

# Assessing Recovery and Development Priorities in Mali's Conflict-Affected Regions

Final Report of the Joint Assessment Mission for Northern Mali

March 2016

Disclaimer: This Recovery and Development Assessment report for northern Mali is a collaborative product authored jointly by staff of the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the United Nations and the World Bank Group. Acknowledging the institutions' different mandates and areas of expertise, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in the assessment report do not necessarily constitute the views or formal recommendations of the four institutions on all issues, nor do they reflect the views of the governing bodies of these institutions or their member states. It is also recognized that due to different mandates not all activities set forth or proposed in the report will be shared by or engaged in by all the collaborating institutions, and it is further understood that each institution will carry out or be engaged with any such activities in accordance with its mandate, and operational policies and procedures.

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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANICT	Local Governments' National Investment Agency ( <i>Agence nationale des investissements des collectivités territoriales</i> )
CFAF	CFA franc
CMA	Coordination of Movements of Azawad
CSA	Monitoring Committee of the Accord ( <i>Comité de suivi de l'Accord</i> )
CSCOM	Community health centres ( <i>centres de santé communautaires</i> )
DCPND	Framework document of the national decentralization policy ( <i>document cadre de la politique nationale de décentralisation</i> )
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
FAMA	Mali's Military and Security Forces ( <i>Forces armées et de sécurité du Mali</i> )
GBV	Gender based violence
GER	Gross enrollment rates
HILO	High-intensity labor force
IDP	Internally displaced person
MIEC	Joint Assessment Mission ( <i>Mission d'évaluation conjointe</i> )
MINUSMA	United Nations multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in Mali ( <i>Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali</i> )
MPTF	Multipartner trust fund
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
PRODEFPE	Ten-Year Programme for the Development of Vocational Training for Employment ( <i>programme décennal de développement de la formation professionnelle pour l'emploi</i> )
RDA	Regional Development Authority
SSR	Security Sector Reform
VBG	Violence Based on Gender

# Foreword

The Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, resulting from the Algiers Process and signed in Bamako on May 15 and June 20, 2015, is a decisive step towards ending the crisis in Mali. It creates opportunities for peace and development in the northern regions as well as the country as a whole. More specifically, it calls for solutions to ensure the reconstruction and recovery of northern Mali, leading to a second phase of sustainable development.

These recovery and development issues were the focus of the Joint Assessment Mission in northern Mali (*Mission d'évaluation conjointe au Nord du Mali*, MIEC). In its Article 36, the Agreement invites “the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank [...] to lead the mission, in collaboration with the Government, other relevant international institutions, and Area representatives.” Its goal is to “identify needs related to rapid recovery, poverty reduction and development in the Area.”

As required under this very specific mandate, the MIEC report provides a comprehensive assessment of needs, listing immediate and short-term priorities related to recovery, as well as medium- and long-term requirements to facilitate sustainable development of northern Mali. The MIEC also makes a series of recommendations related to the implementation of the proposed activities, and outlines elements of a longer term development strategy. In this regard, the report contains a vast quantity of forward-looking data.

However, it is important to stress that the MIEC report is not an end in itself, nor does it aim to answer all open-ended questions related to northern Mali. It merely constitutes one step—i.e., the diagnosis—along the lengthy path towards recovery and development. For this reason, the material contained herein must promptly be used to develop a specific Development Strategy, as required under Article 37 of the Agreement, including regional implementation plans.

Finally, it must be noted that northern Mali populations were broadly consulted throughout the drafting process for this report. Their concerns and priorities form the core of this document.

We wish to thank the MIEC team for their work under a very tight schedule.

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# Executive Summary

Mali's Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, resulting from the Algiers Process and signed in Bamako on May 15 and June 20, 2015, calls on the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank to carry out a Joint Assessment Mission (*mission d'évaluation conjointe*, MIEC) in northern Mali in order to identify needs and priorities, as well as related costs, to ensure a rapid recovery, address poverty and promote development, in order for these regions to reach the same level of development as the rest of the country within the next 15 years. The assessment also includes a review of implementation, financing and monitoring mechanisms that are required to ensure that the various activities that were identified can be implemented in the current, high risk operational environment.

The MIEC was launched in July 2015. The three development banks, as well as the United Nations, carried out the assessment under the supervision of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, using the post-conflict needs assessment methodology. Persistent insecurity severely restricted all aspects of the assessment process, leading up to and during the field work. To address issues related to access to the northern regions, the MIEC carried out perception surveys to seek the opinion of local populations.

The MIEC pulled together and organized available information into fifteen thematic notes, each including a situation analysis and an expected results matrix for the planned transition period and outlining the main activities to be implemented. Simultaneously, priorities related to security, peace, stability and development were assessed from the perspective of northern Mali populations through four perception surveys focused on households, administrative authorities, health centers, displaced groups and refugees. Finally, local authorities and civil society representatives from the three relevant regions, as well as the Government and other stakeholders in Bamako, were consulted in order to further prioritize proposed measures.

## Prioritization Framework

Building on lessons learned from similar post-conflict assessments, the MIEC adopted the following principles: Immediate effect on peace and stability, immediate implementation capacity, addressing urgent priorities as stated by the public, and targeting the poorest and most vulnerable. Based on these principles, a prioritization framework was developed along three pillars: 1) Strengthen peace, social resiliency and decentralized governance; 2) Restore and expand basic social services and social protection; 3) Promote economic recovery, employment and infrastructures. Within each pillar, priorities were categorized based on whether implementation occurs immediately (year 1), in the short term (year 2), or in the medium and long term (3 to 6 years). Three crosscutting themes addressed within each priority pillar were also considered: gender inequality, gaps between and within regions, and the implementation capacity of local communities.

Priority pillar	Cost (CFAF million)			
	Year 1	Year 2	Years 3–6	Total
Strengthen peace, social resiliency and decentralized governance	109,418.6	106,762.9	213,798.2	429,979.7
Restore and improve basic social services and social protection	77,965.8	85,011.4	473,113.6	636,090.8
Promote economic and infrastructure recovery and employment	111,523.8	319,993.0	1,349,971.6	1,781,488.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>298,908.2</b>	<b>511,767.2</b>	<b>2,036,883.4</b>	<b>2,847,558.9</b>

## Identified Priorities

The MIEC identified activities to be implemented as a matter of priority to ensure the recovery and development of northern Mali in the next six years, at an estimated overall cost of CFAF 2,847,558.9 million (*Table E1.1*).

Along with expert analyses, priorities were set on the basis of popular opinion, as expressed in perception surveys, and validation workshops. For respondents, security is the highest priority, followed by food security, poverty reduction, job creation and quality basic social services including in particular access to water. Households and local authorities hold different views, the latter favoring infrastructure building. In terms of governance, all respondents emphasized the need to support initiatives that ensure that local communities are empowered to manage themselves, even though specific proposed measures vary from one region or community to another. In addition, perceptions among the displaced differ from those of the rest of the population.

To the extent possible, humanitarian needs were included in the analysis, largely based on OCHA's annual Common Humanitarian Appeal process. Costs related to various humanitarian clusters were allocated accordingly within each of the three priority pillars.

*Pillar 1 Priority.* This pillar seeks to ensure that the required conditions are in place to immediately implement recovery and development activities. The pillar emphasizes the urgent nature of activities designed to promote confidence building among the parties in conflict, but also to implement essential components aimed at securing surrounding areas, in compliance with the Peace Agreement. These activities aim to integrate combatants into the Malian military, based on mutually agreed criteria, and establish a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Program to help combatants return to civilian life. This pillar also promotes issues related to rebuilding the social fabric and long-term trust towards public institutions in the north, by emphasizing justice, reconciliation and public participation, and by providing immediate support to both returning displaced individuals and host communities. Finally, this pillar focuses on building the essential national and local foundations that are required to strengthen decentralization, deliver on the commitment to delegate Government functions to the regions, and improve the capacity of local public institutions to serve their communities in a more efficient and accountable manner.

*Pillar 2 Priority.* This pillar seeks to restore basic social service delivery infrastructures, which were destroyed during the conflict and increase the capacities of local administrations so that they are able to provide communities in the north with quality social safety nets and services. This pillar's sub-components address education, health, water and sanitation, and social safety nets. The pillar designs emergency interventions aimed at immediately improving access of the most vulnerable to education, health and water services, including by repairing wells and water supply networks, schools and health centers, as well as their equipment and by returning personnel. In the long term, activities are meant to set up a social safety net and improve the quality of basic social services and their large scale

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deployment, by building the capacities of institutions and their staff, and through rebuilding the infrastructure. Given the low population density in some northern areas, mobile service delivery strategies will be prioritized.

*Pillar 3 Priority.* This pillar focuses on priorities related to livelihood support, which is required to expand production capacities, ensure food security and rebuild essential infrastructures, which will sustain and revitalize the local economy and immediately create job opportunities. This pillar also addresses the need to expand infrastructures in the long term, particularly road networks and energy production, to improve access and economic relations with the north. This will boost private sector growth, not only through increased access and the availability of modern infrastructures, but also through vocational training designed to enhance the economic potential of the north, as well as financial service development, which will in turn lead to the creation of sustainable employment opportunities. Finally, efforts aiming to protect the environment in the long term and help adapt to climate change will ensure that these investments are sustainable.

Crosscutting issues were used as filters to further identify each pillar's priorities. Increased participation of women was deemed essential to promote the peace and reconciliation process. While it is important to address women's legal, medical and social issues, their economic activities also require support as they are essential to ensure food security. Furthermore, views differ among and within regions on issues such as security, governance and access, as well as service delivery processes between urban, rural and nomadic areas.

Finally, local communities have seen their implementation capacities, already weak prior to the crisis, further degraded by the conflict. In this regard, short-term implementation plans will realistically have to include short-term activities recommended by humanitarian actors in order to produce rapid results in recovery and service delivery. As a priority, the capacities of local communities will be increased to ensure that implementation is gradually transferred back to them. The pillar focuses on relocating implementation mechanisms as close as possible to the population, including by enhancing the role of Regional Development Agencies. Finally, civil society plays a significant role, which should also enhance demand for good governance based on greater transparency in managing local matters.

## Implementation, Financing and Monitoring Mechanisms

Implementation of priorities outlined in this report will not be easy, due among other things to weak institutional and human capacities and lingering insecurity which limits access to important northern areas. At the very least, the security situation in the north must absolutely improve in order to implement the recommended recovery and development activities. To address insecurity issues, resources will need to be channeled through mechanisms that not only have a proven record of being effective in such environments, but have also remained in place throughout the crisis, including humanitarian organizations and specific communities. The MIEC suggests that in the very short term, the focus must be placed on basic livelihood support, infrastructure rehabilitation in secured areas and initiatives aimed at ensuring that public officials are able to return and service delivery can resume. Similarly, the Government will need to implement the many reforms that are required at the national level.

Specific institutional capacities will be required to plan, implement, coordinate and monitor activities, as well as to address any hurdles in the implementation of recovery and development activities in northern Mali. The MIEC makes a number of recommendations to efficiently implement identified priorities:

- Enhance local planning capacities within local administrations in the north
- Establish a high level intergovernmental coordination mechanism focused on post-conflict implementation
- Prioritize implementation through local institutions
- Create a donor and implementation coordination mechanism for post-conflict recovery and development

During the International Paris Conference of October 22, 2015, commitments made by international partners addressed almost entirely the current financing gap to meet the needs identified by the MIEC. The modalities of

this commitment will need to be further detailed. Given this, the financing strategy to be designed should promote coordination and synergies among various actors, in order to better support recovery and development efforts. Furthermore, a funding pool within a specific instrument should be considered. A multi-donor trust fund would help ensure coordination, bridge the main financing gaps, promote economies of scale and facilitate the collective management of risks associated with highly insecure and unstable environments, without overwhelming limited national and local capacities with reporting requirements.

The MIEC suggests that a monitoring system be designed on the basis of a few, clearly defined, priorities and indicators. This strategic monitoring framework would serve as an efficient tool to monitor progress of peace and recovery activities, without the burden of an overly bureaucratic monitoring or burdensome set of indicators, which tends to cloud the overall picture. This strategic monitoring framework should be complemented with direct feedback from the beneficiaries, for example by maintaining and broadening the perception surveys that informed the MIEC.

## Towards a Long-Term Development Vision

Northern Mali has a significant economic, social and cultural development potential. A home-based and inclusive economic growth is possible by better harnessing the potential of sectors such as farming, agriculture, mining, energy, but also tourism, based on a recognized cultural heritage, trade and links between the Sahel and the Sahara.

A long term development vision for northern Mali could be based on the following: (i) peace and security as pre-conditions, (ii) accelerated support to boost and revitalize economic activity, and (iii) implementation of a structural support program to promote poverty reduction and economic growth. As such, this will require the creation of a growth environment by investing in structuring projects and human capital, placing a priority focus on specific growth sectors based on local potential and supported by an appropriate vocational training, defining of future inputs from the northern regions and their future roles in the economic growth of the country as a whole, and by including cross-border issues when developing trade and cross-border exchanges.

# 1

## Rational and Scope

### INTRODUCTION

The Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (hereafter, the Peace Accord) was signed on May 15 and June 20, 2015. It officially ended the armed conflict that had plagued Mali since 2012 by establishing a joint vision for peace and prosperity predicated on military demobilization and disarmament, the devolution of authority to local governments, and the establishment of conditions for restoring stability and beginning economic recovery in northern Mali. To ensure that efforts to address the needs and priorities of the population in the northern regions are sufficiently grounded, the Peace Accord calls on the international community's involvement. In particular, it requests the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the World Bank to conduct a Joint Assessment Mission in northern Mali to identify immediate recovery and longer term development needs and priorities. The assessment will support short-term peace and stability as well as help bring Mali's conflict-affected regions level with the rest of the country in terms of development outcomes.<sup>1</sup>

This report and the accompanying appendixes represent the findings and recommendations of the Joint Assessment Mission (Mission d'Evaluation Conjointe, MIEC). They identify priorities for immediate, short-, and medium- to long-term action. The report is structured as follows. The rest of Chapter 1 explains the purpose and approach to the joint assessment and the persistent challenges the team had to overcome. Chapter 2 briefly outlines the context, impact, and underlying drivers of the conflict in northern Mali. Chapter 3 develops and explains the prioritization framework that was developed as part of the analysis. Chapter 4 details needs, priorities, and associated costs across the immediate, short-, and medium- to long-term. Chapter 5 outlines the specific implementation and financing arrangements that should be considered by all stakeholders as they operationalize the recommendations in this report. Detailed transitional results matrices for each priority pillar, a strategic results framework to measure overall progress, an overview of the findings of the perception survey that was conducted as part of the assessment, and more detailed explanations of the needs and priorities across the different pillars and cross-cutting areas are all included in the appendixes. Specific measures are described and quantified in Appendix 1; Appendix 5 further details needs and priorities outlined in Chapter 4.

### GOAL AND VISION OF THE JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION

The goal of the joint assessment has been to assess and identify immediate needs and priorities, along with accompanying costs, that should be supported to promote peace, stability, and development in northern Mali over the next

<sup>1</sup> The United Nations accepted an invitation to join the MIEC coordination team, which was deemed necessary given the UN's important presence and access in the north.

six years beyond which any projection becomes unrealistic. The geographical coverage of the assessment was limited to the three regions of northern Mali as defined by the Peace Accord: Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. Neighboring regions affected by the conflict and national concerns as a whole have also been taken into account where these have an impact on the implementation of relief and development activities within the three regions of northern Mali. In addition, building on international lessons learned with similar exercises over the past 15 years, the assessment has included a review of existing and necessary implementation, financing, and monitoring arrangements that should be considered to facilitate delivery on the range of activities identified in what continues to be a highly insecure operating environment. The preliminary findings of this report were presented to the government of Mali and its development partners during the international donor conference in Paris on October 22, 2015.<sup>2</sup>

The situation in northern Mali remains fluid, and the Peace Accord has not yet resulted in meaningful change in the operating environment for humanitarian and development actors on the ground. In light of the persistent insecurity, this report sets out a vision that is grounded in an incremental approach to conflict resolution, focusing on several immediate actions that can promote peace, stability, and recovery in the short term and that would create the foundations over time for longer-term stability and development of the northern regions and Mali as a whole. Consequently, the joint assessment focuses simultaneously on (i) the identification of priorities; (ii) the identification of realistic implementation modalities in the immediate, short, and medium to long terms; and (iii) the establishment of an incremental approach to institutional strengthening predicated in the Peace Accord in order to allow the future of northern Mali to be in the hands of the people living there. The assessment has been developed with the ultimate goal of shortening the delays between the assessment of needs and the design of implementation structures that can have a meaningful impact on people's lives. These structures include those developed through the deliberate emphasis on use of humanitarian and security arrangements for recovery and development purposes until longer-term development modalities can be established.

The Peace Accord is founded on the recognition that a durable resolution to the conflict in northern Mali requires addressing the structural and underlying drivers of conflict. This understanding has also underpinned the identification and prioritization of needs presented in this report—any meaningful effort to recover and develop the northern regions cannot focus on reconstruction of damaged infrastructure alone. Rather, it will need to tackle the deep-rooted and evolving grievances of the population in the north through a combination of investments and broader national reforms required to establish the foundations for lasting peace and prosperity.

## METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

The Joint Assessment Mission was launched in June 2015 following the signing of the Peace Accord. The three development banks, along with the United Nations, have coordinated the preparation and conduct of the assessment, under the overall guidance and direction of the Accords Monitoring Committee.

The assessment has followed the methodology established for Post-Conflict Needs Assessments, as guided by the 2008 Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments.<sup>3</sup> The methodology was adjusted somewhat in response to the

<sup>2</sup> International conference for the economic recovery and development of Mali, OECD, Paris, 22 October 2015, <http://www.oecd.org/countries/mali/mali-development-conference-2015.htm>. The conference welcomed the findings and recommendations of the Joint Assessment Mission.

<sup>3</sup> PCNAs are carried out under a tripartite agreement between the European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank and provide a framework for different partners to participate in the conduct and completion of the assessment, based on respective interests and comparative advantages. While in the past PCNAs were burdensome and lengthy, with a goal to produce comprehensive national reconstruction and development plans, they have become more flexible in order to address urgent needs and more limited objectives within support provided to implement peace agreements and create the conditions for designing long-term development programs. These lessons have a significant impact on the way a PCNA might be carried out to address opportunities and challenges related to the situation in Mali. [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/Trilateral\\_JD\\_on\\_post\\_crisis\\_assessments\\_final\\_draft\\_15\\_September\\_08\\_logos.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/Trilateral_JD_on_post_crisis_assessments_final_draft_15_September_08_logos.pdf)

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tight time-frame imposed by the Peace Accord and the continued insecurity in large parts of northern Mali, which made it difficult for teams to visit and undertake field based information and data collection.

The evaluation has been carried out in four phases:

1. A review and update of existing knowledge and information concerning the situation in northern Mali, building on the work completed before the 2013 Brussels Conference
2. The design and implementation of a survey tool for the collection and validation of additional supplemental data
3. The staging of consultations with the population
4. The finalization and validation of a framework for the evaluation and its prioritization

The first phase of MIEC was organized as an exercise focused on the quick compilation and synthesis of existing knowledge and information related to the development of priority elements and cross-cutting issues. In order to promote the rapid completion of this stage, and given the number of actors taking part within each priority area, the initial task was divided into the production of 15 thematic memos,<sup>4</sup> each of which covers a subseries of strategic objectives and cross-cutting issues. Each memo presents an analysis of the situation based on existing data and information, along with planned project activities. Each also contains a matrix of transition outcomes presenting the main activities to be performed in order to comply with the commitments outlined by the Peace Accord and other programs deemed necessary to achieve peace, stability, and development in northern Mali.

The second phase involved assessing the needs and priorities of the people of northern Mali with regard to security, peace, stability, and development. This was done through the rollout of four different surveys from August to September 2015 (see Appendix 3 for further details).

1. The first was a home survey that investigated responses from 500 households within the regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu.
2. The second was a survey conducted on administrative and traditional authorities in locations where households were surveyed.
3. The third survey was conducted in health centers within the three regions covered by the household survey.
4. The fourth and last was conducted with displaced persons and refugees in camps located in Mauritania and Niger.

The third phase included a series of consultations with local authorities and representatives of civil society in the three regions along with consultations with government and other stakeholders in Bamako. The purpose of these consultations was to facilitate early validation of the results of the Joint Assessment Mission and to refine the prioritization of proposed actions based on a more granular understanding of regional and subregional differences. Validation workshops were organized in the cities of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal and involved more than 170 participants, including local elected officials, administrative staff, representatives from civil society and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and representatives of customary authorities. Their contributions have been integrated into this report and helped refine the prioritization framework.

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<sup>4</sup> Thematic notes were produced for (1) geography, population, demography, and culture; (2) poverty incidence; (3) education and vocational training; (4) health; (5) water and sanitation; (6) humanitarian and food security situation and reinsertion of displaced populations; (7) economic structure and sectors of activity; (8) youth and employment; (9) transport and access; (10) energy and ITC; (11) natural resources and environment; (12) local governance and participation; (13) decentralization; (14) security, justice, social peace, and national reconciliation; and (15) gender.

## CONSTRAINTS AND RISKS

The joint assessment identified several constraints and risks that will impact the recovery and development process in northern Mali in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the Peace Accord. The following risks are particularly worth noting:

- Chronic insecurity complicates the implementation of the Peace Accord and recovery process as well as the implementation of related development priorities, and acts as a buffer against positive results.
- Broader national policy objectives might divert attention toward urgent actions and reforms once the immediacy of the crisis has passed, resulting in a slow-down in implementation of the commitments made in the Peace Accord.
- The absence of compatible organizational structures to ensure the appropriate coordination of recovery priorities between the government and its international partners concerning humanitarian interventions, policies and diplomacy, and security and development may slow performance and lead to redundancy and a poor prioritization of needs and actions, as well as inefficient technical programming.

# 2

## Context and Impact Analysis

### CONTEXT

The conflict in Mali was triggered in January 2012, when a rebellion in the north and a military coup in Bamako almost brought the government to its knees. It was followed by an occupation of the northern regions by terrorist groups who have been routed out by the military intervention of France in support of the Malian army in January 2013, and subsequently reinforced by a coalition of African forces. A period of stability followed with peaceful elections marking the return of democratic government in September that year. The international community offered significant support to the stabilization process, including the authorization of an international Peacekeeping Mission—United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)—and pledges of €3.5 billion during the 2013 international donors’ conference in Brussels. Yet the conflict returned shortly after, in May 2014, when armed groups reclaimed control over large parts of the north. The renewed fighting and the ease with which the rebels regained control over the north have pointed to the significant grievances that still existed in the northern regions and that had not yet been possible to address in the aftermath of the 2012 rebellion.

In order to reach a long-term and comprehensive peace and security agreement, the national government and the armed group resumed negotiations on the 16th of July 2014, under the mediation of the Algerian government and with the help of the international community. These negotiations resulted in the signing of the Peace Accord on the 15th of May and 20th of June 2015 by the national government and two coalitions of armed groups.

The signing of the Peace Accord by the major armed groups represents a significant opportunity to find a lasting solution to the conflicts that have plagued northern Mali for decades. Yet clashes between armed groups remain frequent since May 2014 and a number of violent extremist groups are active across the territory. As a result, most of the regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and especially Kidal, are inaccessible for government and international actors. 2015 has seen a further deterioration of the situation, with violence spreading to other parts of the country and schools and health clinics being temporarily closed due to insecurity and clashes between different groups, including in the regions of Segou and Mopti. The security threat level in Bamako has also been elevated following a March attack by extremists on a Bamako restaurant, and terrorist groups have claimed responsibility for attacks further south toward the border with Côte d’Ivoire.

As the government and international partners prepare to implement the Peace Accord, lessons learned from attempts to implement previous agreements (the 1991 National Pact and the 2006 Algiers Agreements) have revealed several challenges that should be taken into account. These include the need to sustain urgency during the implementation of key provisions of the Peace Accord in order to restore the confidence of the people of Mali in state institutions, the adaptation of announced measures to fit socioeconomic and cultural realities on the ground, the participation of

**TABLE 2.1** Priority Action Sectors for the State, According to Populations in the North (percent)

Priority sector	Gao	Kidal	Timbuktu	Together
Poverty	34.7	39.3	41.6	38.6
Security of persons and their property	18.4	35.0	20.2	20.2
Reduction of consumer prices/cost of living	9.9	2.9	15.0	12.2
Food security	4.9	2.0	11.6	8.3
Youth employment	10.5	8.8	6.0	8.0
Health	5.0	4.0	2.1	3.4
Education	3.4	5.0	0.5	1.9
Other	13.2	3.1	3.1	7.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Household survey. Respondents indicated sectors they considered the most important to address in the present. The total percentage represents the total of households surveyed, and sector percentages represent portions thereof.

local populations in the identification of needs and priorities, and the need to adapt aid coordination and implementation arrangements to fit specific subnational dynamics within the context of wider aid programs. These experiences have highlighted that continued national reform efforts are required to put in place the minimum conditions needed to implement commitments related to security and governance arrangements. They also illuminate the disconnects that can easily be created between good ideas that have national relevance (for example, decentralization) and demands for recognition of special status through application of asymmetrical or special arrangements.

The Peace Accord might not yet have generated security across the north, yet it has offered a critical opportunity to promote stability and development of Mali. This is confirmed by survey results from the population, which highlight that two-thirds of the population is satisfied with the content of the Peace Accord. However, moving beyond the content, only 17 percent of the population expresses confidence in the ability of government to implement the Peace Accord, fewer than half of the households surveyed, and even less than a fifth in some cases, note any meaningful improvements in security, access to jobs, markets, basic infrastructure such as transportation, health services, schools, electricity, portable water, and telephone (see Appendix 3 for more details). Even more challenging is the fact that while the Peace Accord seems to place immediate emphasis on efforts to strengthen access to basic services, the population is asking for actions that address economic poverty and improve security in the short term (Table 2.1). These contradictions are not new, but they will demand significant resolve from the government and its international partners if they wish to avoid the lessons of past failures to implement peace agreements in ways that satisfy the general public.

## IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT

The impact of the conflict in northern Mali was devastating. It included the destruction of economic and social infrastructure, a reversal of previous development gains, and a significant humanitarian and forced displacement crisis. In comparison with the rest of the country, the northern regions are in a critical situation. The crisis has decimated the tourism industry and has weakened the NGO sector, leaving few employment opportunities beyond agriculture and herding. The absence of the state has created lucrative, albeit illicit economic activities for young people, among whom formal unemployment rates are high. In addition, the economic, social, and cultural fabric of northern Mali has changed fundamentally due to the combined presence of criminal and terrorist networks, the collapse of local governance, and the exacerbation of preexisting social and communal tensions.

### 6 Assessing Recovery and Development Priorities in Mali's Conflict-Affected Regions

The regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu remain in a state of prolonged crisis, with high levels of insecurity and weak governance, which are deeply rooted and extend beyond the regional capitals of Gao and Timbuktu. Most parts of the regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and especially Kidal, remain inaccessible to those working for the central government, and even to those working for local governments, without army protection. In northern Mali, most basic social services, health provision, water access, and so forth, are provided by humanitarian organizations. There are also clear signs that the conflict is transforming from rebellions that targeted the central government toward more localized and protracted conflicts between groups in the north. This change is creating rifts between different groups of people and exerting increasing pressure on the social fabric and traditional norms that were at the heart of Mali's ability to ensure a peaceful coexistence. It is also important to note that the impact of the current conflict has not been distributed equally across the northern regions.

The conflict has aggravated the general state of security in the northern regions. First, armed confrontation and tension between groups, although decreasing since the signing of the Peace Accord, remain a reality on the ground. Rivalries between groups from the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) and from the Platform (and tensions that arise from the fact that groups and militias are, in part, community based), combined with the presence of armed extremist groups hostile to the Malian Armed Forces (Les Forces armées et de sécurité du Mali, FAMA) and the international community, have resulted in an unstable level of security. Clashes of varying magnitude are regularly reported, as volatility promotes alliances between different armed groups. The situation is particularly alarming with regard to terrorist attacks, as they primarily target the civilian population and infrastructure. This climate of insecurity is gradually spreading throughout the rest of the country, as demonstrated by successive terrorist attacks in a Bamako restaurant frequented by foreign security forces in March 2015 (Le Monde 2015), in two towns in the south of the country near the Ivorian border in June 2015, in Sevare in August 2015 (BBC 2015), and at the Radisson hotel in Bamako in November 2015.

The civilian population has also been affected by collateral damage from attacks against government targets and the international community, which have been increasing. In October 2015, on the Gao-Gossi axis, an attack against a civilian convoy being escorted by FAMA was carried out with heavy artillery (rocket launchers and explosives) and claimed seven victims in Gao, including the regional director of roads (MINUSMA 2015). In addition, methods of aerial attacks never before seen in Mali have recently been used by terrorists. Finally, the security climate has worsened and the absence of adequate security forces has permitted local criminal activities to develop further, particularly in banditry and organized crime in the trafficking of drugs and human beings. The increase in such traffic is indirectly caused by the lack of alternative means of income for the population, which is sometimes forced to turn to these criminal networks, often led by armed groups.

Food insecurity and malnutrition is chronic in large parts of the Sahel, but the crisis in northern Mali has placed additional stress on the already vulnerable population living there. Today, all of the north is considered food insecure, and as of August four *cercles*<sup>5</sup> were considered by the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to be in an advanced stage of urgency. The situation is particularly worrisome in Timbuktu, where OCHA reports that prevalence of acute malnutrition stands at 17.5 percent of the population. This situation was also confirmed by the survey conducted as part of the MIEC, which highlighted that restoring food security is among the most urgent priorities for the population.

The conflict resulted in large numbers of persons displaced by force. About 353,000 persons were internally displaced, while another 170,000 fled to neighboring countries as a result of the 2012 crisis. In total, about 36 percent of the population that lived in the north before the crisis was forced to leave their homes. By October 2015 this number had decreased dramatically, with less than 200,000 still displaced. Nonetheless, the majority of this decrease has been seen among those internally displaced, while an estimated 137,000 refugees still reside outside

<sup>5</sup> The *cercle* (circle in English) is a local authority gathering several communes with a legal personality and enjoying financial autonomy. The regions of Mali are divided into 49 circles. (fr.wikipedia.org)

Mali's borders (OCHA 2015). The situation also remains unstable; the number of internally displaced increased from 57,000 to 100,000 in May 2015 following a series of attacks against villages in Timbuktu (UNHCR 2015). Surveys conducted among internally displaced persons, refugees, returnees, and residents who remained in the north during the crisis have also highlighted several important features of forced displacement in Mali. For instance, it seems that better educated and richer households as well as those exposed to less violence fled the crisis, while poorer and less educated households remained. In addition, there is a big difference between internally displaced and refugees in the way they trust government institutions, which explains why the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has decreased rapidly while the number of refugees remain high. Finally, those who fled the crisis have seen a considerable decline in their welfare, including the loss of many of their possessions, such as durable goods (20–60 percent of the population) and animals (75–90 percent). It is critical to factor these aspects into a recovery and development strategy.

The 2012 crisis also put further strains on local administrations that had already been negatively affected by the previous rebellions. The departure of many local administrators and elected officials fleeing their posts has harmed the confidence that local communities place in official local governance bodies and affected the capacities of local governments to meet their service delivery responsibilities. In addition, the crisis intensified the difficulties of ensuring justice in the north, as victims complain of impunity for crimes committed by both government forces and other armed groups and at the slowness, or absence altogether, of judicial proceedings. Criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed in the north has been transferred to the First Tribunal of Bamako in recognition of the capacity constraints that persist. In Kidal, the judicial system has been replaced by a discretionary and informal justice system administered by the armed groups that control that region.

## UNDERLYING AND ONGOING CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

The current crisis in Mali is in reality a manifestation of systemic problems related to poverty, governance, and social structures, which previous governments have failed to address in a sustainable way. The causes of the conflict are diverse and multilayered and do not fit the simplified narrative of an underserved region populated by an ethnic group that has been vying for independence ever since the Republic of Mali was formed and that is frustrated by the lack of implementation of past peace accords. What drives conflict in Mali today can be traced to widespread poverty and perceived inequality, the lack of a functioning social contract and institutions capable of strengthening the legitimacy of the state in the north, growing competition over resources (not only public funds but illicit rents), and growing social tensions due to the presence of global criminal networks and terrorist groups. These drivers are exacerbated and fueled by foreign influences, climate change and population growth that have put people's livelihoods under stress, growing access to arms and financing for illicit activities, and persistently high levels of unemployed youth who are more easily recruited for such illicit activities.


### Poverty, Marginalization, and Development Deficit

Mali is a landlocked country with low population density and large geographic diversity. It is one of the world's poorest countries with gross domestic product per capita of US\$480 2012 (adjusted for inflation using prices from 2005). Levels of poverty are high and mainly in rural areas. In 2010, over 51 percent of the population lived in poverty and 90 percent of poor people lived in rural areas, relying on rain-fed agriculture and on agropastoralism to make a living. Since then, drought (2012) and conflict (2012 to the present) have taken their toll, and the poverty level has likely risen. Irrespective of the measure used (monetary or nonmonetary asset), the vast majority of the poor live in the south of the country, where the population density is highest (Figure 2.1).

While the proportion of the poor living in the north is small (due to low population density), poverty incidences are higher than in the south when measuring asset poverty. Using the traditional (consumption–monetary poverty) poverty measure, Sikasso is the region with the highest incidence of poverty (83.2 percent) even though the region is

## 8 Assessing Recovery and Development Priorities in Mali's Conflict-Affected Regions

**FIGURE 2.1** Comparative Poverty Rates between Asset and Consumption Criteria



generally believed to have relatively low levels of poverty on account of its agroecological potential and its association with cotton, because of which market accessibility and the availability of inputs are relatively good. However, using an asset-based poverty measure, the rate of poverty incidence in Sikasso is one of the lowest in the country.<sup>6</sup> Instead, regions in the north face the highest incidence of poverty.

Several factors can be used to explain the different sources of poverty and prosperity in the north. The desert climate and high temperatures greatly limit the variety of income-generating activities and have forced the local population to adapt. Nomadism and transhumant pastoralism represent an important form of income and livelihood for a portion of the population in the extreme north of the country. Nomads account for less than 1 percent of the population in Mali as a whole but account for 42.3 percent of the population in Kidal (OECD 2015). Sedentary agropastoralism represents a critical form of income further south around permanent sources of water, the Niger River and its lower inner delta being the most important. In addition, there is significant commercial activity in the trans-Saharan trade, mainly focused around Timbuktu. Finally, fishing, again largely focused around the Timbuktu region and in the Niger River, deserves mention but remains marginal due to the landlocked nature of the country.

The development deficit is also apparent when looking at access and connectivity. The transportation network in the northern regions is underdeveloped and most of roads lack tarmac. The communications network is also underdeveloped, and access to electricity is sporadic outside the cities of Gao and Timbuktu. This deficit is not necessarily related to the lack of capital investments in the north; data suggest that the northern regions have actually received a higher proportion of the national investment budget over the past decade than other regions. Rather, it is a reflection of the higher than average cost involved in construction and delivery of services in a territory the size of the north with a population density that is significantly below the national average. This underdevelopment has been undermining economic activity and social and human development.

<sup>6</sup> Asset poverty is estimated based on the multiple correspondence analysis from several indicators of the ownership of durable goods: radio, television, landline phone, mobile phone, refrigerator, freezer, computer, air conditioner, ventilator, time piece, jewelry, land, dish, bicycle, motorcycle, car, cart, canoe, stove, table, carpet, mat, chair, armchair, dressing table, sewing machine, bed, couch, sideboard, an wardrobe. The asset poverty line is set such that the asset poverty is equal to monetary poverty at the national level.

While past grievances about poverty and a perceived marginalization of the north in terms of development and economic opportunities are important factors explaining the conflict, the situation is not presented in a comprehensive manner. Indeed, substantial evidence indicates that consumption levels and life expectancy were higher in the three northern regions (after Bamako) than in the rest of country before the crisis. Kidal and Gao have levels of chronic malnutrition lower than those in the rest of the country (World Bank 2014, 84), and Kidal boasted the highest literacy rate among the heads of households, the lowest mortality rate, and the highest levels of per capita consumption after Bamako. (See Table 2.2 for the levels of various human development indicators.) The conflict has, however, likely widened the development deficit between the north and the south through the disruption of activities and health services of hospitals, pharmacies, and schools, as well as of water and electricity services (see Appendix 5 for details). In addition, widespread looting of social service providers and grain storage buildings by armed groups has reduced the ability of institutions to provide food on credit to offset the pervasive food insecurity that has plagued the region. According to the Afrobarometer, close to one out of three Malians has either been personally affected by these disturbances or knew someone in their family who had been (Coulibaly 2014).

The conflict has reduced the mobility of the population, limited access to markets, increased theft of property, and resulted in a general reduction in economic activity. Herders who had owned big herds of livestock were forced to leave the areas of conflict and seek refuge in southern Mali and neighboring countries, while those with fewer animals had to practice farming inside secure compounds. Traders, for the most part, could not leave their places of origin without the risk of facing attack or losing their property and cash, which they often carry with them. The lack of a reliable banking system has added to the overall insecurity of tradesmen, who are often unable to find a safe place for their cash holdings accumulated through their trading activities. Farmers have had to leave their fields and have therefore not been able to continue to cultivate their lands and financially benefit from the potential yields. Some Malians have turned to fishing, and in general subsistence farmers were less disturbed by the crisis given that their operations were initially isolated from the support of social services and their profits were normally not sufficient to attract the attention of marauding rebel groups (Kimenyi et al. 2014).

## Governance

Over the past two decades the government has tried to improve governance nationwide through various reform initiatives, most notably through a political commitment to decentralization and increased degrees of local autonomy. Decentralization has been a component of Malian governance since independence in 1960, but it became more pronounced as a core structural principle of state organization with the launch of the democratization process in the early 1990s. Decentralization was seen largely as a policy reform intended to “restore the balance of political expression across Mali’s vast and disparate territory” (Lemelle 2008, 17). It was meant to consolidate and deepen democracy, improving the relationship between state and society and providing specific development benefits through decentralized service delivery. It came about through an elaborate national dialogue process that was coordinated by the transitional government and was attended by 1,800 delegates, including representatives of the newly created political parties, religious groups, trade unions, women’s groups, students, and peasant representatives. The conference confirmed that “the idea that greater vertical accountability could be achieved through decentralized local governance had great currency in Mali” (Wing 2013, 480).

In reality, decentralization quickly became framed in the context of territorial integrity, peace, and stability. Early efforts to respond to Tuareg grievances and concerns resulted in the promotion of a “special status” for the north. The 1991 Tamanrasset Agreement recognized the special status of the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu and promised to increase development-related efforts in these parts of the country. The National Pact of April 1992 agreed to a new administrative reorganization in northern Mali, yet this special status for the north was never fully realized. Instead, Mali opted for one integrated model of decentralization across the entire country. Three subnational levels were designed, and 761 devolved government entities—*collectivités territoriales*—split into 703 communes, 49 circles, and 8 regions, in addition to the special district of Bamako. Contrary to the promise in the National Pact that the regions would become the primary level of local governance, the decentralization law constituted the commune as

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Indicators	National			Gao		Timbuktu		Kidal	
	Previous period, 2001–8	Before the crisis, 2009–11	After the crisis, 2013–14	Before the crisis	After the crisis	Before the crisis	After the crisis	Before the crisis	After the crisis
Literacy rate	27%	27%	33%						
Rate of working labor force that has not received school education	79%	79%	64%	69%		78%		76.4%	
Primary school completion rate	32%	32%	58%	41.7%	21.5%	35.1%	24.8%	24.6%	0.0%
Gross enrollment rate in primary education	52%	52%	80%	98.5%	51.5%	77.2%	50.0%	54.6%	0.0%
Gross enrollment rate in lower secondary education	22%	22%	57%	43.7%	26.9%	29.9%	18.5%	26.3%	0.0%
Ratio of men to women at primary and secondary level	73%	73% <sup>a</sup>	79%	72%		64%		70%	
Children out of school (6–11 years)		49%	43%	22.3%		67.1%		65.4%	
Children out of school (12–17 years)	67%	67%	49%						
Proportion of children suffering from stunted growth (less than 5 years)	43%	43%	26.6%						
Rate of prenatal consultations	75%	75%	90%	65%	90%	70%	87%	64%	31%
Rate of curative consultations	26%	26%	33%	33%	41%	34%	53%	49%	22%
Infant mortality rate (0–5 years) per 1,000 children <sup>c</sup>		212	132	136		229		136	
Number of infant deaths per 100,000 births	830	830 <sup>c</sup>	540 <sup>b</sup>	534	462	426	472	175	231
Rate of access to portable water		70%	64%	45%	37%	31%	23%	62%	53%

Source: Report on the impact of crisis on social sectors using data from Demographic and Health surveys/WHO Global database on nutrition; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Health; SMART.

a. Females enrolled in proportion of males enrolled; b. DHS 2013 is not fully comparable; c. Not fully comparable with 2010 data.

the basic level of decentralization; the already 19 existing urban communes were maintained, and all villages were asked to organize themselves into rural communes. Local governance at the commune level would be decided based on direct elections, while circle and regional level representation would be decided through indirect elections. Security, which had been a major concern among northern groups, was retained as a central level responsibility.

Decentralization did not contribute to higher degrees of confidence in the state, and the 2012 crisis brought to the fore questions about whether decentralized autonomy and local elections actually promote peace and territorial integrity. Delivering government services in northern Mali is challenging. The per capita cost of services is much higher when the number of service users is lower and the prevalence of nomadism is higher. Insecurity, limited infrastructure, and fiscal constraints compound the challenge and fuel a perception of marginalization and discrimination. Beyond questions of fiscal viability of the system as a whole, the cohesion challenges of the northern regions were not adequately solved by the different waves of decentralization reform over past decades. This problem has been further compounded by the competition to both tradition and the state that was introduced by criminal networks and fundamentalist religious groups and the resulting breakdown in traditional hierarchies guiding social interaction within certain ethnic groups.

The Peace Accord offers a new attempt to address the challenges of governance and local representation. In particular, it includes commitments to increase representation of northern populations in state institutions and to reform the existing High Council of Local Authorities to ensure representation of traditional authorities, youth, and women. It also sanctions regionalization as a guiding principle for further decentralization in Mali, as reflected in the strengthening of the presidency of the Regional Council, which will be elected by direct universal vote, the winner of which will serve as chief executive in the region (Article 6). To achieve the objective of decentralization and regionalization, the state has pledged to transfer 30 percent of its national budget to the benefit of local authorities by 2030. The agreement also provides for a review of the administrative supervision exercised by the central government over the local authorities. Beyond efforts to strengthen local governance, other provisions also aim to reinforce inclusivity and diversity at the national level, notably through the creation of a second chamber in the parliament and through better representation of northern communities in state institutions. While these commitments are promising, lessons from the past have highlighted the challenges of moving from agreement to implementation of such ideas.

