans, human rights assessments and strategies (e.g., CCA/UNDAF), as well as JAM/PCNA, PRSP, and other national planning processes supported by the UN System at country level. Emphasis will be placed on achieving proper sequencing of planning activities, coherence in identifying needs, objectives and results, and identifying opportunities for linking planning activities.”

A key mechanism for planning foreseen in the IMPP is the integrated mission task force (IMTF) . Once established, through a decision of the Secretary-General, the IMTF is expected to prepare a strategic assessment of the post-conflict situation and needs, and possible role for a peace support operation. Such a strategic assessment must be based on comprehensive information regarding the post-conflict environment and factors that could affect the role and scope of a UN peace support operation. The IMPP suggest that such information should include a conflict root cause analysis, monitoring of political and security developments and conditions, results of CHAP/CAP, PCNA processes, human rights assessments, information on existing UN activities, and mapping of other key national, regional and international stakeholders and relevant initiatives. Further down the planning process, the IMPP envisages a draft mission plan that should include an articulation of linkages and coordination mechanisms to ensure consistency (both in terms of planning timeframes and substantive content) with relevant planning processes, including the CHAP/CAP, transitional appeals, UN work plans and strategies, the PCNA and other national strategies and reconstruction plans.



\*Source: DPKO. Diagram is adapted from "Needs Assessment @planning in Post-conflict Settings: A diagram of four processes" by the World Bank Fragile States Group, 2006.

This process is decentralized to the extent possible and provides a central role for the SRSG. It would be thus up to her/him to ensure that the appropriate linkages are made with PCNAs and made in time for maximum relevance. This has consequences for the profile of future SRSGs, as well as for their training and preparation. In several mission, the linkage between the political/security peace keeping process and the socio-economic development process is expected to be made through the D-SRSG, double hatted as RC/RR/HC, who serves as a lynchpin within the concept of integrated mission.

Recent experience suggest mixed results. A 2005 report on integrated missions indicates that:

"While integration is intended to facilitate rationalisation, the reality to date is that the implementation of integration has frequently resulted in the creation of parallel structures and in rare cases even system dysfunction.

It has also become evident in the course of preparing this report that there is a basic lack of clear, unambiguous and transparent guidelines and terms of reference for senior mission management as well as that doctrine for uniformed peacekeepers is not tailored to the requirements of integration. These gaps complicate the ways in which the issues of humanitarian space, human rights as well as development can

be most effectively managed. Equally important, it has left a kind of authority vacuum in missions that need to be filled if the value of integration is to be achieved.”<sup>\*</sup>

Integration is especially important in the area of DDR, where politics intersect with development and security. However, recent experience with integrated DDR sections where UNDP and peacekeeping staff worked together towards common objectives indicates that this was a difficult process. Many UNDP field based staff felt that there was a discrepancy between policy made in headquarters and implementation on the ground. Integration was necessary during assessment, planning, programme design, resource mobilization, reporting and evaluation. But institutional, operational and administrative integration was believed to be near-impossible. Significant administrative and bureaucratic hurdles exist at the level of General Assembly policies with regard to the mixing of assets financed from assessed and voluntary contributions. Separate implementation arrangements may therefore continue to be necessary.<sup>†</sup> Much of this applies “down-stream” from PCNAs, but it has important implications for TRMs and funding arrangements.

From the author’s perspective, it appears that the extent and quality of integration is also much dependent on the individuals in charge and the extent to which they are prepared to relinquish reflexes and loyalties grown inside of their parent organizations to the benefit of cross-discipline collaboration. Anecdotal evidence suggests that considerable cultural gaps still exists between political/security entities and their development counterparts. Common doctrines and training may overcome some of this, as will the nurturing of concepts of integration in future mission leaders.

### **Security and development assessments: parallel or integrated?**

To date, most work related to security oriented interventions has been done in parallel to PCNAs. While integration appears to be the desired state of planning in much of the policy, existing or in development within the UN, it is important to recognize the pros and cons of both options, i.e. parallel planning/assessment or integrated peacebuilding efforts.