## Geographic, Demographic, and Climate Challenges

The regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu cover an area of 932,490 square kilometers, or three-fourths of the total land area of Mali, but only 1.6 million inhabitants, or 9 percent of the national population. While the overall population density of the country was 13.50 persons per square kilometer in 2013, the average was 3.68 in Gao, 1.57 in Timbuktu, and 0.29 in Kidal. This low density has a significant impact on development efforts in terms of costs for infrastructure and delivery of services. Complications in establishing a significant presence of the state are abundant, and the same holds true for strengthening the security and justice system for the entirety of the population.

One special feature of the three northern regions is the arid landscape and a climate that is un conducive to most agricultural production. The climate is characterized, first, by very low rainfall and, second, by a very strong geographic heterogeneity. There are three main ecological zones within these regions. First is the Saharan zone, where the economy is based on livestock, camels, oasis systems, and major caravan routes. Then comes the Sahelian zone, where resource scarcity and unpredictability induces both low population density and a preponderance of pastoral systems operating on the basis of the mobility of the herds, which are a function of the availability of pastureland and water. Finally, there is the zone to the south, defined by agropastoral systems wherein rain-fed agriculture is extremely risky given the inconsistent pattern of rainfall.

These characteristics explain the typology of livelihoods that exist in the north, with a prevalence of nomadism in the far north and agropastoralism along the Niger Basin. While these activities are adapted to the desert climate

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in general, they have not reduced the vulnerability of northern populations to climate change, including increased periods of drought and erratic rainfall, which has had a significant negative impact on the overall economic activity and subsistence income in the northern regions over recent decades. Today most of the nomads have become semisedentary, moving not constantly but up to three times a year to follow the seasons. Many engage in activities traditionally conducted by sedentary communities and, in turn, sedentary communities undertake traditionally pastoral activities. These changes have resulted in an unprecedented competition for access to resources and in increase in the number of local conflicts. They have also contributed to the fragmentation of traditional authority, to the diversification of economic activities, and to the increase in illicit smuggling and trafficking. Finally, the development of this new competition in rural areas has attracted outsiders, coming from mainly urban areas, who take advantage of this conflict by moving in on local markets and profiting from local economic activities.

Population growth puts additional pressure on fragile livelihood and land tenure systems. Mali has an average population growth of 2.8 percent. The population is young, and up of about 47 percent children and youth below 14 years of age. It furthermore has one of the highest age-dependency ratios in Sub-Saharan Africa, at 95 percent (World Bank 2015). Combined with conflict, climate change, and competing demands by pastoralists and farmers, this creates growing pressure on access to productive land and natural resources.


The Sahel-Saharan strip is characterized by borders, which—for practical purposes—are not always taken into consideration by the resident populations. Pastoral spaces used by nomadic groups continue to trade based on interdependency and complementarity of more or less ancient production systems that exploit scarce resources across large spaces to the benefit of all. Therefore, the cross-border zones—while generating economic opportunities—also lead to competition for resources and an increase in the number of localized conflicts.

## Influence of Regional Security Threats in the Sahel

The security problems in Mali have a significant cross-border aspect and are closely intertwined with the situation in the Sahel region and North Africa. The state has long struggled to establish a positive and stabilizing effect in the northern regions. The collapse of the Libyan state in 2011 and the associated arrival of heavily armed and trained militant groups in northern Mali was only the latest in a series of events that have reinforced a governance and security vacuum. The topography and geographic situation of the Sahel provide ideal conditions for the conduct of illegal trafficking, from cigarette and food to migrants, drugs, and weapons. These trends were escalated with the collapse of Libya and the expansion of criminal and international trafficking networks and trading routes across the region that use Mali as a key transit point.

The crisis also resulted in a gradual increase in the number of terrorist groups in northern Mali. At least four terrorist networks are currently believed to be active in northern Mali, including Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique, Ansar Dine, Al Mourabitoun, and Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'ouest. These groups have also formed important links with broader terrorist networks, both in the region (Boko Haram, Islamic State) and globally (Al-Qaida). While the early onset of the 2012 crisis saw these groups struggling to integrate communities in the north with a tradition for more moderate forms of religious expression, there has been a gradual radicalization of communities in response to a protracted security crisis. A gradual increase in access to weapons and training combined with high unemployment rates among young people are also critical factors explaining the persistent insecurity across the north.<sup>7</sup> Deteriorating security situations continue to pose a challenge to development cooperation and restrict the delivery of humanitarian assistance and development aid, which in turn exacerbates the vulnerability of the region and its population.

<sup>7</sup> Youth unemployment was reported to have increased dramatically from 2011 to 2015. It increased from 6.7 percent to 12.3 percent in Timbuktu and from 25.3 percent to 32 percent in Gao. No comparative data exists for Kidal, but unemployment was reported at 41.7 percent in 2011. These figures report unemployment for only the formal sector and are likely to be compounded by underemployment in the formal sector (INSTAT 2015).



# Establishing a Framework to Identify Recovery and Development Priorities in Northern Mali

## 3

### LESSONS LEARNED AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PRIORITIZATION AND SEQUENCING OF POST-CONFLICT NEEDS

The Peace Accord requested that the MIEC be prepared within three months of the accord's signing. Yet peace remains elusive in northern Mali, and the continued insecurity has imposed important restrictions on the design and conduct of the assessment itself. To address these challenges, the technical team responsible for the assessment applied the following lessons from similar exercises in other parts of the world:

- *Place emphasis on immediate actions that are both critical and possible to implement.* The focus was at first placed on performing a quick assessment with the aim to identify the most urgent priority actions that could be defined and implemented during the 18-month interim period established by the Peace Accord. These actions have been evaluated according to their presumed impact on peace and stability in the affected areas, and then evaluated on the basis of what was deemed realistic given the current implementation constraints.
- *Avoid pressures to reinvent the wheel through a heavy assessment process.* Unlike many other post-conflict situations, Mali already has a well-established system for planning and information-gathering. Significant work was carried out to assess needs in the lead up to the 2013 Brussels Conference, which has since been followed by a series of local and regional assessments and development plans, in addition to the range of studies and analyses done by both national and international partners. The MIEC has focused on compiling and updating existing information rather than on collecting new data and information. This approach is supported by lessons from other post-conflict needs assessments, which have shown the futility of generating solid baseline data as a basis for longer term development in fluid and fast-changing conflict environments.
- *Do not plan for the sake of planning.* The results from the assessment will inform decisions concerning the immediate programmatic and financial support that can contribute to peace, stability, and recovery in northern Mali. As such, the assessment has also included mapping ongoing and planned activities by different actors—across humanitarian, stabilization, and development areas—to identify not only the needs but also the actors and implementation mechanisms that could be used and strengthened in the immediate term.
- *Use remote access technology to assess perceptions when faced with access constraints.* An important element of the assessment consisted of comparing the identified needs and priorities with the views and expectations of the affected populations. To this end, a survey was carried out among the population in the north to get a better sense of how they view the Peace Accord and immediate priorities going forward. The survey was conducted in August and September of 2015 and comprised four different surveys directed at households, administrative authorities, health centers, and refugees and displaced persons. The use of mobile phones allows the collection of the perceptions of the population even when faced with access constraints (see Appendix 3 for details of the results).

- *Do not assume that the north is a homogenous area.* The regions of northern Mali were not impacted by the conflict in a uniform manner, and social, economic, and cultural differences are apparent both across and within the regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. Regionalization is an important part of the commitments made in the Peace Accord, and the assessment placed particular emphasis on trying to identify and highlight examples of how prioritization might need to be addressed through a modular approach for each of the three regions going forward.
- *Link localized priorities with progress on national reforms.* Although the Peace Accord focuses on the regions of the country most affected by the conflict, it also includes a certain number of important reforms for strategic, security, and institutional mechanisms. These reforms include the establishment of new regional administrations and new regional development agencies responsible for the implementation of development projects, which will have a significant impact on the planning and implementation of development for the regions. To the extent possible, the assessment worked to highlight these national reforms in the development of the prioritization framework.

On the basis of these lessons learned, the joint assessment has applied the following considerations to guide prioritization:

- Whether the activity would have an immediate impact on peace and stability and the implementation of the Peace Accord at large
- Whether mechanisms exist already to facilitate immediate implementation
- Whether the activity responds to urgent priorities as voiced through the perception survey and validation exercise
- Whether activities will directly target the poorest and most vulnerable households and population groups


## PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

In applying lessons learned from previous post-conflict assessments of needs and the guiding principles outlined above, the MIEC has identified three priority pillars for recovery and development in northern Mali. These have been confirmed by the technical work across sectors as well as by the survey and validation that was undertaken as part of the assessment. The pillars, visualized in Figure 3.1, are as follows:

- *Priority Pillar 1: Strengthen peace, social resilience, and decentralized governance.* Security is a prerequisite for recovery and development in northern Mali. Reconciliation and reinforcement of the country's social fabric also represent an important precondition for effective and sustainable recovery over time. In the absence of social resilience, the risk of renewed conflict remains high, as Mali's recent history has shown, with significant impacts on both the population and on investments in infrastructure, services, and economic recovery. This is particularly critical in a context where large parts of the population were forcefully displaced, and where return risks trigger new conflict dynamics and grievances. To this end, it is essential to ensure the participation of all parts of the population in the peace and reconciliation process over time. The Peace Accord puts significant emphasis on security sector reform (SSR), integration of some combatants into Malian armed forces, and a new Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program through which the armed groups would disarm and participate in the efforts for strengthened security and resilience. Similarly, the Peace Accord is predicated on a renewed commitment to decentralization, which will require significant efforts to both enable the state to return to the north and to build the capacities and institutions required to allow the local population to take an active role in the governance and development of the northern regions.
- *Priority Pillar 2: Restore and improve basic social services and protection.* The sustainable restoration and improvement of basic social services such as education, health, and water and sanitation is an essential element for lasting peace and development, as well as the key to the normalization process and stabilization of society in the areas affected by the crisis. The effective and efficient provision of social services requires both rebuilding and further developing the service delivery infrastructure in the north and putting in place the capacities and

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**FIGURE 3.1** Priority Pillars for Recovery and Development



systems required to facilitate effective delivery and supervision of services over time according to the functional decentralization in Mali. In addition, the establishment of a system for social protection will be critical for long-term support to poor and vulnerable populations, not only by alleviating the suffering of these population groups, but also by reestablishing citizens' confidence in the state.

- *Priority Pillar 3: Promote economic and infrastructure recovery and employment.* The conflict has resulted in widespread disruption of economic activities, destruction of infrastructure, and loss of livelihoods. It was also triggered by a strong presence of illegal economic opportunities and the lack of employment opportunities (in particular among youth). The population in the north reports a strong sense of marginalization from the rest of Mali, which is also explained by the size of the territory and the low population density, which makes infrastructure investments in particular exceptionally costly. Yet facilitating rapid economic recovery and promoting investments that will help the northern regions become better integrated with the rest of the country will be critical to any effort to promote recovery and development in a sustainable manner. As such, this report proposes an approach to economic recovery and the reconstruction of infrastructure that is focused on increased employment and improved social and economic connectivity, in order to reduce the vulnerability of populations affected by the conflict and to increase environmental resilience.

Within each component, the priorities have been distinguished according to whether they should be realized in the immediate term (during the first year), the short term (during the second year), or during the medium to longer term (from the third to the sixth year). This prioritization is the subject of the discussion in Chapter 4 and Appendix 5. It is important to note that the numbering of the pillars does not in any way represent an attempt to prioritize them. Rather, the temporal prioritization is described within each pillar as actions under each of the proposed subcomponents discussed.

In addition to the priority pillars, the MIEC has identified three important transversal issues that need to be treated across each pillar and its respective subcomponents:

- *Gender inequality.* The conflict has disproportionately impacted women, who have lost their spouses and been victims of rape, forced marriage, and other atrocities. Moreover, the destruction of local health-providing infrastructures has had a negative impact on access to important health services, especially reproductive health. The crisis has equally had a negative impact on the economic situation for women, who in many cases are the main providers for large households. The Peace Accord includes a focus on transitional justice measures, which will provide legal support for women in addition to their socioeconomic reintegration by way of economic revival programs and the promotion of income-generating activities. Strengthening the place and the role of women within society through information programs promoting awareness of peace and other themes affecting their lives will support these goals.
- *Perceptions of inter- and intraregional differences.* The MIEC reveals significant differences in the needs of different groups and the perception of these needs by the population. These differences are apparent both when identifying needs and priorities overall and when attempting to assess intraregional differences in the way they are pronounced. The effectiveness of the immediate recovery and development process will depend on whether such differences are captured during the planning and implementation of specific activities.
- *The implementation capacity of regional and local governments.* The causes of the crisis have been traced to the lack of capacity of local governments to assume the roles handed to them by the decentralization law and to engage in efforts to provide development for the population in the north. Weak local administrative and institutional capacity to manage development activities have both impacted the trust that population groups place in their locally elected officials and the effective use of limited resources for service delivery and development. By integrating efforts to strengthen local governments across the pillars of the MIEC, the goal is to promote the implementation and coordination of activities and the responsiveness of local governments to urgent and emerging needs, ultimately resulting in a sustained recovery process that is more participatory, inclusive, and accountable.

The crosscutting issues described have been integrated across the pillars. Specific project lines have been included when explicitly discussing activities targeting these issues, such as women's participation in the reconciliation process or the implementation and operationalization of the new regional government entities described in the Peace Accord.

The crosscutting issues should be understood in two ways:

1. Data regarding gender inequality and regional differences have been used to ensure effective targeting of proposed activities toward the most vulnerable and further prioritization across the pillars with respect to intraregional differences in needs.
2. Information concerning capacities of local governments has been used to prioritize across time based on existing implementation capacities and a strategy to strengthen them.

It must be noted that the MIEC report did not specifically address institutional requirements and specific needs related to the creation of the two new regions of Taoudéni and Ménaka as anticipated by the Agreement (see Chapter 5 for more details).

# 4

## Summary of Identified Priorities

### OVERVIEW

The MIEC has identified priority activities for recovery and development in northern Mali over the next six years amounting to CFAF 2,847,558.9 million (Table 4.1). Of this amount, CFAF 298,908.2 million is related to immediate needs during year one, another CFAF 511,767.2 million for year two, while 60 percent of the total needs—CFAF 2,036,883.4 million—has been identified for years three through six to promote peace, stability, and development.

Strict prioritization has been included in the framework presented. While the majority of the total prioritization, roughly 60 percent, can be associated with economic and infrastructure development under priority component three over the course of the six-year period covered by the assessment, most of these investments will kick in only toward the end of the second year. During the first year, the majority of the needs—approximately CFAF 178,715.2 million—is directly associated with efforts to address the ongoing humanitarian (CFAF 114,718 million) and security (CFAF 63,997 million) situation in northern Mali. This amounts to approximately 60 percent of the total priorities for year one. The remaining 40 percent of the priority activities during this first year are also directly associated with efforts to implement commitments in the Peace Accord and putting the foundations in place for sustainable recovery and development.

The prioritization exercise has been informed by targeted efforts to collect feedback directly from the population in the conflict-affected areas. As mentioned in Chapter 1, perception surveys were carried out and validation workshops were conducted in Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal to seek feedback on the findings and help inform the

**TABLE 4.1** Cost of Recovery and Development Needs

Priority pillar	Costs (CFAF, millions)			
	Year 1	Year 2	Years 3–6	Total
Strengthen peace, social resilience, and decentralized governance	109,418.6	106,762.9	213,798.2	429,979.7
Restore and improve social services and protection	77,965.8	85,011.4	473,113.6	636,090.8
Promote economic and infrastructure recovery and employment	111,523.8	319,993.0	1,349,971.6	1,781,488.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>298,908.2</b>	<b>511,767.2</b>	<b>2,036,883.4</b>	<b>2,847,558.9</b>

recommendations and prioritization of the joint assessment mission (see Appendix 3 for a detailed presentation of the perception survey). These efforts allowed the team to identify key trends and several notable differences between groups and regions in the north in terms of prioritization. Respondents all rated security as their number one concern and the critical priority for government going forward. Food security was also noted as a prime concern, and households emphasize that poverty reduction should be at the core of government action. In terms of socio-economic priorities, respondents and particularly the youth name job creation as a top priority. As for basic social services, households noted that the quality or service and particularly the availability of water would be an important condition for development, whereas authorities surveyed seemed to favor infrastructure construction and capacity strengthening as critical. In terms of governance, all respondents highlighted the need to support initiatives to give more power to local populations to manage their own affairs, although the specific measures proposed differed across regions or communities. Differences also exist between displaced people (IDPs and refugees, especially those in Mauritania) and the rest of the population in terms of which governance or security initiatives should be promoted. These aspects have been integrated into the development of each pillar below.

The costs of meeting anticipated humanitarian needs have, to the extent possible, been integrated into relevant priority pillars. Costs related to the humanitarian clusters Protection and Shelter are found predominantly in pillar one. Costs related to Nutrition, Health, Education, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene are found in pillar two. And costs related to Food Security, Agriculture and Early Recovery are within pillar three. Three challenges are worth noting with the way humanitarian priorities have been integrated into this assessment:

1. Contrary to the strict prioritization that has been carried out for the rest of the assessment, humanitarian projects are strictly needs based and taken from the annual Common Humanitarian Appeal process. While needs have been further refined through follow-up discussions with OCHA staff and other UN agencies and NGOs, no effort has gone into prioritizing among these needs.
2. Disaggregation of costs by region is also not possible using OCHA data, and so calculation of humanitarian needs for the three regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal are therefore approximate.
3. The government also has its own emergency action plan with a compilation of humanitarian needs. The financing and implementation of the activities listed here is often carried out by United Nations agencies. While further analysis was carried out to avoid as much as possible the double-counting of these projects, some overlap and duplication might still exist.

The remainder of this chapter will summarize the priorities identified under each of the priority pillars. For more details regarding each pillar, please refer to Appendix 5.

## **PRIORITY PILLAR 1: STRENGTHEN PEACE, SOCIAL RESILIENCE, AND DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE**

This priority pillar aims to put in place the immediate conditions required for recovery and development efforts to move forward. It places urgent emphasis on efforts to promote security, trust, and confidence-building between former warring parties and to start implementation of critical foundational elements related to the security environment in the Peace Accord. These include parallel efforts to integrate combatants into Malian armed forces based on mutually-agreed criteria, and a new DDR program through which combatants will return to civilian life and communities. It also promotes issues related to the reconstruction of the social fabric and trust in government institutions in the north over time through an emphasis on justice, reconciliation, and participation and through prioritizing immediate support to both returning populations and host communities. Finally, it focuses on the critical underpinnings required at both national and local levels to deepen decentralization, implement the government's commitment to regionalization, and strengthen local government institutions so that these become effective and accountable to the population in the north.

## Needs and Impact of the Crisis

The conflict in northern Mali has generated a protracted crisis. The security situation remains volatile following the signing of the Peace Accord, especially in the northern provinces of the country. On the ground, the rivalry between groups of the CMA and those of the Platform remains strong, and tensions frequently result in violent incidents. The presence of armed extremist groups hostile to the efforts of the international community in northern parts of Mali makes the security situation more unstable and precarious. The presence and repeated attacks by terrorist groups is also worrying. In this highly volatile and insecure situation, implementation of recovery and development activities is close to impossible.

The conflict and resulting displacement have had a direct negative impact on social cohesion and the resilience of communities. Large-scale displacement, diminishing levels of trust, and the lack of rule of law have created new conflict dynamics between groups in the north as each has been left to fend for itself in the absence of the state security and justice. Limited presence of and trust in government institutions was a key challenge before the crisis and has been exacerbated since 2012, when government officials fled, offices were destroyed, and service delivery capacities disrupted. This situation has also further exacerbated a sense among the population that they are marginalized and not cared for by the central government.

## Rationale and Link to Peace Accord

Under this pillar, the focus is on efforts to support the restoration of basic security through SSR and DDR, to strengthen the resilience of populations affected by the conflict (including displaced persons and host communities), to promote reconciliation and trust between groups, and to strengthen the protection of vulnerable groups through an emphasis on justice. Together, these issues are fundamental to efforts to put in place the underpinnings for sustainable peace and development. Indeed, without security few of the other recommendations in this report can be implemented.

Moreover, the security, defense, governance and reconciliation elements covered under this pillar are essential for the implementation of the Peace Accord. Integration and DDR of combatants are among the core security-related activities in the Peace Accord that will lay the groundwork for the participation of former combatants in recovery and development efforts, while sustaining the communities to which former combatants will return. While DDR and integration will help establish a secure environment, it is recognized that integrating former combatants into the military and DDR alone cannot resolve the conflict in Mali. Given the cyclical nature of the conflict, reconciliation and trust are of the utmost importance and will be possible only through the active participation of women and youth. Without real efforts to strengthen intra- and intercommunity trust, and trust between the state and its citizens, there is little chance to ensure lasting peace and development. And without sincere efforts to deepen decentralization and strengthen local institutions it will not be possible for the population to take an active part in their own governance. The survey of perceptions conducted as part of the MIEC has confirmed that people consider safety their first priority and a precondition for anything else; they demand a say in the future governance of their regions.

## Overview of Priority Interventions and Financial Requirements

The peace, social resilience, and governance pillar comes with an estimated cost envelope of CFAF 429,979.7 million, which will be spread across a number of subcomponents, as detailed in Table 4.2.

In the immediate term, CFAF 109,418.6 million will be required to implement a set of urgent priorities across the different subcomponents. These are directly linked to the creation of minimum security conditions for the implementation of other priorities in this report—and the need to urgently generate trust and confidence within and between communities, between returning populations and host communities, and between citizens and the state to prevent the risk of future conflicts. Similarly, immediate actions will focus on support to returning populations, integration and DDR, and the creation of alternative livelihoods for unemployed youth (covered under component

Subcomponent	Objective	Costs (CFAF, millions)			
		Year 1	Year 2	Years 3–6	Total
<b>Security</b>	Improve the security environment in the north for the implementation of recovery and development activities; support the implementation of security-related commitments in the Peace Accord, including integration and DDR of armed groups.	63,996.9	57,390.4	85,869.5	207,256.8
<b>Justice</b>	Expand and strengthen citizens' access to justice in the north by increasing the capacity, legitimacy, and accountability of law enforcement and justice institutions and offering mechanisms for transitional justice.	3,277.4	2,242.4	1,912.4	7,432.1
<b>Reconciliation, trust, and participation</b>	Reconstruct the social fabric in the north, build trust in government institutions, and put in place critical underpinnings to deepen decentralization and strengthen local government institutions so that these become effective, legitimate, and accountable.	15,198.9	35,798.6	122,239.2	173,236.7
<b>Displacement, returnees, and resilience of host communities</b>	Build the resilience of populations affected by conflict, including those that were displaced and those that remained in the north throughout the conflict; promote local conflict mitigation between returnees and host communities.	26,945.4	11,331.5	3,777.2	42,054.1
<b>Total</b>		<b>109,418.6</b>	<b>106,762.9</b>	<b>213,798.2</b>	<b>429,979.7</b>

three). Finally, the pillar proposes a number of urgent priorities related to the implementation of the security and governance arrangements agreed on as part of the Peace Accord, including in terms of supporting reforms to implement the new regionalization policy and developing regional strategies for the implementation of the vision presented by the Joint Assessment.

During the course of the second year and for the remainder of the assessment period, efforts should be scaled up to consolidate the early advances through support to the justice sector, a deepening of efforts to promote security and reconciliation across the north, and more precise efforts to improve the functioning of the Malian police and security sector. In addition, efforts will continue to target both returning populations and the resilience of host communities with a view to keeping new or simmering tensions from erupting. And finally, focus will remain on the wider set of governance reforms required to deepen decentralization and to ensure that local institutions become capacitated to take on the roles and functions predicated in the law.

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Given the nature of the activities covered under this component, many of the proposed activities during the first year and into the second year will rely on a scaling up of existing humanitarian programs, to ensure that these are able to deliver the types of urgent activities proposed. Similarly, security-promoting activities will involve financing through the UN Peacekeeping Operation and other relevant actors. Finally, support to reconciliation and decentralization reform will need to find ways to channel resources and support directly to the north to promote the dialogue activities and institutional strengthening required for the implementation of recovery and development activities to be done through local institutions over time (see Chapter 5 for further details).

## PRIORITY PILLAR 2: RESTORE AND IMPROVE BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES AND PROTECTION

Priority Pillar 2 aims to restore basic service delivery infrastructure that was destroyed by the conflict and to further improve the capacity of local governments to deliver quality services and social welfare support to the population in the north. Sub-elements covered are education, health, water and sanitation, and social protection. The component defines the immediate and long-term priorities needed to restore essential social services, in accordance with the Peace Accord.

### Needs and Impact of the Crisis

While Mali had made significant progress on its human development indicators between 2001 and 2010, it was not on track to meet many of the Millennium Development Goals. The three northern regions were, in some cases, lagging behind the rest of the country in terms of access to basic services even before the 2012 crisis, but the situation was worsened by the crisis, as highlighted in Table 2.2 (Chapter 2).

The conflict has had major impacts on infrastructure and education, health, and water services in the north. Many facilities were destroyed and looted, and teachers and health workers were forced to flee. Altogether, 533 trained health workers, about 77 percent of the total, left the north as a result of the conflicts. In the Timbuktu region, more than 94,000 children have not attended school during the crisis, and in Kidal, the 7 out of 62 schools that were still functioning in 2014 have closed as a direct result of the conflict. Access to water has also suffered, with a near doubling of nonfunctioning water pumps. Access to potable water dropped by an average of 8 percent in the three regions following the crisis.

Adding to the challenge, the immediate negative effects on consumption, food insecurity, and malnutrition have driven the population toward negative coping strategies. With less money to spend, the proportion of food expenditure has increased notably because of the increase of the price of food items, while nonfood expenditure, including for social services, has been reduced. These effects are particularly felt by women and vulnerable groups.

### Rationale and Link to Peace Accord

The focus of the components in this pillar is to restore and improve essential service provision in the north to strengthen the government's ability to meet the demands of the population. The restoration of basic social services and related institutions is important to improve the lives of the population and to promote peace, stability, and sustainable development. Rapid improvements in access to services and in the provision of social welfare will improve the situation of populations affected by the conflict, in particular women and other vulnerable groups, and will prepare the ground for a sustainable return of IDPs, which will send an important signal demonstrating the return to normality. Strengthening local government delivery capacity will also help long-term efforts to deepen decentralization and help restore public trust in the state.

Vulnerability to shocks and deteriorating services means social safety nets are required as an element of the social protection system. Investing in social safety nets will increase the quantity and quality of consumption and, if attached to the health and education sectors, improve general human development. In all cases, the Malian

government efforts to reduce the overall poverty status depend on the country's ability to increase its human capital, which requires investment in the areas of water management, health, and education.

Service delivery is also a critical element in the process of rebuilding trust in the state. The Peace Accord is based on the recognition of a specific socioeconomic situation in northern Mali: a movement toward greater regionalization of development and implementation services, a commitment toward greater decentralization of resources and functions, and the implementation of modalities that promote greater participation in decision making at the local level.

## Overview of Priority Interventions and Financial Requirements

The basic social services and protection pillar comes with an estimated cost envelope of CFAF 636,090.8 million, which will be spread across a number of subcomponents, as detailed in Table 4.3.

In the short term, CFAF 77,965.8 million will be necessary to implement a set of urgent priorities to rehabilitate destroyed infrastructure and meet key commitments in the Peace Accord. These interventions have been identified based on their potential to generate immediate improvements in terms of access to education, health, and water services for the most vulnerable. Such urgent priorities include the rehabilitation of wells and supply of drinking water, the rehabilitation and reopening of destroyed schools and health centers, vocational technical training for the youth-at-risk, and the adaptation of national programs for education, health, and social welfare support through NGOs.

Given the urgency of these activities and the limited capacities that exist in the north, priority will be given to the use of existing implementation mechanisms, in particular the humanitarian services system. Delivery mechanisms will also be prioritized based on their capacity to promote peace and stability in the short term, including through the use of labor intensive construction and cash-for-work initiatives.

In the medium and long term, CFAF 558,125 million will be needed to improve the capacity of institutions in the north to deliver quality basic social services and to establish a sustainable social protection system. Activities will

**TABLE 4.3** Restore and Improve Basic Social Services and Protection: Subcomponents and Associated Costs

Subcomponent	Objective	Costs (CFAF, million)			
		Year 1	Year 2	Years 3–6	Total
<b>Social service infrastructure (education, health, water and sanitation)</b>	Rehabilitate damaged infrastructure for education, health, and water services to facilitate rapid improvements in access; construct new schools, health facilities, and water points to improve service delivery outcomes across the north.	26,575.5	21,910.8	291,465.9	339,952.3
<b>Service delivery capacity</b>	Improve the capacity of institutions in the north to meet urgent needs of populations affected by the conflict and deliver high quality services.	49,453.0	47,854.0	160,391.7	257,698.7
<b>Short-term social welfare support and scaling up social safety nets</b>	Provide access to adaptive social protection and integration of the northern regions into the national social protection system.	1,937.3	15,246.6	21,256.0	38,439.9
<b>Total</b>		<b>77,965.8</b>	<b>85,011.4</b>	<b>473,113.6</b>	<b>636,090.8</b>

focus on enhancing access to education, health, and water through the construction of critical infrastructure and development of institutions for delivery and oversight.

The implementation of these initiatives will over time come through the scaling up of national service delivery programs, including those for social protection, vocational training, and preventive healthcare. Budgets will primarily rely on fiscal transfers, as foreseen in the Peace Accord and in line with the functions assigned to local governments in the decentralization law. International financing and support will allow national programs to be adapted to the particular context of the north in the short term and to support the transfer of implementation mechanisms toward the north, including through the use of the new Regional Development Authorities (RDA), as the main interlocutors for technical and implementation support.

## **PRIORITY PILLAR 3: PROMOTE ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY AND EMPLOYMENT**

This pillar covers a number of important priorities relating to supporting livelihoods in order to enhance productive capacities, food security, and the reconstruction of critical infrastructure needed to revive the local economy and create immediate opportunities for employment. It also covers the need for developing longer term infrastructure to improve access and connectivity to the north, promoting a thriving private sector, the development of financial services, and the creation of sustainable employment and ensuring long-term environmental sustainability.

### **Needs and Impact of the Crisis**

The economy of the northern regions is characterized by significant limitations in terms of productive scope. Pastoralism, small-scale agriculture, and long-distance trade are among the main income-generating activities. The conflict disrupted the already weak economy, reduced income-generation, and further strained livelihoods and coping mechanisms for much of the population. The destruction of important productive infrastructure, including irrigation systems and farm equipment, has affected agricultural production and exacerbated problems of food insecurity.

With the disruption of economic activity, herders, merchants, and local entrepreneurs were the hardest hit. The conflict reduced human mobility, limited access to markets, and destabilized supply chains. Herders were forced to leave the conflict zones for safer areas outside of the north, with or without their cattle. Merchants could not travel without the risk of being attacked and losing their goods and money. The absence of a functioning banking system following the looting of banks and the removal of microfinance organizations has exacerbated the insecurity of merchants who did not have any reliable way to hold their assets. Farmers were forced to abandon their fields as they fled the conflict. In addition, the conflict has disrupted the tourism industry, which in the past provided an important source of income for a large segment of the population through employment in the service industry and/or through the trade of local crafts.

Illegal trade and trafficking have added further strain on the population in the north. Opportunities for highly profitable revenue related to smuggling cigarettes, drugs, weapons, and fuel; kidnapping and ransoming of hostages; and misappropriation of public funds have led to the emergence of a new set of actors who are motivated to protect their assets through the use of violence. These networks have been thriving during the conflict and the absence of a state regulatory and security presence. The large revenues that can be generated from such activities also attract unemployed youth who have few other opportunities to make a living. These activities thus disrupt traditional social and economic structures.

### **Rationale and Link to Peace Accord**

Economic recovery and the creation of income-generating activities for people and especially for young people and women are fundamental to the normalization and stabilization of the north. The components under this pillar thus constitute essential interventions to support the implementation of the Peace Accord and to put in place the foundations

for sustainable recovery and development. In particular, they are critical to deliver on the promise that the specific economic, social, and cultural features of the north be recognized in the recovery and development of Mali in the future.

The Peace Accord puts forward a number of immediate and longer term actions to stimulate and revive the economy in the short term and create structural foundations for continued economic activity in the long term. In particular, it cites the need to improve the access and connectivity of northern Mali to the rest of the country as a way to integrate the northern regions in the national economy and value chain. Better access to northern regions of Mali would significantly reduce the widespread feeling of marginalization and alienation in recent decades, which has allowed for the armed conflict to materialize and for criminal activities to develop, and generate the necessary preconditions for sustainable, endogenous economic growth and job creation.

## Overview of Priority Interventions and Financial Requirements

The total cost of the activities covered under this component has been estimated at CFAF 1,781,488.4 million (Table 4.4). In the short term, CFAF 111,523.8 million will be required to implement a set of urgent priorities across the different subcomponents. These have been identified based on their ability to support immediate delivery of visible peace dividends, decrease risks related to new conflict and criminal activity, and offer improvements to the livelihood for the most vulnerable, including returning populations. Urgent activities include immediate efforts to promote food security through humanitarian channels, put in place the early foundations for rural and private sector development, generate employment, increase the supply of critical productive tools, and rehabilitate destroyed productive and market infrastructure. It will also include the immediate launch of a very limited number of high-profile infrastructure projects (most notably the Kidal airport and the road from Goma Coura to Timbuktu).

**TABLE 4.4 Promote Economic and Infrastructure Recovery and Employment: Subcomponents and Associated Costs**

Subcomponent	Objective	Costs (CFAF, million)			
		Year 1	Year 2	Years 3–6	Total
<b>Agriculture (food security, productive capacity, and livelihoods)</b>	Build the resilience of the population in the north against food shocks and develop sustainable livelihoods (agriculture, livestock, fishery), focusing on rural areas and on the most vulnerable.	55,618.7	99,518.0	268,391.4	423,528.1
<b>Infrastructure rehabilitation and construction</b>	Rehabilitate and construct critical transportation, communications, and electricity infrastructure to connect the north to the national and regional economy.	54,250.0	190,074.0	1,025,707.8	1,270,031.8
<b>Private sector development and financing services</b>	Create a business-enabling environment to support income generation, trade, and employment creation.	1,555.1	5,401.0	14,331.3	21,287.4
<b>Environmental sustainability</b>	Protect the fragile environment in northern Mali through adapted recovery and development activities and a focus on natural resource management.	100.0	25,000.0	41,541.1	66,641.1
<b>Total</b>		<b>111,523.8</b>	<b>319,993.0</b>	<b>1,349,971.6</b>	<b>1,781,488.4</b>

Given the urgency of these activities and the limited capacity that exists in the north, as well as the significant constraints imposed on large-scale investments by the continued insecurity on the ground, the majority of these activities should be channeled through humanitarian agencies already present and working in the north. The component also recognizes that implementation will need to be driven by modalities that can compete with the reach and influence currently carried by criminal networks and illicit activities. This means that preference might be given to schemes that allow for cash handouts to workers and that would offer immediate employment for at-risk-youth.

In the medium to long term, CFAF 1,669,964.60 million will be required to consolidate improvements and initiate larger scale capital intensive infrastructure and transport construction. Activities will include more targeted support to rural communities to find viable mitigation strategies against food shocks, support to agricultural and livestock production, schemes that are adapted to nomadic populations, and efforts to develop an enabling environment in which private sector activities and trade can thrive. Large-scale transportation, communications, and electricity infrastructure development are also anticipated, with a particular focus on the environmental sustainability of such activities, given the fragile environment in the north.

These activities will be scaled up during the second year but will require more preparatory work and a marked improvement in the security environment to allow access. Given the large focus on a number of capital intensive investments, implementation will need to consider the trade-offs between equity in access and efficient use of resources given the extremely low population density in the northern regions. In particular, the proposed infrastructure and transportation program requires more careful analysis to understand the detailed costs of implementation. Implementation of these activities will to the extent possible involve extensions of national programs, with the necessary adaptation to make these fit for purposes in the northern regions. As such, they will require dialogue with the new RDAs and integration into regional planning exercises.

## INTEGRATION OF TRANSVERSAL ISSUES IN THE PRIORITIZATION FRAMEWORK

The transversal issues have been integrated across the above pillars to avoid duplication and fragmentation of needs and priorities. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the transversal issues should be understood in two different ways: as a filter to prioritize within an identified need, and as a way to introduce realism about the time it might take to establish the institutional capacities needed to deliver on identified needs. Below follows a brief description of how the transversal issues have been integrated. For more details, the reader is referred to Appendix 5.

Gender inequality has been integrated across all three pillars. Greater participation of women in the peace process at the national and local levels has been identified as particularly critical, both to promote the reconstruction of the social fabric and to ensure that the reconciliation and recovery process takes into account the needs of the most vulnerable. The crisis has also greatly exacerbated the situation for women, many of whom have been the victims of gender based violence. Courts for victims are difficult to access, risks of reprisals from their attackers is a reality and access to social services, especially psychological and medical support, has become particularly difficult for women. As a consequence, priority has been given to legal support for women, and access to centers offering both psychological and reproductive health services. Programs supporting girls' education and school attendance have also been prioritized. The economic situation of women was particularly affected by the conflict, compounded by the fact that they are usually overrepresented in unprofitable and small-scale economic activities in agriculture, livestock herding and petty trade and crafts. Yet these activities are fundamental to the food security of the entire population, since women alone account for over 70 percent of food production. Therefore, measures supporting women and women's associations activities as well as more focus on vocational training in activities traditionally pursued by women were prioritized.

Similarly, the consultations and survey work that were conducted as part of the joint assessment mission generated a better sense of the inter- and intraregional differences that exist across the three pillars. For instance, respondents in

the regions of Timbuktu and Gao expressed a greater degree of trust in the ability of MINUSMA, the police and the Malian Army to generate improvements in security and justice, while respondents in Kidal expressed a lower level of trust in these institutions. Likewise, while respondents in all regions stressed the critical importance of efforts to deepen decentralization and local governance, the results from Kidal put greater emphasis on the up-front design and implementation of a thorough decentralization process, whereas those in Timbuktu and Gao focused more on improving governance through better training and accountability of locally elected officials and civil servants.

Sub-regional differences emerged as a critical factor in terms of access to basic social services, both in terms of services being much better in urban than in rural areas, and the particularly poor coverage for nomadic populations. Nomadic populations placed particular emphasis on lack of reliable access to water as their main problem, which regularly forces these population groups to move to areas with less regular health and education coverage as well.

Several socio-economic differences emerged during the work. In particular, respondents in both Gao and Timbuktu stressed the isolation of these regions and the need to prioritize the rehabilitation of the Sévaré-Gao road and the construction of the roads Goma Coura-Timbuktu and/or Douentza-Timbuktu. Perhaps surprisingly, isolation seems to be less of a concern in Kidal, where respondents were more focused on economic support for pastoralists and trade. As pointed out in Chapter 2, the climate zones that exist in the north also influence the type of support required for agricultural activities: populations along the Niger River ask for more support for agriculture (irrigation, seeds, etc.) whereas in the sahelian belt extension services to pastoralism are requested, a fact reflected in the prioritization.

The implementation capacity of local governments was weak before the crisis but has been further hampered by the displacement of government officials and physical destruction of service infrastructure. While the Peace Accord puts a great deal of emphasis on development driven by local governments in the north, the reality is that that capacities at the regional and local level is insufficient to take on these roles, particularly in terms of delegated contract management. The lack of qualified staff prevents regions and municipalities from carrying out their delegated tasks.

Given these constraints, priority in the short term has been guided by a realistic take on what can be delivered with existing implementation capacity, including through humanitarian actors and NGOs, to deliver quick results in terms of recovery and service delivery. Similarly, the three pillars include a focus on the types of capacities that need to be strengthened to facilitate a gradual transfer of implementation to local authorities. Prioritization has been based on strengthening local government and administrative capacity, while simultaneously expanding the accountability functions performed by civil society to increase demand for good governance through greater transparency in the management of local affairs. Finally, priority has to be placed on transferring implementation mechanisms as close as possible to the population, including through strengthening the role of the RDAs as the main interlocutors for technical support, planning and implementation. A first step should be to translate the findings of the Joint Assessment Mission into regional recovery and development strategies, as a basis both for rapid delivery of key priorities identified across the three pillars and to ensure that national programs are scaled up to cover the north in a way that promotes local participation in the governance and implementation of these programs.

# Implementation, Financing, and Monitoring Arrangements

## 5

### PRIORITIZATION AND SEQUENCING

Implementation of the recommendations and priority actions presented in this report will be challenging, particularly given the lack of institutional and human capacities and the continued insecurity that constrains access to large parts of the north. To overcome these challenges, strict prioritization and sequencing is required, based on (i) a more granular understanding of what is feasible under current circumstances, (ii) the implementation mechanisms that exist and that can be scaled up in the short term, and (iii) the institutions and capacities that will need to be established and strengthened to positively have an impact on implementation of the medium- to long-term agenda.

Improvement of the security situation in the north is an absolute minimum condition for implementation of the proposed recovery and development priorities, even in the immediate term. This is reflected in the prioritization framework in Chapter 4, which estimates that 60 percent of the total costs during the first year should go toward security and humanitarian needs. The focus during the early stage of implementation should be to support the government in prioritizing implementation of the security-related provisions in the Peace Accord, including the finalization of the DDR strategy, putting in place the necessary monitoring arrangements to track violations of the ceasefire agreements, establishing grievance mechanisms to tackle violations, and stepping up efforts to reform the security sector. In parallel, efforts are included to support the dialogue with armed groups and the population in the north to promote reconciliation and local conflict mediation. It is, however, important to recognize that the improvement of the security situation through the implementation of the related provisions of the Peace Accord and its Annex 2 (security sector reform, joint operational mechanism, joint patrols, cantonment, integration, and DDR) requires a sustained involvement of all stakeholders and signatories of the accord, which goes beyond the external support that can be provided through development aid.

In the absence of security on the ground, resources should be channeled through modalities that have proven their ability to operate in such environments and that have maintained a presence throughout the crisis, including, in particular, humanitarian and community organizations. A quick assessment could be undertaken to identify specific links between existing activities and specific recovery and development objectives and the capacities required to allow these programs and projects to be scaled up in the short term.

Results will have to be adjusted accordingly. The Joint Assessment Mission suggests that focus during this early period could be on (i) efforts to support the basic livelihood and economic recovery of the most vulnerable through handouts and emergency health care, (ii) opportunities for basic rehabilitation of physical damaged infrastructure in secure pockets of the north, including the regional capitals, and (iii) more targeted efforts to create the conditions for the return of government officials and service providers. In parallel, the government should focus on advancing the many reforms required at the national level to support implementation of the Peace Accord, strengthening the

regulatory frameworks to rapidly deepen decentralization once the conditions on the ground are ripe, scaling up the ongoing security sector reform operation, and putting in place the new or revised institutional arrangements envisaged. Finally, local planning and prioritization could proceed even in the absence of security, anchored at the regional level, with a view to better understand how the recommendations in this report should be adapted to regional and subregional needs and priorities. These regional implementation plans are particularly important and should determine which specific measures and initiatives ought to be implemented in each region.

This will provide an opportunity to focus more specifically on ensuring that the two newly created regions, as anticipated in the Peace Agreement, become operational. While the MIEC does list specific needs related to the territories of these two new regions, it does not specifically address the institutional mechanisms that are required to implement them or their specific needs (as opposed to the needs of those same territories within existing regions).

This effort could also be used for government and international actors to prepare for a rapid scale-up of priorities once security improves, including the reform of existing and establishment of new institutional and financial mechanisms to fit the context (further details follow).

Once the minimum security conditions are in place, priority should be given to the immediate priorities identified in Chapter 4. While a complete mapping was not possible, the Joint Assessment Mission identified a number of ongoing and planned activities across the three priority pillars that could be rapidly scaled up to facilitate immediate implementation (see Table 5.1). In some areas, such as food security and private sector development, the majority of the financing required has already been committed, while other important areas, including security and reconciliation, which are critical for short term peace and stability, remain significantly underfunded.<sup>8</sup>

**TABLE 5.1 Available Financing and Gaps for the Priority Pillars (CFAF, million)**

Priority pillar	Total	Available financing	Financing gap
<b>Strengthen peace, social resilience, and decentralized governance</b>			
Security	207,256.8	0.0	207,256.8
Justice	7,432.1	369.1	7,063.0
Reconciliation, trust, and participation	173,236.7	611.7	172,625.0
Displacement, returnees, and resilience of host communities	42,054.1	6,491.5	35,562.6
<b>Restore and improve basic social services and protection</b>			
Social service infrastructure (education, health, water and sanitation)	339,952.3	33,495.5	306,456.8
Service delivery capacity	257,698.7	51,696.9	206,001.7
Short-term social welfare support and scaling up social safety nets	38,439.9	3,907.9	34,532.0
<b>Promote economic and infrastructure recovery and employment</b>			
Agriculture (food security, productive capacity, and livelihoods)	423,528.1	193,798.3	229,729.8
Infrastructure rehabilitation and construction	1,270,031.8	257,020.0	1,013,011.8
Private sector development and financing services	21,287.4	8,660.5	12,626.9
Environmental sustainability	66,641.1	0.0	66,641.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,847,558.9</b>	<b>556,051.4</b>	<b>2,291,507.5</b>

<sup>8</sup> This data was collected on the basis of self-reporting and does not necessarily reflect the full scale of international engagement across identified priority areas. In the security sector, for instance, many actors already support the Malian security forces through Official Development Assistance eligible activities, yet refrained from reporting these figures for different reasons.

### 30 Assessing Recovery and Development Priorities in Mali's Conflict-Affected Regions

## INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Dedicated institutional capacities for planning, implementation, coordination, and monitoring will be required to overcome past challenges of implementing recovery and development activities in northern Mali. This section offers a number of recommendations that government and development partners should consider to strengthen the institutional architecture for effective implementation of the priorities listed in Chapter 4. These are drawn from Mali's own experience with past post-conflict responses as well as broader international experiences and lessons learned.

*Embed local planning capacities in local governments in the north.* The Peace Accord suggests that the regions should be responsible for the overall planning and implementation of development activities. An urgent priority will be to support the establishment of the RDAs and to provide these with sufficient capacity and clarity of mandate to take on this role. Learning from past efforts to strengthen local institutions in Mali, this might require dedicated financial arrangements in the short term.

*Build high-level intergovernmental coordination around post-conflict implementation.* Past post-conflict responses have highlighted the challenges of maintaining an urgency of response once the crisis has passed. Building on experiences with the early decentralization effort in the 1990s, a special purpose vehicle should be established under the aegis of the executive branch to facilitate effective cross-ministerial coordination for recovery and development activities. Such a mechanism should seek representation of key line ministries at both national and regional levels, along with representatives from decentralized levels of government, civil society, Signatory Movements, and international partners.

*Prioritize implementation via local institutions.* In line with the Peace Accord, implementation capacity should be created locally to support a deepening of decentralization and allow local government agencies to take charge of the implementation of recovery and development activities. Given the starting point, this would likely involve hybrid arrangements in the short term, using a mix of dedicated government agencies, local government offices, and existing local and international organizations to overcome inefficiencies of existing implementation arrangements.

*Establish a dedicated donor coordination and implementation mechanism for post-conflict recovery and development.* Development partners should identify best-fit mechanisms to ensure that they too can support implementation of the recommendations in this report. In line with the aid effectiveness principles for working in fragile states, this might require adaptation to existing coordination arrangements to facilitate collaboration among humanitarian, political, and development engagements and a willingness to channel development financing through humanitarian channels to promote rapid results. Reforms of existing donor coordination structures in Mali will likely be needed to strengthen coordination between different policy agendas, in particular to overcome the challenging implementation environment of the north and facilitate a different discussion about these challenges in the short and medium term.

*Ensure that the conditions required to ensure that the new proposed institutions are operational are in place.* To do so, it will be necessary to efficiently devolve authority and budgets, and recruit qualified personnel, enhance skills and rely on experts who are familiar with or come from the region, while ensuring that control and transparency mechanisms are in place.

## FINANCING STRATEGY AND MODALITIES

The MIEC has identified needs amounting to CFAF 2,847,558.9 million, and a substantive financing gap of CFAF 2,291,507.5 million (Table 5.1). Additional financial resources to plug the gap are expected to come from a combination of national and international budget lines. At the international conference in Paris on October 22, 2015 international partners committed to almost filling the gap by committing an additional €3.2 billion for recovery and development activities in Mali in the years to come. The critical challenge ahead is to understand whether the

pledges made represent new or existing resources, how much of the total amounts are specifically for the north, and how these pledges can be materialized in a manner that maximizes support for the prioritization and sequencing suggested in Chapter 4.

To support this process, a financing strategy should be developed, linking domestic and international resources in support of recovery and development priorities. Such a strategy should promote synergies among the different financing sources and instruments in support of recovery and development priorities. This will be critical to strengthening the effectiveness of support during the implementation of this report. The following material offers recommendations to government and donors as they think through the appropriate financing strategy for northern Mali.

An important consideration when agreeing on a financing strategy for the MIEC is the extent to which it will promote coordination and collective responsibility for delivery of specific results in conflict-affected areas. There are limits to shared accountability for results across different financing sources and instruments. Yet integration at the outcome level can be achieved through focus on a subset of activities where a broader coalition and joint action is both possible and warranted in response to high risks, insecurity, and limited capacity of government to deliver. In these areas, specialized and tailored solutions can be identified, including those for pooling of certain resources (human, procedural, financial) and for jointly assessing evolution in context-specific risks as a basis for joint management of these during MIEC implementation.

Given the subnational nature of the conflict in northern Mali, it will be important to identify the right mix of financing instruments to allow implementation by local institutions. This means identifying the best-fit options to channel recovery and development financing through local government institutions and directly to agencies operating in the north. The Peace Accord already commits the government to increasing intergovernmental transfers from 22 to 30 percent during the interim period, and a first challenge will be to identify exactly what the impact of this increase will be on the budgets for the three northern regions. Development partners can further strengthen the ability of subnational governments to make good use of these resources through further strengthening existing transfer mechanisms like *Agence Nationale des Investissements des Collectivités Territoriales (ANICT)* so that these become effective channels for engagement with the regional governments and RDAs, strengthening local government capacities for planning and financial management, and through supporting efforts at the national level to increase accountability and reporting arrangements for local spending.

Development partners should carefully scrutinize their existing financing instruments to understand how these might be amended to allow for effective financing of local recovery and development efforts in the north. This would involve prioritizing mechanisms that already exist for such transfers, including continued direct financing of local and international organizations and the coordinated whole-of-government use of different budget lines to support overlapping security, political, humanitarian, and development needs outlined in this report. It will also involve looking at new special-purpose vehicles in the short and medium term to finance direct implementation at the community level of critical livelihood supporting activities, the use of cash-for-work modalities that can transfer funds directly to the local population, and mechanisms that can strengthen social accountability and the participation of people in decision making and implementation of development activities.

A second consideration relates to the utility of pooling grant financing in a specific instrument. The Peace Accord already mentions the establishment of a pooled fund,<sup>9</sup> and experiences from other post-conflict contexts have highlighted the potential benefit of such financing mechanisms—multi-partner trust funds (MPTFs)—to promote coordination, which would prevent duplication and fragmentation of activities, fill critical gaps in financing, promote

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<sup>9</sup> Sustainable Development Trust Fund, referenced in Articles 34, 37 and 54 of the Accord.

economies of scale, and facilitate collective risk management in highly insecure and fluid environments. In the case of northern Mali, such instruments could have a number of benefits:

- They could offer a joint platform enabling donors to coordinate with regional governments and promoting more coherence in the use of the very limited capacity that exists locally for implementation.
- They can reduce the transaction costs of the government by limiting the number of partners that require reporting, accounting, meetings, and other demands on limited national and local capacity.
- By pooling supervision and implementation costs, an MPTF could also help development partners establish the necessary arrangements to ensure security of staff and adequate monitoring of implementation through third-party arrangements.
- A pooled fund would allow more targeted focus of grant resources on key aspects of the peace-building process that government might otherwise find difficult to engage in. In Mali, these activities include the broader reconciliation and dialogue process, specific security and DDR arrangements in the Peace Accord, early social protection schemes, and the provision of technical assistance to establish and strengthen key institutions (for example, the RDAs).
- The creation of joint vehicles to promote localized peace-building efforts that require direct financing of local priorities, cash-for-work, and so forth.

To more clearly outline the types of instruments needed to finance the recovery and development process in northern Mali, the Joint Assessment Mission proposes that government and donors should urgently come together and draw up a more detailed financing strategy that matches financial needs with existing resources, identifies gaps, and options to fill these. This could be done through a four step process:

1. Identifying and agreeing on a set of priorities (financing needs) within the overall cost envelope of the joint assessment that require collective action and focus.
2. Mapping the various financing sources that can be accessed to deliver these priorities, including through reallocation of government and aid resources and the restructuring of existing projects.
3. Identifying the range of specific instruments needed for delivery (strategic allocation framework).
4. Establishing appropriate institutional arrangements, including governance and accountability mechanisms, to promote joint responsibility for outcomes.

## MONITORING FRAMEWORK

The transition results matrix in Appendix 1 of this report offers the basic elements of a monitoring framework that should be used over the coming years as recovery and development activities move forward. The matrix highlights specific actions, associated costs, output indicators, and the financing gap that needs to be filled for implementation to be possible. As has been the experience in other post-conflict contexts, these two tools offer a useful starting point for government and donors to come together at regular intervals to assess collective progress and areas where additional attention might be warranted.

Lessons from other recovery and development processes have nonetheless highlighted the shortcomings of monitoring processes that focus on financing levels and output indicators in isolation. In particular, these experiences suggest that administrative monitoring of inputs and outputs should be complemented with direct beneficiary feedback to assess whether recovery and development priorities are generating changes on the ground in terms of promoting stability, peace, and confidence in the change process itself. Perception surveys can be used for this purpose, building on the survey that was carried out for the Joint Assessment Mission (see Appendix 3).

A Strategic Results Framework is proposed in Appendix 2 for monitoring of overall progress over time. This is based on a very limited number of key objectives, outlined in Table 5.2, and indicators that can be used to assess

TABLE 5.2 Strategic Outcomes for Monitoring	
Overall objective	To promote peace, stability and development in northern Mali
Strategic Outcome #1	Security restored in the north
Strategic Outcome #2	Improvements in capacity of government to perform basic functions and deliver services
Strategic Outcome #3	Peace sustained through deepened reconciliation and practical cooperation between local governments and communities
Strategic Outcome #4	Economic recovery and sustainable livelihoods for all
Strategic Outcome #5	Northern regions integrated into the economy of Mali
Strategic Outcome #6	Delivery of aid promises made

progress in peace, stability and development over time, based on an understanding of the priority actions and outcomes required for peace and stability to be sustained. It offers a tool that national and international stakeholders can use to align efforts to maximize the opportunities for a successful transition through the interim period, while minimizing the risk that support would undermine or trigger new conflict.

Together, the Transitional Results Matrix and Strategic Results Framework offer the basic elements of a monitoring system for implementation of this report, allowing government and development partners to keep track of and discuss:

- Key priorities to be addressed over a 24-month period
- Costing of these priorities
- Indication of where the financing will come from (including existing projects)
- Expected results to be achieved by addressing these priorities (according to the set time frame)
- Identification of benchmarks to measure progress made toward achieving these results (every three or six months)
- Monitoring of inputs and outputs
- Direct beneficiary feedback on changes on the ground

The perception survey that was undertaken as part of the Joint Assessment Mission could be used to design a beneficiary feedback mechanism as a complement to administrative monitoring efforts. Using the same sample of villages and respondents it could collect monthly data on changes in perceptions of the populations in the Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal regions. It could report on progress in the implementation of projects (including through documentary photographs) and report on changes in household welfare, including security, food prices, and access and use of services. It could collect information from local authorities, those in charge of clinics and schools, and would be able to report on general changes in the economic environment (for example, frequency and cost of transport, availability of fertilizer in shops, whether the agricultural season has started). It would allow national and international actors to assess, on a systematic and regular basis, whether activities are having the intended impact in terms of generating peace, stability, and trust in government institutions in the north over time and whether the theory of change that underpins the Peace Accord is indeed materializing. This would allow mid-course corrections based not only on an understanding of whether financing and activities are delivered but also on whether these activities are indeed generating change.

# 6

## Toward a Long-Term Vision of Development

This report has highlighted the many challenges and needs that will need to be overcome to promote sustainable peace and development in northern Mali. It has outlined the total and disaggregated needs that should be met over the next six years and also outlined a proposal for how to prioritize among and sequence the many needs to promote catalytic support that can help remove the underlying causes of cyclical conflict. The report addresses, as well, the implications this prioritization has for implementation and financing of recovery and development needs. According to the Peace Accord, the analysis in this paper will inform the development of a strategy for northern Mali. In this chapter some ideas are offered on what such a strategy could emphasize, based on the findings of the Joint Assessment Mission.

It is important to note that despite the current image of an area plagued by conflict, insecurity, and terrorism, northern Mali has significant potential for economic, social, and cultural development. While this report has pointed to the many and significant challenges that exist, real opportunities for change have also been highlighted. There is economic potential in the mining and energy sectors and within the livestock herding and agricultural sectors due to the presence of the Niger River and inner delta basin. Mali also has an undeniable cultural heritage and a real potential for tourism. Finally, if the challenges of conflict and insecurity can be overcome, northern Mali's geographic position could make it an important commerce and exchange center for Sahel-Saharan trade.

The aspiration of the northern population concerning the implementation of the Peace Accord is to create peace and to generate domestic economic growth. The specific strategy for development in the north should as such be guided by an opportunity to establish conditions for a sustainable improvement of living conditions for the population. This should be done through the building of a strong economic base that, once the economy has recovered, would allow for the creation of a dynamic self-sustaining wealth production that is equitably distributed across the north, both between and within the three regions. At the same time, a strategy should be designed to ensure that the northern regions become integrated into the economy of Mali and that their contribution and value added to the national economy in terms of economic, social, cultural, and spatial issues is well understood and supported.

### BOX 6.1 Regionalization

As part of the new focus on regionalization, it is anticipated that Mali's regions will play a central role in development planning and in the organization of land usage. This requires an approach that allows the regions to become the epicenter of local governance at the administrative level and a

lynchpin in the decentralized management and delivery of basic social and government services. The regions should be the place that links the local and central administrative units together, but with a view to responding to demands from the local population rather than to demands from the center.


It is fundamental to take into account local economic realities and social and cultural values, as these can act to catalyze or block inclusive economic growth and create or hinder the conditions for an integrated and sustainable development of the northern regions. This aspiration is in line with the vision contained in the national visioning exercise for Mali 2025: *one nation united through a diversified and rehabilitated cultural base; a political and democratic organization of institutions, ensuring development and social peace; a strong, diversified, and open economy; a reduction in poverty and social progress affecting all regions and all categories of the population* (Mali Vision 2025).

Building on this notion, and drawing on the analysis and findings of the Joint Assessment Mission, the following three elements should form the basis for a vision for long-term development for northern Mali: (i) peace and security as a prerequisite condition, (ii) rapid support to stimulate and revive economic activity, and (iii) implementing a program of structural support to promote poverty reduction and economic growth. This vision should emerge on the back of the short-term actions outlined in Chapter 4, which aim to address the underlying challenges and put in place the early foundations needed for development and economic growth to take root.

- 1. *Peace and security as a prerequisite condition.*** The effective implementation of the security provisions in the Peace Accord is required to improve the situation on the ground, and a prerequisite for both addressing the priorities identified by the joint assessment and the creation of an environment conducive to long-term growth and development. This topic has been amply covered in earlier chapters of this report, but beyond short-term actions a longer term development strategy will need to address the broader aspects of reform of the security sector, based on the principles of unity, participation, and inclusiveness efforts to promote a positive and stabilizing presence of the state across the north, addressing challenges of illicit trade and criminal activity, and promoting regional solutions to stabilizing the entire Sahel. Most of these activities are outside the influence of development actors and will require continued support and involvement by military and diplomatic communities going forward. Yet it is important to note that certain development activities highlighted in this report can serve as positive catalysts for improving security over time. In particular, efforts to reintegrate former combatants, provide employment to unemployed youth, and help returning populations and host communities find sustainable livelihood arrangements all have the potential to decrease future security threats.
- 2. *Rapid support to stimulate and revive economic activity.*** A series of measures can then be proposed to significantly increase spending and public investment (for a recovery of productive capacity) in the northern regions. Transfer of resources (both domestic and international) will be critical in the short term to support the consumption of the population while stimulating local production (agricultural and handicraft production). In addition, development investments can support such efforts through the choice of implementation modalities (labor intensive or capital intensive). The Joint Assessment Mission has identified several of these measures, addressing them in terms of restoring productive capacities, livelihoods, and social services and in terms of supporting early income-generating activities for the population. These should be built into the longer term strategy from the outset.
- 3. *Implementing a program of structural support to promote poverty reduction and economic growth.*** In addition to short-term support to reviving economy activity, a strategy should promote the creation of the structural foundations required for economic growth to take root in the northern regions. This will need to factor in and address critical future constraints and risks related to demographic growth, regional insecurities, and climate change, which will have a growing impact on livelihood options and stability for the population in the north. It should integrate the following priorities from this report:
  - *Create the enabling environment for growth.* This should include investments in infrastructure and public services, investments in human and institutional capacities, and efforts to increase revenue generation through land reorganization and taxation. In addition, a strategy should build on the investments in economic and transport infrastructure proposed by the joint assessment for the medium to long term, which require linking the north to both the rest of Mali and to the wider Sahel region. This is important if northern Mali is to regain its strategic geographic position in the nexus of cross-regional trade and commerce.

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- *Prioritize specific growth sectors.* The specific strategy could implement sectoral strategies to include the revitalization of tourism and the development of the mining industry as well as measures to support the development of small and medium-sized business and industries that will have the potential for creating jobs. Agriculture and livestock herding, the basis of economic activity in the north, should be supported as a priority and coupled with the development of the processing industries (see Appendix 5, Box A5.1), which in turn will be made possible by transportation and energy infrastructure. A key element in this regard will be the inclusion of affirmative action in favor of women. The northern regions of Mali may become, through the effective implementation of the ongoing initiatives of the government and its partners, a zone of endogenous economic growth, through the promotion of agropastoral products and a strengthening of the abilities of the region's actors.
- *Define the future role and contributions of the northern regions to national economic growth.* It will be important for a longer term development strategy to clearly outline what the roles and contributions of the north might be to the overall economic growth of the country. Such a narrative should factor in both the sources of future growth in the north and the higher than average costs of capital investments and service delivery given geographic and population features.
- *Focus on cross-border aspects.* Designing an inclusive growth vision that focuses connectivity and infrastructure will tackle the obstacles related to quality and cost of connections to existing cross-border economic activity. Therefore, it will be important to expand the infrastructure connectivity to promote potential new markets and economic activities and establish new connections across various production zones. Improved local and cross-border connectivity will help exploit the potential of national markets, create jobs and lower transportation costs which would lower production costs and increase the value of agricultural outputs vis-à-vis regional and cross-border markets.



# Transitional Results Matrices

## Organization and Structure of the Matrices

The matrices in Appendix 1 list all costs associated with needs identified by the MIEC. One matrix has been developed per priority pillar: Matrix 1 for the pillar ‘Strengthen peace, social resilience, and decentralized governance,’ matrix 2 for the pillar ‘Restore and improve basic social services and protection’, and matrix 3 for the pillar ‘Promote economic and infrastructure recovery and employment’. Each matrix is further subdivided per subcomponent (color green) and further per topic covered (color grey).

## Which Measures Are Included?

All needs identified by the MIEC are listed in the matrix with associated costs. All measures listed in Annex 3 of the Peace Agreement have been included, along with a number of additional measures that emerged through the thematic work and consultation efforts of the Joint Assessment Mission. The additional measures are largely drawn from national sectorial strategies, from planned or approved projects, and from a closer analysis of the types of activities needed to promote peace, stability and development in northern Mali over time (see Chapter 3 for further details on the prioritization framework). All measures from the ‘Plan d’urgence, période intérimaire’ of the government have been included.

## Where Do the Cost Come From?

Costs come from the sources cited above (costing from relevant ministries for infrastructure, unit costs from national strategies, costs from ‘Plan d’urgence’, etc.).

## How to Read the Matrices?

- Prioritization per period: measures are prioritized per period (year 1, year 2, year 3–6) according to the prioritization framework presented in Chapter 3. It is assumed that a certain number of preconditions will be met (for example, for infrastructure projects prioritized in year 3–6: return of security, technical studies start as soon as possible, economic feasibility is confirmed, financing is secured). It is likely that these preconditions will be met more easily for some projects than others, thereby influencing the effective time frame of their implementation.
- Financing gap: sources of financing have been identified where possible, although these are based on self-reporting from development partners and have not been validated further. The related financing gap is the best possible guess, but it should not be considered final.

- Humanitarian costs are listed at the end of relevant subsections. The sum per humanitarian cluster (‘education’, ‘food security’, etc.) is underlined in light grey. This sum adds up all related humanitarian needs and projects as identified by the Common Humanitarian Appeal (not detailed in the matrices) and humanitarian projects coming from the ‘Plan d’urgence’, listed below the aforementioned sum. The allocation key of humanitarian costs for year 1, 2 and 3 is explained in the last section of Appendix 5.
- Indicators are listed wherever possible.

**PRIORITY PILLAR 1 Strengthen Peace, Social Resilience, and Decentralized Governance**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
<b>SECURITY</b>				<b>63'996'926'762</b>	<b>57'390'394'268</b>	<b>85'869'495'324</b>	<b>207'256'816'355</b>	<b>207'256'816'355</b>
<b>SSR</b>				<b>56'981'342'762</b>	<b>50'374'810'268</b>	<b>57'807'159'324</b>	<b>165'163'312'355</b>	<b>165'163'312'355</b>
Infrastructure and equipment (weapons excluded)	X	X	X	27'473'722'357	24'288'363'243	27'871'892'246	79'633'977'845	79'633'977'845
Training	X	X	X	431'765'144	381'705'417	438'022'610	1'251'493'170	1'251'493'170
Investment and functioning	X	X	X	29'075'855'262	25'704'741'609	29'497'244'469	84'277'841'340	84'277'841'340
<b>DDR</b>				<b>7'015'584'000</b>	<b>7'015'584'000</b>	<b>28'062'336'000</b>	<b>42'093'504'000</b>	<b>42'093'504'000</b>
Finalizing of the identification and the validation of the cantonment sites within 30 days of the peace accord's signing, and construction/rehabilitation of the sites within 120 days	X			0	0	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>750 ex-combatants per site</li> <li>8 planned sites</li> <li>The lists are available, the sites are defined</li> </ul>
Cantonment and programmatic activities of the DDR	X	X	X	3'800'108'000	3'800'108'000	15'200'432'000	22'800'648'000	22'800'648'000
Inclusion of the needs of women combatants	X	X	X	116'926'400	116'926'400	467'705'600	701'558'400	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of included women</li> <li>Number or % of ex-combatants women planned</li> </ul>
Formal inclusion of a DDR process for children	X	X	X	140'311'680	140'311'680	561'246'720	841'870'080	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number or % of ex-combatants children planned</li> <li>Number of children kits distributed</li> </ul>
Make sure that no combatants' group is perceived as being favored compared to others (for ex., avoid the cantonment of a single group at the beginning)	X	X	X	0	0	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Representativity of individuals in the cantonned groups at a given time</li> </ul>
Assurance that host communities around the cantonment sites fully accept their presence in their surroundings	X	X	X	2'356'066'960	2'356'066'960	9'424'267'840	14'136'401'760	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>12,000</li> <li>Number of financed projects in favor of communities</li> <li>Perception of the communities</li> </ul>
Prevention of gender and sexual based violence during the DDR process	X	X	X	17'538'960	17'538'960	70'155'840	105'233'760	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of campaigns</li> </ul>

**PRIORITY PILLAR 1 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)			Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
Stockpile management and arms destruction	X	X	X	3'507'792'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5,000 combatants per year</li> <li>• Number of weapons registered and destroyed</li> </ul>
Linking the DDR process with transitional justice mechanisms	X	X	X	0	
<b>JUSTICE</b>				<b>7'062'952'467</b>	
<b>Justice reform</b>				<b>5'207'952'467</b>	
Support for the generalization of judicial and legal assistance (advocacy and technical assistance for a modernization of the law on the CADJ to integrate the attributions of BAO, BAJ and IMC; setting up of offices in all jurisdictions; mobilization of dedicated funds for judicial assistance by MJDH)	X	X	X	50'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of office</li> <li>• Number of defendants receiving assistance</li> </ul>
Infrastructure construction for the judiciary system	X	X	X	1'349'865'000	• 9 courts rebuilt
				1'034'776'512	• 8 judge housings rebuilt
				1'347'617'673	• 10 MAC rebuilt
				50'337'174	• 2 national guards rebuilt
				443'013'900	• 8 gendarmeries rebuilt
			95'650'548	• 3 police stations rebuilt	
			836'691'660	• 5 guards camps rebuilt	

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Total				
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Total				
<b>Strengthening of transitional justice</b>							1'855'000'000	
Advocacy and technical assistance to reform legal texts to guarantee there is no amnesty for the authors of war crimes and crimes against the humanity; the setting up of a legal framework for the protection of victims and testimonies; and the revision of the CVJR decree according to international norms	X						20'000'000	20'000'000
Coordinated adoption and operationalization of the strategy for the implementation of transitional justice ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, justice and reconciliation</i> )	X						235'000'000	235'000'000
Strengthening of judicial authorities' capabilities for the treatment of cases related to transitional justice, in particular drawing on the experience of international courts	X						100'000'000	100'000'000
Operationalization of the strategies to assist the CVJR: technical and logistical assistance, hiring of consultants, notably for the database on violations, and strengthening of the CVJR staff's capabilities on thematic areas and specialized skills	X	X					400'000'000	600'000'000

**PRIORITY PILLAR 1 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
Support to the special fund for sexual violence victims (judicial assistance, material support for travels, alert procedure, material assistance to the focal points in appropriate departments)	X	X		200'000'000	100'000'000	0	300'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of cases handled</li> <li>• Number of focal points established in services</li> <li>• 80 currently, more targeted</li> </ul>
Support for the development of a common judicial framework for victims and testimonies: hiring of an international consultant, organization of workshops and implementation of recommended measures	X			200'000'000	0	0	200'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adoption of a law on the protection of victims and witnesses consistent with international standards</li> <li>• All victims and witnesses of the crisis have filed complaints</li> </ul>
Facilitate the conceptualization and implementation of compensation programs: organization of national consultations, study on the needs and expectations of victims in terms of compensation, workshops to strengthen capabilities on good practice in terms of compensation	X			100'000'000	0	0	100'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of workshops</li> <li>• Publication of study results</li> <li>• Adoption of a program document and creation of a repair fund</li> <li>• 30 staff of the CVJR</li> <li>• Population and victims</li> </ul>
Strengthening of the identification work of violations and victims: technical assistance and strengthening of capabilities for the OSC in charge of establishing a single database, roundtables on documentation techniques, mapping of serious human rights violations during the crisis	X	X	X	50'000'000	30'000'000	20'000'000	100'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of OSCs trained</li> <li>• Number of round tables made</li> <li>• Publication of the results of the mapping</li> <li>• 10 organizations</li> <li>• The entire population of the north</li> </ul>
Sensibilisation campaign on transitional justice: production of various leaflets, video and audio supports, actions on social networks and regional forums to facilitate the communication between institutions and civil society and support the participation of victims	X	X	X	100'000'000	50'000'000	50'000'000	200'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of sessions and forums</li> <li>• Number of booklets distributed</li> <li>• Entire population of the north</li> </ul>

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Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
<b>RECONCILIATION, TRUST, AND PARTICIPATION</b>				15'198'942'750	35'798'558'875	122'239'182'576	173'236'684'202	172'625'017'590
<b>Reconciliation, trust-building</b>				4'393'942'750	4'993'558'875	5'253'052'958	14'640'554'584	14'028'887'972
Rehabilitation and support of regional and subregional culture departments, as well as the cultural missions in Tomboucto, Gao and Es souk		X			2'000'000'000	0	2'000'000'000	2'000'000'000
Promotion of pluridisciplinary research activities on cultural, patrimonial questions and the cultural industry		X		0	1'000'000'000	0	1'000'000'000	1'000'000'000
Strengthening of intercultural dialogue through the reinstating of cultural events in the northern regions like rentrées culturelles, national weeks, artistic and cultural biennials and festivals			X	0	0	5'000'000'000	5'000'000'000	5'000'000'000
Education to peace, training to the prevention and management of conflicts, including in school programs: organization of talks in schools, training of teachers		X		0	30'000'000	0	30'000'000	30'000'000
Organization of discussions and conferences framework with the implication of local opinion leaders such as traditional religious chiefs in the social dialogue	X	X	X	27'000'000	52'000'000	52'000'000	131'000'000	131'000'000
Integration of peace and reconciliation dynamics in the local governments' local development plans	X	X		500'000'000	250'000'000	0	750'000'000	750'000'000

**PRIORITY PILLAR 1 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
Gender, participation and representativity: circulation of norms and standards in the field of peace and security to key stakeholders in terms of peace in Mali and to the population	X			294'000'000	0	0	294'000'000	294'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of stakeholders informed about the content of Resolution 1325 and its action plan</li> </ul>
Gender, participation and representativity: advocacy to attain a 30% representativity rate for women in the mechanisms planned by the Peace Accord and that women's priorities are integrated in this process	X			294'000'000	0	0	294'000'000	294'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of women of different monitoring committees and commissions of the peace agreement at national and decentralized levels</li> <li>• Advocacy for women's participation in the reform of the security sector</li> </ul>
Gender, participation and representativity: strengthening of women capabilities to help them take a role in the community reconciliation at the national and community level	X			147'000'000	0	0	147'000'000	147'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of women trained as 'peace players' per region (500 women in total)</li> </ul>
Gender, participation and representativity: support to community initiatives for reconciliation		X		0	588'000'000	0	588'000'000	588'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 50 rapprochement and reconciliation initiatives undertaken by women at the community level</li> </ul>
Prevention of gender based violence and victims' access to holistic centres (medical, law, economic reintegration, psychosocial, security)	X			294'000'000	0	0	294'000'000	294'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of media actors sensitized that have programs against GBV</li> <li>• Number of outreach activities organized by the media</li> <li>• % of women and girls ex-combatants or associated with combatants who have received reintegration program</li> </ul>

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	X			882'000'000	0	0			882'000'000
				0	0	0	470'400'000	470'400'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of people sensitized to the fight against GBV and attesting to have changed attitudes and behavior</li> <li>Number of functional centers set up</li> <li>Number of victims of GBV supported</li> <li>Number of judgments pronounced on cases of GBV</li> <li>Draft law on GBV developed</li> </ul>
	X			0			470'400'000	470'400'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of victims of GBV supported</li> <li>Existence of a law against GBV</li> </ul>
Gender based violence: coordination of prevention services, referencing, psychosocial support, judicial support and socio-economic reintegration	X			400'000'000			0	400'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of people supported</li> </ul>
HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS PROTECTION/HUMAN RIGHTS/RULE OF LAW (OCHA'S projects list + Plan d'urgence interim period)	X	X	X	1'555'942'750	603'158'875	201'052'958	2'360'154'584	1'748'487'972	
Implementation of empowerment initiatives and networking of women organizations to reduce inter- and intracommunautary conflicts ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, justice and reconciliation</i> )	X			349'625'000	0	0	349'625'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of activities for the strengthening of social cohesion</li> </ul>
<b>Local governance and decentralization</b>				<b>10'805'000'000</b>	<b>30'805'000'000</b>	<b>116'986'129'618</b>	<b>158'596'129'618</b>	<b>158'596'129'618</b>	
Establishment and clarification of the ADR mandates and institutional anchoring within the framework of regionalization	X	X		250'000'000	250'000'000	0	500'000'000	500'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mandate established and clarified</li> <li>Institutional anchoring completed</li> </ul>

**PRIORITY PILLAR 1 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
Support to the technical staff of the regional authorities of the three northern regions	X	X		150'000'000	150'000'000	0	300'000'000	• Technical staff supported
Support to the Regional Development Agencies of the three northern regions	X	X		150'000'000	150'000'000	0	300'000'000	• RDAs supported
Accelerate the transfer of financial resources	X	X	X	0	0	0	0	• 30% transfer quote achieved
Implementation of a coordination and steering mechanism, and monitoring and evaluation	X	X		25'000'000	25'000'000	0	50'000'000	• Mechanism in place
Implementation of formal mechanisms to strengthen the role of civil society in the north	X	X		30'000'000	30'000'000		60'000'000	• Mechanisms in place
Organization of a National Conference on the appropriation of the peace accord			X	0	0	100'000'000	100'000'000	• Conference organized
Local tax system reform			X	0	0	60'000'000	60'000'000	• Enacted reform law
Creation of a Special Fund to finance the Accelerated Development Program for the northern regions			X	0	0	50'000'000	50'000'000	• Fund created
Technical and logistical support to the Ministry of Decentralization for the implementation of the national decentralization strategy by way of regional workshops on the organization and running of local administration and basic social services	X	X		200'000'000	200'000'000	0	400'000'000	• Number of workshops/capacity building sessions organized
Strengthening of the State's presence	X	X	X	5'000'000'000	15'000'000'000	63'358'129'618	83'358'129'618	
Implementation of regionalization	X	X	X	5'000'000'000	15'000'000'000	53'418'000'000	73'418'000'000	
<b>DISPLACEMENT, RETURNEES, AND RESILIENCE OF HOST COMMUNITIES</b>				<b>26'945'365'041</b>	<b>11'331'541'520</b>	<b>3'777'180'507</b>	<b>42'054'087'068</b>	<b>35'562'583'468</b>
HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS EARLY RECOVERY (OCHA'S projects list + Plan d'urgence interim period)	X	X	X	6'198'582'000	1'499'400'000	499'800'000	8'197'782'000	
Implementation of quick impact community projects in the agriculture, trade, livestock, food processing and craft sectors (Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples)	X			275'000'000	0	0	275'000'000	• Number of vulnerable households receiving QIPs

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
Support in the implementation of a cash transfer system for returnees families and returnees (IDPs) for income generating activities and rehabilitation of damaged housings ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			175'000'000	0	0	175'000'000	0	Number of targeted recipients receiving cash transfers
Rehabilitation of targeted vulnerable households's productive assets in areas most affected by the crisis by way of access to improved seeds, feeding and livestock restoration ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			2'749'782'000	0	0	2'749'782'000	0	Number of productive assets rehabilitated
HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS PROTECTION/HUMAN RIGHTS/RULE OF LAW (OCHA'S projects list + Plan d'urgence interim period)	X	X	X	14'363'386'678	6'727'943'339	2'242'647'780	23'333'977'796	19'467'632'804	
Signing of the tripartit accords (Malian government, UNHCR and host countries) for the return of refugees living in Mauritania ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			7'500'000	0	0	7'500'000	7'500'000	Number of tripartite agreements signed
Identification and safeguarding of return corridors ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			25'000'000	0	0	25'000'000	0	Number of return corridors for returnees identified Number of secure return channels
Deployment of secured structures for registration and transit (old and new) in important return areas, with a view to support the functionality of basic social services ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			75'000'000	0	0	75'000'000	0	Number of functional accommodation and transit facilities Number of secured accommodation and transit facilities
Operationalization of census mechanisms for IDPs and returnees in the transit and return areas ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			128'000'000	0	0	128'000'000	0	Number of supervision missions for sites Number of agents for recording and entering data Number of functional registration points

**PRIORITY PILLAR 1 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Year			Needs (XOF)				Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Total		
Organization of voluntary return from refugees and internally displaced persons to their usual living areas ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			450'000'000	0	0	450'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of returnees from host countries</li> <li>Number of IDPs returned to their home area</li> </ul>
Organization of sensibilization campaigns and support of communities on stabilisation, living together and prevention of inter-community conflicts ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			50'000'000	0	0	50'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of awareness-raising and coaching measures realized</li> </ul>
Offer of medical and psychological support to returnees ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			67'000'000	0	0	67'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of people supported</li> </ul>
Organization of prevention and management of gender based violence and reinsertion of women having suffered GBV ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			60'000'000	0	0	60'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of GBV identified</li> <li>Number of GBV supported</li> </ul>
Distribution of legal documents to returnees ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			45'000'000	0	0	45'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of people having received administrative documents</li> </ul>
HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS SHELTER (OCHA'S projects list + Plan d'urgence interim period)	X	X	X	6'383'396'363	3'104'198'182	1'034'732'727	10'522'327'272	7'897'168'664	
Evaluation of damaged housings and support for their rehabilitation ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			175'000'000	0	0	175'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of evaluation conducted</li> <li>Number of housings rehabilitated or constructed for returned IDPs</li> </ul>

PRIORITY PILLAR 2 Restore and Improve Basic Social Services and Protection									
Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)			Total	Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator			
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6						
<b>SOCIAL SERVICES INFRASTRUCTURE (EDUCATION, HEALTH, WATER AND SANITATION)</b>									
<b>Education</b>									
Enhancing the functionality of schools by rehabilitating damaged schools ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, education</i> )	X								
	26'575'529'000	21'910'849'173	291'465'898'328	339'952'276'501	306'456'821'500				
	4'855'000'000	4'379'000'000	175'531'000'000	184'765'000'000	162'075'545'000				
	3'295'500'000	0	0	3'295'500'000	2'165'545'000	• 232 classrooms rehabilitated in Kidal, 612 in Gao, 10 in Timbuktu			
	168'000'000	0	0	168'000'000	0	• Number of rehabilitated CDPE (7 in Gao, 11 in Timbuktu, 4 in Kidal and 2 IES)			
	133'500'000	0	0	133'500'000	0	• Number of rehabilitated IFM (IFM Aguel Hoc, Hegire of Timbuktu and Dire)			
	186'000'000	0	0	186'000'000	0	• Number of rehabilitated secondary schools (high schools: target 7)			
	72'000'000	0	0	72'000'000	0	• Number of secondary technical and vocational training schools rehabilitated			
Construction and equipment of Temporary Learning Environments (EAT) ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, education</i> )	X								
	1'000'000'000	0	0	1'000'000'000	0	• 110 EAT built and equipped in Gao			
						• 110 in Timbuktu			
						• 180 Kidal			
Rehabilitation of the vocational training center for the promotion of agriculture in the Sahel in Gao	X								
	0	0	0	0	0	• The center has been rehabilitated			

**PRIORITY PILLAR 2 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
Construction of new schools according to the school map in the regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal	X	X	X	0	1'000'000'000	2'120'000'000	3'120'000'000	3'120'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 312 classrooms to be built in the region of Timbuktu</li> <li>• Unit cost FCFA 10 million</li> </ul>
	X	X	X	0	325'000'000	500'000'000	825'000'000	825'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 165 classrooms to be rehabilitated in the Timbuktu region</li> <li>• Unit cost FCFA 5 million</li> </ul>
	X	X	X	0	14'000'000	25'000'000	39'000'000	39'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 78 new canteens to be implanted in the Timbuktu region</li> <li>• Unit cost 0.5 million FCFA</li> </ul>
	X	X	X	0	20'000'000	50'000'000	70'000'000	70'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 280 canteens to strengthen in the Timbuktu region</li> <li>• Unit cost 0.25 FCFA million</li> </ul>
	X	X	X	0	2'000'000'000	5'000'000'000	7'000'000'000	7'000'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 700 classrooms to be built in the Gao region</li> <li>• Unit cost FCFA 10 million</li> </ul>
	X	X	X	0	370'000'000	1'100'000'000	1'470'000'000	1'470'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 147 classrooms to be built in the region of Kidal</li> <li>• Unit cost FCFA 10 million</li> </ul>
Rehabilitation of training centers and employment decentralized services in the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu	X			0	0	0	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of centers rehabilitated</li> </ul>
Development of university centers in the northern regions with the creation of faculties according to the specifics of each of said regions			X	0	0	84'000'000'000	84'000'000'000	64'000'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 university built in Timbuktu</li> </ul>
			X	0	0	50'000'000'000	50'000'000'000	50'000'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 university built in Gao</li> </ul>
Creating a public technical school in each region			X	0	0	5'800'000'000	5'800'000'000	5'800'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3 technical schools built</li> </ul>

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
Construction of a vocational training center in each circle in the northern regions (including the agropastoral training centers in Kidal and Timbuktu)	X			0	650'000'000		650'000'000	650'000'000	• 13 technical studies are available for the construction of 13 vocational training centers in each circle of the 3 regions
		X		0	0	26'936'000'000	26'936'000'000	26'936'000'000	• 13 vocational training centers are built in each circle of Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu
<b>Health</b>				<b>6'370'000'000</b>	<b>2'026'000'000</b>	<b>20'000'000'000</b>	<b>28'396'000'000</b>	<b>22'026'000'000</b>	
Support for the rehabilitation and equipping of 52 non-functional health facilities in the regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal (Plan d'urgence, interim period, health)	X			1'490'000'000	0	0	1'490'000'000	0	• Gao: 12 non-functional health facilities rehabilitated and functional • Number of outpatient visits conducted
				1'470'000'000	0	0	1'470'000'000	0	• Kidal : 12 non-functional health facilities rehabilitated and functional • Number of outpatient visits conducted
				3'410'000'000	0	0	3'410'000'000	0	• Timbuktu: 28 non-functional health facilities rehabilitated and functional • Number of outpatient visits conducted
Launch of the construction and equipment of three community health and social assistance centers respectively in Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu		X		0	1'820'000'000	0	1'820'000'000	1'820'000'000	• CSCOM built
		X		0	103'000'000	0	103'000'000	103'000'000	• CSCOM built
		X		0	103'000'000	0	103'000'000	103'000'000	• CSCOM built
Construction of a regional hospital in Kidal and Menaka			X	0	0	10'000'000'000	10'000'000'000	10'000'000'000	• Regional hospital built
			X	0	0	10'000'000'000	10'000'000'000	10'000'000'000	• Regional hospital built