An interesting model in this regard was the approach originally envisaged in Somalia. At a October 2005 donor meeting, hosted by Sweden, a draft Declaration of Principles was agreed upon to guide assistance from the donor community. The idea was to:

- § implement a Rapid Assistance Programme (RAP) that focused on establishing transitional institutions; improving the security environment (see below); developing a framework for macro-economic and fiscal policy; developing a framework for social service delivery; and promoting reconciliation and public awareness. Improving the security environment would have included
  - disengagement arrangements (and possible deployment of peacekeepers),
  - A full security sector review and DDR
  - Rule of law (establishing a civilian police force)
- § In parallel, the international community would launch preparations for a longer term Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) through a Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) or PCNA;
- § Down the road this would eventually lead to an international donor conference, while humanitarian crisis situations would continue to be addressed, in coordination with the programming for the RAP and the RDP.

In other words, this approach would have implied a full security sector review in parallel to the JNA. However, the RAP did not materialize as a result of disagreement between the interim government and the donor community. In any event, its objectives appear to have been overambitious in the context of Somalia.

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<sup>\*</sup> Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations, by Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kasper sen, Randolph Kent and Karin von Hippel Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, 2005. (<http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/Report%20on%20Integrated%20Missions%20May%202005%20Final%202.pdf>)

<sup>†</sup> Notes from an internal UNDP/BCPR workshop for DDR programme managers, attended by the author.

But as a model it was not a bad idea. The RAP would have provided assistance to fledgling government institutions and would have provided political cover for a structured security sector review in a framework that linked it to a needs assessment in the social and economic sectors. Big question remains though, who would have led this exercise on the side of the international community assuming that the Somali parties and clan leaders would have agreed?

A parallel process reflects the reality of current and different dynamics of and between the stakeholders involved: security-oriented entities within the UN, member states and target countries. These entities include foreign affairs and defense ministries, national security councils and the armed forces. “Whole-of-Government” approaches in some donor governments aside, fact of the matter remains that these entities respond to different inputs and timetables than do development agencies. Given these different dynamics, security planning processes will thus rarely commence at the same juncture as PCNAs, sometimes earlier, sometimes later, and will continue in parallel. It is likely that this practice will continue for the foreseeable future.

An advantage of a parallel process is that it allows for assessment modalities that create greater trust and confidence between a limited number of security actors, with due regard to requirements of confidentiality.

A fully integrated process, meaning one in which security actors and considerations are treated similar to health, infrastructure etc. within a comprehensive and holistic approach, appears much less feasible. It assumes that all stakeholders and in particular national counterparts agree to the integration of the often sensitive security domain in a PCNA process that aims to be as transparent as possible. It also requires a synchronization of planning processes that follow different dynamics, which may cause perhaps unacceptable delays in the launching of both and could render a needs assessment overly complex. Costs associated with security sector transformation may not be as easily funded through a donor conference as those in more traditional areas of development, leading to unmet expectations in a vital area.

If processes are more likely to take place in parallel, it will be important that steps are taken as soon as feasible to establish the contacts and procedures across processes to ensure exchange of information, synchronization of interventions, and more realistic planning. Decision makers or process managers on both sides, regardless which one starts first, should plan and make space for strong linkages between, if not full integration of the two processes.

### **Towards integrating security into future PCNAs**

Regardless of whether there is a parallel or more integrated process, in the organization and design of PCNA's it would be feasible to do the following:

- § During the initial stages, it would be appropriate to take in to account the security framework of the country in order to establish whether sufficient access exist for data collection and stakeholder consultations. A donor-driven rush to a donor conference may lead to assessments done from the capital, which may not reflect the needs on the ground.
- § Ensure that the donor group is in agreement with the inclusion of a more elaborate approach to security along the lines sketched above. If possible, identify a donor with a comparative advantage (such as an existing military cooperation framework) to take the lead for security matters.
- § Do not push and seek buy-in from national counterparts on the inclusion of a security focus in the PCNA. Stakeholder engagement in the security area needs to include building trust and confidence with the national parties, full consent of key stakeholders and cross-fertilization/linkages with traditional PCNA areas, but this may require time.