**PRIORITY PILLAR 2 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)				Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Total		
<b>Water and sanitation</b>						
Rehabilitation of water points (boreholes, pastoral wells)	X	15'350'529'000	15'505'849'173	95'934'898'328	122'355'276'500	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of diagnosed water points</li> <li>Number of pumps/wells rehabilitated/planned number</li> </ul>
	X	120'000'000	0	0	120'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of pumps/wells rehabilitated and to rehabilitate</li> </ul>
	X	10'500'000'000	0	0	10'500'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of pumps and wells rehabilitated and to rehabilitate</li> </ul>
	X	1'889'000'000	0	0	1'889'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of boreholes rehabilitated and to rehabilitate</li> </ul>
	X	780'000'000	0	0	780'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of infrastructure rehabilitated and to rehabilitate</li> </ul>
	X	782'529'000	0	0	782'529'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>m<sup>3</sup> produced</li> <li>m<sup>3</sup> distributed</li> <li>Customer complaints</li> <li>Continuity of service (hours of downtime/day)</li> </ul>
	X	570'000'000	0	0	570'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 borehole drilled</li> </ul>
Completion of a drill in Kidal	X	0	0	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 borehole drilled</li> </ul>
Completion of a drill in Gao	X	0	0	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 tank built</li> </ul>
Completion of a tank well in Timbuktu	X	0	0	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water supply and sanitation in rural centers of the Gao region (construction of 52 boreholes, 36 Shiva/SHPA, AEP 24, 88 modern wells, 19 tanks)</li> </ul>
Supply of drinking water to vulnerable populations	X	4'541'500'000	4'541'500'000	4'541'500'000	9'083'000'000	

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	X	X	X	0	1'470'027'983	2'940'497'018	4'410'525'000	4'410'525'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Realization of 69 AEP and 25 Shva in centers of more than 5,000 people in the Gao region</li> </ul>
	X	X	X	0	3'423'000'000	3'423'000'000	6'846'000'000	6'846'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WSS in the circles of Dire, Gourma Rharous, Goundame and Niafounké in the Timbuktu region</li> <li>Equipment 291 villages without PEM</li> </ul>
	X	X	X	709'000'000	1'418'000'000	709'000'000	2'836'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WSS in 13 rural and semi-urban centers of the region of Timbuktu</li> </ul>
	X	X	X	0	720'000'000	720'000'000	1'440'000'000	1'440'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Realization of Improved Village Water Systems in the Kidal region (53 Shva)</li> </ul>
	X	X	X	0	1'006'211'250	1'006'211'250	2'012'422'500	2'012'422'500	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AEP work in the region of Kidal (60 boreholes equipped with PMH, 41 modern wells, 46 tanks)</li> </ul>
	X	X	X	0	1'367'129'940	2'734'670'060	4'101'800'000	4'101'800'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction of latrines in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu</li> </ul>
Strengthening the water supply of the town of Gao	X	X	X	0	460'000'000	460'000'000	920'000'000	920'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening Gao water production capacity from underground waters: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5 boreholes constructed</li> <li>installed electric equipment</li> <li>raccordements made</li> <li>strengthened treatment plant</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

**PRIORITY PILLAR 2 Continued**

Recommended interventions (continued)	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
Strengthening the water supply of the town of Timbuktu		X	X	0	0	0	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening the production of treated water from the waters of the Niger (2025): study carried out</li> <li>Boreholes done</li> <li>Creating a demanganzation system</li> </ul>
Completing of the aqueduct In Esseri—In Tebaz—Kidal		X	X	0	900'000'000	900'000'000	900'000'000	900'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extensions and reinforcement of the distribution network performed</li> <li>Technical studies conducted to better define feasibility</li> <li>Realized aqueduct</li> </ul>
Realization of preliminary studies before the installation of water points and attention to quality of works		X	X	0	0	0	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Technical studies systematically conducted</li> </ul>
<b>SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY</b>				<b>49'453'020'187</b>	<b>47'853'953'929</b>	<b>160'391'675'181</b>	<b>257'698'649'297</b>	<b>206'001'749'884</b>	
<b>Education</b>				<b>19'104'528'402</b>	<b>29'072'998'536</b>	<b>103'613'511'384</b>	<b>151'791'038'321</b>	<b>118'935'503'099</b>	
Organisation of the school year start in 2015 across all regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal	X			0	0	0	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of schools in the north where the school start was carried out (to measure after October 1)</li> <li>Was done</li> </ul>
Update of the situation in all the schools in the regions	X			0	0	0	0	0	
Provision of school materials (including creative material) and school kits (Plan d'urgence, interim period, education)	X			4'751'474'200	0	0	4'751'474'200	2'364'331'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1,150 establishments endowed</li> <li>46,000 students endowed</li> <li>10,525 girls endowed</li> <li>Approximately 200,000 vulnerable children supported</li> </ul>

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
Fast and effective return in the regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal of all teachers redeployed to other areas of Mali through incentives to return ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, education</i> )	X			252'500'000	0	0	252'500'000	0	• % of teachers returned (to be assessed after October 1) on approximately 5,000 teachers
Orientation of students admitted to the DEF in the academies of Timbuktu and Gao ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, education</i> )	X			565'400'000	0	0	565'400'000	0	—
Recruitment of contractual teachers for the duration of the intervention ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, education</i> )	X			863'768'700	0	0	863'768'700	768'700	• 122 recruited in Kidal 100 in Gao 78 in Timbuktu
Ensure the registration and the management of students admitted to the Bac in educational faculties	X			0	0	0	0	0	
Mobilization and community engagement to support the return and keeping of children, especially girls, to school in affected areas ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, education</i> )	X			30'000'000	0	0	30'000'000	0	• Number of sensitization activities by affected areas
Teachers trained in the techniques of remediation and psychosocial support ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, education</i> )	X			520'000'000	0	0	520'000'000	0	• 2,000 teachers
Registration and upgrading the educational level of children of returnee families ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, education</i> )	X			144'000'000	0	0	144'000'000	0	• Number of children/pupils of returnee families receiving intensive remedial courses. Target 50,000
Enrollment of children of displaced families in the region of Kidal to Gao in functional schools by providing school kits ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, education</i> )	X			4'900'000	0	0	4'900'000	0	• Number of children of displaced families in the Kidal region enrolled in schools in the Gao region endowed with kits
Endowment of 1000 schools (500 in Timbuktu and 500 in Gao) in educational trunks ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, education</i> )	X			395'750'000	0	0	395'750'000	0	• Number of schools that have benefited from educational trunks

**PRIORITY PILLAR 2 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
Support for continued access to quality education in emergency situations ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, education</i> )	X			1'250'000'000	0	0	1'250'000'000	0 • Number of children in an emergency situation having benefited from quality education (target 200,000)
Schooling of children who could not be enrolled during the crisis		X		0	13'530'744'385	0	13'530'744'385	• 94'019 children • Unit cost = 143,915 FCFA
Schooling of children who could not continue normally their studies		X		0	437'520'000	0	437'520'000	• 9,115 infants • Unit cost = 48,000 FCFA
Increased access of students from the north to the scholarship programs of donors			X	0	0	117'600'000	117'600'000	• Number of scholarships distributed
Staffing of schools with quality teachers in sufficient numbers	X	X	X	0	0	0	0	• Number of new recruitments
Endowment of students with school supplies and textbooks and teachers with teaching materials	X	X	X	0	0	0	0	• Equipment supplied
Launch of a major communications program to support the keeping of children, particularly the girls, in school		X		0	0	100'000'000	100'000'000	• Campaign conducted
Girls' enrollment and keeping of girls in school			X	0	0	4'000'000'000	4'000'000'000	• Separate latrines • Scholarships for girls • Prizes for girls
Allowance for teachers in rural and disadvantaged areas (remoteness premium)			X	0	0	10'800'000'000	10'800'000'000	• 6,000 teachers in Kidal, Timbuktu, Gao receive 50,000 FCFA premium/month for 3 years
Support for school canteens: introduction of breakfast and improvement of quality			X	0	0	41'280'000'000	41'280'000'000	• 800,000 students and teachers get breakfast during 172 days a year, for 3 years
Deployment of revised and adapted curricula (including updating of textbooks and their distribution)			X	0	0	15'000'000'000	15'000'000'000	• Revised curricula • Number of textbooks distributed

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Total	Year 1	Year 2		
	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Total		
Strengthening of the school administration, inspection and controls			X	0	0	4'000'000'000	4'000'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Administration strengthened</li> <li>Number of inspectors</li> </ul>
Endowment of the administration in vehicles			X	0	0	540'000'000	540'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3 AE, 17 CAP of the 3 regions are endowed with vehicles</li> </ul>
Endowment of educational advisers in motorbikes			X	0	0	51'000'000	51'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>170 CP and CAP of Kidal, Timbuktu, Gao are endowed in motorbikes</li> </ul>
Recruitment and training of technical and vocational education teachers			X	0	0	3'800'000'000	3'800'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>60 trainers recruited and trained for LIT Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu</li> <li>130 trainers recruited and trained to the PSC of 13 circles of northern regions</li> </ul>
Vocational training: youth and women skills-building in line with the real needs of local economies and their active participation	X	X	X	2'610'000'000	8'810'000'000	19'160'000'000	7'920'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of youth trained (3 northern regions, period from 2016 to 2018, target beyond that period to be defined later): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initial vocational training: 8,206</li> <li>Skills training: 6,149</li> <li>Continuing education: 16,176</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Vocational training: improving productivity and competitiveness of artisans and craft enterprises through vocational training	X	X	X					
Vocational training for school dropouts during the crisis		X	X	0	4'000'000'000	4'000'000'000	8'000'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of youth trained</li> </ul>
HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS EDUCATION (OCHA'S projects list + partly Plan d'urgence interim period)	X	X	X	7'716'735'502	2'294'734'151	764'911'384	6'993'539'014	
Enhancing the functionality of school canteens in 314 schools at the opening of classes with the endowment of food and appropriate equipment (Plan d'urgence, interim period, education)	X			3'127'267'200	0	3'127'267'200	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>First 6 months: 69 canteens supported in Kidal, 100 in Gao, 45 in Timbuktu</li> <li>Next 6 months: 100 remaining canteens</li> </ul>



Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	X	X	X	50'000'000	44'000'000	211'200'000			305'200'000
Organization of medical days for specialized care (cardiology, ophthalmology, surgery) in regional hospitals by national hospitals practitioners ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, health</i> )	X	X	X	50'000'000	44'000'000	211'200'000	305'200'000	255'200'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gao: Number of specialized care (cardiology, ophthalmology, surgery) provided to support regional hospitals</li> <li>Timbuktu: Number of specialized care (cardiology, ophthalmology, surgery) provided support to regional hospitals</li> </ul>
Improved financial access of the populations to health facilities through the taking over of costs of care for indigent persons and returnees	X	X	X	4'986'024'000	1'794'969'000	7'179'875'000	13'960'868'000	11'706'868'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Overall health costs exemption, then focused. Number of beneficiaries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Year 1: whole population</li> <li>Year 2: targeted at children U5 + FEFA</li> <li>Années 3-6: targeted at children U5 + FEFA</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Continued funding of subsidized medical care of the poor		X	X	0	720'481'000	2'881'922'000	3'602'403'000	3'602'403'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of beneficiaries after enlistment in RAMED</li> <li>Number of beneficiaries</li> </ul>
Strengthening of advanced strategies for preventive and curative care by mobile teams ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, health</i> )	X			600'000'000	0	0	600'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gao: Number of beneficiaries covered by health care</li> <li>% of children from 0-59 months totally vaccinated by the strategy</li> </ul>
				220'800'000	0	0	220'800'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kidal: Number of beneficiaries covered by health care</li> <li>% of children from 0-59 months totally vaccinated by the strategy</li> </ul>

**PRIORITY PILLAR 2 Continued**

Recommended interventions (continued)	Needs (XOF)			Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
	600'000'000	0	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timbuktu: Number of beneficiaries covered by health care</li> <li>• % of children from 0-59 months totally vaccinated by the strategy</li> </ul>
Organization of mobile teams and advanced strategies in all functional health areas in the three regions	0	781'440'000	3'750'912'000	4'532'352'000	
Implementation of screening systems, reference and counter reference and care of cases of children suffering from acute malnutrition ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, health</i> )	X		0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gao: Number of cases detected and supported</li> <li>• Number of children who received Vitamin A supplementation</li> </ul>
			0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kidal: Number of cases detected and supported</li> <li>• Number of children who received Vitamin A supplementation</li> </ul>
			0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timbuktu: Number of cases detected and supported</li> <li>• Number of children who received Vitamin A supplementation</li> </ul>
Care of child malnutrition in the three regions and especially in Timbuktu	0	625'900'000	3'004'320'000	3'630'220'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of beneficiaries</li> </ul>
Epidemiological surveillance in the three regions and establishment of a response device ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, health</i> )	X		264'000'000	419'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gao: number of reports on epidemiological monitoring</li> </ul>
			211'200'000	335'200'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kidal: number of reports on epidemiological monitoring</li> </ul>

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
				100'000'000	55'000'000	264'000'000	419'000'000	419'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timbuktu: number of reports on epidemiological monitoring</li> </ul>
Implementation of Essential Care in communities in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, health</i> )	X			160'000'000	0	0	160'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of functional ASC sites in Gao and Timbuktu</li> </ul>
Provision of essential care in communities		X	X	0	156'750'000	752'400'000	909'150'000	909'150'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of people consulted by ASCs</li> </ul>
Strengthening health providers' capabilities ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, health</i> )	X			50'000'000	0	0	50'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of trained providers in Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu</li> </ul>
Strengthening of the cold chain ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, health</i> )	X			125'000'000	0	0	125'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of health facilities equipped with cold chain</li> </ul>
Supply to health facilities of essential drugs for the treatment of health problems of the mother/woman and child ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, health</i> )	X			1'112'000'000	0	0	1'112'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gao: % of pregnant women covered by prenatal health care in each area</li> <li>• % of deliveries in health centers</li> <li>• % fully immunized children</li> </ul>
				1'112'000'000	0	0	1'112'000'000	320'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kidal: % of pregnant women covered by prenatal health care in each area</li> <li>• % of deliveries in health centers</li> <li>• % fully immunized children</li> </ul>
				1'112'000'000	0	0	1'112'000'000	320'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timbuktu: % of pregnant women covered by prenatal health care in each area</li> <li>• % of deliveries in health centers</li> <li>• % fully immunized children</li> </ul>

**PRIORITY PILLAR 2 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Year			Needs (XOF)				Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Total		
Endowment of the northern regions of medicines, medical consumables and laboratory reagents		X	X	0	1'834'800'000	8'807'040'000	10'641'840'000	10'641'840'000	
Support of health care staff (communities contract workers)	X			70'000'000	0	0	70'000'000	0	• Number of contractual staff supported
Support to regional CSRef	X			835'519'000	0	0	835'519'000	790'519'000	• Number of CSRef supported
Continued payment of wages of the Bamako specialists contract workers in the northern regions		X		0	32'560'000	156'288'000	188'848'000	188'848'000	
Training of six specialists (cardiologist, ophthalmologist, surgeon), two in each discipline, to be affected in the northern regions			X	0	0	1'920'000'000	1'920'000'000	1'920'000'000	• Number of specialists trained
Training of medical personnel (upgrading of district doctors , DTC, midwife at least 5 days per year)			X	0	0	160'000'000	160'000'000	160'000'000	• 200 people/year
Training of focal points in nutrition and officers in charge of SLIS on the PCIME/PCIMA/ANJE during 5 days a year			X	0	0	80'000'000	80'000'000	80'000'000	• 100 people/year
Training and awareness of the ASACO, community relays, ASC, local elected officials, leaders of civil society for their greater involvement in the management of their health problems and use of health services			X	0	0	160'000'000	160'000'000	160'000'000	• Number of people trained
Replacement of equipment, rolling logistics and communication equipment for half of structures			X	0	0	819'500'000	819'500'000	819'500'000	• Number of equipment/vehicles
Support for the coordination and monitoring/evaluation of the implementation of planned activities (Plan d'urgence, interim period, health)	X	X	X	25'000'000	30'000'000	144'000'000	199'000'000	174'000'000	—
HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS HEALTH (OCHA'S projects list)	X	X	X	10'096'230'004	4'358'377'002	2'069'087'334	16'523'694'340	7'852'334'264	—

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
<p>Women's access to reproductive health services (SSR)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rehabilitate and equip sexual and reproductive health services, including youth-friendly and adolescent reproductive health facilities destroyed or damaged in health facilities</li> <li>Provide sexual and reproductive health services, including youth-friendly and youth inputs and drugs (kits) necessary for their proper functioning</li> <li>Strengthen the capacity of health providers to support cases of GBV</li> </ul>	X			1'176'000'000	0	0	1'176'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rehabilitate and equip at least 50% of maternity and youth centers affected by the crisis</li> <li>Rehabilitate and equip and support IEC activities in at least 50% of youth friendly centers affected by the crisis</li> <li>Training of at least 50% of health personnel on the management of sexual and other GBV is ensured</li> <li>50% of health centers have inputs (kits) of reproductive health including maternity materials</li> </ul>	
		X		0	882'000'000	0	882'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>80% of women and girls in the project intervention area have access to quality reproductive health services</li> <li>75% of health centers have inputs (kits) of reproductive health including maternity materials</li> <li>50% of youth centers have inputs and conduct IEC activities</li> </ul>	
			X	0	0	588'000'000	588'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>90% of women and girls have access to quality reproductive health services</li> <li>90% of health centers have inputs (kits) of reproductive health including maternity materials</li> </ul>	

**PRIORITY PILLAR 2 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Year 1			Year 2			Year 3-6			Needs (XOF)			Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
<b>Water and sanitation</b>				7'620'918'782	6'993'978'391	17'924'659'464	32'539'556'636	28'223'956'782							
Assistance to resettle the administration's services	X			300'000'000	0	0	300'000'000	300'000'000					300'000'000		—
Capacity strengthening of the DNH staff	X			1'752'962'000	0	0	1'752'962'000	1'016'000'000					1'016'000'000		• Number of people trained
Implementation/redynamisation and support of management committees for the water points and system (AEP, AES, SH V A)	X	X	X	200'000'000	200'000'000	800'000'000	1'200'000'000	1'200'000'000					1'200'000'000		• Number of committees or management structures in place
Staff and operating budget reinforcement should be programmed by the State in its annual budgets		X	X	0	0	0	0	0					0		—
Improve the availability of spare parts by facilitating the creation of a spare retailer network		X	X	0	50'000'000	50'000'000	100'000'000	100'000'000					100'000'000		• Functional network resellers in Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal
Capacity strengthening of repair craftsmen		X	X	0	60'000'000	180'000'000	240'000'000	240'000'000					240'000'000		• 200 people / year
Improvement of devolution of responsibilities and quality of service		X	X	0	4'000'000'000	16'000'000'000	20'000'000'000	20'000'000'000					20'000'000'000		—
<b>HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS WATER AND SANITATION (OCHA'S projects list)</b>	X	X	X	5'367'956'782	2'683'978'391	894'659'464	8'946'594'636	5'367'956'782					5'367'956'782		—
<b>SHORT-TERM SOCIAL WELFARE SUPPORT AND SCALING UP SOCIAL SAFETY NETS</b>				1'937'295'903	15'246'595'903	21'255'995'903	38'439'887'709	34'532'000'000					34'532'000'000		
Social safety nets program Jigisemejiri	X	X	X	589'295'903	589'295'903	589'295'903	1'767'887'709	0					0		• Gao component: 2,730 beneficiaries
Support to the transition towards resilience and economic recovery in post-conflict zones (cash transfer share)	X	X		492'000'000	492'000'000	0	984'000'000	0					0		• Number of beneficiaries

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	X			656'000'000	0	0			656'000'000
Strengthening of national programs of SA and social and nutritional safety nets ("flexible" safety nets and nutrition by Jigisemejiri)	X			656'000'000	0	0	656'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2 communes in Mopti and Timbuktu (Youwarou and Niafunke)</li> <li>• Identification of 3,200 households, including 1,000 beneficiaries of cash transfers</li> <li>• MA + PNP for 5,000 children U5 and FEFA</li> </ul>
Situation assessment of current institutions', services' and NGOs' presence to support the implementation of social safety nets and assessment of needs	X			200'000'000	0	0	200'000'000	200'000'000	
Capacity strengthening of technical services at the level of municipalities and deconcentration of services		X		0	500'000'000	0	500'000'000	0	
Extension of the cash transfer program Jigiséméjiri in the north		X	X	0	6'999'300'000	14'000'700'000	21'000'000'000	21'000'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 30,000 households</li> </ul>
Food distribution through NGOs using the common NGO's framework and using the financing of humanitarian agencies to complement and increase the social safety nets cover of the poor and vulnerable population	(X)	X	X		6'666'000'000	6'666'000'000	13'332'000'000	13'332'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Estimated distribution of food for a basket of 2,100 kcal/person/day for 4 months a year to 30,000 households</li> </ul>

**PRIORITY PILLAR 3 Promote Economic and Infrastructure Recovery and Employment**

Recommended interventions	Year			Needs (XOF)				Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Total		
<b>AGRICULTURE (FOOD SECURITY, PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY AND LIVELIHOODS)</b>				55'618'695'235	99'517'978'017	268'391'455'260	423'528'128'513	229'729'779'906	
Food security, restoring productive capacity and livelihoods				51'591'990'435	17'461'773'217	16'315'903'072	85'369'666'725	41'514'732'518	
HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS AGRICULTURE (OCHA'S projects list + Plan d'urgence interim period)	X	X	X	7'290'793'326	3'452'896'663	1'150'965'554	11'894'655'543	10'749'200'590	
Distribution of agricultural inputs (Plan d'urgence, interim period, local economy)	X			150'000'000	0	0	150'000'000	0	• Number of households benefiting from agricultural inputs
Organisation of vaccination campaigns and treatment of livestock (Plan d'urgence, interim period, local economy)	X			100'000'000	0	0	100'000'000	0	• Number of vaccinated cattle
Assure the functionality of vaccination parks in high density livestock areas (Plan d'urgence, interim period, local economy)	X			85'000'000	0	0	85'000'000	0	• Number of functional vaccination parks
Reparation of motor pumps in irrigated zones (Plan d'urgence, interim period, local economy)	X			50'000'000	0	0	50'000'000	0	• Number of functional motor pumps
HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS EARLY RECOVERY (OCHA'S projects list + Plan d'urgence interim period)	X	X	X	14'247'538'798	4'855'876'899	1'618'625'633	20'722'041'330	13'572'610'071	
Implementation of income generation activities for women and youth in the agricultural, livestock, small trade, fishing and craft sectors (Plan d'urgence, interim period, local economy)	X			600'000'000	0	0	600'000'000	0	• Number of AGR funded through the implementation of the MSAHR and BOA protocols

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
Implementation of actions to promote local economic recovery and assist local communities in the north of Mali ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, local economy</i> )	X			3'279'785'000	0	0	3'279'785'000	0 • Number of communities and the private sector supported for the rehabilitation of productive infrastructure • Number of vulnerable households benefiting from social safety nets • 6 towns of Gao and Timbuktu regions
Investment promoting fast recovery in terms of living conditions of the beneficiaries and economic recovery in the Kidal region ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, local economy</i> )	X			656'000'000	0	0	656'000'000	0 • Number of investments
HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS FOOD SECURITY (OCHA'S projects list + Plan d'urgence interim period)	X	X	X	30'053'658'311	9'152'999'656	13'546'311'885	52'752'969'852	17'192'921'857
Purchase, transport and stocking of food products in the warehouses in the regions of Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao and Kidal ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, food security</i> )	X			8'800'000'000	0	0	8'800'000'000	• 11,048 tons Amount of food stored in stores of regions of Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal and Mopti
Food distributions to the share of the population finding itself in food insecurity in the regions of Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, food security</i> )	X			863'550'000	0	0	863'550'000	• 40,306 tons of which CSA 11,514 tons, WFP 23,407 tons and ICRC 5,385 tons • Number of beneficiaries 395,539

**PRIORITY PILLAR 3 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)					Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2			Year 3-6
Purchase of livestock fodder to distribute free of charge to herders in zone of livestock food insecurity ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, food security</i> )	X			1'000'000'000	0	0	1'000'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quantity of livestock feed stored in stores regions of Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal and Mopti</li> <li>Number of villages/fractions that received cattle feed</li> <li>Amount of subsidized animal feed: 7,400 tons CSA 790T FAO, ICRC 1200T, 900T NGOs for a total of 10,290T</li> <li>98 municipalities</li> </ul>
Strengthening vulnerable communities' resilience through an assistance to the protection, restoration and strengthening of livelihoods (Regions of Gao, Mopti and Tombouctou) ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, food security</i> )	X			0	0	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of tons of seeds distributed: FAO 434,5 tons to 31,437 households; ICRC 448 tonnes for 17,963 households</li> <li>Heads vaccinated Number 200,000 PPR, CBPP and coals</li> <li>Number of Stakeholders whose capacities are developed</li> </ul>
Contribution to the reduction of food and nutritional insecurity in Mali ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, food security</i> )	X	X	X	3'935'742'000	3'935'742'000	11'807'226'000	19'678'710'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of people whose income improved by supporting the development of the fishing industry</li> <li>Strengthened national food security system</li> </ul>

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	X			5'019'851'000	0	0			5'019'851'000
Distribution of food and non food items (household and hygiene kits) to families in food insecurity situation and returnees (IDPs and refugees) ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, displaced peoples</i> )	X			5'019'851'000	0	0	5'019'851'000	1'332'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of beneficiaries of the distribution of food and non-food items (Target: 68,000 IDPs and 132,000 returnees)</li> <li>Quantities of food distributed</li> </ul>
<b>Rural development</b>				<b>4'026'704'800</b>	<b>63'077'704'800</b>	<b>171'604'704'800</b>	<b>238'709'114'400</b>	<b>151'650'000'000</b>	
Support to seeds, fertilizers and other inputs producers and development of commercialization networks		X	X	0	40'000'000'000	110'000'000'000	150'000'000'000	150'000'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of beneficiaries</li> <li>Number of marketing channels</li> </ul>
Support to technical services for the reconstitution of vegetal and animal genetic resources (support for the deconcentration)	X	X		50'000'000	50'000'000	0	100'000'000	100'000'000	
Strengthening of animal health throughout the rehabilitation of regional and local veterinary structures	X			500'000'000	0	0	500'000'000	500'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rehabilitated structures</li> </ul>
Improvement of the livestock's sanitary protection in each region (mobile services)	X	X		150'000'000	150'000'000	0	300'000'000	300'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of beneficiaries</li> </ul>
Giving of material, logistical means and technical equipment to the technical services as well as support for the return of technical human resources	X	X		375'000'000	375'000'000	0	750'000'000	750'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of equipment</li> <li>Number of supported staff</li> </ul>
DUE/FED Fund—Project PRORESA, OS2 "Improvement of the food and nutrition state of the population through prevention actions against malnutrition"	X	X	X	2'951'704'800	2'951'704'800	2'951'704'800	8'855'114'400	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of beneficiaries</li> </ul>
Taoussa Dam		X	X	0	19'551'000'000	58'653'000'000	78'204'000'000	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of beneficiaries</li> </ul>

**PRIORITY PILLAR 3 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)			Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
<b>Agriculture</b>				<b>17'445'982'180</b>	
Improvement Lac Faguibine	X	X	X	502'900'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Project intergrated agricultural development Saoune plain	X	X	X	22'800'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Project to assist rural development of the Daye, d'Hamadja, Koriomé plains	X	X	X	0	• Number of beneficiaries
Project of development of irrigated villages plots in the region of Gao (PAPV)	X	X	X	217'700'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Rural development project in the Ansongo cercle (PRODECA)	X	X	X	0	• Number of beneficiaries
Project to assist the wheat value chain in the region of Tombouctou (Project-Alkama)	X	X	X	305'900'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Maintenance and infrastructure development in the Office du Niger (Contract Plan)	X	X	X	2'124'400'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Project to assist the rural development of Tienkounou and Tamani (PADER-TKT)	X	X	X	1'498'500'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Project of hydro-agricol development Molodo Nord	X	X	X	928'000'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Government project to develop 60000 ha	X	X	X	30'000'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Investment program and rural development in the northern regions (PIDRN)	X	X	X	1'760'000'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Integrated project development region Kidal (PIDRK)	X	X	X	1'242'700'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Program for an agriculture resilient to climate change	X	X	X	5'527'200'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Rehabilitation and equipment of irrigated village plots in the region of Gao	X	X	X	3'285'882'180	• Number of beneficiaries

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
<b>Livestock</b>									
Project to assist livestock rearing in north eastern Mali (PADENEM) Phase II	X	X	X	0	3'614'375'000	19'554'913'008	23'169'288'008	11'603'288'008	• Number of beneficiaries
Project to assist the improvement of livelihoods of poor and vulnerable people in the lake zone (PAACVP)	X	X	X	0	192'125'000	576'375'000	768'500'000	153'700'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Project to develop livestock rearing in the region of Liptako Gourma in Gourma (IsDB)	X	X	X	0	1'256'000'000	3'768'000'000	5'024'000'000	1'004'800'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Project selection and multiplication ZEBU AZAWAK (phase II)	X	X	X	0	261'250'000	783'750'000	1'045'000'000	209'000'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Assuring the functionality of vaccination parks in high density livestock zones	X	X	X	0	10'625'000	31'875'000	42'500'000	8'500'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Organization of vaccination campaigns and livestock treatment	X	X	X	0	12'500'000	37'500'000	50'000'000	10'000'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Regional project to improve the quality of leather and skins	X	X	X	0	58'625'000	175'875'000	234'500'000	46'900'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Assisting vulnerable groups for beef and mutton rearing in the regions of Gao, Tombouctou			X	0	0	2'302'588'008	2'302'588'008	2'302'588'008	• Number of beneficiaries
Pastoral development program resilient to climate change			X	0	0	6'409'200'000	6'409'200'000	6'409'200'000	• Number of beneficiaries
<b>Fishing</b>				0	1'881'625'000	11'655'352'200	13'536'977'200	7'515'777'200	
Project to assist continental fishing in the Central Niger Delta zone (Mopti)	X		X	0	1'881'625'000	5'644'875'000	7'526'500'000	1'505'300'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Programme for the development of fishing farms			X	0	0	5'468'400'000	5'468'400'000	5'468'400'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Project to develop fish farming in floating cages and basins (promotion of small fishing ponds, floating cages and introduction of fish in ponds)			X	0	0	542'077'200	542'077'200	542'077'200	• Number of beneficiaries

**PRIORITY PILLAR 3 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION AND CONSTRUCTION</b>								
<b>Road infrastructure</b>								
Link Kidal, Gao and Tombouctou to the transsaharian road			X	0	0	0	0	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Gao—Bourem—Taoussa		X		0	4'000'000'000	16'000'000'000	20'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Bourem—Kidal		X		0	20'000'000'000	115'000'000'000	135'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Kidal—Timiaouine (Algerian border)			X	0	0	100'000'000'000	100'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Dirtroad Mounia—Diafarabé—Dia—Tenenkou—Youwarou			X	0	0	8'000'000'000	8'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Anefis—Tessalit—BordjBajjiMoctar			X	0	0	96'250'000'000	96'250'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Kidal—Menaka			X	0	0	93'000'000'000	93'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Ansongo—Menaka—Anderamboukane—Niger border			X	0	0	70'000'000'000	70'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Goma Coura—Tombouctou	X	X		20'000'000'000	40'000'000'000	20'000'000'000	80'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Douentza—Tombouctou			X	0	0	156'000'000'000	156'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Dirtroad Ansongo—Tessit—Frontière Burkina Faso			X	0	0	5'000'000'000	5'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
Douentza—Gao (rehabilitation)		X	X	0	17'000'000'000	50'000'000'000	67'000'000'000	67'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Gossi—Gourma—Rharous			X	0	0	36'750'000'000	36'750'000'000	36'750'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Dirtroad Boré—Korientzé—Aka			X	0	0	6'500'000'000	6'500'000'000	6'500'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Dirtroad Indelimane—frontière Niger			X	0	0	4'000'000'000	4'000'000'000	4'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
Léré—Fassala			X	0	0	3'500'000'000	3'500'000'000	3'500'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, road built
<b>Aerial infrastructure</b>				<b>32'250'000'000</b>	<b>39'200'000'000</b>	<b>107'500'000'000</b>	<b>178'950'000'000</b>	<b>178'700'000'000</b>	
Rehabilitation of Kidal airport	X			32'250'000'000	0	0	32'250'000'000	32'250'000'000	• Airport built
Rehabilitation of Tessalit airport			X	0	0	35'000'000'000	35'000'000'000	35'000'000'000	• Airport built
Rehabilitation of Taoudeni airport		X	X	0	12'250'000'000	20'000'000'000	32'250'000'000	32'250'000'000	• Airport built
Rehabilitation of Menaka airport		X	X	0	12'250'000'000	20'000'000'000	32'250'000'000	32'250'000'000	• Airport built
Rehabilitation of Gao airport		X		0	14'700'000'000	0	14'700'000'000	14'700'000'000	• Airport built
Construction of Goundam airport			X	0	0	32'500'000'000	32'500'000'000	32'250'000'000	• Airport built
<b>Fluvial infrastructure</b>				<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>37'300'000'000</b>	<b>37'300'000'000</b>	<b>37'300'000'000</b>	
Purchase of 3 Drague ships			X	0	0	7'500'000'000	7'500'000'000	7'500'000'000	• 3 ships purchased
Purchase of 4 fast passenger ships on the northern forebay of the river Niger			X	0	0	6'000'000'000	6'000'000'000	6'000'000'000	• 4 ships purchased
Purchase of 2 ships for liquid goods shipping			X	0	0	4'000'000'000	4'000'000'000	4'000'000'000	• 2 ships purchased
Purchase of 2 ships for solid goods shipping			X	0	0	3'000'000'000	3'000'000'000	3'000'000'000	• 2 ships purchased
Purchase of portuary equipments on the river Niger			X	0	0	1'500'000'000	1'500'000'000	1'500'000'000	• Equipments purchased

**PRIORITY PILLAR 3 Continued**

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
Purchase of standard maintenance equipments for ships			X	0	0	1'800'000'000	1'800'000'000	1'800'000'000	• Equipments purchased
Construction of a naval construction site and of a port in Mopti			X	0	0	7'000'000'000	7'000'000'000	7'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, project built
Training of human resources			X	0	0	2'000'000'000	2'000'000'000	2'000'000'000	• Number of training beneficiaries
Construction of docks in the fluvial transit places of Bamba, Dire and Youwarou			X	0	0	4'500'000'000	4'500'000'000	4'500'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, docks built
<b>Ferrovial infrastructure</b>				0	0	40'000'000'000	40'000'000'000	40'000'000'000	
Studies and construction of the new train connection Dori-Ansongo (210 km) on the roundline (Cotonou-Niamey-Ansongo-Kaya-Ouagadougou-Abidjan) and extension all the way to Gao			X	0	0	40'000'000'000	40'000'000'000	40'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, line built
<b>Telecommunications</b>				0	11'750'000'000	44'000'000'000	55'750'000'000	51'600'000'000	
National broadband project: Markala-Niono-Léré-Niafunké-Goundam-Tombouctou, Gao-Douentza-Mopti and Bamako-Kourémalé			X	0	0	44'000'000'000	44'000'000'000	44'000'000'000	• Technical studies conducted, line built
Repair of damages to Sotelma following the crisis in the north		X		0	5'000'000'000	0	5'000'000'000	4'600'000'000	
Repair of damages to Orange Mali following the crisis in the north		X		0	2'600'000'000	0	2'600'000'000	2'600'000'000	
Installation and commissioning of 3G transmitters in Gao and Timbuktu		X		0	150'000'000	0	150'000'000	0	
Completion of the coverage of statutory lines and localities		X		0	2'500'000'000	0	2'500'000'000	0	
Rolling out of the new FH3 line		X		0	400'000'000	0	400'000'000	400'000'000	
Extension of the MSAN network		X		0	500'000'000	0	500'000'000	0	
Extension of the CDMA network		X		0	600'000'000	0	600'000'000	0	

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
<b>Energy</b>							77'031'810'000		
Repair of damages on rural electrical installations to be able to restart them	X			2'000'000'000	58'124'010'000	16'907'800'000	2'000'000'000	2'000'000'000	
Strengthening of diesel power stations (classical energy production) through hybridation with solar stations		X		0	11'000'000'000	0	11'000'000'000	11'000'000'000	• The powers range between 30 and 250 kWp, totaling 2,080 MWp and implementation of 73km of electric grid MV/LV
Tombouctou (Hybridation of thermic/isolated solar power stations)		X		0	7'474'650'000	0	7'474'650'000	7'474'650'000	• Power station built
Kidal (Hybridation of isolated stations)		X		0	5'554'000'000	0	5'554'000'000	5'554'000'000	• Power station built
Gao (Hybridation of isolated stations)		X		0	7'474'650'000	0	7'474'650'000	7'474'650'000	• Power station built
Goundam (Hybridation of isolated stations)		X		0	924'000'000	0	924'000'000	924'000'000	• Power station built
Diré (Hybridation of isolated stations)			X	0		1'844'280'000	1'844'280'000	1'844'280'000	• Power station built
Niafunké (Hybridation of isolated stations)		X		0	1'632'510'000	0	1'632'510'000	1'632'510'000	• Power station built
Gourma-Rharouss (Hybridation of isolated stations)			X	0		4'812'840'000	4'812'840'000	4'812'840'000	• Power station built
Bourem (Hybridation of isolated stations)			X	0		4'812'840'000	4'812'840'000	4'812'840'000	• Power station built
Ménaka (Hybridation of isolated stations)			X	0		4'812'840'000	4'812'840'000	4'812'840'000	• Power station built
Tin-Essako (Hybridation of isolated stations)		X		0	1'604'280'000	0	1'604'280'000	1'604'280'000	• Power station built
Abeibara (Hybridation of isolated stations)		X		0	1'604'280'000	0	1'604'280'000	1'604'280'000	• Power station built

PRIORITY PILLAR 3 Continued

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
Téssalit (Hybridation of isolated stations)	X			0	1'604'280'000	0	1'604'280'000	• Power station built
Ansongo (Hybridation of isolated stations)		X		0		625'000'000	625'000'000	• Power station built
Douentza (Hybridation of isolated stations)	X			0	4'812'840'000	0	4'812'840'000	• Power station built
Tenikou (Hybridation of isolated stations)	X			0	4'812'840'000	0	4'812'840'000	• Power station built
Youwarou (Hybridation of isolated stations)	X			0	4'812'840'000	0	4'812'840'000	• Power station built
Léré (Hybridation of isolated stations)	X			0	4'812'840'000	0	4'812'840'000	• Power station built
<b>Gas</b>				<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	
Link the three northern regions to the regional transsaharian gas pipeline (no study or costing so far)			X	—	—	—	—	• Technical studies conducted, pipeline built
<b>PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING SERVICES</b>				<b>1'555'100'000</b>	<b>5'401'000'000</b>	<b>14'331'285'000</b>	<b>21'287'385'000</b>	<b>12'626'885'000</b>
Promotion of income generating activities for youth and women organized in cooperatives and social enterprises	X		X	0	300'000'000	300'000'000	600'000'000	
Training and management support, targeted mainly towards the capabilities of self-entrepreneurs and initiators of income generating activities	X		X	0	0	3'279'785'000	3'279'785'000	
Support to the creation of micro-enterprises in communities to revive the local economy and promote job opportunities				75'000'000	0	0	75'000'000	
Support to cooperatives and business which can generate jobs, through financial and non-financial support adapted to their needs	X	X	X	1'037'500'000	2'075'000'000	5'187'500'000	8'300'000'000	Beneficiaries of PROCEJ, PACEPEP and IsDB in the 3 northern regions: • 4,900 young people trained to entrepreneurship with seed money • 257 SMEs supported

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
Training and management support, targeted mainly towards the capabilities of self-entrepreneurs and initiators of income generating activities	X	X	X						1,150 projects are financed and monitored
Entrepreneurship support program for young graduates and women, training and insertion programs for out-of-school and not schooled youth	X	X							
Better organization of tradesmen		X		0	100'000'000	0	100'000'000	100'000'000	
Creation of crafts villages in the northern regions of Mali			X	0	0	100'000'000	100'000'000	100'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of craft villages created</li> <li>Number of spaces created</li> </ul>
Development of exchange spaces and foires in view of the subregional integration			X	0	0	100'000'000	100'000'000	100'000'000	
Promotion of economic activities linked to the cultural sector such as cultural tourism, events and artistic and cultural artifacts			X	0	0	50'000'000	50'000'000	50'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of events supported or organized</li> </ul>
Access to financing and production means: development of micro-finance services ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, local economy</i> )	X	X		150'000'000	150'000'000	0	300'000'000	100'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of institutions supported</li> <li>Number of members</li> <li>Number of projects funded</li> </ul>
Promotion of extractive industries (research, exploration and exploitation) in the northern regions			X	0	0	50'000'000	50'000'000	50'000'000	
Fostering of commercial exchanges between the three northern regions and other regions through the creation, the identification and the reviving of distribution networks ( <i>Plan d'urgence, interim period, local economy</i> )	X	X		100'000'000	100'000'000	0	200'000'000	50'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of networks created, identified and revitalized</li> </ul>

**PRIORITY PILLAR 3 Continued**


Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6			Total
Local economic recovery through the creation of savings groups and promotion of micro-enterprises for youth and women	X			75'000'000	0	0	75'000'000	69'750'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of savings groups created, number of micro-enterprises created</li> </ul>
Strengthening of the economic autonomy of women and recovery in the post-conflict context	X			117'600'000	0	0	117'600'000	117'600'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct a survey on income generating activities in the affected areas to identify those that are most promising for women; groups, associations and local NGOs for future implementation</li> <li>Establish response mechanisms to finance income generating activities and identifying beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		X		0	1'176'000'000	0	1'176'000'000	1'176'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1,000 vulnerable women and girls lead income generating activities with high profitability and value added</li> <li>Vulnerable women and girls engaged in income generating activities and make internal savings</li> </ul>
			X	0	0	1'764'000'000	1'764'000'000	1'764'000'000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Value chain restructuring</li> </ul>

Recommended interventions	Needs (XOF)						Financing gap (XOF)	Indicator
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3-6		
Other projects for the development of the private sector and financial services		X	X	0	1'500'000'000	3'500'000'000	5'000'000'000	• Number of beneficiaries
<b>ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY</b>				100'000'000	25'000'000'000	41'541'082'396	66'641'082'396	
Fight against the silting of the Niger river, the river affluents, the main lakes, ponds and canals		X		0	25'000'000'000	0	25'000'000'000	• Number of desilted kilometers
Protection of fauna and its habitats to develop eco-tourism			X	0	0	50'000'000	50'000'000	• Number of projects
Antiacridic measures	X			100'000'000	0	0	100'000'000	
National integrated project for the development and the adaptation to climate change in the Niger basin			X	0	0	12'700'800'000	12'700'800'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Intensive reforestation program to reconstitute the forestal ecosystem in Mali			X	0	0	11'054'400'000	11'054'400'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Economic and environmental project to rehabilitate the river Niger			X	0	0	10'746'045'803	10'746'045'803	• Number of beneficiaries
Natural resources integrated management program			X	0	0	114'718'800	114'718'800	• Number of beneficiaries
Harvesting and collecting of rainwater program			X	0	0	3'692'640'000	3'692'640'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Riverbank protection through bourgou plantation and measures against invasive plants			X	0	0	1'456'856'554	1'456'856'554	• Number of beneficiaries
Project of firewood production and installation of a firewood market in the regions of Gao and Tombouctou			X	0	0	476'280'000	476'280'000	• Number of beneficiaries
Construction of structures of fight flooding in the Gao region			X	0	0	1'249'341'240	1'249'341'240	• Number of beneficiaries



# Strategic Results Framework

Outcome	Indicators
Security restored in the north	<p><b>Tangible evidence of security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # security related incidents—broken down by number of deaths and number of incidents</li> </ul> <p><b>Population's perception of their own security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of women who feel it's safe when walking alone</li> <li>• % of citizens who feel it's safe to travel to the nearest town</li> <li>• % of citizens with primary school aged children who feel it's safe for their children to go to school</li> </ul>
Improvements in capacity of government to perform basic functions and deliver services	<p><b>Usable capacity for service delivery</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutions established and operational, as per peace accord</li> <li>• % of teachers present during school day (relative to number of teachers on payroll)</li> <li>• % of medical staff present (relative to number of staff on payroll)</li> <li>• % of wells functioning at village level</li> </ul> <p><b>Actual use of basic services</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of households with livestock who have used veterinary services in last 3 months</li> <li>• % of eligible children attending primary school</li> </ul>
Peace sustained through deepened reconciliation and practical cooperation between local governments and communities	<p><b>Perceptions of confidence in peace agreement/trust in government</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of citizens who express trust in police</li> <li>• % of citizens who express trust in Malian army</li> <li>• % of citizens who express trust in the judiciary system</li> </ul> <p><b>Tangible evidence of peace</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of intercommunal/ethnic/religious conflicts reported</li> <li>• % of households that registered the return of a displaced person</li> <li>• # of people still displaced</li> </ul>
Economic recovery and sustainable livelihoods for all	<p><b>Perceptions of livelihoods improving</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of citizens who feel better off compared to last year</li> <li>• % of citizens who expect to be better off next year</li> </ul> <p><b>Tangible evidence of livelihoods improving</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Food Consumption Score</li> <li>• % of those aged 15–60 who are employed for cash (a wage) during last week</li> </ul>
Northern regions integrated into economy of Mali	<p><b>Connection to networks across Mali</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of communes with cellphone network</li> <li>• Change in transport cost/km to the center of the commune/circle</li> </ul> <p><b>Connection to markets</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Availability of fertilizer (specify the type) in local shop</li> <li>• Availability of seed (specify the type) in local shop</li> <li>• Price of petrol</li> <li>• Price index of transport to center of commune or circle</li> </ul>



# Results and Analysis of the Survey of the Local Population Concerning Needs and Priorities

As part of the Joint Assessment Mission, a survey was undertaken among populations in northern Mali in August and September of 2015. The survey comprised four components.

First, a household survey was conducted with 500 households proportionally distributed across the regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu (Table A3.1). The survey explored different aspects of the lives and livelihood of people in northern Mali, their perceptions about physical security, and their views on possible initiatives that could be implemented to consolidate peace and security. While the survey interviewed approximately equal numbers of men and women (53 and 47 percent, respectively), over 90 percent of surveyed households were headed by men. The survey population is very young (60 percent under the age of 25) and poorly educated (45 percent reported no education). Eighty-four percent of those interviewed live in rural areas. Households surveyed were randomly selected to ensure representativeness across the regions.

Second, a survey was carried out with administrative and traditional authorities in communities where households were surveyed. This survey collected the opinions of the authorities to assess their priorities concerning economic activities, access to basic infrastructure, perception regarding the social welfare of the population, and the existence of social investment projects. Surveyed individuals were all men between ages of 30 and 86 of which 44 percent were either barely literate or had no education at all.

Third, a survey was conducted in health centers in the three regions in the north to assess the impact of the crisis on the functioning of health centers, movement of staff, and current needs of these centers in terms of supplies.

Finally, a survey was carried out with displaced persons and refugees in the camps in Mauritania and Niger, to assess their priorities and collect ideas on actions that could be implemented to restore peace and security in Mali.

The following analysis draws on all four surveys.

## SITUATION OF PEOPLE AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH

Former IDP's and refugees represent 23.5 percent of the surveyed population. Agriculture, animal husbandry, small business, and services are the principal economic activities of households in Gao and Timbuktu (Table A3.2). Animal husbandry, small business, and services are the main economic activities in Kidal. Very few households engaged in fishing in the three regions.

**TABLE A3.1** Sociodemographic Characteristics of Heads of Households and of the Survey Population (percent)

Characteristics	Head of household	Population	Characteristics	Head of household	Population
<b>a. Gender</b>			<b>b. Location</b>		
Male	91.2	52.9	Urban	17.7	16.3
Female	8.8	47.1	Rural	82.3	83.7
<b>c. Age</b>			<b>d. Ethnicity</b>		
Younger than 25	0.9	60.1	Songhaï	46.1	51.6
Between 25 and 34	10.1	13.6	Tamasheq	37.5	31.5
Between 35 and 44	26.2	11.9	Arab	6.3	5.5
Between 45 and 54	22.3	6.1	Peulh/Foulbé	7	8.8
55 years and older	40.5	8.3	Other	3.1	2.7
<b>e. Education</b>			<b>f. Principal activity</b>		
None	51.3	45.1	Agriculture	48.8	25.9
Literate	21.9	15	Animal husbandry	13.5	10.3
Primary school	13.5	26.2	Commerce	13.3	6.9
Middle school	6.2	8.1	Unemployed/inactive	4.6	12.5
High school	3.1	3.6	Homemaker/ housewife	1.5	18.3
Higher	4.1	2	Student	0	16.6
<b>g. Marital status</b>			Other	18.2	9.5
Single	2.5	32.8			
Married	89.6	61			
Separated/divorced	1.2	1.9			
Widow	6.7	4.3			

**TABLE A3.2** Percentage of Households That Have Worked within a Particular Sector

	Gao	Kidal	Timbuktu	Average
Agriculture	58.0	0	71.9	62.3
Animal husbandry <sup>10</sup>	82.5	56.0	81.0	80.3
Fishing	6.2	0	7.7	6.7
Small business, crafts, and services	60.6	50.3	45.6	43.3

Note: The table shows the percentage of households involved in an activity within a particular sector in the last 12 months.

<sup>10</sup> There is at least one farm animal per household. The table only includes cattle, sheep, goats and camels. The inclusion of other types of farm animals, representing on average at least 2 per household, would bring the row total to 100 percent.

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Households engaged in agriculture rely for the most part on food crops and to a lesser extent on cash crops that in turn pay for food rather than generate a net profit. In terms of inputs, households use improved seeds, crop protection products, organic fertilizer, and even industrial chemical fertilizer. The crisis has accentuated the difficulties that households already face regarding access to labor and to inputs and their high costs as well as transportation costs, which despite being previously very expensive have risen substantially during the conflict. Almost 37 percent of households do not practice agriculture and therefore have to buy all their food.

Each household has at least one livestock animal. The scarcity of food, robberies, lack of veterinary products, and a lack of job opportunities are the primary challenges in this sector, and the crisis has amplified these. Some households are putting their animals in sheds or pens, but most have no habitat for their animals, which are mainly fed with whatever they can find in the pasture and to a lesser extent with hay. They are watered from wells and cisterns or rivers and creeks. Internal deworming is the main care that farmers administer to animals that are destined for self-consumption, accumulation of wealth, or sale. The difficulties for this sector are mainly related to food safety, veterinary care, and weak demand for animals in the market.

Less than one in ten households engage in the practice of fishing. The main difficulty in marketing is not low prices but a lack of demand, which has greatly increased since before the start of the crisis. Many fishermen lack an adequate labor force, which has worsened after the crisis. Continuing insecurity is also a problem that has developed with the crisis, adding to robberies that existed before the outbreak of the conflict.

In the field of entrepreneurship, insecurity, a lack of demand, and few job opportunities are common problems in all sectors and have been exacerbated by the conflict. Activities conducted in the three regions reported by the survey include small business, agricultural product processing, and services. Some entrepreneurs have experienced their first difficulties because of the crisis; the number of entrepreneurs who had no trouble before the war has declined in each of these activities. Insecurity has seen resurgence with the crisis among small businesses, processors of agricultural products and meat, professionals, and especially among taxi, car, and bus drivers.

## ACCESS TO BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE

The level and principal mode of access to basic infrastructure have not significantly changed with the crisis. For the most part, households have the same level of access to water through wells as they did before the crisis. Furthermore, while access to water fountains and well drilling decreased, access to public and household tap water has increased. Torchlight is the principal method for lighting within households, and its use has increased slightly along with the use of solar panels, batteries, and light bulbs. Pit toilets with and without concrete slabs are the types most used, with a slight increase in the use of pit toilets with concrete slabs. Purchased or gathered wood is the main fuel and the level of use did not change significantly during the crisis.

With regard to access to education and health infrastructure, primary schools are on average less than one kilometer away from households (Table A3.3). Middle schools and vocational schools are on average more than seven kilometers away from households within all regions except in urban areas, where they are less than three kilometers away. Under these conditions, over 56 percent of households have access to primary schools, less than 33 percent have access to secondary schools, less than 15 percent have access to vocational schools, and only 10 percent have access to kindergartens. A large proportion of households that do not use these schools regret their remoteness.

Health centers are on average over four kilometers away from households in all three regions except in urban areas, where they are on average less than one kilometer away. Despite this distance, more than three-quarters of households have access to health centers.

**TABLE A3.3** Average Distance of Households to the Nearest Educational, Health, and Financial Infrastructure (in kilometers)


Infrastructure	Gao	Kidal	Timbuktu	Urban	Rural	Average
Kindergarten	40.2	15.8	27.3	1.1	38.6	29.6
Primary school	0.5	0.6	1.4	0.6	1.0	0.9
Second cycle	7.8	9.7	10.3	0.7	12.0	9.3
High school/vocational	32.4	40.1	40.3	2.7	48.4	37.4
Madrasa	15.8	3.1	18.4	1.6	18.5	14.4
Health center	4.9	4.0	5.2	0.8	6.1	4.8
Veterinary services	24.2	9.1	16.5	1.9	22.8	17.8
Bank/microfinance	42.7	40.6	30.6	14.6	44.0	37.0

## IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON THE POPULATION

The main shock experienced by households is rising food prices, followed by displacement or living as a refugee, insecurity, and the high rate of animal diseases (Figure A3.1). Households have also lost much of their livestock in terms of cattle, sheep, goats, camels, donkeys, and horses (Figure A3.2). Households have experienced a very limited loss of their durable goods and equipment. However, households headed by a displaced person or refugee of war have lost a significant part of their durable goods.


Insecurity remains high both day and night and affects all regions (Table A3.4). This insecurity is largely attributable to bandits, thieves, and criminals and to armed movements like the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad, Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad, or the Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad, as well as to the presence of arms and drug traffickers.

**FIGURE A3.1** Principle Shocks Suffered by Households during the Crisis



Note: The figure shows the percentage of the primary shock experienced by households during the crisis, for each of the mentioned problems.

**FIGURE A3.2** Average Number of Animals before the Crisis and at the Time of the Survey, August and September 2015



**TABLE A3.4** Percentage of Households Who Report Feeling Unsafe during the Day and at Night

	Gao	Kidal	Timbuktu	Total
At home at night	41.5	45.6	35.2	38.4
Outside during the day	40.4	41.4	31.4	35.7

In this climate of uncertainty, overall intercommunity trust has decreased. Only 74 percent of households reported trusting people from another ethnic group and only 70 percent report that they trust foreigners. In addition, over 40 percent of households do not trust the judicial system, political parties, and armed rebel groups. Nevertheless, over 90 percent of households trust neighbors, people of the same ethnic group, traditional and religious leaders, teachers, and health workers. Also, households grant an important role for elders and village leaders in the management of an eventual fund collected for construction projects.

## PERCEPTION OF THE PEACE ACCORD AMONG THE POPULATION

The Peace Accord has generated optimism among the population. Almost 46 percent are somewhat satisfied and 18 percent very satisfied with the signing. However, households remain pessimistic about the willingness of the parties to respect their commitments. Only 17 percent believe that the agreement will be respected, close to 38 percent

do not think it will be respected, and 43 percent are not sure of the intention of the signatories in terms of respecting the agreement. Moreover, since the signing of the Peace Accord, fewer than half of households and even less than a fifth in some cases have noted an improvement in security and access to jobs, markets, and basic infrastructure such as transportation, health services, schools, electricity, drinking water, and telecommunications.

Apart from those in Kidal, most households place more trust in MINUSMA, in the police, and in the Malian army to restore security and peace in Mali than they do in armed movements and self-defense groups.

## PREFERENCES OF THE POPULATION CONCERNING RECONSTRUCTION

From the perspective of the people, the state's actions do not take sufficient account of the needs of the poorer populations of the north. They believe the state should primarily address the fight against poverty, the security of people and property, and high food prices (Table A3.5). Security is also a priority area for action as advocated by administrative and traditional authorities, in addition to agricultural development and access to basic infrastructure.


In order to ensure good governance, local management of their own affairs is the priority measure according to both the populations and local authorities in the regions of Gao and Kidal. Apart from Kidal, people, like the local authorities, prioritize first the progressive redeployment of the armed and security forces of Mali in order to maintain security. Apart from Timbuktu, job creation is the measure deemed most important by the population within the framework of socioeconomic development, while the authorities there prioritize the development of access to basic services such as health, education, drinking water, and so forth.

The preferences of displaced persons and refugees based in camps in Mauritania and Niger following the conflict are not uniform and do not always coincide with those of the population that remained in the north and the local authorities. Refugees in the camp in Niger prefer the establishment of communities with elected bodies through universal suffrage as a measure for governance, the gradual redeployment of the armed and security forces of Mali as a security initiative, and the creation of jobs for socioeconomic development. On the contrary, refugees in Mauritania favor the fair distribution of powers and responsibilities between the state and local communities as a measure for good governance, in addition to the inclusion and meaningful representation of northern populations in the armed and security forces of Mali as a means to ensure the security and the establishment of a northern development zone whose funding will come from public resources in addition to an international socioeconomic development initiative.

**TABLE A3.5** Priority Areas for State Intervention Desired by the Population (percent)

Priority sector	Gao	Kidal	Timbuktu	Total
Poverty	34.7	39.3	41.6	38.6
Security of people and property	18.4	35.0	20.2	20.2
Reduction of consumer prices and cost of living	9.9	2.9	15.0	12.2
Food security	4.9	2.0	11.6	8.3
Youth employment	10.5	8.8	6.0	8.0
Health	5.0	4.0	2.1	3.4
Education	3.4	5.0	0.5	1.9
Others	13.2	3.1	3.1	7.4
Total	100	100	100	100

**FIGURE A3.3** Average Number of Staff before the Crisis and at the Time of the Survey, August and September 2015



## IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON HEALTH CENTERS

Health centers are affected by a reduction in staff and a lack of medicine in the wake of the crisis (Figure A3.3). The conflict has had a significant impact on staff, health provision, and on equipment in most health centers. These centers have witnessed the departure of staff members during the conflict, and the centers have not yet returned to pre-conflict levels of staffing. With the decrease in staff, different services are offered daily, but only for a limited number of hours.

Equipment and salaries are mainly paid by NGO's and nonprofit organizations and in some cases by the state. These centers are experiencing a need for basic medications such as antimalarials and amoxicillin, and some centers have already had to suspend wages.

## CONCLUSION

The opinion survey of populations in the north of Mali has identified actions that people want to see implemented in order to consolidate peace and security. The priorities of the people revolve around the insecurity that hinders the development of activities with regard to agriculture, fishing, animal husbandry, and entrepreneurship. The high level of insecurity and physical abuse are major problems that can lead to higher food prices and a drop in demand, and indirectly cause unemployment.

Measures designed to fight poverty through job creation and reducing food prices will have a significant impact if they can take place in the needed secure environment. The authorities support the views of the people to fight against insecurity and high food prices in order to promote the development of infrastructure and services and reduce unemployment.

In terms of governance, the population and the authorities wish to manage their own affairs, and in regard to security, they both desire a gradual redeployment of the armed and security forces of Mali on the ground. Their opinions differ in terms of socioeconomic development; the people favor job creation while the authorities prefer the development of infrastructure access. These priorities of the population are not necessarily in line with the actions currently being implemented. The actions issued by the Peace Accord are focused on the implementation of infrastructure projects, but their effectiveness is being compromised by the security situation. Local security advisory committees, as prescribed by the Peace Accord, should be operational to ensure security precedes the implementation of the socioeconomic development projects.



# Concept Note for Joint Assessment Mission

## INTRODUCTION

This concept note was jointly written by the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank, in consultation with Mali's Technical and Financial Partners. It describes the context leading up to the Joint Identification and Assessment Mission (MIEC) in the northern regions of Mali and outlines the objectives and principles of the mission, its proposed approach and methodology, specific tools to be used for data collection in a context of lingering insecurity, expected inputs from various partners, as well as the institutional and organizational framework under which this work is to be carried out. To do so, the note builds on the experience gained by the international community in carrying out such missions—also named Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs).<sup>11</sup>

The main objective for the MIEC/northern Mali is to identify the needs in terms of rapid recovery, poverty reduction and development of the three regions of northern Mali. Results from the MIEC/northern Mali will provide data that will inform the design of an area-specific development strategy in a broader and more participatory framework.

With a total surface area of 1,241,238 km<sup>2</sup> (2/3 of which are arid), Mali is a continental sahelian country sharing borders of about 7,000 km with seven other countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal). Estimated at 16,808,000, Mali's population is predominantly young (47% are under 15) and is rapidly growing, at a rate of 3.6%. The country draws its resources mostly from agriculture, farming and fisheries. Approximately 80% of the labor force works in the primary sector,

which represents around 40% of the gross domestic product (GDP). The country has a significant agricultural potential, which has yet to be fully tapped, as well as vast potentialities in sectors such as energy, tourism, handicrafts and mining. Mali counts among the least advanced countries in the world (ranking 182nd out of 187 nations, with a human development index of 0.344 in 2013). However, economic growth has been the most robust among WAEMU countries, reaching an average of about 5% in 2007–2011.

<sup>11</sup> PCNAs are carried out under a tripartite agreement between the European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank and provide a framework for different partners to participate in the conduct and completion of the assessment, based on respective interests and comparative advantages. While in the past PCNAs were burdensome and lengthy, with a goal to produce comprehensive national reconstruction and development plans, they have become more flexible in order to address urgent needs and more limited objectives within support provided to implement peace agreements and create the conditions for designing long-term development programs. These lessons have a significant impact on the way a PCNA might be carried out to address opportunities and challenges related to the situation in Mali.

The northern Regions of Mali, as well as affected parts of the Segou and Mopti regions, are primarily characterized by their immense territories. These three (3) regions and parts of Segou (Niono circle) and Mopti (Douentza, Youwarou and Tenenkou circles) are spread over 999,412 km<sup>2</sup> or 80.52% of the country's total surface area. The Timbuktu region is the largest, with 497,926 km<sup>2</sup>, or 39.55% of the country's national territory. The Kidal region covers 264,000 km<sup>2</sup>, or 21.27%, whereas the Gao region covers 170,564 km<sup>2</sup>,


or 13.74%. The areas of Mopti and Segou that were occupied represent 5.39% of the national territory. An estimated 2,690,066 Malians lived in the occupied area in 2013, representing 16% of Mali's overall population. Average population density appears to be 2.69 per km<sup>2</sup>, compared to 13.54 nationally, albeit with large differences among the three regions (Gao: 3.68 per km<sup>2</sup>, Timbuktu: 1.57 per km<sup>2</sup> and Kidal: 0.29 per km<sup>2</sup>) on the one hand, and on the other between the river area and the exposed areas of those regions.

## OVERVIEW

Mali went through a severe crisis in 2012, when the Government was overthrown on March 22 and the northern regions were occupied for nine months by Tuareg rebels and armed Islamic groups. With support from the international community and regional institutions (including ECOWAS and the WAEMU), the perpetrators of the coup were pushed back and a transitional government was put in place. Transitional authorities then drafted a road map, the implementation of which ended the political transition, thus allowing the country to return to normal constitutional life.

Once armed Islamist groups were stopped as they advanced towards the center of the country in January 2013 by the French military (Serval Operation) with support from troops sent by Chad and ECOWAS, the international community put in place in April 2013 an International Force (*Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali*—MINUSMA) whose mandate was renewed and enhanced in June 2014. In August 2014, the French Operation Serval was replaced by the Berkhane Operation, expanding its regional mandate to all the countries threatened by terrorist groups (Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Chad).

All these measures helped to stabilize the country to some extent, although the situation remains fragile. To reach a comprehensive and sustainable peace, stability and security agreement, the Government and armed groups resumed their negotiations on July 16, 2014, with Algeria serving as a mediator and the support of the international community (ECOWAS, AU, UN). As a result, an Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali was signed on May 15, 2015 by the Government and the Platform, and on June 20, 2015 by the Coordination of the Azawad Movements.



The Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali produced by the Algiers process focuses on political, institutional, defense and security issues, socioeconomic and cultural development, reconciliation, justice, and humanitarian concerns, among others. In particular, regarding socioeconomic and cultural development (Title IV), the peace agreement calls for the following (in Articles 31 to 37):

- Establishing a Northern Regions Development Zone, along with a specific development strategy aiming at bringing the northern regions up to the same level as the rest of the country in terms of development indicators within the next 10 to 15 years;
- Organizing a “fundraising conference” to be held within two months of the completion of the specific development strategy, for the purpose of financing a “Sustainable Development Fund” to serve as a funding mechanism for that specific development strategy.

The specific development strategy, which will be “designed jointly by the parties with the support of international partners,” must be based on identified needs related to rapid recovery, poverty reduction and development of the three regions of northern Mali. This is the purpose of the Joint Identification and Assessment Mission (MIEC/Northern Mali) to be implemented by the World Bank (WB), the African Development Bank (ADB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB).

## OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTED RESULTS

### Overall Objectives

The Peace Agreement grants the MIEC a rather vast mandate: to identify the needs in terms of rapid recovery, poverty reduction and development of the three regions of northern Mali. In practice, the MIEC will focus on the three following objectives:

- Conduct a rapid assessment of essential needs and priorities that can be financed and addressed during the 24-month transition period and are expected to have a direct positive impact on peace, stability and the overall implementation of the Peace Agreement;
- Identify specific operational, institutional and financing mechanisms that can be used to address priority needs in light of persistent insecurity and significant constraints on implementation capacities;
- Identify priority activities while completing a longer term development strategy, and improve the efficiency of ongoing projects, and assess the long-term impact of peace and development.

Building on lessons from other PCNAs and Mali’s experience in implementing peace agreements, the PCNA will aim to reduce the length of time separating the planning and implementation phases, ensure that immediate development aid has a positive direct impact on the implementation of the Peace Agreement while ensuring that the Government and the other partners can focus on required broader political, security and institutional change and reforms.

### Expected Outcomes

A separate document outlining the specific needs of the three regions of northern Mali and providing evidence to inform the design of the northern area Specific Development Strategy will be drafted at the end of the mission. More specifically, diagnosis items will focus on:

- The humanitarian and food security situation, as well as the rapid recovery needs of the area;
- Issues related to monetary poverty and basic social service needs;
- Economic infrastructures and needs to be met for the sustainable development of the area.

## Constraints

The MIEC must be completed in three months, in areas that remain highly insecure, creating significant constraints on the agreed approach, namely:

- **Focus on priority needs to be most urgently met during the transition and the requirements to ensure a more locally based development.** Given the urgent need to accelerate recovery efforts in conflict affected areas, an emphasis will be placed on conducting a rapid assessment in order to identify the most urgent priorities, and responses could be designed and implemented during the transitional period; these will be assessed based on their expected impact on peace and stability in affected areas, and analyzed against a realistic assumption of what is possible, taking into account the current environment and the situation as it evolves during implementation;
- **Develop early implementation options.** It is expected that the outcomes of this rapid assessment will inform Government and development partners' decisions on immediate programmatic and financial aid, including budget lines to be allocated to humanitarian, stabilization and development efforts during the transition; thus, the priority will consist of understanding “who does what,” as well as the types of implementation actors and structures that can immediately be called upon to carry out some specific activities;
- **Conduct the groundwork required for longer term measures.** While an emphasis must be placed on priorities that can be addressed immediately, the assessment will also identify gaps in data and knowledge, to be collected during the transition; this could lead to the design of a broader strategy, including a number of larger investment projects towards the end of the transitional period;
- **Focus on existing information.** Substantial efforts have already been made in Mali to prepare the action plan that was presented during the 2013 Brussels conference; they were complemented by a series of local and regional development programs and additional research implemented by national and international partners. The goal will therefore be to compile and present this existing information, rather than collect more data and information;<sup>12</sup>
- **Actively communicate with affected populations—women and youth in particular—about perception surveys and workshops to have them directly validate priority activities.** One important aspect of the assessment will consist of matching identified priority needs and actions with the perspectives and expectations of affected communities. This will be essential to determine whether priority activities do in fact have a positive impact on peace and stability, and whether they durably increase confidence in the Peace Agreement;
- **Ensure that regional, social and cultural differences are adequately taken into consideration.** Each conflict affected area has a specific set of needs and priorities. The evaluation and validation processes will need to consider the economic, social and cultural specificities of each area and provide detailed guidance on targeting within and among specific projects. One option would be to set-up a filtering mechanism, with more frequent feedback loops;
- **Broaden the partnership.** The three Banks were invited to conduct the MIEC. However, the situation in the north requires the active involvement of the other development partners, particularly the United Nations through MINUSMA to facilitate access and validate results. It is therefore suggested that MINUSMA be included in the overall coordination of the mission (it is a member of the broader Technical and Financial Partners Troika), which would also comply with the tripartite agreement governing the PCNAs;
- **Link priority actions to overall reform processes.** While the Peace Agreement focuses on areas of the country that have been in conflict, it also includes critical political, security, administrative and institutional reforms. They include the establishment of new regional administrations and new regional development agencies, which are expected to implement development projects designed to have a significant impact on development planning and implementation in the regions beyond the transitional period. It will be essential to ensure that priority actions and immediate implementation mechanisms that are identified in the assessment help monitor and

<sup>12</sup> Such an approach complies with lessons learned from other PCNAs, namely that it is often counterproductive, even impossible, to properly establish a foundation for development in highly volatile and constantly evolving conflict environments.

support the implementation of these broader reforms. This will require a close coordination with the Peace Agreement Monitoring and Implementation Committee (*Comité de suivi de l'Accord*, CSA).

## METHODOLOGY

The objective of the Joint Identification and Assessment Mission in northern Mali is to “identify the needs for rapid recovery, poverty reduction and development in the area” no later than three months after the agreement is signed (May 15, 2015). It should be implemented by multilateral organizations, namely the three Banks which, in compliance with the agreement, “will be invited” to conduct the mission in consultation with the Government, other international institutions and local representatives.

### Phases of the Mission

#### Draft Brief Thematic Notes Describing Existing Knowledge about Needs and Priorities

As previously indicated, the situation in conflict affected areas has been well documented, and one of the primary urgent tasks will be to synthesize available information. This will be done through a desk review of all reference documents listed by the **Technical Committee** of the MIEC. Reference documents and data sources are listed in the annex.

Thematic notes will use a standard format of four sections of at most ten pages each, consisting of:

- *A brief description of the current situation in the area using the most recent data, information and research.* This section should also include any available information on trends (i.e., deterioration during the last few years) and the most critical constraints in the sector; it should provide indications on how the sector is linked to efforts aimed at establishing peace and stability in the north, to the implementation of the Peace Agreement and to claims made by the communities.
- *The current strategy and planning framework for the sector and the area.* This section should contain a summary of existing plans, as described in the Government’s strategies and plans and those of donors, and indicate whether priorities have already been defined and sorted based on their immediacy or medium and long-term range.
- *An outline of current and planned activities in the sector and in the area.* This section should draw an overall picture of activities that are already being implemented in the sector, including a brief description of implementation mechanisms and challenges.
- *Overview of priority activities to be considered during the 24-month transition, and a sense of priority activities to be designed for the longer term development strategy.* Based on the above mentioned sections, it should include planned activities described in the Peace Agreement (including Annex 3), and make a link between defined priority activities and an understanding of the impact on peace and stability. It should include rough costing estimates of activities. Finally, it should highlight gaps in data and information that will need to be filled either before the MIEC is completed, or during the transitional period, to feed into longer term development planning. It should be presented in a standard table format to be provided by the MIEC coordination.

Given the urgent need for the MIEC to accelerate peace dividends and the preference for priority actions that can be initiated during the transition, the Mission shall focus on specific sectors and thematic issues. The Peace Agreement provides guidance on how this should be done, by including a list of specific measures and priorities in the defense and security sectors in its Annex 2, and by underlining in Annex 3 several priority and immediate intervention areas (education and health, water, economic recovery and enhanced institutional and regional capacities) and longer term priorities (rural development, food security, environment, economic recovery, infrastructure, culture). Using this as a starting point, and taking into account those critical sectors listed under previous recovery and development strategies for the north, the MIEC coordination intends to focus on the following sixteen thematic areas:

- Geography, population, demography and culture;
- Incidence of poverty in the north;
- Education and vocational training;
- Health;
- Water and Sanitation;
- Humanitarian situation, food situation and reinsertion of displaced people;
- Economic fabric and activity sectors;
- Youth and employment;
- Transportation and greater access to the north;
- Energy and ICT;
- Natural resources and environment;
- Decentralization and participation;
- Administrative localization and local governance in the north;
- Security, justice, social peace and national reconciliation;
- Gender and status of women;
- Development vision for the northern regions.

Team leaders will bring in other organizations/experts as needed and organize the required consultations on the thematic notes during the transition period.

Thematic notes should be completed by mid-June in order to inform both the design of next steps and additional data collection if necessary. They should be summarized in the first part of the final MIEC report, and can also be attached in full as an Annex to the report.

### **Design and Implement Survey and Validation Mechanisms**

Given the security situation in areas affected by the conflict and the schedule of the MIEC, real field work is impossible. However, a rapid survey tool will be designed and put in place both to help collect additional information and data, and to assess public perceptions, collect benchmark data and establish a regular monitoring feedback loop by calling respondents on mobile phones. The survey shall build on the significant experience garnered in using this type of tool in the past few years in Mali to collecting data on the following three major aspects:

- Overview of the situation in the various sectors (in addition to above-mentioned thematic notes—the design of the questionnaire shall be completed based on suggestions articulated in the thematic notes);
- Perceptions related to the most urgent development and recovery priority actions;
- Perceptions related to the most urgent peace and stability priority actions.

Each of the three components shall be subdivided into geographic, social and subsistence systems in order to reach a more detailed understanding of the situation. This will inform the design of a targeting system to help define priorities based on subregional needs and ensure that activities have the greatest positive impact on peace and stability.

As the security situation evolves, a number of focus groups will also be organized in areas affected by the conflict, with MINUSMA's support. These discussions can follow the same format and methodology as the survey tool, but they should allow for deeper conversations and interactions with respondents. They should especially be an essential part of the initial validation work to be undertaken by the MIEC. In addition, a number of debates will be held on the radio to give the public an opportunity to speak freely or to “vote” by SMS.

The survey should be complemented by an assessment of public infrastructures. Within the UN System, a large volume of geocoded data exists on the location of various types of public infrastructures (schools, health centers, water supply sources). Using an approach based on sampling or the security census, those facilities that are still

operational will be rapidly assessed to determine the basic requirements to reactivate them as well as requirements for their longer term enhancement.

These two data collection processes (the household survey and the facility survey) will form the basis of a long-term monitoring system, which will include a call center to receive feedback from beneficiaries (households) and service providers. This will be achieved by providing respondents with mobile phones during the two surveys (only in areas where mobile phone connection is available), to be later used for monitoring purposes during the implementation of the Peace Agreement. This approach was successfully tested in Mali.

### **Prepare the Required Implementation and Financing Mechanisms**

For most PCNAs, one major concern stems from the fact that the planning process may fail to sufficiently consider how specific implementation challenges should be addressed to ensure rapid implementation in post-conflict areas. This challenge is particularly relevant in Mali where insecurity and the absence of the state in the northern regions have negatively impacted efforts made by Government and development partners in the past two years. Therefore, one of the MIEC's major tasks shall be to ensure that an implementation plan is agreed upon before completing its work, to ensure that implementation can move forward without delay during the transition period.

The implementation and financing strategy shall be closely linked to work currently being done by the Thematic Donors Working Group on Rebuilding the north (Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Commission) and by the World Bank under the Emergency Reconstruction Project. This component should bring together the Government and donors in a conversation focusing on several issues, including:

- Government ownership of the coordination of the implementation strategy;
- Ongoing efforts and implementation capacities in areas affected by the conflict (mapping activity currently undertaken by AFD);
- Peace Agreement provisions aiming to strengthen implementation capacities at regional level, including by creating regional development agencies;
- Options available to assess and manage major risks, including through joint Government-donor mechanisms;
- Bottlenecks resulting from direct use of existing non-governmental and military implementation capacities during the transition period, including to finance the Government and specific solutions;
- Options available to transfer implementation capacities and the attention of Bamako-based institutions to regions affected by conflict;
- Options available to transfer funding, including work-for-pay programs, infrastructure projects and small scale community activities;
- Options for local capacity building through implementation, including for community organizations, social responsibility and local public institutions;
- Institutional and coordination mechanisms required to facilitate rapid implementation using Government and development partners funding, including by allocating budget lines to humanitarian aid and stabilization.

Given the multifaceted uncertainty about how the situation in the north might evolve, the implementation strategy may include different scenarios based on a range of potential trends. They could be based on the proposed risk management mechanism and include benchmarks to determine how to continue implementing specific activities, resources needed, etc.

### **Complete and Validate the Report, and Prepare an Iterative Information and Monitoring System**

Items listed below will be grouped in the final MIEC report, which will outline a priority program and its cost for the transition period, as well as implementation mechanisms and required financing. The report will also contain an overview of indicators for a longer term development plan, based on existing data and information, and will

describe the drafting process during the transition process. Finally, it will include a proposed iterative system for data collection and impact monitoring. The report outline is presented in the Annex.

The proposed monitoring system should clearly list priority measures, as well as their outcomes and financial implications. It should provide a tool that can be used by national and international stakeholders to harmonize their efforts in such a way that the transition has every opportunity to succeed throughout the transition period while minimizing the risk that such assistance might undermine efforts or trigger a new conflict. The monitoring system could include:

- The main priority measures to be implemented within 24 months;
- The cost of these priority measures;
- An indication of the financing source (including for ongoing projects);
- Expected outcomes of these priority measures (with corresponding deadlines);
- Identifying benchmarks to measure progress in accomplishing these outcomes (3 or 6 months).

Additional validation of the rapport is also possible, including through regional and national validation workshops.

## COORDINATION OF THE MISSION

Several levels of coordination must be considered when conducting the MIEC/Northern Mali:

The first level of coordination of the MEIC shall rely on existing coordination mechanisms among TFPs and between TFPs and Government, to ensure that all existing knowledge related to the northern regions (at the level of TFPs and clusters) and the expertise of field-based actors (including the United Nations) are included and a genuine partnership is in place to accomplish the mission.

This level is led by the **Technical Committee**, which brings together technical staff named by the three Banks, the coordinator of Mali's Thematic TFP Group on Reconstruction of the North (Commission on the Rehabilitation of Post-Conflict Areas), and UNDP (as coordinator of other UN agencies).

The second coordination level is more political, aiming to ensure that the Peace Agreement and National Reconciliation Monitoring Committee (CSA), Government and other actors interact; this level implements Core Supervision functions, by: (i) approving the mission's expected outcomes in terms of the scope of the needs assessment; (ii) validating the mission's methodology; and (iii) validating the mission's outcomes before they are presented to the CSA.

This level is led by the **Coordination Committee**, which is comprised of representatives of the three Banks (at the highest level) and Mali's broader TFP Group, and will ensure that the GEC and GA of the TFPs are involved.

## IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE

The MIEC/North must deliver its outcomes no later than three months after the signature of the Peace Agreement, under the leadership of the Agreement Monitoring Committee. The sequencing of activities is detailed in the Annex.

In terms of scheduling, the MIEC can be completed and deliver its final document outlining priority actions for the transition period within the required deadlines. Overall, the mission will be scheduled as follows:

- Preliminary assessment and design of the methodology and the approach;
- Reach a consensus among representatives of the three coordinating entities; present the approach to Government and other partners;
- List relevant planning documents and data available to be used in drafting the thematic notes;
- Establish the required contracts and contacts; draft the TORs; reach an agreement with the other partners on their involvement in drafting thematic notes;

### 100 Assessing Recovery and Development Priorities in Mali's Conflict-Affected Regions

- Draft thematic notes; complete the survey design and sign consultant contracts;
- Conduct the survey, collect additional data, draft implementation mechanisms;
- Draft and finalize the MIEC report and implement validation mechanisms in the regions and nationally.

The donor meeting and the amount of resources that it will need to raise will depend on commitment levels and political opportunities. It will not be organized by the technical agencies in charge of the MIEC.


## IMPLEMENTATION TEAM AND TASK DEFINITION

The Assessment Mission is jointly led by the three institutions using the mechanisms listed in paragraphs 31 to 32 of the Peace Agreement.

Each institution will provide high level technical staff members who will sit on the Technical Coordination Committee. A team leader will be named to ensure overall coordination. In addition, a technical consultant pool will be hired to carry out specific tasks to assist the Committee in promptly implementing a number of tasks and activities. Consultants must be experienced in: (i) drafting and assessing public policies and strategies in general, and more specifically in identifying and assessing needs related to rapid recovery, poverty reduction and development; (ii) assessing needs in countries that are fragile, in conflict or in transition; and (iii) drafting and implementing development programs in countries that are fragile and/or in transition.

## SECURITY ISSUES

Security rules of all three Banks dictate that any visit to northern Mali must be authorized and supervised by their security departments. Therefore, the MIEC will rely on the UN System to conduct field surveys and share provisional outcomes with communities and stakeholders in northern Mali.



# Evaluation of Priorities and Costs of Recovery and Development for Northern Mali

APPENDIX

# 5

The Joint Assessment Mission (Mission d’Evaluation Conjointe, MIEC) has identified the most critical needs for recovery and development in northern Mali across three priority pillars. The prioritization framework is presented in Chapter 3 and the summary of priorities is further described in Chapter 4. The findings and recommendations of the MIEC are based on a significant amount of technical work across 15 different sectors.<sup>13</sup> This work was completed by sector teams between July and September 2015. The following offers a more detailed account of the findings of the technical work, as background for the prioritization that has taken place.<sup>14</sup> Much of the data and information used here rely on government documentation, data collected by humanitarian agencies, as well as a number of analyses done by international organizations over the past two years to understand the impact of the 2012 crisis on human development indicators and outcomes. In addition, the findings of the perception surveys presented in Appendix 3 are brought in to inform the analysis in terms of regional differences in needs.

## FINDINGS RELATED TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN PEACE, SOCIAL RESILIENCE, AND DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE

The Joint Assessment Mission undertook thematic work in a number of areas deemed critical for peace, social resilience, and better governance. These included topics such as security, justice, humanitarianism, governance, and poverty. The work highlighted a number of needs and challenges, in particular related to restoring basic security; strengthening the social fabric, justice, reconciliation, and trust-building; and supporting the recovery of populations affected by the conflict (including displaced and host communities). It also highlighted a number of specific needs and challenges related to promoting greater public participation in governance through a deepening of the decentralization process, building local institutions, and focusing on social accountability.

<sup>13</sup> Thematic notes were produced for (1) geography, population, demography, and culture; (2) poverty incidence; (3) education and vocational training; (4) health; (5) water and sanitation; (6) humanitarian and food security situation and reinsertion of displaced populations; (7) economic structure and sectors of activity; (8) youth and employment; (9) transport and access; (10) energy and ITC; (11) natural resources and environment; (12) local governance and participation; (13) decentralization; (14) security, justice, social peace, and national reconciliation; and (15) gender.

<sup>14</sup> The findings represented here summarize the rich background analysis undertaken for the Joint Assessment Mission. It is presented for transparency purposes, but with the caveat that much more detailed analysis went into constructing the three pillars and subcomponents that constitute the prioritization framework in Chapter 4.

## Needs and Impacts of the Crisis

### Security

The 2012 crisis differed from previous crises in northern Mali in that it involved an unprecedented volume of weaponry and sophistication in armaments as well as the presence of both drug-trafficking groups and jihadists fighting in the rebellion. The geographical features of northern Mali make it virtually impossible to ensure security in this context, even by foreign forces, whose effectiveness is already showing its limits. The lack of a secure environment is one of the priorities highlighted by the survey of the population of northern Mali, who greatly fear for their personal safety and have consequently lost confidence in public institutions and political parties that aim to promote and ensure security. An analysis of the security sector in Mali reveals many challenges. The institutional and security crisis that erupted in 2012 has greatly shaken the foundations of the state and underscored the weaknesses of the national defense and security forces. Institutional and structural weaknesses diminish physical, material, and financial capabilities.

After the signing of the Peace Accord in Mali, the security situation remains volatile, especially in the northern provinces. On the ground, the rivalry between groups of the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad, CMA) and those of the Platform remains strong. Tensions remain high in some areas where the parties are in close proximity to each other, especially around Ber and Didi (Timbuktu region), Tabankort and Menaka (Gao region), and Anefis and In-Khalil (Kidal region). This situation could lead to an increase in armed violence between communities (as a number of groups and militias were formed around a strong communal dimension). The presence of armed extremist groups hostile to the presence of the international community in combination with the large-scale absence of the Malian Armed Forces (Les Forces armées maliennes, FAMA) in the north and center of Mali makes the security situation more unstable and precarious. The presence of active terrorist groups (confirmed by repeated attacks) in Nampala, Nara, Dioura (Segou), Tenenkou, Gathyl Loumou, Modoro, Boni, and Youwarou (Mopti) explains the recent deterioration of the security situation in central Mali. In this highly volatile situation, armed clashes of varying magnitude are reported regularly, and shifting alliances between different groups are frequent. In the absence of strong and unchallenged national security structures, many conflicts will be settled by the use of violence. The current conditions are therefore particularly favorable for the development of armed groups in northern Mali.

While it appears that harassment and guerrilla operations focus primarily on targets considered “combatants,” French troops from Barkhane (previously under Operation Serval), Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), contingents of the Malian armed forces, and rival armed groups, attacks against non-combatant targets or collateral damage to civilians are regularly recorded: attacks against foreign persons and structures (including kidnapping and murder); use of improvised explosive devices against convoys or checkpoints; terrorist attacks against hotels, government buildings and infrastructure; symbolic or strategic attacks; and attacks with mass casualties (the November 2015 terrorist attack in Bamako being but one illustration). Recent incidents (the discovery of surface-to-air missiles and antitank missiles and recent gunfire against a French helicopter using weapons previously not seen in Mali) also suggest that the threat of attacks against civil aviation could rise.