- § Include key military and security experts agencies in the interagency coordination process as well as in the PCNA –team itself. DPKO is best placed, but may not have the mandate or human resources to assist, especially so if the prospect of establishing a peace operation in the country is remote. Alternatively and when politically feasible, this may involve a lead donor nation.
- § Ensure that a security framework analysis is part of the conflict analysis. In this regard, PCNAs should take into account the relevant security provisions in peace agreements and determine their cost implications.
- § Security sector transformation issues that are either relevant to short term stabilization (such as army integration), or have major impacts on development processes and/or fiscal sustainability (high defense expenditures) need to integrate in PCNAs in order to present an indicative picture of security sector costs and processes. Rule of law issues are not considered to be part of SST and will often be costed separately.
- § In most cases, security warrants a cluster or sector of its own that includes objectives, measures and results related to legacy of conflict, early stabilization, and security sector transformation. This, in turn, requires a sector/cluster lead person. One possibility is that interested donor countries second a qualified military officer to the UN for the duration of the PCNA.
- § Future PCNAs should include an analysis of security dynamics and scenarios (including deployment of peacekeeping forces) which should be contrasted with key assumptions regarding the timing, implementation and impact of PCNA recommendations. One way of doing this is through an exercise involving all stakeholders that simulates the peacebuilding process and which allows participants (through a “gaming” approach see appendix IV) to compare and test their assumptions regarding the timelines and critical success factors in each of the sectors and clusters. For example, infrastructure support to local administrations requires security and access, both of which may depend on movement of security forces and road repair, which may in turn depend on the arrival of key equipment. A possible outcome of such a planning approach may well be that the need for infrastructure support is clear and vital, but that the enabling (security) environment may not be created within the timeframe covered by the transition period.
- § Better linkage to economic and social services delivery activities will result from a recognition at policy level that such a linkage is needed and from the establishment of implementation, monitoring and management structures in which security input is envisaged. This will most likely be the direct result if security is in a cluster of its own, rather than seen as an exogenous factor.
- § Given current gaps in the international system, options to provide expertise for security analysis and security sector transformation include :
  - DPKO (subject to resource and mandate constraints);
  - UNDP/BCPR (through imported expertise);
  - A bilateral lead nation or regional organization (e.g. EU) ; or
  - External consultants, seconded to/hired by the PCNA process;
  - In any event, it would be important, given high levels of sensitivities in this area to ensure proper area expertise or “street credibility”.

APPENDIX I	Haiti	Iraq	Liberia	Somalia	Sudan	Afghanistan	Timor-Leste
Impact of security situation on PCNA process	Little impact, process took place in capital.	Major impact on assessment and national participation	Security conditions restricted movement and validation of data.	The security situation continues to pose challenges to the implementation of the JNA. However, this is less of a problem in Puntland and Somaliland.	Security situation had not stabilized, leading to sub-optimal coverage of field missions.	No field work done in country, except for consultations in Kabul.	Pre electoral violence required a complete reorientation of the planning assumptions. Security constraints complicated assessments on the ground.
Establishment/maintenance of conditions of security	Main responsibility of MINUSTAH Stability and security preconditions for undertaking an ICF	Security was biggest challenge – yet fell outside the scope of the needs assessment at the request of the CPA	Security a separate cluster; main responsibility of UNMIL	Envisaged presence of African peacekeepers, but no apparent planning link between two processes.	UN peacekeeping operation in South and AU monitoring mission in Darfur. Synthesis matrix included a pillar on security, whose key actions for the initial period included: •Assembly of troops •Ceasefire institutions established and operational; •Reintegration of other armed forces initiated; •Deployment of Joint Integrated Units initiated.	The PNA was not linked with the US-led Coalition's planning processes,  Security seen as the pre-condition for development in Afghanistan	INYERFET and UNTAET responsible for security.  Security was not considered to be a major risk during JAM given that the source of the conflict had retreated from the territory.
Rule of law	Justice, penitentiary institutions and human rights; covered under Priority One: political governance and national dialogue	Focus on non-core security actors.	Judiciary, police and corrections.	Coordinating the three legal systems, improving access to justice and capacity building for judicial personnel, management reform, rehabilitation or construction of infrastructure and equipment.	Rule of law and police covered under governance cluster peace-building & reconciliation, human rights, accountability, and media and information campaigns);	Security cluster included: •Justice and Human Rights • Drugs control	Focus on judiciary and training of police
DDR	DDR covered under Priority One: political governance and	Not included.	DDR separate cluster; joint UNMIL/UNDP	DDR in all Somali regions within five years.	DDR process is not sufficiently advanced to allow costing of	Security cluster included: • Reintegration of	Not included



	national dialogue		responsibility		the full program—hence a major expected expenditure is missing	War Combatants •Mine action	
Mine action/UXO	N/A	Separate cluster		Within security sub-cluster:	UN will seek to help both parties to jointly develop a national mine action strategy.	Security cluster included: •Mine action	
	Haiti	Iraq	Liberia	Somalia	Sudan	Afghanistan	Timor-Leste
Weapons management	Included under DDR: collection and destruction		Included under DDR: collection and destruction.	Included in DDR	UN DDR Office is working with the GOS and SPLM/A to formulate a National SALW policy and program for the Sudan as a component of the DDR process		
Security sector transformation (SST)	Security and police, covered under Priority One: political governance and national dialogue. Objectives for PNH were strengthening of organization, operational effectiveness and professionalism with key support from MINUSTAH.	Outside the scope of the needs assessment	Establishment of armed forces' role in building peace and supporting democratic transformation; restructuring, retraining and deployment initiated in accordance with the CPA.	SSR was included in the non-implemented Rapid Assistance Program. A security sector review would have taken place concurrently with the JNA. In the JNA as it stands, a comprehensive security sector review is seen as a key priority, to be undertaken under DDR heading. Training and continued capacity building police forces in Somaliland and Puntland, Develop community-based police in South-Central Somalia Development of a	immediate and significant increases in police forces to maintain law and order, as well as security sector reform in general, including military professionalization and downsizing. Phase II includes a defense review. There was no specific mechanism within the JAM process to provide advice on security sector policy or on operational aspects of security sector reform;	The section on security encompasses a full treatment of SSR priorities. (security sector review; ( a national plan for the transformation of the security sector; ensuring civilian control and oversight accelerated training programme for security sector personnel; and rehabilitating and reconstructing the military and police academies;	Security sector reform was not included in the JAM. It is now recognized by those who led and participated in the JAM that the JAM should have included an expert on security and police restructuring issues.

				coast guard is envisaged under rebuilding key productive sectors			
Linked to economic development, social sector, and/or political issues.	Linkages between security, political, economic and social issues were articulated with DPKO and DPA. Explicit linkages were made with MINUSTAH only towards the end. A gap was reported between the peacekeeping and development sides.	Lack of security recognized as main obstacle to development. No explicit linkages	Security and elections seen as primary determinants of sustained peace; UNAMIL led the security cluster, but essentially a parallel process.	Outside of DDR and police, no expertise on security sector issues was available for the Somalia JNA. The SRSG from UNPOS sits as co-chair of CMC but neither he nor his office have been operationally or technically involved in the JNA.	No formal link was established between UNMIS planning and the JAM. Items in the synthesis matrix pillar on security were imported from the political process into the JAM documents rather than considered in depth during cluster team work.	The PNA was not linked with the US-led Coalition's planning processes, though there is mention of the Coalition's contribution to the UXO problem in Afghanistan in the PNA. The PNA does not appear to have been linked in any way with the planning for ISAF which entered Kabul late in 2001.	JAM took place in parallel to other planning and budgeting exercises, notably DPKO mission planning.  UNAMET also sent at least two staff to participate in the JAM (in the areas of public administration and the judiciary).