As a result of the political, economic, and security crisis, criminal activities are increasing in the north (banditry and organized crime). The lack of defense forces and of strong and unchallenged security plays into the hands of isolated groups who have turned to trafficking and criminality in order to find new sources of revenue. In addition, residual armed groups, often made up of former elements of insurgent groups that controlled northern Mali in 2012, are circulating in the Kidal region and reinforcing criminal networks there. Increasingly, the positions of armed movements in the regions of Gao and Kidal seem to be dictated by the concern for controlling geographical trafficking routes (for drugs and arms) rather than for political ones.

Security challenges are numerous and multifaceted. They range from urban banditry to terrorism in the context of community conflicts. But what is most worrying is organized crime: drug trafficking, human trafficking, and above

all, transnational terrorism. The geopolitical position of Mali, with its location in the Sahel and its porous borders, favors this development. The negative impacts of these threats on peace and social cohesion are immeasurable.

## **Justice**

Respondents to the perception survey identified security as the most pressing issue that the country must contend with. The Malian justice system is widely considered corrupt and illegitimate, unable to prevent the widespread proliferation of unlawful activities. Poor management and weak state governance practices at the central and regional levels are also seen as the main causes of illegal trade. Narcotic trafficking and the profitable business of kidnappings have contributed to the rise and consolidation of jihadist groups. In this context, national dialogue and reconciliation between communities are necessary to ensure a sustainable peace. Apart from Kidal, most households in other regions have more trust in MINUSMA, in the police, and in the Malian army to restore security and peace in Mali than they do in armed groups and self-defense movements.

## **Trust and Resilience**

The conflict in Mali has essentially taken the form of regular rebellions against the state, because the process of decentralization has sometimes resulted in forcing local officials to choose between competing with each other for positions within state structures or opposing the government altogether. The development of criminal networks, the collapse of traditional authority, and the continued incapacity of the state to stabilize the region have all led to the resurgence of inter- and intracommunity tensions. Security alliances that certain groups had with one another following the collapse of the army have also contributed to the decline in trust among groups in the north.

There are indications that high levels of social tension are changing the nature of conflict in the north, which could pass from what one might consider a traditional rebellion against the state to a situation likely to lead to a complete collapse of social cohesion and bring about a civil war. The perception survey also highlighted that the lack of security in general and the difficulties of local governance in maintaining an appropriate level of security causes tensions and increases the loss of trust between different communities. Intercommunity trust and cooperation is an important achievement in social cohesion needed for stabilization and peacekeeping as well as economic recovery.

The 2012 crisis in Mali also had a significant impact on the resilience of individuals and on traditional mechanisms for building communities. Returning internally displaced persons and refugees both lack socioeconomic resources and community support that would otherwise enable them to address unexpected stress factors in their lives. Security incidents, inter- and intracommunity conflicts, diseases, and the loss of support at the family level are often drastically felt and have a direct impact on the well-being of whole families, which in turn can affect social cohesion within communities. Also, returnees can place an extra burden on already weakened coping mechanisms and overstretched resources like water and land for agriculture or livestock.

## **Local Governance and Decentralization**

Concerning the deficiencies in local governance, the conflict has exacerbated already existing tensions between local communities and the central government regarding the lack of mobilization and involvement of local people in the management of development practices. The conflict also unfolded in a context where the exercise of local governance was already made difficult, manifested by a weak development of social services in the northern regions, which was characterized by a low population density over a wide area. In addition to the slow pace of transferring human and material skills and resources to the northern local authorities, a lack of funding for mobilization projects and a general feeling by the local population of a loss of control over their own development are fostering resentment against the central government. This has resulted in the gradual alienation of northern populations from the central government. The process of decentralization was initiated in the early 1990s, and it had aroused great enthusiasm among the population and has led to many improvements, albeit in an incremental fashion. However, it was unable to overcome all the difficulties associated with its implementation.

With the flight of the majority of the local administrative officials and representatives based in the north, the conflict has led to a paralysis of local institutions. At present, the persistent climate of insecurity constitutes an obstacle to the return and recruitment of local representatives and agents, and thus prevents the general resumption of activities of local authorities and the strengthening of their material and financial capabilities. Damages linked to the weakness or absence of local governance during and after the conflict are many and are spread across sectors. However, a certain mistrust persists against local officials due to the lack of transparency in the allocation of funding, and mistrust toward the central government is due to budget transfers still considered insufficient, being spent mostly for the operation of local authorities, limiting the available budget for investment. As a consequence, there is also a severe shortage of skilled managers and technicians at the regional and local level. Deconcentrated units of the central administration are understaffed, lack logistical means, and are viewed with a certain mistrust by local authorities. Regional governments also lack skilled technicians.

In addition, there is a lack of knowledge and understanding of the way local governance should function. Many mayors of rural communes are illiterate and do not possess the needed managerial skills and knowledge of laws and regulations to manage their communes. This is compounded by the fact that many communal councils are not functional, depriving mayors of needed support and posing transparency threats. Training of members of local executive bodies was conducted in the past to address this constraint but was not sustained, a serious shortcoming with the very high turnover in local governments. Citizens often lack a basic understanding of their rights and duties and of the way local government functions; they are therefore not being able to play their role in checks-and-balances.

The strengthening of local governance thus represents a key issue for peace and development of the northern regions, in that their present difficulties in responding to post-conflict issues are one of the major sources of the persistent problems linked and exacerbated by the conflict: insecurity and banditry, a lack of access to basic social services, undernourishment, and a weakness of the labor market, all of which pose challenges to economic recovery and infrastructure development.

### **Perceptions of Intra- and Interregional Differences in Northern Mali**

The need for security is so important and pervasive that respondents in the perception survey in each region reported no significant differences in prioritizing their security needs, and they stressed the need to entrust the supervision of restoring security at the local level instead of the central level alone. Respondents in the regions of Timbuktu and Gao trust MINUSMA, the police, and the Malian Army more than armed groups to bring back peace and security in Mali, whereas respondents in Kidal have a lower level of trust in these institutions. In all regions, forced displacement or life as a refugee is the second concern. Food insecurity is next, followed by concern for the general climate of insecurity. On average, 40 percent of respondents felt threatened day and night, and all of the respondents expressed a wish for the gradual redeployment of the army and security forces. Participants in the validation workshops in Timbuktu and Gao noted that the pervasive insecurity in rural areas and the general climate of impunity for offenders is testing the patience of the population.

Respondents in all regions rate all initiatives that promote decentralization and local governance as important and favorable for the return of peace. These include, for example, the management by the local population of its own affairs or a greater representation of the northern populations in national institutions. Participants in the validation workshops in Kidal expressed the need for a very thorough and subsequently implemented decentralization process, whereas participants in Timbuktu and Gao were less vocal about the topic and rather highlighted the need for better governance (in particular better training and accountability of local politicians and civil servants). Participants in the three regions agree in wanting development programs to be managed locally with more local expertise.

Some differences were noted between the priorities identified by internally displaced persons and refugees. Preferences of displaced persons and refugees based in camps in Mauritania and Niger following the conflict are not the same and do not always coincide with those of the greater population and with the local authorities in the regions of Timbuktu and Gao, while they do in Kidal.

## Gender Inequality

The crisis has greatly exacerbated the situation for women, many of whom have been the victims of gender-based violence. Violence based on gender (VBG) has greatly increased during the crisis and has been reported according to order of importance as follows: rape, sexual assault, physical assault, forced marriage, and psychological and emotional abuse. According to a public poll conducted by Oxfam in 2014,<sup>15</sup> rape, forced prostitution, and early marriage are among the main concerns of the population. The loss of their spouse during violent clashes has also made some women more vulnerable and more susceptible to VBG. In a span of just one-and-a-half years, from April 2012 to December 2013, 6,227 cases of VBG were reported, and this does not include unreported cases, which are estimated to be very numerous. In addition, 20 percent of these VBG victims were children. The only competent courts functioning in Mali are located in Bamako and are therefore difficult for those in the north to access. Victims often refuse to turn to the police and the judiciary for fear of being stigmatized by society, in addition to fearing reprisals from their attackers, who generally live in the same community.

It is essential to ensure greater participation of women in the peace process so that they can fulfill their roles as actors for peace. Indeed, the participation of women in the peace process can promote in no small way the reconstruction of the social fabric and reconciliation for the entire population, and help society to take into greater account the security needs of the most vulnerable, among whom are women and children. It is urgent to address this shortcoming. To date, the participation of women in decisions about the peace process has been very marginal, and therefore their needs and those of children are taken less into account in the implementation of the Peace Accord, which has placed focus on the protection of women and children.

## Justification and Links to the Peace Accord

Efforts to support the restoration of basic security, to strengthen the resilience of populations affected by the conflict (including displaced persons and host communities), to promote reconciliation and trust between groups, and to strengthen the protection of vulnerable groups through an emphasis on justice are integral to the Peace Accord and necessary conditions to sustaining peace and stability over time. In particular, without security, no other recommendations in this report can be implemented.

The various aspects just discussed are essential for the implementation of the Peace Accord. Given the cyclical nature of conflict in Mali, reconciliation and trust are of the utmost importance. Without real efforts to strengthen intra- and intercommunity trust, and trust between the state and its citizens, there is little chance to ensure lasting peace and development. The perceptions survey also confirmed the fact that people consider safety as their first priority.

The Peace Accord has given much space to aspects of defense and security (four chapters and an appendix). The unity of the army and its representative character of the nation's diversity are reiterated. A gradual redeployment is planned for the reformed army throughout northern Mali. Chapter 8 discusses the stationing of former combatants and the integration of some of them within the constituent bodies of the state, under the plan for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). An ambitious plan has been established for DDR, including a tight schedule to start implementing it, details of institutional arrangements, and the roles of international and national participants. As stated in the Peace Accord, the DDR plan is considered an integral part of the post-conflict recovery and consolidation process, as it would help create a favorable environment for the peace process and political reconstruction by better managing the crucial period of transition from conflict to peace and development. The success of DDR is linked to the degree to which DDR activities reflect a broader recovery and stabilization program that is inclusive so that all parties are involved in its discussions and planning. In the context of reform of the security sector (RSS), DDR can be seen as a pillar supporting demobilization and the socioeconomic reintegration

<sup>15</sup> OXFAM GB, « Evaluation rapide de protection dans la région de Gao, Mali », Février-mars 2014, not published.

of members of armed groups with state-guided assistance. In Mali, it is expected that some fighters will ask to be integrated into the security structures of the state. The DDR process must be performed in close coordination with the global RSS effort, while ensuring that its activities are an integral part of the development and rehabilitation program in the north.

The Peace Accord emphasizes justice and reconciliation, with a call for a profound reform of the judicial system, the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism, and no amnesty for authors of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and severe violations of human rights. It also put forward a better integration of traditional justice institutions within the broader judicial system (Article 46).

Regarding local governance institutions, the accord calls on development partners to support the implementation of its principles and measures in order to strengthen the capabilities of local authorities, increase their representation at the local and national levels, and ensure the participation of the local population (Article 5, Section 2). The accord also emphasizes the necessity of supporting and expanding the decentralization process (Articles 6–16, Chapters 3–6).

The Peace Accord also provides for increased protection of women, which is in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, as well as the National Action Plan for the implementation of this resolution. More specifically, the Government Action Programs for the period 2013–18 relating to (i) the restoration of safety of persons and goods throughout the national territory and (ii) the implementation of a policy of active reconciliation, are the framework for realizing better protection for women in addition to their participation in the peace process and national dialogue.

## **Actions That Should Be Prioritized in the Short Term**

The most urgent priorities relate to the establishment of peace and stability in the north—urgent and prerequisite conditions for the implementation of other priority actions in this report. Specifically, they will act to (i) strengthen security throughout the northern regions of Mali through the realization of the DDR program, (ii) ensure the repatriation of displaced populations and refugees in neighboring countries, (iii) reestablish as quickly as possible the trust within and between communities and between the citizenry and the state, and (iv) resume the process of decentralization and the strengthening of local governance in order to avoid the risk of future conflicts. Indeed, the reinforcement of the presence and capabilities of local governance institutions represents a major post-conflict challenge to peace, reconciliation, and the restoration of trust in the state. Local competence is an essential tool for expanding access to basic social services, boosting economic activity, and rehabilitating and building critical infrastructure in a sustainable manner.

### **Security**

In accordance with the Peace Accord, the security objectives are aimed at ensuring a minimum level of safety and compliance with the ceasefire through the creation of joint patrols (FAMA, CMA, and the Platform); new security management units (Technical Security Commission and Operational Coordination Mechanism); local safety advisory committees; a national commission for DDR; a development plan and calendar for the redeployment of armed and security forces; the identification and validation of military quartering and regrouping sites for the demobilization of former combatants; and the revision of the government decree establishing the national council for the RSS.

### **Justice Sector Reform and the Establishment of Transitional Justice**

With regard to the justice sector, the goal in the short term is first to ensure access to justice for local people by setting up temporary tribunals or local civil and criminal courts, pending the reform of the justice sector. This will be followed by the creation of justice sector assessment units at the national and local levels, to help with the coordination and the inclusion of the population in designing methods for the evaluation of these newly created units. In the future these will help develop a broader plan for justice reform. Regarding transitional justice, it is necessary

to develop a collaborative plan for the national police services with the help of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and anticipate this future collaboration through the establishment of an immediate program for collecting the testimonies of victims and evidence of the crimes committed against them. Finally, efforts to implement a transitional justice system must also result in the development of dialogue and conflict mediation committees, as developed in the context of decentralization.

### **Reconciliation and Trust Building, within the Framework of Decentralization**

The first step will be to develop mechanisms for dialogue and conflict mediation, which will allow various factions to share their frustrations and aspirations and work together in the search for joint resolutions. This highlights the importance of a process that is inclusive and participatory in the identification and prioritization of actions to be undertaken, as well as in the targeting of beneficiaries of the various actions for social protection, water supply, and infrastructure projects. At the same time, it is important to begin to implement the regional development authorities (RDAs) (clarification of missions, effective creation of local institutions, recruitment of personnel, and building security) and to strengthen the capacity of technical staff in the three northern regions and of RDAs in order to allow oversight of the quality of work, be it from a legal, financial, or technical point of view. The acceleration of the transfer of resources will be done in parallel in order to manage contract plans and to allow RDAs and the regions to carry out their mandates. It will also be necessary to develop and ensure the development of a local governance transparency plan, which will have the advantage of enhancing participation and reconciliation. Finally, social accountability mechanisms established by law for the management of basic social services should be made operational.

### **Return of Internally Displaced Peoples and Refugees and Building the Resilience of Host Communities**

The short-term objectives are to facilitate a smooth return of displaced persons and refugees through the distribution of adequate food and the provision of a safe environment for people in transit through the territory of Mali, but also to reinforce the hosting capacities of communities through food support, security, access to basic social services such as health and education services in these communities, and by local mediation initiatives (community dialogue) ensured by the regional authority staff in order to avoid conflict between returning populations and communities that stayed in place during the conflict.

### **Strengthening Implementation Capacities of Local Authorities and Decentralization in the Short Term**

In general, the expansion of the decentralization process has become more important in terms of being identified as a priority by the population in the survey. This expansion includes the development of RDAs as outlined in the Peace Accord. In addition, there should be increased support for further dialogue at the local government level to strengthen local participation and to promote demand for good governance through greater transparency in the management of local affairs, including in the management of local finance and project management. Currently, the capacity of regions, particularly in terms of project management, is low. The lack of qualified staff, in either legal, financial, or technical terms, prevents regions and municipalities from carrying out their tasks satisfactorily. The explanation may also be found in the lack of projects designed and awarded in the regions. As such projects are centralized in Bamako, there is no need and means for recruiting qualified personnel.

The forced departure of most of the local representatives and officials has strongly affected the trust of the population in local authorities and their ability to implement the measures contained in the Peace Accord for expanding the process of decentralization, promoting reconciliation between communities, and supporting the reintegration of returnees and veterans. Thus, capacity building of local authorities in the framework of priority actions should include the establishment of local advisory committees for security (to ensure that security precedes socioeconomic

development projects); the return, appointment, and recruitment of local representatives and authorities; the support and transfer of technical knowledge to local authorities for the development and implementation of reconciliation and reintegration plans; and the technical means to help coordinate local agents acting within the framework of planning reconciliation and reintegration.

Implementation of these activities must have support from partners in order for the necessary capabilities to be developed. Thus the implementation of priority actions can be based first on local officials and traditional leaders, who already constitute anchorage points for dialogue in terms of reconciliation and trust building. Similarly, these entities can act as catalysts within the framework of traditional justice. In order to provide increased security, it appears that the establishment of local advisory committees in accordance with the Peace Accord can be implemented immediately by local representatives who remain on-site and have the will of the local population to participate in peace measures. Then, state subsidies can be added to the limited resources of the municipalities, along with the support of the municipalities' technical and financial partners. These funds can be mobilized for the realization of initiatives for reconciliation and confidence building. In addition, government employees are a major asset in terms of human resources available for the supervision of these activities organized by the municipalities. However, capacity strengthening is necessary, in particular with regard to the management of joint activities, which requires real skills, for example, in terms of moderation. Finally, at the state level, the Ministry of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action, and Reconstruction in the North, is mobilizing resources for social resilience.

Finally, local authorities should pay particular attention to strengthening support for women and children victims of GBV, by channeling this support through humanitarian assistance that is already present on the ground and working with women, by assisting humanitarian aid workers with the material and human resources available for better coordination of efforts to protect women and children (for example, by the provision of temporary and secure housing), and by implementing a GBV census unit within the Ministry of Women, Children, and Families, which will coordinate with the Management Information System of GBV under the European Bureau of Aid, which is already in place. Local authorities also have the opportunity here to act as facilitating agents for the inclusion of women in the process of peace and reconciliation by organizing the appointment of women who can participate in official procedures, on the one hand, and facilitate the establishment of focus groups and needs of women representation in society, on the other. To this end, local governments can coordinate their efforts with those of civil society. Generally, for the prevention of crimes based on gender and the security of women and children, local authorities may become attached to the idea of consistently developing intelligence in a uniform manner, in committees already set up in Gao and Mopti.

## **Actions That Should Be Prioritized in the Medium and Long Terms**

In the medium and long term, there is a need to consolidate the efforts just described and further advance reform of the justice sector, the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, expansion of security efforts and reconciliation in the north, and more targeted efforts to improve the functioning of the police and the security sector in Mali.

### **Reform of the Security Sector**

Efforts planned for the medium and long terms will focus on (i) the structural reinforcement of the security sector by overseeing the integration of former combatants therein, (ii) development and implementation of a national DDR program, and (iii) implementation of the redeployment plan of the armed and security forces, by proceeding with the evaluation of the defense and security sector in order to construct and implement RSS, supervising and controlling armed and security forces at the local and national levels by the national commission of RSS, promoting respect for the law and rule of law pending broader justice reform, and adopting a law establishing a national police force.

## **Reform of the Justice Sector and the Establishment of Transitional Justice Systems**

With regard to the justice sector, reforms must continue to be developed and ultimately implemented, eventually replacing the temporary courts. For transitional justice to be effective there needs to be close collaboration with the International Criminal Court and there must be local communication and promotional services in place in order to ensure that reconciliation and trust-building efforts in the north benefit from the positive effects of transitional justice.

## **Reconciliation and Trust Building within the Framework of Decentralization**

Medium- and long-term efforts aim to ensure the continuity of short-term initiatives in addition to strengthening the decentralization process through (i) the development of quality and accessible training programs for administrative staff and (ii) the effective implementation of local institutions as a whole, which includes the regional development agencies (RDAs) created in the short-term period. Measures to levy local taxes will be conditional on the creation of a local tax base resulting from the economic development of the north. Finally, these efforts should also include promoting more transparency through the decentralization of taxation and management of local revenues, particularly concerning possible revenues from mining through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative<sup>16</sup> and the process of Kimberle.<sup>17</sup>

## **Reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees**

The aim here is to ensure an easy and sustainable reintegration of returning displaced persons and repatriated refugees into their communities. This processes of returning to home communities will happen gradually. Additional costs and competition for limited resources in communities could become problematic and serve as a source of conflict. From this perspective, it is crucial to maintain protection services available for the most vulnerable people, be they displaced persons or refugees, including the most vulnerable in host communities, with an ability to direct assistance where needed to enable individuals and communities to confront the situation peacefully. Social safety nets, for instance in the form of cash-for-work programs, are particularly adapted for this.

In addition, successful integration will require continued mediation efforts and support for the economic development of individuals and families returning to their communities, not to mention the destination communities themselves. This includes the establishment of a special chamber for resolving conflicts between the formerly displaced people or refugees who return to their communities and claim ownership of their lands and property, and the new owners who acquired land that had been abandoned.

## **Strengthening Decentralized Implementation Capacities in the Medium and Long Term**

Concerning the implementation capacities of local authorities, objectives are based on complementary reinforcement measures. These include the establishment of better coordination between organs of local justice and ministerial law and local and central governance bodies in order to ensure that local judicial bodies have sufficient means to process applications within a reasonable time frame and avoid duplication of efforts between the formal justice organs and more informal, traditional ones. The objectives also include the creation of an independent agency for investigations and sanctions against corruption; the creation of specific units corresponding to security sector reform, such as the creation of a national council for the RSS; the creation of a police force under the control of the local authorities; the creation of local advisory and security committees; and the establishment within local communities of units charged with observing reconciliation between communities and the restoration of public trust, which may involve taking testimonies and conducting surveys. Concerning the protection of women and the prevention and punishment of gender-based crimes, local authorities can encourage the creation of a special

<sup>16</sup> <https://eiti.org/eiti>.

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/about>.

government chamber within the local courts, as well as expand the training of police officers in the specificities of GBV, and continue to work on an information campaign about these issues and extend it to local schools.

Given the nature of activities covered in this component, the combined focus will be on the existing DDR and justice and reconciliation programs, on one hand, and more specific efforts focused on the process of dialogue and engagement, on the other. However, it remains difficult to identify and map specific results considering the strategic and less programmatic aim of this report.

In terms of local governance and decentralization, the achievement of objectives is based on strengthening local government and administrative capacity, but also on expanding knowledge and developing the role played by civil society and citizens as a counterweight. In this sense, the focus will be on capacity building for local elected officials, civil servants, and citizens. Priority will be placed on the transfer of implementation mechanisms to the population, including through the use of RDAs as the primary interlocutors of technical support and by the transfer of project implementation units to regional capitals.

The difficult working conditions in the north justify giving motivational salary bonuses to administrative staff (teachers, health personnel, and so forth) to enable them to cope with the difficult living conditions and the high cost of living following the crisis. Otherwise these officials will continue to abandon their positions at the first opportunity. However, this incentive policy must be coupled with more systematic sanctions: officials who are paid a bonus must be at their post and perform quality work. Currently, there are too many civil servants who receive bonuses without reporting to their posts, which removes any incentive for this device.<sup>18</sup> The work ethic of civil servants is essential for a functioning administration as well as to demonstrate to citizens that the state fulfills its responsibilities.

## FINDINGS RELATED TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF NEEDS TO RESTORE AND IMPROVE BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES AND PROTECTION

Detailed background work was done in the areas of education, health, water and sanitation, and social protection, as well as for employment and humanitarian needs, to inform the Joint Assessment Mission. This work focused on a combination of restoring service delivery infrastructure and capacities that had been damaged as a result of the conflict, and on the need to improve service delivery and protection as part of a strategy to bring development in northern Mali to par with the rest of the country over time.

### Needs and Impacts of the Crisis

Although Mali has made progress toward achieving its Millennium Development Goals in its social sectors between 2001 and 2010, the results achieved in 2010 were far from the prescribed objectives and also began to decline in 2010. They have since degraded rapidly following the crisis period. Table 2.2 shows the situation of the primary human development indicators before and after the crisis (see Chapter 2, subsection “Poverty, Marginalization, and Development Deficit”). The three regions of northern Mali were, in some cases, lagging behind the rest of the country in terms of access to basic services even before the 2012 crisis.

The inadequacy of basic infrastructure (schools, health centers, literacy centers, and water systems) constitutes a real bottleneck for human and social development in the area. High population mobility (nomadism and migration) and the lack of qualified human resources are obstacles to the development of the area.

More specifically for the sectors of human development, we see the following:

<sup>18</sup> This perception was learned during interviews by the authors of administrators of the Gao region and NGOs.

**TABLE A5.1** Rate of Gross Enrollment in Middle Schools (grades 1–6) by Region, 2010–15 (in percent)

Region/District	2010–11	2011–12	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15
Kayes	80.2	74.8	74.5	75.5	73.5
Koulikoro	85.1	85.6	84.5	81.8	80.7
Sikasso	73.2	83.9	77.4	74.9	71.7
Ségou	79.2	75.4	71.2	59.1	58.6
Mopti	62.1	57.6	53	55.6	56.2
<b>Tombouctou</b>	<b>77.2</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>55.9</b>
<b>Gao</b>	<b>98.5</b>	<b>38.7</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>51.5</b>	<b>61.4</b>
<b>Kidal</b>	<b>54.6</b>	<b>31.1</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>
Bamako	116.4	91.9	90.4	86.7	81.3
Pays	81.5	76.1	71	70.1	69

## Education


Since 2012, many children have been out of school in several areas under military occupation, raising the total number of schools closed in areas affected by the conflict (Table A5.1). To date, the situation affects more than 20,000 students. Even communities that have experienced the opening of schools face increased rates of absenteeism. In the north, combatants destroyed, plundered, and occupied more than 130 schools in 2012, and early in 2015 more than 1,300 teachers had already left, reducing local capacities to teach by a fourth overall, and by two-thirds in Kidal. In addition, the situation is somewhat similar with gross enrollment rates (GER), varying from one area to another without any clear distinction between the north and south, with Gao having the highest GER in the country after Bamako before the crisis, and Kidal having the lowest. It remains obvious, however, that within the education sector, northern regions have been hit hardest by the crisis. In the Timbuktu region, more than 94,000 children have not attended school during the crisis. While in Kidal, 7 out of 62 schools that were functioning during the crisis have closed following the events of May 2014, and of about 398 teachers who were in service before the crisis, only 26 remain in the area, making it virtually impossible to run schools, of which 50 percent were destroyed during the crisis. In the region of Gao, as of late 2015 more than a third of teachers had not returned and nearly 700 schools need rehabilitation. In terms of vocational training the situation is equally inadequate, with the closing or pillaging of vocational training centers. Only about 5 percent of young people pursue vocational training, a rate comparable to the rest of Mali but still too low when one considers that vocational training can provide young people with the skills in demand in the labor market and thus provide them with a chance to find a job. Access to secondary education and vocational schools is one of the priorities that the population has highlighted through the survey.

## Health


The provision of health services has been degraded during the crisis. The conflict has had major effects on infrastructure and health services in the north because many facilities were heavily damaged<sup>19</sup> or destroyed there, a sizable amount of equipment and vehicles in health centers and hospitals have been damaged or stolen outright and pharmacies have been looted of their medications. The occupation of the northern areas by armed groups has also led to massive displacements of health personnel to the south. Altogether, 533 trained health workers from a total of 690, or about 77 percent, have left the north following the conflicts (Figure A5.1). The crisis is also reflected

<sup>19</sup> Cellule d'exécution des programmes de renforcement des infrastructures sanitaire (Cepris).

**FIGURE A5.1** Average Number of Staff in Health Centers before the Crisis and at the Time of the Survey in August and September 2015



**FIGURE A5.2** Reduction of Vaccination Rates, 2012–15



Source: ACLED and DHS 2013.


Note: y axis depicts the decrease in vaccination rate.

in terms of human development. The Permanent Modular Population Survey of 2014–15 gives a mortality rate of 32 percent for the Gao region and 24 percent for the Timbuktu region. These rates are among the highest in all of the regions. Also, the rate of vaccinations against measles in the region of Kidal has been estimated to be 24.2 percent, this being confirmed by a vaccination map and testimony of the children’s mothers. This rate is well below the minimum threshold of 80 percent recommended by the WHO in order to prevent an outbreak in the Kidal region. The impact of the conflict on the use of health services in the northern regions is also illustrated by the fact that immunization rates declined drastically from 2012 to 2015 (Figure A5.2). Given this decline,

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significant increases in vaccine-preventable diseases in the future could be expected. Explanations for these low scores are illustrated in Figure A5.3 and include the destruction of hospital equipment and the withdrawal of medical caregivers in the wake of the crisis. However, the influx of NGOs supporting the health efforts on the ground has increased access to health services for local people. This explains in particular the apparent contradiction of the recent improvement in human development indicators, such as the rate of prenatal consultations. The survey of the population confirms the importance of providing support in the health sector. Interviewees have complained

**FIGURE A5.3** Assessment of State Medical Equipment and Structures in Mali, 2013



Source: WHO 2013.

about the severity of the impact of the conflict on the number of health providers and the availability of medical equipment in health centers.

### **Water and Sanitation**

In the northern regions of Mali, the access rate to potable water was already weak before the crisis (45 percent in Gao, 31 percent in Kidal, and 62 percent in Timbuktu, as opposed to 70 percent nationally), and it has deteriorated further after 2012 (37 percent in Gao, 23 percent in Kidal, and 53 percent in Timbuktu) with the sharp decline of water and food provision systems following the occupations of these regions by armed groups. The rate of nonfunctionality in water provision systems (30 percent before the crisis) has deteriorated to a standing point of 56 percent for manual pumps (drilling) and 65 percent for piping networks. From these figures, we can estimate the total number of persons affected by these malfunctions in the northern regions to be at about 742,200. Unlike drinking water, sanitation problems in the north (with a sanitation rate of 22 percent) are not due to the conflict but are largely structural and arise from the same structural problems that affect all of Mali: a weak rate of general access to public sewage systems. In terms of the health risks associated with open-air sewage systems, the situation in northern regions is much more worrying than in the rest of country.

### **Social Protection**

Immediate negative effects on consumption, food security, and nutrition have driven the population toward negative coping strategies. With people having less money to spend, the proportion of food expenditure has increased while nonfood expenditure, including social services, has been reduced. This can have a long-term negative impact if it means that patients cannot be treated and children have to leave school. Quantitative data on such coping strategies is confirmed by qualitative data showing an increase in the sale of goods.

Food insecurity and malnutrition worsened overall. Events prevented farmers from cultivating their fields and pastoralists from migrating with their animals, which reduced their ability to obtain sufficient food and proper nutrition. The chronic undernourishment of children increased overall in 2012, with alarming levels of malnutrition for the age group 0–12 months, resulting from the food crisis of 2011 and aggravated by the 2012 crisis. This has led to the deterioration of maternal care and nutrition, with the north being disproportionately affected. Food insecurity is repeatedly cited as one of the major challenges of the crisis by the participants in the population survey. Rising food prices and the disruption or loss of revenue is linked to the impact of the crisis on livestock and small shops and services, which are the primary sources of income in the north.

### **Deficiencies with Decentralized Service Delivery**

Provision of basic social services is hindered by deficiencies in local governance, which the conflict exacerbated. Lack of investment capacities, civil servants that tend to be averse to serving in rural locations, and a lack of logistical means to serve rural areas in a context of low population density over a wide area all explain the severe lack of access to potable water, health centers, and schools. The population criticizes the shortcomings of local authorities in their mission of providing basic social services, with the hope to meaningfully participate in decisions that affect them through local institutions.

Moreover, the mandate and resources of local authorities are insufficiently adapted to the lifestyles and constraints of the northern regions. For example, in rural areas where the population is dispersed and practices livestock herding, access to the population cannot be achieved with the same modes as in the regional capital. Provision of basic social services should adapt to this context and be organized around mobile strategies—mobile teams in charge of human and animal health, education, visiting defined fixation points around water points (Table A5.2). Rural and especially nomadic populations have confirmed in the validation workshops that they expect more results in this area from local governments, as they feel that presently they are forced to choose between maintaining

Infrastructure	Gao	Kidal	Timbuktu	Urban	Rural	Together
Kindergarten	40.2	15.8	27.3	1.1	38.6	29.6
Primary school	0.5	0.6	1.4	0.6	1.0	0.9
Middle school	7.8	9.7	10.3	0.7	12.0	9.3
High school/vocational	32.4	40.1	40.3	2.7	48.4	37.4
Madrasa	15.8	3.1	18.4	1.6	18.5	14.4
Health center	4.9	4.0	5.2	0.8	6.1	4.8
Veterinary service	24.2	9.1	16.5	1.9	22.8	17.8
Bank/microfinance	42.7	40.6	30.6	14.6	44.0	37.0

their traditional lifestyle and getting access to social services by moving to towns. More adapted strategies would enhance public confidence in local government and, by extension, in the state, providing a sustainable basis for national unity.

### Perceptions of Inter- and Intraregional Differences in the North

Overall, the perception survey as well as consultation with local authorities, the administration, and members of the civil society during the validation workshops confirmed that a return to complete security is a prerequisite for the restoration of services.

Water needs, whether for drinking, animal care, or irrigation, are also highlighted in the three regions as the premier priority for the survival of the population and should be the top priority for investment, with positive spillover for development solutions in other fields such as education, health, and employment. On the other hand, sanitation seems to be a real concern only for the administration. All participants in the validation workshop agree that the situation in terms of water is tougher in rural and nomadic zones. A woman in a rural commune close to Timbuktu explained that there was only one well in the commune and that children wasted a lot of time fetching water as this well was far away from many dwellings. Other participants confirmed this situation for smaller towns or villages of the three regions, where there is a shortage of wells. Likewise, a pastoralist from the region of Gao cited the lack of water as a major problem: with sufficient water or a well, pastoral populations could have a geographic focal point, and the delivery of health and education services would be easier as a consequence. Water specialists from the administration seem, on the other hand, to have a broader view and advocate for the strengthening of their services; investment to support private sector providers in towns such as Gao, Bourem, Ansongo, and Menaka; or services to protect against flooding and stagnating water in the towns of Gao, Menaka and Timbuktu. In Kidal, participants support large-scale investments to pump sufficient water from aquifers from as far away as Tamasso.

Education and health are also very important priorities from the perception survey and the validation workshops. Households name above all the *quality* of service as a priority, investment in infrastructure coming second. As with water, rural inhabitants complain of a very low standard of service. The secretary-general of a rural commune of 17,000 inhabitants in the Timbuktu region complained that their community health centres (centres de santé communautaires CSCOM) are staffed with only a nurse, a fact that is not satisfying as there is no functional ambulance service and an evacuation can last up to 48 hours and be life-threatening, a fact corroborated by women in the validation workshops who are particularly at risk by pregnancies. Members of the administration in Timbuktu plead for more logistical resources and a school to train health professionals. In Gao, the administration wishes for the rapid

rehabilitation of the hospital and the long-term development of a third-level hospital in Gao to avoid evacuation of severe patients all the way to Bamako.

For education, the participants in the validation workshop also name quality as a main concern: teachers are too often absent, there are no sufficient meals for children, equipment is lacking, and vocational training is not adapted to the specificities of the region. A participant in Timbuktu notes that vocational training should be adapted to the agropastoral characteristics of the region. In Kidal, a representative of the association of young men emphasized the need for the inclusion of the cultural identity of Kidal in the curriculum and that local identity is important for local development. A mayor of the Kidal region noted the need for the use of local teachers. Security is also a prerequisite. In Gao region, the school system is particularly disrupted in the area of Al-Nousra due to a lack of security. It is thus imperative to encourage the return of teachers there (which have to manage up to 180 students per class), provide more school equipment, and distribute food to local community canteens that had been previously looted.

With regard to regional differences in relation to the access of the population to different socioeconomic infrastructure, Table A5.2 gives some indications.

### **Gender Inequality**

Access to services has become particularly difficult for women, especially concerning access to psychological and medical support. Currently, support and aftercare services for victims of GBV remain underfunded, while the demand for them is increasing day by day. This is also the case for organizations that inventoried cases of GBV up until 2014, which had allowed for better planning of actions and support between service centers. Today, these organizations have had to lay off staff, reduce the range of services offered, and regroup around major cities. Finally, the destruction of health infrastructure has increased the need for access to family planning and pre- and postnatal counseling, which are crucial for the reproductive health of women and the medical treatment of children.

## **Justification and Links to the Peace Accord**

The restoration of basic social services, government institutions, and local capacity is the key to peace, stability, and sustainable development in northern Mali. A quick reimplementation of services will help improve the situation of populations affected by the conflict and will prepare the groundwork for a sustainable return of internally displaced persons, which will stand as an important signal demonstrating the return to normality. Strengthening government delivery capacity will also help long-term efforts to improve the implementation of services and will help restore public trust in the state.

Thus, vulnerability to shocks, deteriorating services, and the presence of poverty traps justify the need for social safety nets (as an element of the social protection system) and aid interventions in the water management, health, and education sectors. Investing in social safety nets will increase the quantity and quality of consumption, on one hand, and, if attached to the health and education sectors, improve general human development, on the other. In all cases, the Malian government efforts to reduce the overall poverty status depend on the country's ability to increase its human capital, which requires investment in the areas of water management, health, and education.

Rebuilding trust in the state through improving the capacity of local authorities to provide basic services is a fundamental pillar of the Peace Accord. It is considered essential for lasting peace. The Peace Accord is based on the recognition of a specific socioeconomic situation in northern Mali: a movement toward greater regionalization of development and implementation services, a commitment toward greater decentralization of resources and functions, and the implementation of modalities that promote greater participation in decision making at the local level.

The effort for recovery and development in the north has the potential to significantly improve access to basic services such as education, health, and water and their associated implementation systems. A key challenge will be to ensure that investments are well suited to the needs and priorities at the subregional level and that the deployment

of national projects and programs is adjusted to the demands and social, economic, and cultural challenges of the northern regions.

At the same time, the deployment of large-scale investment has the potential to introduce new priorities and reforms that will strengthen delivery systems and critical capacities at the national and local levels. Institutional reforms proposed in the Peace Accord, including the creation of RDAs, require priority support from the central government in parallel with a strengthening of the demand side of accountability mechanisms in the north. While decentralization should be expanded further, it must be done in a way that respects differences in needs that stem from differences in livelihoods and different cultural traits among the northern regions. Similarly, a national social protection system is needed, including cash-for-work programs that can target the most vulnerable segments of the affected population in addition to strengthening social cohesion. It is important to understand what can and should be delivered locally through existing mechanisms or through building capacities of local and regional institutions, which would require adaptation of national programs to overcome specific implementation difficulties in the north.

## **Actions That Should Be Prioritized in the Short Term**

In the short term, a number of urgent needs should be met to support the implementation of key commitments of the Peace Accord and ensure rapid improvement of access to services for the most vulnerable. Such urgent priorities include the rehabilitation of wells and supply of drinking water, the rehabilitation and reopening of destroyed schools and health centers, vocational training centers for at-risk youth, and the adaptation of national programs for education, health, and social protection through NGOs.

### **Education**

Urgent action is needed to rehabilitate damaged school infrastructure (classrooms and canteens) and build temporary learning environments. Provision of school materials (notably textbooks but also teaching materials) should ensure that the material conditions for education are restored, while enhancing the functionality of school canteens would favor a higher attendance and more attention from otherwise underfed children. Crucial for the reopening of schools is the return of teachers and the recruitment of contract teachers where needed. Simultaneously, the return to school of children who could not be enrolled during the crises (notably returning internally displaced persons and refugees) should be prepared by training teachers in remediation techniques. Vocational training should also be resumed as soon as possible, notably to train older children who could not attend school during the crisis and to occupy school dropouts and offer them alternative to criminal activities.

### **Health**

The first priority is to strengthen health services by providing more materials, equipment, and drugs to health providers, rehabilitating existing health centers, and ensuring the return of staff and the hiring of contract medical officers through a national recruiting campaign that includes financial incentives. It will also be necessary to improve the quality of health services by organizing medical days for specialized care (cardiology, surgery, and ophthalmology) and begin with the strengthening of advance strategies for preventive and curative care by mobile teams. Capabilities need to be improved, notably for the treatment of cases of child malnutrition and for the management of infectious diseases. In addition, the health system must provide support for returnees and women's access to reproductive health services.

### **Water and Sanitation**

Urgently needed actions include restoring the effective operation of water systems (boreholes, wells, and pumps). These renovations will be preceded by a diagnostic of the current facilities, as the causes of a cease in operations often vary from one installation to another. Technical studies for the construction of new capacities should be started in parallel to ensure that no time is lost while at the same time ensuring the quality of future water systems.

## Social Safety Nets

Initially, social safety nets will duplicate the national social protection scheme within the northern regions. This scheme provides, among other things, cash transfers to the poorest households. In addition, supporting better and higher demand for health services may entail cash transfers conditional on health care attendance, channeled through a strengthened safety net system. Indeed, reducing inequities in access to preventive and curative health services between poor and nonpoor, urban and rural households, and males and females is critical to improving the overall health outcomes among the disadvantaged. Healthier workers are more productive, live longer, learn more, are more creative, and can cope better. This is especially true in subsistence agriculture, because households usually have a hard time replacing labor lost to sickness. The need to focus on improved supply of and demand for maternal and child and reproductive health care is especially important.

## Strengthening Implementation Capacities of Local Authorities in the Short Term

Given the urgency of these activities and the limited capacities that exist in the north, as well as significant subregional differences in terms of needs, capabilities, and access, priority will be given to the use of existing implementation mechanisms, including in particular the humanitarian system for the deployment of recovery and development actions. The activities will also explore delivery arrangements in terms of their capacity to reinforce peace and stability in the short term, including the use of high-intensity construction methods or cash-for-work initiatives with a focus on reaching the most vulnerable people, including women.

Included among the urgent priorities is a strengthening of the capacity of local government to manage the delivery of services and of the reconstruction and maintenance of infrastructure. The priority given to existing implementation mechanisms constitutes for the local government an opportunity to concentrate on the essential reforms that must be implemented in order to expand the process of decentralization and strengthen the role and capacity of local government institutions to take charge of delivering education, health, and water services and generally increase its capacity in terms of delegated contract management.

## Actions That Should Be Prioritized in the Medium and Long Term

In the medium and long term, focus should be on improving access to and on implementing basic social services in the northern regions in order to develop a sustainable social protection system and to strengthen the capacity of local authorities to meet the demands of the population. Activities will focus on enhancing access to education, health, and water through the construction of critical infrastructure. Similarly, activities will focus on the deployment of national programs in the north, including social protection, vocational training, and preventative health care. Regarding the funding of social sectors, budgets will be based on the national budget, on the technical and financial contributions of the partners, and on community mobilization organized by civil society. The delivery of health services has been made completely free during and after the crisis. Thus CSCOM will need state subsidies, which could be financed by the community social security program managed by the Ministry of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action, and Reconstruction in the North. Social safety nets and conditional cash transfers could be developed on the basis of existing initiatives.

## Education

In the domain of education, there is an important need in infrastructure: the construction of new schools according to the school maps of the regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal; the construction of a vocational training center in each *cercle*<sup>20</sup> to offer training opportunities in rural zones as well as the stocking of these centers with the equipment needed for technical training; and in the long term the development of a university center in the north.

<sup>20</sup> The *cercle* (circle in English) is a local authority gathering several communes with a legal personality and enjoying financial autonomy. The regions of Mali are divided into 49 circles. (fr.wikipedia.org)

Quality of service is at least as important and implies a sustained effort to staff schools and vocational training centers with well-trained teachers in sufficient number. The improvement of the quality of education is a major priority in the long term and entails the need (i) to increase support to school canteens, with greater community involvement in school management; (ii) to implement incentive mechanisms for recruitment in rural and difficult areas of the country; (iii) to deploy revised and adapted curricula (including updated textbooks); and (iv) to strengthen the school administration, inspection, and controls. Other medium-term priorities include campaigns to increase girls' enrollment and mechanisms to keep them in schools as well as ensure the schooling of children who could not be enrolled during the crisis. Finally, vocational training should be deployed on a large scale and its programs adapted to local needs and defined with local economic actors.

## **Health**

Priorities include constructing several health centers and regional hospitals and endowing them with equipment and medicines. In the long term, however, major efforts should mainly aim at the improvement of the quality of service, by training and hiring specialists, offering appropriate conditions to keep them in the north, and deploying programs for the treatment of cases of child malnutrition and for the management of infectious disease. Deploying advanced strategies for preventive and curative care by mobile teams is a priority for rural and pastoral populations and should be coupled with the sufficient logistical means. In addition, holistic centers for women and child survivors of GBV, which will provide emergency services, psychological and medical support, legal assistance, and economic reintegration into society, should be developed. As one-stop centers they prevent the stigmatization of women and children victims of GBV, which is a drawback to centers that address that issue exclusively.

## **Water and Sanitation**

Likewise, there is a need for massive investments in water supply to expand access to drinking water for the most vulnerable populations, be it in major towns (strengthening of water supply in Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal), rural towns, or villages. Solid preliminary technical studies should be carried out, as later malfunctions or disappointing water flows are often linked to a lack of or incomplete studies. Water supplies in pastoral zones should be planned to accommodate both human and animal use. To be effective, these massive investments must be coupled with a better management system. The capacity of technical services and deconcentrated services from the Direction Nationale de l'Hydraulique DNH should be improved, in addition to building on the capacities of local authorities for delegated contract management. This would also include the creation of management committees for water access points and clearly define their responsibilities. Better management would also create a value chain dedicated to the repair and maintenance of pumps and wells (availability of spare parts and equipment, training, and so forth). All this should help to reduce the rate of nonfunctionality of existing wells and pumps, which is currently very high.

In terms of sanitation, the priority is to establish sanitation infrastructure in public buildings and education centers, launch educational campaigns challenging social norms about existing sanitation practices, and contemplate the subsidizing of sanitation systems for people ready to invest in them.

## **Social Safety Nets**

Social safety nets can be used as long-term poverty alleviation programs, supporting minimum consumption levels and promoting the accumulation of human capital. However, social safety nets in Mali face significant challenges, including poor targeting practices and a failure to promote the productive inclusion of their beneficiaries. The social safety net system should be reviewed. Cash transfers should be combined with other social programs that aim to reduce poverty in order to ensure that the population has widespread access to the social safety net. This could include public employment and income-generating activities designed to increase the productivity of households. In addition, programs for adapting to climate change (particularly in the sectors of water management and biodiversity conservation) can be coupled with social protection programs such as a cash-for-work program to implement

such initiatives. The overall objective for the medium to long term is to revise the social protection system and to ensure its effective implementation across the north of Mali.

### **Strengthening Decentralized Implementation Capacities in the Medium and Long Term**

With specific concern to strengthening the technical capacity of local governments, there is a need to increase their material, human, and knowledge capacities for the local management of services, to coordinate with organizations in civil society (particularly in the field of health), to extend the process of decentralization, and to increase the collection of local revenues necessary for infrastructure construction and for the maintenance of various services. More specifically, the implementation of these activities will possibly be associated with the development of national programs, after their necessary adaptation to the current context of the northern regions. This adaptation must be defined by the steering mechanism in charge of the implementation of the recommendations of the MIEC. Priority will be placed on transferring implementation mechanisms as close as possible to the population, including through the use of RDAs as the main interlocutors of technical support and of transferring project implementation units to the regional capitals.

Basic social services, including education and health, are normally provided by the local municipalities. To this end, their estimates are recorded in the national budget, which, with the help of its partners, subsidizes the local communities. The Document cadre de la politique nationale de décentralisation DCPND III and its 2015–19 action plan are guidelines already defined for the expansion of the decentralization process. Their implementation will to a large extent contribute to the preparation for the implementation of priority actions designed to strengthen peace. Thus, contributions of the state and its technical and financial partners paid under the DCPND are at the same time resources for the consolidation of peace. Resource transfers provided by the state and local authorities, in accordance with its commitments, represent an available budget for the implementation of priority actions in the domain of decentralization.

## **FINDINGS RELATED TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF NEEDS FOR ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY AND EMPLOYMENT**

Detailed background work was done in the areas of food security, livelihoods and economic activity, employment, transportation, trade, private sector development, energy, and environmental and natural resource management to inform the Joint Assessment Mission. This work identified a number of needs and challenges that should be addressed to facilitate economic recovery, growth, and integration of northern Mali into the national and regional economy over time.

### **Needs and Impacts of the Crisis**

The conflict has disrupted the already weak economy in the three northern regions, with significant spillovers in the regions of Mopti and Segou. The impact has been a reduction in income-generation and well-being for much of the population. The destruction of important productive infrastructure, including irrigation systems and farm equipment, has affected agricultural production and exacerbated the problems of food insecurity. To this are added water scarcity, energy supply deficits, and the interruption of financial services following the organized looting of grain stores and financial institutions by armed groups.

The northern regions are characterized by the narrowness of their productive base. Pastoralism and trade over long distances are the main economic activities in the north. Agriculture and fishing activities are carried out in flooded areas of the Niger River and its various tributaries, lake, and pond areas, creating competition for access to wetlands and pastures. Local craftwork and tourism provide the subsistence means for a large segment of the population in northern Mali.

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The displacement of people has severely deteriorated their living conditions. About 36 percent of the total population of the north was displaced as a direct result of the conflict. Approximately 353,000 people were displaced within Mali, and 170,000 people sought refuge in neighboring countries. The population perception survey shows that those who stayed behind saw their economic situation improve over the past few years.

Herders, merchants, and local entrepreneurs were the hardest hit. The conflict has reduced human mobility, limited access to markets, destabilized supply chains, and has led to the theft of property. Herders who possessed many cattle were forced for fear of theft to leave the conflict zones for safer areas in southern Mali and in neighboring countries, while those with fewer cattle were obliged to raise their animals on their familial lands. Merchants could not travel without the risk of being attacked and losing their goods and money. The absence of a functioning banking system following the looting of banks and the removal of microfinance organizations has exacerbated the insecurity of merchants who did not have any reliable way to hold their assets. Farmers were forced to abandon their fields because of the conflict and resort to fishing. It should be noted that even before the crisis, farmers were not receiving enough support from the state, and many were forced into subsistence farming. Moreover, their profit margins were not attractive enough to be a frequent target of attack by rebel groups.

Illegal trade and trafficking have fueled and continues to fuel the conflict. Opportunities for highly profitable revenue related to smuggling cigarettes, drugs, weapons, and fuel (coming from Algeria); kidnapping and ransoming of hostages; and misappropriation of public funds have led to the emergence of a new set of actors who are motivated to protect their assets through the use of violence. These networks have been able to grow, following the demilitarization granted by the National Pact and the Algiers Agreement, which have essentially left individual regions without armed forces to control them. The new revenue opportunities have disrupted traditional social structures, and youth have found new ways to be economically independent in the absence of other legal and non-violent alternatives.

### Perceptions of Inter- and Intraregional Differences in the North

Several similarities can be noted. Respondents all consider the return of security as a prerequisite for economic recovery projects. For all regions the primary concern for households is food insecurity, due to rising food prices and the pervasive loss of livelihoods in general. Participants in the validation workshops mention the need to support the short-term recovery and long-term development of agropastoral activities. Participants coming from along the Niger River name needs related to agriculture, such as the rehabilitation of irrigation canals and the development of irrigated perimeters, whereas pastoralists emphasize their numerous challenges: insufficient access to water and a lack of vaccination services, which combine to decimate their livestock. These different needs reflect the different types of livelihoods per regions (Table A5.3) and climate zones.

**TABLE A5.3** Percentage of Households That Have Worked within a Particular Sector

Activity	Gao	Kidal	Timbuktu	Total
Agriculture	58.0	0	71.9	62.3
Livestock farming <sup>21</sup>	82.5	56.0	81.0	80.3
Fishing	6.2	0	7.7	6.7
Small business, crafts, and services	60.6	50.3	45.6	43.3

Note: The table shows the percentage of households involved in an activity within a particular sector in the last 12 months.

<sup>21</sup> There is at least one farm animal per household. The table only includes cattle, sheep, goats and camels. The inclusion of other types of farm animals, representing on average at least 2 per household, would bring the row total to 100 percent.

Isolation due to lack of roads was named as a major problem by participants in the validation workshops of Gao and Timbuktu, with negative impacts on the local economy and the functioning of social services. Participants in Gao named the rehabilitation of the Sévaré-Gao road as a major priority, while participants in Timbuktu named the completion of the Goma Coura-Timbuktu road and the construction of the Douentza-Timbuktu road as equally important. Perhaps surprisingly, participants in Kidal also named isolation as a challenge but the demand for road construction was much less pronounced than in Timbuktu and Gao.

Opinions vary on issues of socioeconomic development; authorities focus on infrastructure construction while the population, and in particular young people, favor job creation as a chief priority, reflecting the high unemployment rate of youth. Access to microfinance is also a need for participants in the validation workshops: for instance, young men taking part in the Kidal workshop emphasized the need to improve access to credit to restart local economic activity. Craftsmen in Timbuktu were very dependent on tourism, and their trade was extremely affected by the crisis, so they ask for efforts to revive tourism or alternatively (and more realistically in the short term) for training to help them convert to more utilitarian crafts.

As part of the economic recovery and infrastructure construction framework, climate change (with increased drought and increasing irregularity of rainfall) must be taken into account, in that these affects are contributing to the degradation of the means of subsistence for the population (degradation of land, rising temperatures, and flooding) and their mobility. Public concerns related to climate change rank fourth according to the survey, with animal diseases ranking fifth.

### **Gender Inequality**

The economic situation of women was particularly affected by the conflict. From April 2012 to December 2013, there were 1,694 cases of denial of resources and opportunities for women that were considered acts of GBV. In general, women are limited to unprofitable and small-scale economic activities such as cattle fattening, gardening, petty trade, and crafts. Yet these activities are fundamental to the food security of the entire population, since women alone account for over 70 percent of food production. Women in the validation workshops insisted that not enough attention is paid to the specificities of their economic activities and asked for more support for women's organizations and small-scale vegetable production, as well as the development of vocational training curriculums such as dyeing, hairdressing, and crafts. The retention of women's productive activities is important for the overall survival of the population, and the development of these activities is important for women's economic autonomy. Women in general wish for more access to more types of productive activities in order to ensure autonomous management of their own activities. Also, the independence of women increases their safety against violence and gender-based crimes and adds to their ability to pursue justice in court when such crimes are committed.

### **Justification and Links to the Peace Accord**

Economic recovery and the creation of income-generating activities for people and especially for young people and women are fundamental elements for the normalization and stabilization of the lives of people in the northern regions of Mali. Thus, the revival of economic activities, rehabilitation efforts, and the installation of basic infrastructure constitute essential actions for supporting the implementation of the Peace Accord. These are the foundations for initiating a process of sustainable development in the context of the increased accountability of regions envisaged under the accord. In fact, the accord takes into account the economic, social, and cultural specificities of the north that must be integrated into the process of recovery and development. It appears indeed essential to take action and to stimulate and revive the economy in the short term and create structural foundations for continued economic activity in the long term.

The Peace Accord cites the need to improve access to and connectivity of northern Mali to the rest of the country through basic infrastructure such as the rehabilitation and construction of roads, the development of the energy network combined with the promotion of renewable energy sources, and the improvement of telephone coverage. Better

access to northern regions of Mali would significantly reduce the widespread feeling of marginalization and alienation in recent decades, which has allowed for the armed conflict to materialize and for criminal activities to develop.

## Actions That Should Be Prioritized in the Short Term

In the short term, the findings suggest a need to focus on a number of important activities aimed at stimulating economy recovery. These actions were identified based on their ability to support the immediate implementation of visible peace results, reduce the risk of renewed conflict and criminal activities, and provide opportunities for improving the livelihoods for the most vulnerable, including returnees. Included among the urgent actions are (i) the need to ensure food security; (ii) the restoration of productive capacity and livelihoods, particularly by supporting the immediate productive capacity within the herding and agriculture sectors; (iii) the rehabilitation of destroyed production and trade infrastructure and the launch of construction of new infrastructure that will sustain income-generating activities (especially in favor of youth, women, and other vulnerable groups); and (iv) the creation of jobs by setting up favorable framework conditions for the private sector and short-term employment programs for the rehabilitation of buildings and public works.

### Agriculture (Food Security, Productive Capacity, and Livelihoods)

*Agriculture.* Short-term efforts in the agriculture sector concern the distribution of food from humanitarian aid organizations and local public institutions. Efforts must reach remote and isolated areas and nomadic peoples in order to ensure food security and peace. They should include the distribution of natural agricultural inputs adapted to different cultures, the rehabilitation of the current irrigation system, support and respect for traditional farming techniques combined with better training, proper guidance in terms of technical advisory support services, and a plan to open up production areas and link them to sales channels.

*Livestock herding.* Regarding the production of livestock, emergency measures must be organized for the distribution of food products to farmers, vaccination campaigns and the treatment of livestock, the rehabilitation of cattle markets, and financial support to different types of herders (sedentary, nomads, and those who practice agropastoralism), with compensation for the loss of livestock. In addition, there must be measures to ensure the security of local markets (and depending on the level of security forces available, ensuring the secure passage along key routes where there has been rampant banditry) and support the production of dairy products, hides, and skins to ensure the revival of the local economy, which is largely based on the trade of these products.

*Fishing.* Primarily developed in the Timbuktu region and increasingly in Gao (where the Niger River flows for over 400 kilometers), the fishing industry requires urgent priority actions that include support for the purchase of fishing equipment and the commercialization and conservation of fish products.

### Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Construction

The rehabilitation of electrical installations damaged by the conflict would help facilitate the return of refugees, the resumption of basic social services such as education and health, as well as the gradual recovery of economic activities. Restoring access to the Internet, to allow the interconnection of regions and a connection with central government services (a precondition for the transfer budget and other subsidies for example), is also urgent, along with the rehabilitation of energy and ITC infrastructure.

### Private Sector Development, Financing Services, and Employment

Economic entities that are present in the north have largely been victims of the crisis, many of which were forced to stop their production, as in the case of the Tilemsi phosphate plant, whose production facilities were looted by attackers. Other organizations, particularly in the sectors of hospitality and tourism, banking, telecommunications, construction and public works, and transportation have been severely affected as well. The resumption of business

activity is a sine qua non for the revival of economic activity and job creation. To do this, it is first necessary to support the restart of existing businesses.

Urgent priorities for trade include (i) maintaining market access for local and regional sales of food, construction materials, and hydrocarbons; (ii) the import of food and hardware materials, mainly from Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger; (iii) the export of local livestock, agriculture and handicraft products, entailing the strengthening security on the premises of markets and shipping points for imports and exports; and (iv) the reopening of the Algerian border under favorable conditions for maintaining security and peace to avoid banditry.

In the short term, employment opportunities will be provided by cash-for-work programs or high-intensity labor force (HILO) methods on rehabilitation and construction projects for public buildings and roadwork. Priority will be given to the poor and to demobilized ex-combatants as part of the DDR. Determining the level of wages will be a tricky issue, as they should be attractive to ex-combatants but not too high so as to crowd out the poorest due to heightened competition for these jobs.

### **Strengthening Implementation Capacities of Local Authorities in the Short Term**

Given the urgency of priority activities and the existing limited capacities in the north, in addition to significant regional differences in terms of needs, capabilities and access, priority will be given to the use of existing delivery mechanisms, such as the humanitarian system, to ensure quick results in terms of recovery. It is important to organize a coordination of the humanitarian system, and provide for a gradual transfer of the management of the previously mentioned priorities. This includes the setting up or rehabilitation of basic food distribution points powered by local authorities and international donations. Indeed, the survey found that food insecurity is the primary concern of the local people. Ensuring access to food is also a way for local authorities to restore a climate of security.

Moreover, local authorities will take over promoting income-generating activities and economic recovery in general, which requires the participation of the population in employment programs and infrastructure reconstruction. Implementation should be based on methods likely to limit the presence and influence of criminal networks and their illicit activities. This means that preference could be given to the development of cash-for-work systems and to provide immediate jobs for young people at risk of recruitment into armed groups or illegal activities.

Finally, with regard to improving the economic situation of women, the central government will be charged with creating additional production units and increasing the profitability of existing ones, in order to promote the development of small businesses. The empowerment of women also depends on access to quality education and training, which the central government will strengthen by the development of specific programs. The government will offer different vocational tracks such as the production and sale of raw materials and the transformation of raw materials into finished products and the management of this process, in addition to the marketing of finished products at the local and regional level. Women's participation in sustainable trade programs abroad and the creation of women's groups for business management and the defense of women's rights will also be means by which to promote women's empowerment.

### **Actions That Should Be Prioritized in the Medium and Long Term**

In the medium and long term, investments are needed to improve the infrastructure in the north and reduce its isolation. Private sector development will in a large part depend on better infrastructure, as well as the development of financing services, and a focused strategy aimed at developing value chains grounded in the specificities and potentials of the north and coupled with the necessary vocational training providing the needed skilled workforce. Job creation will be a result of this endogenous economic growth.

#### **Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries**

In the framework of productive capacity development, priority actions for the medium and long term for agriculture aim to extend the irrigation system, implement a plan to open up productive areas, develop new cultivation practices

adapted to the local climate and designed for food agriculture for sale in local markets, and support the integration of sedentary nomadic areas for those who wish to transition into sedentary areas. For livestock herding, the aim is to improve the availability of vaccination, develop livestock herding where appropriate while planning resilience to climate change, and help develop a processing industry in the north that will increase demand for livestock. For fishing, the development of fish farms will open up new economic opportunities while ensuring respect for the environment with a more natural approach to breeding in order to avoid counterproductive results with rapid environmental destruction and the degradation of sanitary conditions, which can cause disease.

## Infrastructure

In the medium and long term, investments are needed to integrate the north into the national and regional economy, including through the construction of transportation and communications networks. These constitute investments to create structural foundations for economic activity. These activities require more preparatory work (particularly prior technical studies), which can be started immediately, as well as improvement in the security environment to ensure safe access to work areas. As the focus will be on a number of capital-intensive investments, this pillar attaches particular importance to trade-offs between equality and efficient use of and access to resources, due to the extremely low density of the population in the north. In addition, the environmental dimension should also be taken into account with all potential investments, in order to ensure their sustainability. Furthermore, the infrastructure program (transport, energy, and telecommunications) require a careful analysis to understand the detailed costs of their implementation, which will depend, to a large extent, on security improvements. The implementation of these activities will concern, as much as possible, the extension of national programs and projects, with the necessary modifications made to match the objectives of the northern regions. To do this, it will be necessary to establish a dialogue with the new ADRs and to ensure the integration of those programs and projects in regional planning exercises.

*Transportation.* New transportation capacity aims to solve problems of access to and remoteness of the northern regions and seeks to enable their integration in national development dynamics (integration with the rest of the country) as well as subregional opportunities (trade with neighboring countries). The construction of this infrastructure must also be linked to a job creation plan in the short term. Priorities in terms of transportation infrastructure are first concerned with the expansion of the road network and urban thoroughfares and their maintenance. Top priorities are the rehabilitation of the Sévaré-Gao road and the construction of the Goma Coura-Timbuktu and/or Douentza-Timbuktu roads, which will end the isolation of the most populous regions of the north and offer a welcome productivity boost to the local economic sector. Other priorities include the construction of regional roads to improve access to rural areas and international roads linking the north to Algeria and Niger. The development in the river system network through the construction of new docks, and the rehabilitation and construction of new airports, are also important. Reducing the costs of air transportation could facilitate access of the local population and domestic and regional tourists to a means of transport still considered a luxury, which will allow the resumption of tourism, job creation, and increased trade.

*Energy and telecommunications.* The development of the northern regions depends heavily on better access to energy and telecommunication means in order to improve connectivity and to provide a basis for local economic activity. For telecommunications, there should be a reduction in differences in access between the towns of Timbuktu and Gao. Kidal should be rendered operational by rehabilitating the destroyed sites and expanding the national broadband communication network. Ensuring the security of technical teams to move into the respective areas for maintenance work, and securing technical equipment against theft, will be paramount to ensuring the quality and reliability of service.

Regarding access to electricity, it is necessary to strengthen the energy network by rehabilitating damaged infrastructure and building new power plants and solar fields, both in urban and rural areas. Priority should go to investment in renewable energies, as they present less risks of price volatility in the long run, exploit local potentials (sun and wind), and offer a sizable contribution to the fight against climate change. The establishment of a fiscal

policy encouraging investment in these sectors, and the establishment of a more efficient system for the collection of electricity bills, would be a useful support.

### **Private Sector Development and Financing Services**

The deployment of new infrastructure will allow for the development of a modern private sector, along with the expansion of vocational training and accompanying measures such as (i) the promotion of income-generating activities for young people and women; (ii) training and capacity-building assistance, in particular with regard to management for entrepreneurs; (iii) support to cooperatives and the creation of small businesses as providers of employment; and (iv) the implementation of support programs for encouraging entrepreneurship among young graduates and women.

Initiating an endogenous growth able to sustain employment and income generation requires a focus mainly on the agropastoral potential of the regions; the development of value chains, to include production of raw material; the growth of processing industries (transformation and conservation units); and the development of support services (construction, cold chain, transportation, and so forth). These value chains will likely be constituted mostly of small and medium-sized businesses.

Likely value chains include those for meat production and transformation, tanneries for leather goods, fish-processing units, wheat processing, and a consolidation of the construction sector and its use of local construction materials (see Box A5.1).

*Tourism and craftwork.* Tourism is an important economic sector in the north, particularly in Timbuktu, but it was brought to a virtual standstill by the crisis. It also affects the craftwork sector, whose natural outlet is tourists. A restart of the sector is dependent on the restoration of security and perceived safety. The excessive dependence on western tourists, potentially more averse to security threats, should be mitigated by developing a diversification strategy targeting tourists at the national and subregional level. The strengthening of touristic infrastructure, in particular hotels and airports, should be informed by these new needs, while ensuring the inclusion of local people in tourism revenue, particularly with the recovery of craft trades, an important provider of jobs in the north. A plan to protect and safeguard tourist sites and the training of guides would also be important.

*Natural resources.* Regarding the exploitation of natural resources, it is necessary to relaunch operations aimed at extracting phosphate and oil, which were interrupted by the crisis; to ensure employment and a strong source of revenue within the affected areas; to restore the trust of various actors within these sectors; to support local businesses in the exploitation of phosphate, many of whom lost their equipment during the crisis; and to strengthen the technical capacity of institutions involved in the promotion of the mining sector. Then, for the development of a favorable management of natural resources for economic recovery, as well as for social cohesion and peace, it is necessary to ensure the establishment of a propriety title management policy that enables local populations to access these type of titles; the training of local people in management and executive positions within businesses, as well as technical positions; the promotion of sustainable human development within local communities; and the promotion of socioeconomic development in the areas of gold mining to benefit local communities, particularly women and youth. Finally, it is necessary to strengthen the legal and institutional framework of natural resource sectors to adapt to the particular and riskier situation in the north.

*Financial services.* The development of economic activities in the north cannot be achieved without the establishment of appropriate and sustainable funding mechanisms. The microfinance sector appears to be best suited for financing local economies of the three regions in the short and medium term. It can sustain and support the financing of micro and small enterprises in the agriculture, livestock, crafts, and tourism sectors. Women and young people should be given priority as part of financing. Furthermore, the development of the banking sector and the system of Islamic finance could be surveyed in the long term, with the possible support of Arab partners who have the needed expertise and are generally active in the area.

*Supportive framework conditions.* To facilitate private sector development in northern Mali, the government should accelerate the implementation of support measures. The deconcentration of the one-stop counter for business

## BOX A5.1 Ideas for Promising Sectors in Northern Mali

The following ideas about promising value chains come from discussions with stakeholders. Their potential and implementation should be further analyzed.

### **Meat-processing industry and by-products**

Idea: Livestock herding is a very important activity, especially for nomads. It can create significant added value (high price of meat, dairy products industry, by-products such as skins, crafts, and so forth). Currently, meat is sold and exported without maintaining most of the value added in the region. Modern slaughterhouses should be built and a value chain organized around them. This industry is a priority as it is an activity controlled and controllable by many of the young people who might otherwise end up in armed or criminal groups. The processing industry will develop only with rapid communication (paved roads) to markets to guarantee the cold chain.

Location: Regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu

Conditions: Business plans for slaughterhouses, value chain built around them, opening up of road connections

### **Agricultural and fish-processing industry**

Idea: Develop agricultural transformation activities (fishing, culture of bourgou, and so forth) near the harvesting areas of raw materials. This would generate more value added locally. Targeted are fish-processing units and the like. There are also means to couple the development of this sector to the development of a cold chain support industry.

Location: Lake zone (Niafunke) and Timbuktu region

Conditions: Specific vocational training, opening up of road connection

### **Gum arabic industry**

Idea: The gum harvest occurs in the arid Sahel zone, where it offers great potential for increasing income. There is the potential to develop an integrated chain (storage, packaging, transportation) creating added value.

Location: Sahel climatic zone of Timbuktu and Gao

Conditions: Update existing strategy paper (Sector Strategy for gum arabic in Mali, 2011–2016) and implement it with identified stakeholders while building on existing good practice in Chad and Sudan.

### **Oasis agriculture**

Idea: The oasis agriculture, based in large part on the date palm, creates added value and helps settle populations in arid and hyper-arid climatic zones.

Location: Sahara climatic zone of the regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal

Conditions: Build on the many successful projects in other desert countries

### **Craft industry**

Idea: Develop a value chain for local crafts (in Tuareg and other communities) while also developing distribution channels not dependent on a recovery in tourism.

Location: Regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal

Conditions: Vocational training, support to women's groups

### **Tourism industry**

Idea: The tourism potential is important, even though it needs to be potentiated by a strategy based on the return of security and stability, diversification, creation of adequate infrastructure, and capacity building for its actors. In terms of diversification, the sector should come out of its almost exclusive reliance on Western tourists and develop other offers for tourists of the subregion or religious tourism.

Location: Three northern regions, in particular Timbuktu

Conditions: Vocational training, hotel infrastructure, and environmental protection

### **Construction industry**

Idea: A competitive construction industry is needed to assist the reconstruction, construction of infrastructure, and decentralization (delegated contract management entrusted to local authorities). There is also a demand for skilled workers in construction trades and technicians.

Location: Regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal

Conditions: Skill-oriented vocational training on construction trades (masons, plumbers, electricians) and technicians (site managers and foremen) as well as on-the-job training courses of a few weeks to reintegrate school dropouts in a formal activity

### **Local construction material industry**

Idea: Building out of local materials pursues a threefold purpose: (i) keep a larger share of the value added locally (manufacture of materials on-site as opposed to importation of standard materials, use of local know-how, and larger proportion of labor in the value); (ii) maintain the cultural heritage and beautify localities in view of a recovery in tourism; and (iii) value the local culture in a positive and constructive manner.

Location: Regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal

Conditions: Platform of discussion and coordination between the construction industry, vocational training authorities, scholars, and local leaders

creation in the regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal will facilitate the procurement of permits without passing through Bamako and make it easier access to finance. Alternatively or in addition, financing could be had through direct government support to create conditions of flexible and preferential loans (rates, procedures) for economic operators working in the north. State incentives could also take the form of tax or customs responses or even in the form of free provision of developed land.

*Employment.* Developing short-term employment will depend on the restoration of productive capacities and the rehabilitation of infrastructure. (HILO programs should be favored as they create many jobs, especially for the youth.)

The medium- and long-term objectives for promoting employment revolve around increased access to vocational training in various sectors (agriculture, livestock, crafts, trade, and tourism) for both the urban and rural population, be it for skilled craftsmen, technicians, or managerial positions. Vocational training should be in accordance with existing or targeted value chains, as is endorsed in the national vocational training strategy (Programme Décennal de Développement de la Formation Professionnelle pour l'Emploi—PRODEFPE) to adapt to regional strengths and needs of the local economy, so that training can better be matched to actual employment needs.

The informal sector makes up the vast majority of jobs. Recognition of this fact and the establishment of support for these activities, in connection with the development of a national social protection system and coupled with controls to promote better working conditions, including access to a decent wage, should help the formalization over time. Coordination between short-term social safety net programs (particularly cash-for-work projects) and the availability of jobs in related sectors will also be important to ensure the sustainability of job creation over time.

Finally, in order to allow a change in the quality of employment in a structural way, it will be required to establish a permanent prospective research unit that will conduct a needs assessment of employment and sectors to promote and coordinate with vocational training.

### **Environmental Sustainability**

The three northern regions of Mali cover three main ecological zones, all of which are ecologically fragile and threatened by climate change. Adaption to adverse effects is important to protect the poorest and most marginalized sectors of the population, who are the most exposed and vulnerable to the threat of a changing climate. Therefore, environmental sustainability should be taken into account in every investment decision and infrastructure projects.

The Niger River is the lifeline of the region. The preservation of the river system through the implementation of a protection plan and saving the Niger River against silting and the construction of banks to avoid a decrease in the flow of water in times of flood recession is a priority. The Investment Plan for the Strengthening of Resilience to Climate Change in the Niger Basin, a scheme run by the nine countries constituting the Niger Basin Authority, offers a long-term framework to protect the environment of the northern regions while at the same time developing economic opportunities in sustainable agriculture, including the use of natural fertilizers, livestock herding and fishing, reforestation, and firewood production. Good water management should be achieved by developing a plan for safeguarding water quality, managing water use, and storing rainwater in the fight against water scarcity and desertification, along with the preservation of vegetation cover, biodiversity, and soil fertility.

A waste management plan for the northern regions should be put in place, and the development of extractive industries should be coupled with social and environmental criteria for operating sites and their waste products.

### **Strengthening Decentralized Implementation Capacities in the Medium and Long Term**

For these medium- to long-term priorities, and taking into account the strong focus on a number of capital-intensive investments, the component places particular importance on trade-offs among equality, access, and efficient use of resources, given the extremely low population density in the northern regions. In particular, the proposed infrastructure and transportation program requires a careful analysis to understand the detailed costs of implementation, which will depend to a large extent on improvements made to accessibility. The implementation of these activities will involve, to the extent that it is possible, the extension of national programs with the necessary modifications

to match the objectives of the northern regions. To do this, it will be necessary to establish a dialogue with the new RDAs and ensure their integration in regional planning exercises. Finally, improved security in terms of access to construction sites and the implementation of arbitration bodies is generally based on the responsibility of local authorities. Thus, it is necessary to provide strategic and technical support to the development of a security access plan, on the one hand, and independent and transparent arbitration bodies, on the other. Faced with insecurity, donors must set up additional funds to finance the supplemented costs to work in these environments.

Local authorities at the regional level, especially within the framework of the “contract plans” project, have real decision-making power. Subsidies from the state and its partners are added to regional budgets. Local communities have a Social and Cultural Economic Development Program, which serves as a framework for control and execution of development actions. Negotiations with the different partners allow communities to raise funds for its implementation. The allocations of investment funds through the ANICT (Local Governments’ National Investment Agency) constitute important funds available for the implementation of infrastructure by local authorities. Finally, local authorities can ensure the implementation of fiscal decentralization.

Regionally, the RDAs constitute appropriate structures to effect economic recovery. They will rely on human resources identified for this purpose. Their support through the national budget is an asset on which the technical and financial partners can rely. In addition, the technical services of the state at the regional level are also part of the capacities available for the strengthening of peace and the revival of development in the northern regions. Outside of the capabilities available through the decentralization process, there are also sectoral projects run by ministries, with the support of partners, in the framework of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. These capabilities can be further analyzed to determine precisely the means for the sectoral project in the north. Finally, environmental protection actions and the protection of life are supported within the framework of the implementation of priorities by local governing bodies that administer waters and forests and those in charge of sanitation and pollution control.

## BACKGROUND ON THE IDENTIFICATION AND INTEGRATION OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

The cost of meeting anticipated humanitarian needs have to the extent possible been integrated into relevant priority pillars (Table A5.4). Costs related to the humanitarian clusters Protection and Shelter are found predominantly in Pillar 1; costs related to Nutrition, Health, Education, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene are found in Pillar 2; costs related to Food Security, Agriculture and Early Recovery are mainly within Pillar 3.

**TABLE A5.4 Humanitarian Needs and Their Costs for the Three Northern Regions**

Humanitarian clusters	Humanitarian needs for the three northern regions calculated by MIEC (in CFAF millions)
Early recovery	21,184.3
Agriculture	11,509.7
Food security	26,190.9
Education	10,776.4
Health Nutrition	13,877.7
Protection and human rights	24,437.0
Shelter and nonfood items	10,347.3
Water, hygiene, and sanitation	8,946.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>127,269.8</b>


Four challenges are worth noting with the way humanitarian priorities have been integrated into this assessment:

1. Contrary to the strict prioritization that has been carried out for the rest of the assessment, humanitarian projects are strictly needs-based and taken from the annual Common Humanitarian Appeal process. While needs have been further refined through follow-up discussions with staff from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other UN agencies and NGOs, no effort has gone into prioritizing between these needs.
2. The annual Common Humanitarian Appeal for 2016 was not available at the time of writing. Discussions with OCHA staff and other UN agencies and NGOs gave clear trends for 2016, but there are bound to be minor discrepancies between the MIEC figures and the appeal for 2016.
3. Disaggregation of costs by region is also not possible using OCHA data, and so calculation of humanitarian needs for the three regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal are therefore approximate.
4. The government also has its own emergency action plan with a compilation of humanitarian needs. The financing and implementation of the activities listed here is often carried out by UN agencies. While further analysis was carried out to avoid as much as possible the double counting of these projects, some overlap and duplication might still exist.

The humanitarian needs, supposed to cover the needs for one year (2016) were spread over three years according to the following breakdown: 60 percent for year one, 30 percent for year two, and 10 percent for year three. The rationale for this is based on the following assumptions. First, Common Humanitarian Appeals are regularly underfinanced, so that the needs assessed for one year are covered in two or three years. Second, the reality on the ground concerning security, among other things, makes it difficult to effectively implement the entire list of needs projects. (Again, it is more realistic to plan their implementation for two to three years.) And third, based on the assumption that peace and security will soon materialize on the ground, it is possible to reduce humanitarian projects in medium term, with their replacement by development projects. For all these reasons, the above adopted segmentation is well adapted for an estimate of humanitarian needs in the north of Mali, provided that both peace and security are quickly guaranteed.

# Map of Mali





# Reactions of the Government and Signatory Movements to the Draft MIEC, and Answers of the MIEC Team

APPENDIX

7

A draft of the MIEC report was forwarded on November 27, 2015 to the CSA subcommittee in charge of development issues for comment.

Appendix 7 gathers these comments, and the answers to them given by the team in charge of the MIEC. These comments have highlighted important issues or factual errors, and allowed for a substantial improvement of the final report.

The comments and answers are listed chronologically in Appendix 7, in their original French version.

## COMMENTS OF THE SIGNATORY MOVEMENTS

The comments of the Signatory Movements, dated December 21, 2015.

### Réactions sur le document MIEC de la CMA et de la Plateforme

#### Mesdames, messieurs,

Tout d'abord permettez de vous transmettre toutes nos félicitations pour le travail immense abattu par vos soins pour l'élaboration du présent document. La Plateforme et la Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (C.M.A.) vous remercient d'avoir contribué de façon significative dans la compréhension d'un sujet aussi complexe et politique que est la question de développement de l'Azawad/Régions Nord du Mali.

Nos commentaires qui vont suivre vont porter sur des questions de forme et de fond.

#### Sur la forme:

L'article 32 de l'accord consacre la zone de développement des régions du nord comme espace territorial et humain de développement qui va être doté d'un conseil consultatif interrégional. Pour ce faire, cette évaluation doit faire ressortir et/ou évaluer, avant tout, les rôles et les responsabilités des élus et leurs organes consultatifs, placés au centre d'un pouvoir local de plus en plus partagé avec les chambres consulaires, les structures de développement, les entreprises et les représentants du corps social. Comment ces organes doivent-ils travailler ensemble et développer des mécanismes de redevabilité compte tenu des nouvelles logiques institutionnelles, sociales et économiques.

La recherche de l'intégration des réalisations et surtout leurs pérennisations doit être planifiée dès le départ, car les zones concernées sont interdépendantes dans chaque territoire. C'est l'innovation de l'accord en matière de

développement, ainsi une démarche d'évaluation prenant en compte ces dimensions va certainement apporter un grand éclairage pour la stratégie spécifique de développement de l'Azawad /Nord Mali.

D'autre part, l'ensemble des besoins exprimés n'ont été **ni quantifiés ni territorialisés**.

L'opérationnalisation des régions de Taoudéni, Ménaka et les cercle d'Almoustaratt et Achibogo ne sont pas pris en compte.

La question de l'identification des «**sujets du développement**» et de leur reconnaissance comme acteurs ne ressort pas suffisamment dans le document d'évaluation et cela pourrait avoir des incidences sur la pérennité des programmes de développement.

## **Sur le fond:**

### **Pilier prioritaire 1 : Bâtir la paix, la résilience sociale et la gouvernance décentralisée**

#### **Vous dites:**

« Dans l'immédiat, 109 418,6 millions de francs CFA seront nécessaires pour mettre en œuvre un ensemble de priorités urgentes *via* différentes sous-composantes. Celles-ci sont directement liées à l'instauration de conditions minimales de sécurité nécessaires. La mise en œuvre d'autres activités prioritaires du présent rapport tel le renforcement en toute urgence de la confiance entre les communautés, les populations rapatriées, les communautés d'accueil, les simples citoyens et l'État en vue de prévenir tout risque futur de conflit. De même, des mesures immédiates seront engagées pour soutenir les populations rapatriées, l'intégration et le DDR, la réintégration des anciens combattants et la création de moyens de subsistance alternatifs pour les jeunes chômeurs (composante 3). Enfin, le pilier propose un certain nombre de priorités urgentes concernant la mise en œuvre des mécanismes de sécurité et de gouvernance convenus dans le cadre de l'Accord de paix, notamment en termes de soutien aux réformes pour appliquer une nouvelle politique de régionalisation et élaborer des stratégies régionales afin de mettre en œuvre la vision de l'Évaluation conjointe.

Les premiers progrès en apportant un soutien au secteur de la justice, en approfondissant les efforts visant à promouvoir la sécurité et la réconciliation dans le nord, et en engageant des initiatives plus pointues pour améliorer le fonctionnement de la police malienne et du secteur de la sécurité ».

#### **Notre commentaire :**

Dans le cadre de l'accès des citoyens à la justice il serait important de cibler la justice traditionnelle comme composante de la justice transitionnelle et / ou coutumière en vue de restaurer et renforcer la confiance et contribuer de façon significative à la paix.

Nous ne pourrions parvenir à de meilleurs résultats en matière de justice que si une plus grande reconnaissance mutuelle (entre la justice coutumière et la justice jacobine étatique) est encouragée, et si des synergies se développent, entre les systèmes judiciaires coutumiers et étatiques du Mali, tous deux étant alors considérés comme des composantes à peu près égales de l'« écosystème judiciaire » du pays. Accepter que l'État malien n'a pas le monopole de la justice, qu'il ne parviendra pas à l'avoir et ne devrait pas y aspirer dans les prochaines décennies est une donnée fondamentale si l'on souhaite améliorer la façon dont la justice est rendue dans les affaires qui concernent les Maliens et les Azawadiens dans leur vie quotidienne. C'est ce rapprochement entre les deux systèmes pour une approche « hybride » qui pourrait être une initiative pointue pour améliorer la sécurité et la stabilité en lieu et place des questions de police nationale. Il s'agit de renforcer le droit coutumier vis-à-vis du droit positif.

#### **Plus loin vous énoncez :**

Enfin, l'accent sera maintenu sur un ensemble plus large de réformes de la gouvernance qui sont nécessaires pour renforcer la décentralisation et s'assurer que les institutions locales acquièrent les capacités d'assumer les fonctions et les rôles prévus par la loi.

### **A ce niveau :**

Nous remarquons que le système électoral et son perfectionnement n'ont pas été pris en charge par l'évaluation. Une des causes de déstabilisation de l'Azawad réside dans le dysfonctionnement des systèmes électoraux mis en œuvre par le gouvernement central et plusieurs frustrations et des conflits dans le nord se sont déclenchés par cette pratique.

### **Dans le cadre de la sécurité vous avez mentionné :**

« De même, les activités de promotion de la sécurité nécessiteront des financements qui devront être mis en œuvre par le Département des opérations de maintien de la paix de l'ONU et d'autres acteurs pertinents » cette disposition ou suggestion mérite d'être développée.

Humanitaire :

### **Vous dites:**

« sur un déploiement à grande échelle des programmes humanitaires existants afin de s'assurer qu'ils soient capables de mettre en œuvre les types de mesures d'urgence proposées . »

Nos inquiétudes : A ce niveau nous vous invitons à être très précis en terme de nombre de personnes concernées, les zones couvertes et les instances de gestion. Ceci pour éviter les détournements et les utilisations abusives.

## **Pilier prioritaire 2 : Rétablir et développer les services sociaux de base et la protection**

### **Vous dites :**

« restaurer les infrastructures de fourniture de services de base qui ont été détruites par le conflit et de renforcer davantage les capacités des *administrations transitoires* et locales à fournir à la population du nord une protection sociale et des services de qualité. Les sous-composantes couvertes sont l'éducation, la santé, l'eau et l'assainissement et la protection sociale »

### **Notre commentaire :**

Avant de renforcer l'administration locale, il faudrait se référer et prendre en compte la mise en œuvre des autorités transitoires et renforcer leur capacité pour qu'elles puissent remplir leur rôle, instaurer la confiance et préparer l'arrivée des autorités élues des régions, cercles et communes. De telles entités sont aussi à prendre en compte dans la perspective d'un nouveau découpage administratif.

Pour ce qui concerne les services sociaux de base, encore là il manque une quantification et une territorialisation. Pour ce qui concerne les nouvelles régions de Taoudéni et de Ménaka il va falloir être précis pour les élever au même niveau des régions qui existent.

### **Vous écrivez :**

« À court terme, 77 965,8 millions de francs CFA seront nécessaires pour mettre en œuvre un ensemble de priorités urgentes afin de réhabiliter les infrastructures détruites et de répondre aux principaux engagements de l'Accord de paix. Ces interventions ont été sélectionnées en fonction de leur capacité à améliorer immédiatement l'accès des plus vulnérables aux services d'éducation, de santé et d'eau. Ces priorités urgentes incluent la réhabilitation de puits et la fourniture d'eau potable (*quelles sont les activités sous cette déclaration*), la réhabilitation et la réouverture d'écoles et de centres de santé détruits, une formation technique professionnelle pour les jeunes à risque, et l'adaptation des programmes nationaux pour soutenir l'éducation, la santé et la protection sociale avec le concours des ONG *dans le cadre des normes socioculturelles répondant aux besoins des communautés*.