## Appendix II From the UN Inventory of peacebuilding capacity:

### 1. Security System Governance

- § Two main entities: DPKO, UNDP with dedicated but limited overall institutional capacity
- § No clear conceptualization as to UN role in security system governance and how it relates more broadly to law enforcement, defense, DDR, justice, and governance
- § Such capacity that may exist in the field is not coordinated, focused, or harnessed by headquarters
- § No dedicated policy, standards, lessons learned, or training capacity
- § Capacity even more limited in areas of civil society and legislative oversight

### 2. Law Enforcement Agencies

- § Main entity: DPKO; Other main: UNODC (drug trafficking, money laundering, crime), UNDP
- § Substantial headquarters and field human resources and operational capacity, wealth of experience (DPKO)
- § Limited expertise in supporting the policy aspects of the reform of law enforcement agencies ('RRR'- Reform, Restructuring, and Rebuilding'); focus so far on deploying UN police officers and 'advising, mentoring, and training' national agencies rather than on the police institution as a whole
- § Resources to support reform of national law enforcement agencies are all voluntary contributions
- § Lack of UN-wide coherent and agreed-upon approach and strategy; Lack of designated focal point
- § Coordination with other UN entities which offer some niche capacity (OHCHR, UNDP, UN-LIREC, UNODC) at headquarters and in the field remains *ad hoc* and limited
- § Rosters of experts, tools, material, and training exist for specific niche expertise (DPKO, OHCHR, UNODC), but no dedicated standards, training, or lessons learned specifically for 'RRR'
- § But new initiatives being launched by DPKO Police Division: Doctrine Development Groups, International Police Advisory Council, Standing Police Capacity, Rule of Law Index

### 3. Defense Reform

- § Specialized defense reform capacity is almost non-existent although UN has on occasion been mandated by the SC to perform tasks in relation to the restructuring and training of military capability
- § In particular, no capacity to offer advice to national authorities on governance issues and to coordinate and facilitate reform in this area with the support provided by external actors (member states, donors, private firms) to perform core operational tasks

### 4. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-combatants (DDR)

- § Main UN entities: DPKO, UNDP, UNICEF; a total of 15 entities part of Interagency Working Group
- § Fairly good delineation of responsibilities with UN entities offering niche expertise; World Bank also an increasingly important player but no designated UN focal point
- § Relatively well resourced sector; however timeliness and sustainability remain a concern
- § Some limited standing capacity in entities involved, but no integrated headquarters capacity
- § Pool of in-house experts –at the working and managerial level- is scanty; no dedicated roster
- § Improved coordination at headquarters, Integrated DDR Standards covering strategic and operational issues, UN system web-based DDR Resource Centre to be launched
- § Joint planning of operations and integrated programmes currently being piloted in two countries, but overall coordination in the field remains haphazard due to atomization of capacities and fragmentation of programmes
- § Recently strengthened training efforts at headquarters and at the country level, in partnership with regional organizations
- § Lack of UN-wide communication strategy

### 5. Mine Action

- § Main UN entities: DPKO/UNMAS (designated UN focal point), UNDP (socio-economic consequences and national capacity development), UNICEF (mine risk education), UNOPS (implementing partner)
- § Agreed-upon set of goals; well-coordinated community of actors
- § UNMAS drawing upon specific niche expertise of main UN partners (interagency process) as well as capacity and funds of external actors (main area of potential overlap internal to DPKO between UNMAS and military demining units); UNDP taking the lead when transition from a UN managed to a UN supported programme with national government assuming responsibilities
- § Substantial headquarters core staff capacity; a few regional advisers; a great number of staff on the ground
- § Roster (UNOPS/ 500 consultants)
- § Strong capacity for assessments, planning and implementation (UNMAS, UNDP, UNOPS)
- § Extensive network of practitioners and partners: donors, states, universities, NGOs, private firms
- § Established policy, standards and guidelines; dedicated website and information management system, joint media, and outreach strategy; various training packages although no formal ToT capacity
- § Embryonic lessons learned through James Madison University but currently limited capacity
- § Relatively well-funded sector, including a rapid response mechanism, but funding may be inflexible and tied to projects; victims' assistance under-funded and, more generally, identified as gap area

E (SIMPLIFIED)