Compte tenu de l'urgence de ces activités et du caractère limité des capacités existantes dans le nord, la priorité sera accordée à l'utilisation des mécanismes de mise en œuvre existants, notamment le réseau du système humanitaire.

Les mécanismes de fourniture seront également privilégiés en fonction de leur capacité à promouvoir la paix et la stabilité à court terme, y compris en recourant à des activités de construction à forte intensité de main-d'œuvre et à des initiatives de type « rémunération contre travail ».

#### **Nos Commentaires :**

Il faudrait revaloriser les compétences locales, faire émerger des nouvelles capacités et compétences. Le statut quo décrit par l'évaluation ne pourrait pas relever la situation. Plusieurs entreprises et entrepreneurs sont disponibles dans l'azawad, il faudrait trouver et développer des mécanismes pour les renforcer et les mettre à profit pour relever les défis et booster l'emploi. A ce niveau la CMA et la Plateforme pourraient aider à l'identification lors des missions de validation partielles.

Sur le moyen et le long terme, 558 125 millions de francs CFA seront nécessaires pour renforcer les capacités des institutions du nord à fournir des services sociaux de base de qualité et à établir un système de protection sociale pérenne. Les activités seront axées sur l'élargissement de l'accès à l'éducation, à la santé et à l'eau grâce à la construction d'infrastructures essentielles et au développement d'institutions en charge de la fourniture et de la supervision.

les institutions du Nord les autorités de transition et celles des régions

La mise en œuvre de ces initiatives se fera au fil du temps par un déploiement à grande échelle des programmes nationaux de fourniture de services, y compris ceux destinés à la protection sociale, la formation professionnelle et la santé préventive (que des intentions). Les budgets s'appuieront dans un premier temps sur des transferts budgétaires, comme prévu dans l'Accord de paix et conformément aux fonctions assignées aux administrations locales par la loi sur la décentralisation. Les financements et les soutiens internationaux permettront aux programmes nationaux d'être adaptés à court terme au contexte spécifique du nord, et de soutenir le transfert de mécanismes de mise en œuvre au nord, y compris en recourant aux nouvelles Agences régionales de développement en tant que principaux interlocuteurs pour l'appui technique et à la mise en œuvre.

Nous pensons que ces deux chapitres sont très importants, pour ce faire il serait important d'élaborer ces deux chapitres en ciblant les institutions à renforcer conformément à l'esprit de l'accord, en donnant plus d'habilitation aux institutions de la zone de développement et plus en désagrégé, les institutions régionales.

*Fournir un accès à une protection sociale évolutive et intégration des régions du nord dans le système national de protection sociale. A clarifier. Y a-t-il une politique nationale de protection sociale?*

### **Pilier prioritaire 3 : Promouvoir la reprise économique, l'emploi et les infrastructures**

#### **Vous dites :**

« On estime 1 781 488,4 millions de francs CFA le coût total des activités couvertes par ce pilier (tableau 4.4). À court terme, 111 523,8 millions de francs CFA seront nécessaires pour mettre en œuvre un ensemble de priorités urgentes dans différentes sous-composantes. Ces priorités ont été sélectionnées en fonction de leur capacité à promouvoir immédiatement les bénéfices visibles de la paix, à réduire les risques liés à un nouveau conflit et aux comportements criminels, et à améliorer les moyens de subsistance des plus vulnérables – y compris les populations rapatriées. Les activités urgentes couvrent des actions immédiates pour promouvoir la sécurité alimentaire par le biais des circuits humanitaires, pour établir les premières bases du développement du secteur rural et du secteur privé, pour créer des emplois, pour accroître l'offre d'outils de production essentiels et pour réhabiliter les infrastructures.

Compte tenu de la nature infranationale du conflit dans le nord du Mali, il sera essentiel d'identifier le bon équilibre entre les instruments financiers afin de permettre une mise en œuvre par les institutions locales. L'Accord de paix

impose déjà au gouvernement d'augmenter les transferts intergouvernementaux de 22 % à 30 % durant la période de transition et un premier défi sera d'identifier exactement quel impact cette augmentation aura sur le budget des trois régions. »

#### **Nos commentaires :**

Les programmes et projet restructurant doivent apparaitre de façon très claire dans le document d'évaluation des besoins. A ce niveau nous remarquons que vous insister sur les mécanismes de transfert des ressources.

#### **Le fonds de développement durable :**

- La Nécessité pour les azawadiens de contrôler leur développement est un besoin comme celui de l'accès à l'eau, pour ce faire il serait important dans l'évaluation d'exprimer sans ambages le caractère de fonctionnement transparent du fonds de développement durable.
- Dans le cadre du renforcement de la zone de développement nous suggérons que ce fonds soit sous la tutelle de cette dernière assorti des mécanisme de contrôle, suivi et de redevabilité clairs.

#### ***Au regard de ces différents commentaires nous vous recommandons de prendre en compte les points suivants***

Recommandations :

- I.** Il sera opportun de souligner les activités énoncées dans l'évaluation mais ne répondant pas à aux mandats de différentes institutions. Celles qui ne seront pas partagées feront l'objet de requêtes de financement en complément avec d'autres donateurs.
- II.** L'amélioration de la gouvernance doit inclure aussi l'aide au processus électoral. En effet la consolidation de la paix réside aussi dans des élections libres transparentes, inclusives, minimisant toutes velléités d'entretiens d'irrégularités.
- III.** Dans les besoins de la sécurisation du cheptel, il y a lieu de prendre en compte l'aliment du bétail et les cultures fourragères (dans la zone inondée et surtout dans les jardins en zone exondée). La complémentation pour les animaux est aussi importante que la santé animale.
- IV.** L'artisanat et le maraîchage viennent en 4ème position dans les activités des régions du nord notamment à Kidal.

Il importe de souligner que l'artisanat utilitaire concerne tout un peuple qui n'a rien à voir d'avec le tourisme. Il prend en charge l'habitat, l'ameublement, les emballages pour le transport, les harnachements de montures, etc. Quant au maraîchage, il est à professionnaliser et y introduire les cultures fourragères, handicapées par l'insuffisance de semences de qualité et adaptées. Les jardiniers se contentent des résidus comme supplément d'aliment bétail.

- V.** La filière viande manque cruellement d'abattoirs équipés, structurés et modernes dotés de chaînes froides pour une meilleure conservation et ventes du produit.
- VI.** Parmi les gisements prouvés ayant connus un début d'exploitation et abandonnés pour cause de rébellion, figurent :
  - Le gypse de Tessalit (plâtrière) Région de KIDAL
  - Le manganèse d'Ansongo Région de GAO.

Dans l'attente d'une prise en compte de ces différents commentaires, nous vous réitérons une fois de plus notre disponibilité à collaborer avec vous pour l'aboutissement de ce programme pour le bien être des communautés.

# ANSWERS OF THE MIEC TEAM TO THE COMMENTS OF THE SIGNATORY MOVEMENTS

The answers of the MIEC team, dated January 21, 2016.

## Réponse de l'équipe de la MIEC aux commentaires formulés par les mouvements

Rappel du mandat de la MIEC :

L'Accord de Paix, Article 36, stipule que « Les Parties conviennent de la mise en place, sous l'égide du Comité de Suivi du présent Accord (CSA), d'une « Mission d'évaluation conjointe au Nord du Mali (MIEC/ NordMali) », afin de procéder à l'identification des besoins en matière de relèvement rapide, de réduction de la pauvreté et de développement dans la Zone.

La note de conception de la MIEC (voir Annexe 3, p. 92 du rapport de la MIEC) précise que « la MIEC restera focalisée sur les trois objectifs suivants :

- Effectuer une évaluation rapide des besoins et priorités essentiels pouvant être financés et faire l'objet d'une réponse pendant les 24 mois de la période transitoire, et qui auront un impact positif direct sur la paix, la stabilité, et la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de paix dans son ensemble ;
- Identifier les mécanismes opérationnels, institutionnels et de financement spécifiques pouvant être utilisés pour répondre à ces besoins prioritaires compte tenu de l'insécurité persistante et des contraintes importantes sur la capacité de mise en œuvre ;
- Identifier les activités prioritaires dans le cadre de la finalisation d'une stratégie de développement à plus long terme, et améliorer l'optimisation des projets en cours, et évaluer l'impact des activités sur la paix et le développement dans la durée. »

Commentaire	Réponse	Référence dans le rapport final en français
« L'article 32 de l'accord consacre la zone de développement des régions du nord comme espace territorial et humain de développement qui va être doté d'un conseil consultatif interrégional. Pour ce faire, cette évaluation doit faire ressortir et/ou évaluer, avant tout, les rôles et les responsabilités des élus et leurs organes consultatifs, placés au centre d'un pouvoir local de plus en plus partagé avec les chambres consulaires, les structures de développement, les entreprises et les représentants du corps social. Comment ces organes doivent-ils travailler ensemble et développer des mécanismes de redevabilité compte tenu des nouvelles logiques institutionnelles, sociales et économiques. La recherche de l'intégration des réalisations et surtout leurs pérennisations doit être planifiée dès le départ, car les zones concernées sont interdépendantes dans chaque territoire. C'est l'innovation de l'accord en matière de développement, ainsi une démarche d'évaluation prenant en compte ces dimensions va certainement apporter un grand éclairage pour la stratégie spécifique de développement de l'Azawad / Nord Mali. »	Cette question ne fait pas partie du mandat de la MIEC, mais devra être traitée dans le cadre de la stratégie spécifique et des plans de mise en œuvre régionaux.	—

Commentaire	Réponse	Référence dans le rapport final en français
<p>« D'autre part, l'ensemble des besoins exprimés n'ont été ni quantifiés ni territorialisés. L'opérationnalisation des régions de Taoudéni, Ménaka et les cercles d'Almoustaratt et Achibogo ne sont pas pris en compte. »</p>	<p>L'ensemble des besoins ont été quantifiés : les informations se trouvent dans les matrices de l'Annexe 1 et dans l'Annexe 5.</p> <p>L'opérationnalisation des régions de Taoudéni, Ménaka et des cercles ne fait pas partie du mandat de la MIEC, mais devra être traitée dans le cadre de la stratégie spécifique et des plans de mise en œuvre régionaux.</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 1, pp. 41 à 87 et Annexe 5, pp. 107 à 139</p> <p>Voir précision p. 19 et p. 32 du rapport final</p>
<p>« La question de l'identification des « sujets du développement » et de leur reconnaissance comme acteurs ne ressort pas suffisamment dans le document d'évaluation et cela pourrait avoir des incidences sur la pérennité des programmes de développement. »</p>	<p>L'enquête de perception a précisément consisté à tenir compte des avis et besoins tels qu'exprimés par la population. Ces éléments ont largement servi à définir les besoins et priorités tels que formulés par le rapport de la MIEC.</p> <p>Le rapport de la MIEC fait aussi largement ressortir le rôle important que les citoyens ont à jouer dans la gouvernance locale.</p>	<p>Voir Chapitre 1, pp. 3–4, Chapitre 4, p. 21, Annexe 3, pp. 89 à 96, Annexe 5, pp. 110–111, pp. 122–123 et pp. 129–130</p> <p>Voir Chapitre 4, pp. 22–23, Chapitre 5, p. 33</p>
<p>« Dans le cadre de l'accès des citoyens à la justice il serait important de cibler la justice traditionnelle comme composante de la justice transitionnelle et / ou coutumière en vue de restaurer et renforcer la confiance et contribuer de façon significative à la paix. Nous ne pourrions parvenir à de meilleurs résultats en matière de justice que si une plus grande reconnaissance mutuelle (entre la justice coutumière et la justice jacobine étatique) est encouragée, et si des synergies se développent, entre les systèmes judiciaires coutumiers et étatiques du Mali, tous deux étant alors considérés comme des composantes à peu près égales de l'« écosystème judiciaire » du pays. Accepter que l'État malien n'a pas le monopole de la justice, qu'il ne parviendra pas à l'avoir et ne devrait pas y aspirer dans les prochaines décennies est une donnée fondamentale si l'on souhaite améliorer la façon dont la justice est rendue dans les affaires qui concernent les Maliens et les Azawadiens dans leur vie quotidienne. C'est ce rapprochement entre les deux systèmes pour une approche «hybride» qui pourrait être une initiative pointue pour améliorer la sécurité et la stabilité en lieu et place des questions de police nationale. Il s'agit de renforcer le droit coutumier vis-à-vis du droit positif. »</p>	<p>Le rapport de la MIEC évoque le besoin de mettre en place des services de communication et de promotion de la justice au niveau local afin d'assurer l'inclusion des populations. Il reviendra lors de la mise en œuvre de tenir compte de la justice traditionnelle et ce d'autant plus que la question est déjà traitée et réglée par l'Accord. A titre de rappel, l'article 46 alinéa 8 dispose que les parties prennent « l'engagement à mettre en œuvre une réforme profonde de la justice pour la rapprocher du justiciable, améliorer ses performances, mettre fin à l'impunité et intégrer les dispositifs traditionnels et coutumiers sans préjudice du droit régalién de État en la matière. »</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 5, p. 113</p>
<p>« Nous remarquons que le système électoral et son perfectionnement n'ont pas été pris en charge par l'évaluation. Une des causes de déstabilisation de l'Azawad réside dans le dysfonctionnement des systèmes électoraux mis en œuvre par le gouvernement central et plusieurs frustrations et des conflits dans le nord se sont déclenchés par cette pratique. »</p>	<p>L'évaluation du système électoral ne fait pas partie du mandat de la MIEC, mais devra être traitée dans le cadre de la stratégie spécifique et des plans de mise en œuvre régionaux.</p>	<p>—</p>

Commentaire	Réponse	Référence dans le rapport final en français
« De même, les activités de promotion de la sécurité nécessiteront des financements qui devront être mis en œuvre par le Département des opérations de maintien de la paix de l'ONU et d'autres acteurs pertinents. Cette disposition ou suggestion mérite d'être développée. »	La phrase a été corrigée et précisée.	Voir Chapitre 4, p. 24
« Sur un déploiement à grande échelle des programmes humanitaires existants afin de s'assurer qu'ils soient capables de mettre en œuvre les types de mesures d'urgence proposées. Nos inquiétudes : A ce niveau nous vous invitons à être très précis en terme de nombre de personnes concernées, les zones couvertes et les instances de gestion. Ceci pour éviter les détournements et les utilisations abusives. »	Le nombre de personnes concernées, les zones couvertes et les instances de gestion devront être traitées dans le cadre de la stratégie spécifique et des plans de mise en œuvre régionaux.  Le rapport de la MIEC formule de nombreuses recommandations en termes de financement et de gestion de la mise en œuvre.	—  Voir Chapitre 5, pp. 31–37
« Avant de renforcer l'administration locale, il faudrait se référer et prendre en compte la mise en œuvre des autorités transitoires et renforcer leur capacité pour qu'elles puissent remplir leur rôle, instaurer la confiance et préparer l'arrivée des autorités élues des régions, cercles et communes. Des telles entités sont aussi à prendre en compte dans la perspective d'un nouvel découpage administratif ».	Le rapport de la MIEC accorde une importance conséquente au développement des compétences locales, à savoir les autorités et institutions régionales et locales, en parallèle de l'administration locale. Pendant cette phase de renforcement des capacités, la prestation de service pourra être assurée en parallèle par des structures actuellement fonctionnelles, notamment le système humanitaire.	Voir Chapitre 4, p. 26, p. 30, Chapitre 5, pp. 32–33
« Pour ce qui concerne les services sociaux de base, encore là il manque une quantification et une territorialisation. Pour ce qui concerne les nouvelles régions de Taoudéni et de Ménaka il va falloir être précis pour les élever au même niveau des régions qui existent » ».	L'ensemble des besoins ont été quantifiés : les informations se trouvent dans les matrices de l'Annexe 1 et dans l'Annexe 5.  L'opérationnalisation des régions de Taoudéni, Ménaka et des cercles ne fait pas partie du mandat de la MIEC, mais devra être traitée dans le cadre de la stratégie spécifique et des plans de mise en œuvre régionaux.	Voir Annexe 1, pp. 41 à 87 et Annexe 5, pp. 107 à 139  Voir précision p. 19 et p. 32 du rapport final
« Il faudrait revaloriser les compétences locales faire émerger des nouvelles capacités et compétence. Le statu quo décrit par l'évaluation ne pourrait pas relever la situation. Plusieurs entreprises et entrepreneurs sont disponibles dans l'azawad il faudrait trouver et développer des mécanismes pour les renforcer et les mettre à profit pour relever les défis et booster l'emploi. A ce niveau la CMA et la Plateforme pourraient aider à l'identification lors des missions de validation partielles ».	Le rapport de la MIEC ne prône pas le statu quo. Il met l'accent sur la mise en œuvre à court terme par l'intermédiaire de structures actuellement fonctionnelles, notamment le système humanitaire, pour assurer la prestation de services efficace à la population dans l'immédiat. Il accorde cependant une importance conséquente au développement des compétences locales, que ce soit au niveau des institutions (renforcement des capacités des collectivités territoriales, etc.) ou du secteur privé (large déploiement de la formation professionnelle, mesures de soutien au secteur privé). Le développement des compétence est d'ailleurs partie intégrante de la quantification effectuée puisqu'elle prend en compte des formations.	Voir notamment Chapitre 4, p. 30, Chapitre 5, p. 35
« Nous pensons que ces deux chapitres sont très importants, pour ce faire il serait important d'élaborer ces deux chapitres en ciblant les institutions à renforcer conformément à l'esprit de l'accord, en donnant plus d'habilitation aux institutions de la zone de développement et plus en désagrégé, les institutions régionales ».	Ces thèmes sont élaborés dans l'Annexe 5.	Voir Annexe 5, pp. 117–128

Commentaire	Réponse	Référence dans le rapport final en français
« Fournir un accès à une protection sociale évolutive et intégration des régions du nord dans le système national de protection sociale. à clarifier. y a t il une politique nationale de protection sociale? »	La politique nationale de protection sociale (PNPS) est en cours de validation. La révision du Plan d'actions national d'extension de la Protection sociale (PAN-EPS) devant couvrir la période 2016–18 vient de démarrer début 2016. La PNPS comprend 4 résultats stratégiques, relatifs notamment à l'opérationnalisation de la Couverture maladie universelle (CMU) visant une couverture sanitaire accrue pour les populations démunies et le secteur informel. A ce titre, elle inclut les régimes des gratuités de santé (accouchement, césariennes, etc.) et le système des mutuelles, et prévoit l'introduction de transferts sociaux ciblant les populations les plus pauvres à travers des transferts monétaires, etc. à l'instar du Programme Jigisemejiri.	Voir Chapitre 4, pp. 24–26, Annexe 1, pp. 72–73, Annexe 5, p. 125 et pp. 127–128
« Les programmes et projets restructurant doivent apparaître de façon très claire dans le document d'évaluation des besoins. A ce niveau nous remarquons que vous insistez sur les mécanismes de transfert des ressources ».	Les besoins en termes de programmes et projets structurants sont clairement explicités. Il est cependant du rôle de la stratégie spécifique d'effectuer des choix entre ces programmes et projets et de leur donner le cadre et la cohérence voulus.  Les mécanismes de transfert des ressources et de financement sont effectivement largement évoqués.	Voir Annexe 1, pp. 41 à 87 et Annexe 5, pp. 107 à 139  Voir Chapitre 5, pp. 31–37
« La Nécessité pour les azawadiens de contrôler leur développement est un besoin comme celui de l'accès à l'eau, pour ce faire il serait important dans l'évaluation d'exprimer sans ambages le caractère de fonctionnement transparent du fonds de développement durable. »	Les mécanismes de transfert des ressources et de financement sont largement évoqués, ainsi que les conditions de fonctionnement, de coordination et de contrôle indispensables pour le succès.	Voir Chapitre 5, pp. 31–37
« Dans le cadre du renforcement de la zone de développement nous suggérons que ce fonds soit sous la tutelle de cette dernière assorti des mécanisme de contrôle, suivi et de redevabilité clairs ».	Les mécanismes de transfert des ressources et de financement sont largement évoqués, ainsi que les conditions de fonctionnement, de coordination et de contrôle indispensables pour le succès.	Voir Chapitre 5, pp. 31–37
« Recommandation I : Il sera opportun de souligner les activités énoncées dans l'évaluation mais ne répondant pas à aux mandats de différentes institutions. Celles qui ne seront pas partagées feront l'objet de requêtes de financement en complément avec d'autres donateurs ».	Le rapport de la MIEC ne constitue pas un plan de mise en œuvre des différentes institutions rédactrices du rapport, ou d'autres PTF. Les besoins formulés dans le rapport de la MIEC doivent d'abord être traduits dans une stratégie avant de pouvoir faire l'objet d'un engagement de financement.	—
« Recommandation II : L'amélioration de la gouvernance doit inclure aussi l'aide au processus électoral. En effet la consolidation de la paix réside aussi dans des élections libres transparentes, inclusives, minimisant toutes velléités d'entretiens d'irrégularités. »	L'évaluation du système électoral ne fait pas partie du mandat de la MIEC, mais devra être traitée dans le cadre de la stratégie spécifique et des plans de mise en œuvre régionaux.	—
« Recommandation III : Dans les besoins de la sécurisation du cheptel, il y a lieu de prendre en compte l'aliment du bétail et les cultures fourragères (dans la zone inondée et surtout dans les jardins en zone exondée). La complémentation pour les animaux est aussi importante que la santé animale. »	Le soutien à des activités économiques spécifiques est détaillé dans le pilier prioritaire 3. L'élevage et l'agriculture bénéficient d'un soutien important. Les détails spécifiques seront à préciser lors de la mise en œuvre.	Voir Annexe 1, pp. 41 à 87 et Annexe 5, pp. 128–139

Commentaire	Réponse	Référence dans le rapport final en français
<p>« Recommandation IV : L'artisanat et le maraîchage viennent en 4ème position dans les activités des régions du nord notamment à Kidal. Il importe de souligner que l'artisanat utilitaire concerne tout un peuple qui n'a rien à voir d'avec le tourisme. Il prend en charge l'habitat, l'ameublement, les emballages pour le transport, les harnachements de montures etc....</p> <p>Quant au maraîchage, il est à professionnaliser et y introduire les cultures fourragères handicapées par l'insuffisance de semences de qualité et adaptés. Les jardiniers se contentent des résidus comme supplément d'aliment bétail ».</p>	<p>Le soutien à des activités économiques spécifiques est détaillé dans le pilier prioritaire 3. L'artisanat bénéficie d'un soutien important, en particulier par l'intermédiaire de mesures soutenant le secteur privé, l'accès au financement et la formation professionnelle adaptée. Les détails spécifiques seront à préciser lors de la mise en œuvre.</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 1, pp. 41 à 87 et Annexe 5, pp. 128–139</p>
<p>« Recommandation V : La filière viande manque cruellement d'abattoirs équipés, structurés et modernes dotés de chaînes froides pour une meilleure conservation et ventes du produit. »</p>	<p>Le soutien à des activités économiques spécifiques est détaillé dans le pilier prioritaire 3. La filière viande bénéficie d'un soutien important, en particulier par l'intermédiaire de mesures soutenant le secteur privé, l'accès au financement et la formation professionnelle adaptée, en vue de développer des filières performantes. Les détails spécifiques seront à préciser lors de la mise en œuvre.</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 1, pp. 41 à 87 et Annexe 5, pp. 128–139 (en particulier pp. 135–137)</p>
<p>« Recommandation VI : Parmi les gisements prouvés ayant connus un début d'exploitation et abandonnés pour cause de rébellion ; figurent :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Le gypse de Tessalit (plâtrière) Région de KIDAL</li> <li>• Le manganèse d'Ansongo Région de GAO. »</li> </ul>	<p>Le soutien à des activités économiques spécifiques est détaillé dans le pilier prioritaire 3. Le secteur minier bénéficie d'une attention particulière au vu de la valeur ajoutée considérable qu'il peut générer. Les détails spécifiques seront à préciser lors de la mise en œuvre.</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 1, pp. 41 à 87 et Annexe 5, pp. 128–139 (en particulier p. 135)</p>

# COMMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT

The comments of the Government, dated March 4, 2016.

## PRIMATURE

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Comité National pour la Coordination  
De la Mise en Œuvre de l'Accord (CNCA)  
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SECRETARIAT PERMANENT (SP)



## REPUBLIQUE DU MALI

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Un Peuple - Un But - Une Foi  
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### Observations sur le Rapport Provisoire de la

### Mission d'Evaluation Conjointe au Nord du Mali (MIEC) :

#### **I. Observations d'ordre général :**

Le Rapport provisoire, dans son ensemble prend en compte tous les aspects évoqués dans la Note Conceptuelle (termes de références) de la MIEC. Par conséquent, il donne les pistes pertinentes pour l'élaboration de la Stratégie Spécifique de Développement des Régions du Nord du Mali, conformément à l'esprit de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali, issu du processus d'Alger, signé à Bamako les 15 mai et 20 juin 2015.

Toutefois, le Rapport donne l'impression que les régions concernées sont homogènes aussi bien en ce qui concerne de diagnostic que des solutions préconisées (les réalisations à entreprendre) ; ce qui n'est pas le cas. Il aurait donc été souhaitable que le rapport, pour plus de réalisme, fasse ressortir les aspects convergents et divergents entre les régions concernées et mettre ainsi en relief la particularité de chacune de ces régions.

La matrice des actions doit être revue pour s'assurer de la proportionnalité entre les activités et les coûts qui leurs sont associés. Certes, il s'agit d'une «évaluation à la louche», mais à y voir de près, les chiffres en plusieurs endroits n'ont pas de proportionnalité avec les actions qui leurs sont attachées. Ce qui pose la problématique de la méthodologie de chiffrage des éléments de coûts.

En outre, l'estimation des besoins doit être mieux affinée sur la base des projets/programmes bien identifiés, territorialisés, géo-localisés et répertoriés auprès des acteurs porteurs potentiels (Services techniques de l'Etat, Collectivités territoriales, Secteur privé, Société civile, ONGs, etc..).

Par ailleurs, le rapport provisoire doit présenter les principaux résultats issus de la Mission d'Evaluation Conjointe dans un tableau synoptique au niveau d'un résumé exécutif, qui manque au document. En effet, compte tenu du volume du Rapport (137 pages), il nous semble indiqué de faire un résumé du document, ce qui va en faciliter la compréhension. Le chapitre 4 (pages 23 à 35) qui semble tenir lieu de « résumé exécutif » se trouve noyé au milieu du document et il est aussi trop long pour un résumé.

#### **II. Observations d'ordre spécifique :**

De façon spécifique, la lecture du document et de ses annexes appelle les remarques suivantes :

- 1) Page 14 :** le rapport n'élucide pas suffisamment le « paradoxe dit de Sikasso » : Sikasso, l'une des régions du Mali les mieux dotées de potentialités agro-pastorales, apparaît comme l'une des plus pauvres du point de vue « niveau de consommation des ménages », alors que les Régions du Nord, faiblement dotées en ressources, enregistrent des niveaux de consommation des ménages au-delà du seuil de pauvreté et même de la moyenne nationale. Autrement dit, le Rapport provisoire aurait dû approfondir l'analyse de la pauvreté dans les régions

- du Nord du Mali, afin d'avoir une base de comparaison fiable par rapport aux régions du Sud et à l'ensemble du pays. Cela facilitera le suivi de la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de Paix ;
- 2) **Page 15** : les rapports entre la décentralisation et les chefs coutumiers méritent d'être revus. La réalité est que de plus en plus de chefs coutumiers et traditionnels se retrouvent élus locaux, ce qui est plus source de concentration de pouvoirs au niveau local que d'opposition ou autre chose comme semble l'insinuer le rapport ;
  - 3) **Page 30** : il est proposé d'intégrer le nord dans le système national de protection sociale. En quoi le nord du Mali en est-il exclu pour justifier cette proposition ?
  - 4) **Pages 30 à 32** : le troisième pilier ne paraît pas bien explicite et en rapport avec son objectif de relance économique, parce qu'on ne parle à ce niveau que de la réalisation de deux infrastructures. On pourrait suggérer qu'on y ajoute des activités à haute intensité de main de d'œuvre (de type aménagement urbain et restauration des ressources naturelles en certains endroits) ;
  - 5) **Page 39** : au niveau du tableau 5.1, relatif aux « Financements disponibles... », il convient d'insérer une colonne « **Rappel des coûts** » avant celle des « Financements disponibles » ;
  - 6) **Page 45** : chapitre 6 intitulé « **Vers une Vision à Long Terme du Développement** » : ce chapitre mérite d'être davantage développé (car il est traité en deux pages et demi seulement dans le Rapport provisoire), afin qu'il serve de base solide à l'élaboration de la Stratégie Spécifique de Développement des Régions du Nord. Autrement dit, les idées pertinentes abordées au niveau de ce chapitre méritent d'être approfondies davantage ;
  - 7) **Page 45** : paragraphe 117, corriger l'erreur matérielle et écrire « **Vision Mali 2025** » en lieu et place de « Vision Mali 2015 » ;
  - 8) **Page 47** : clarifier le contenu des items pour faciliter la compréhension des évaluations. Exemple : dans le volet RSS une rubrique investissement et une rubrique infrastructures se suivent : que contiennent elles chacune pour avoir une idée de la justesse des montants qui leurs sont associés ?
  - 9) **Pages 47 et 48** : plusieurs indicateurs ne semblent pas pertinents ou doivent être explicités. Exemple : 5000 combattants pour le cantonnement et activités programmatiques DDR puis 5000 combattants par année pour la gestion stocks et la destruction armes ;
  - 10) **Page 49** : au niveau du tableau « **Pilier prioritaire** », insérer une colonne « **Financements acquis** » avant celle relative au gap de financement, pour faciliter la lecture et la compréhension du tableau ;
  - 11) **Page 51** : pourcentage des femmes dans les différents comités et commissions de suivi de l'Accord pour le genre, participation et représentation ;
  - 12) **Page 52** : quelle est la différence entre les activités « VBG », pour pouvoir les évaluer séparément ?
  - 13) **Page 53** : la clarification des ADR est évaluée à 500 millions alors que les appuis aux ADR le sont pour 300 millions de F CFA. Quel est le contenu indicatif qu'on leur donne pour justifier cela étant entendu que les appuis en général demandent plus de moyens que la clarification du concept ou des rôles ? Par ailleurs, le renforcement de la présence de l'Etat est prévue et évaluée pour 83 milliards de F CFA. Quel est son contenu indicatif. Cela est d'autant important qu'il est prévu en d'autres endroits le renforcement des certaines administrations déconcentrées sectorielles (voir page 68), comme si celles-ci ne font pas partie de l'Etat ;
  - 14) **Page 83** : mieux expliciter le contenu du Tableau A2.2 « **Pourcentage des ménages ayant exercé une activité dans un secteur particulier** » ;
  - 15) **Page 84** : préciser les unités de la Figure A2.1 « **Principaux chocs subis suite à la crise** » ;
  - 16) **Page 86** : le nombre moyen d'animaux avant et après la crise a sensiblement augmenté dans la région de Kidal alors qu'il a diminué dans les autres régions : cela mérite une explication claire et pertinente ;

- 17) **Page 89** : de notre point de vue, il ne peut pas y avoir d'opposition (ou conflit) entre les préoccupations des populations et les priorités de développement dans les Régions du Nord définies au niveau national : les **PDSEC** prendront en charge les initiatives de base et le document de **SSD/RN** mettra l'accent sur les projets/programmes structurants et intégrateurs figurant à l'annexe 3 de l'Accord. Il s'agira de créer tout simplement les complémentarités et synergies nécessaires entre les deux niveaux de planification ;
- 18) **Pages 110 et 111** : la création de capacités de mises en œuvre durables pour les Autorités locales apparaît comme la condition sine qua none au relèvement et au développement des Régions du Nord du Mali. Par conséquent des propositions concrètes, dans ce sens, doivent être esquissées dans le Rapport final de la MIEC, en direction de tous les Acteurs : Etat central, Collectivités territoriales, Autorités traditionnelles, Secteur privé, Société civile.

Bamako le 4 mars 2016.

## ANSWERS OF THE MIEC TEAM TO THE COMMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT

The answers of the MIEC team, dated March 9, 2016.

### Réponse de l'équipe de la MIEC aux commentaires formulés par le Gouvernement

#### Rappel du mandat de la MIEC :

L'Accord de Paix, Article 36, stipule que « Les Parties conviennent de la mise en place, sous l'égide du Comité de Suivi du présent Accord (CSA), d'une « Mission d'évaluation conjointe au Nord du Mali (MIEC/ NordMali) », afin de procéder à l'identification des besoins en matière de relèvement rapide, de réduction de la pauvreté et de développement dans la Zone.

La note de conception de la MIEC (voir Annexe 3, p. 92 du rapport de la MIEC) précise que « la MIEC restera focalisée sur les trois objectifs suivants :


- Effectuer une évaluation rapide des besoins et priorités essentiels pouvant être financés et faire l'objet d'une réponse pendant les 24 mois de la période transitoire, et qui auront un impact positif direct sur la paix, la stabilité, et la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de paix dans son ensemble ;
- Identifier les mécanismes opérationnels, institutionnels et de financement spécifiques pouvant être utilisés pour répondre à ces besoins prioritaires compte tenu de l'insécurité persistante et des contraintes importantes sur la capacité de mise en œuvre ;
- Identifier les activités prioritaires dans le cadre de la finalisation d'une stratégie de développement à plus long terme, et améliorer l'optimisation des projets en cours, et évaluer l'impact des activités sur la paix et le développement dans la durée. »

Commentaire	Réponse	Référence dans le rapport final en français
<p>Le Rapport provisoire, dans son ensemble prend en compte tous les aspects évoqués dans la Note Conceptuelle (termes de référence) de la MIEC. Par conséquent, il donne les pistes pertinentes pour l'élaboration de la Stratégie Spécifique de Développement des Régions du Nord du Mali, conformément à l'esprit de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali, issu du processus d'Alger, signé à Bamako les 15 mai et 20 juin 2015.</p>	<p>—</p>	<p>—</p>
<p>Toutefois, le Rapport donne l'impression que les régions concernées sont homogènes aussi bien en ce qui concerne le diagnostic que des solutions préconisées (les réalisations à entreprendre) ; ce qui n'est pas le cas. Il aurait donc été souhaitable que le rapport, pour plus de réalisme, fasse ressortir les aspects convergents et divergents entre les régions concernées et mette ainsi en relief la particularité de chacune de ces régions.</p>	<p>Le rapport de la MIEC s'est concentré sur la Zone, telle que définie dans l'Accord de Paix. Le diagnostic a été fait par région, et les besoins ont été regroupés pour avoir une réponse pour la Zone. Le rapport fait ressortir de nombreuses différences entre les régions, tout d'abord en termes de diagnostic (différences en termes de densité de population, zones propices à l'agriculture le long du fleuve Niger et zones propices à l'élevage sur le reste du territoire ; etc.) ; Mais aussi en termes de solutions préconisées, par exemple en prescrivant des stratégies mobiles pour les services de santé et d'éducation en zones nomades, ou pour les idées de développement de filières économiques adaptées aux forces des régions. Enfin, les différences régionales en termes de perception ont largement été évoquées. Ce sera ensuite à la stratégie et aux plans de mises en œuvre régionaux de préciser ces priorités régionales.</p>	<p>Voir Chapitre 2, pp. 13–14, Annexe 5, pp. 110–111, pp. 129–130</p> <p>Voir Annexe 5, p. 122, Encadré A5.1 p. 136</p> <p>Voir Chapitre 4, p. 21, Annexe 5, pp. 110–111, pp. 122–123, pp. 129–130</p>
<p>La matrice des actions doit être revue pour s'assurer de la proportionnalité entre les activités et les coûts qui leurs sont associés. Certes, il s'agit d'une « évaluation à la louche », mais à y voir de près, les chiffres en plusieurs endroits n'ont pas de proportionnalité avec les actions qui leurs sont attachées. Ce qui pose la problématique de la méthodologie de chiffrage des éléments de coûts. En outre, l'estimation des besoins doit être mieux affinée sur la base des projets/programmes bien identifiés, territorialisés, géo-localisés et répertoriés auprès des acteurs porteurs potentiels (Services techniques de l'État, Collectivités territoriales, Secteur Privé, Société civile, ONGs, etc...).</p>	<p>Les coûts ont été évalués en consultant l'administration et les experts, complétés d'hypothèses si besoin. Il s'agit donc effectivement d'une évaluation, nécessairement sujette à imprécisions compte tenu du délai imparti, qui devra être complétée et affinée le moment venu dans le cadre des plans de mise en œuvre régionaux ou des études des projets spécifiques.</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 1, pp. 41 à 87</p>
<p>Par ailleurs, le rapport provisoire doit présenter les principaux résultats issus de la Mission d'Évaluation Conjointe dans un tableau synoptique au niveau d'un résumé exécutif, qui manque au document. En effet, compte tenu du volume du Rapport (137 pages), il nous semble indiqué de faire un résumé du document, ce qui va en faciliter la compréhension. Le chapitre 4 (pages 23 à 35) qui semble tenir lieu de « résumé exécutif » se trouve noyé au milieu du document et il est aussi trop long pour un résumé.</p>	<p>Un sommaire (« rapport exécutif ») a été ajouté au rapport final.</p>	<p>Voir Sommaire, pp. vii à x</p>

Commentaire	Réponse	Référence dans le rapport final en français
<p>Page 14 : le rapport n'élucide pas suffisamment le « paradoxe dit de Sikasso » : Sikasso, l'une des régions du Mali les mieux dotées de potentialités agro-pastorales, apparaît comme l'une des plus pauvres du point de vue « niveau de consommation des ménages », alors que les Régions du Nord, faiblement dotées en ressources, enregistrent des niveaux de consommation des ménages au-delà du seuil de pauvreté et même de la moyenne nationale. Autrement dit, le Rapport provisoire aurait dû approfondir l'analyse de la pauvreté dans les régions du Nord du Mali, afin d'avoir une base de comparaison fiable par rapport aux régions du Sud et à l'ensemble du pays. Cela facilitera le suivi de la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de Paix ;</p>	<p>La référence au « paradoxe de Sikasso » dans le rapport de la MIEC a pour objectif de souligner l'interprétation prudente qui doit être faite des statistiques de pauvreté, selon que l'on se base sur l'indicateur de la pauvreté basée sur la consommation ou les actifs.</p> <p>Pour une analyse approfondie de la pauvreté, des documents spécifiques sont disponibles, qui ont servi de sources au rapport de la MIEC, en particulier :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enquête Malienne d'Évaluation de la Pauvreté EMEP (INSTAT)</li> <li>• Enquête Modulaire et Permanente auprès des Ménages EMOP (INSTAT)</li> <li>• Cadre Stratégique pour la Relance Economique et le Développement Durable du Mali CREDD (Gouvernement)</li> </ul> <p>Des documents des Partenaires Techniques et Financiers sont aussi disponibles sur ce thème, en particulier :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• World Bank. 2014. Géographie de la pauvreté au Mali. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.</li> </ul>	<p>Voir Chapitre 2, p. 9</p>
<p>Page 15 : les rapports entre la décentralisation et les chefs coutumiers méritent d'être revus. La réalité est que de plus en plus de chefs coutumiers et traditionnels se retrouvent élus locaux, ce qui est plus source de concentration des pouvoirs au niveau local que d'opposition ou autre chose comme semble l'insinuer le rapport ;</p>	<p>Le point est bien noté. La phrase a été supprimée dans le rapport final.</p>	<p>Voir Chapitre 2, p. 12</p>
<p>Page 30 : il est proposé d'intégrer le nord dans le système national de protection sociale. En quoi le nord du Mali est-il exclu pour justifier cette proposition ?</p>	<p>Le Nord n'est pas formellement exclu, mais en pratique, il a été écarté du système de protection sociale par la crise. Or c'est notamment au cours des dernières années que le système de protection sociale est en train d'être étoffé sur tous les plans (mise en place du RAMED, démarrage d'un programme de filets sociaux, élaboration d'une stratégie en matière de CMU, etc.). Le redéploiement progressif des agents locaux et régionaux du MSAHRN au nord Mali va faciliter l'opérationnalisation de ces volets dans les régions du nord Mali. En attendant, les acteurs humanitaires intervenant dans les filets sociaux ont déployé des programmes à large échelle visant la couverture des besoins essentiels des populations les plus pauvres dans ces régions, et contribuant à un renforcement des capacités des services déconcentrés de l'État intervenant dans le domaine de la PS.</p> <p>Pour information, la politique nationale de protection sociale (PNPS) validée fin 2015, est en cours d'approbation. La révision du Plan d'actions national d'extension de la Protection sociale (PAN-EPS) devant couvrir la période 2016–18 vient de commencer début 2016.</p> <p>La PNPS comprend 4 résultats stratégiques, relatifs notamment à l'opérationnalisation de la Couverture maladie universelle (CMU) visant une couverture sanitaire accrue pour les populations démunies et le secteur informel. A ce titre, elle inclut les régimes des gratuités de santé (accouchement, césariennes, etc.) et le système des mutuelles, et prévoit l'introduction de transferts sociaux ciblant les populations les plus pauvres à travers des transferts monétaires, etc. à l'instar du Programme Jigisemejiri.</p>	<p>Voir Chapitre 4, pp. 24–26, Annexe 1, pp. 72–73, Annexe 5, p. 125 et pp. 127–128</p>

Commentaire	Réponse	Référence dans le rapport final en français
Pages 30 à 32 : le troisième pilier ne paraît pas bien explicite et en rapport avec son objectif de relance économique, parce qu'on ne parle à ce niveau que de la réalisation de deux infrastructures. On pourrait suggérer qu'on y ajoute des activités à haute intensité de main-d'œuvre (de type aménagement urbain et restauration des ressources naturelles en certains endroits) ;	Le point est bien noté. La liste totale des projets se trouvent dans l'Annexe 1, alors qu'une analyse approfondie du pilier 3 est disponible à l'Annexe 5.	Voir Annexe 1, pp. 74 à 87, et Annexe 5, pp. 128 à 139
Page 39 : au niveau du tableau 5.1, relatif aux « Financements disponibles... », il convient d'insérer une colonne « Rappel des coûts » avant celle des « Financements disponibles » ;	Le point est bien noté. La modification a été apportée dans le rapport final.	Voir chapitre 5, p. 33
Page 45 : chapitre 6 intitulé « Vers une Vision à Long Terme du Développement » : ce chapitre mérite d'être davantage développé (car il est traité en deux pages et demi seulement dans le Rapport provisoire), afin qu'il serve de base solide à l'élaboration de la Stratégie Spécifique de Développement des Régions du Nord. Autrement dit, les idées pertinentes abordées au niveau de ce chapitre méritent d'être approfondies davantage ;	Le chapitre est délibérément synthétique, étant donné son rôle de conclusion, et le fait que l'élaboration de la stratégie n'est pas du mandat de la MIEC. Le chapitre 6 offre cependant des pistes qui mériteraient d'être approfondies, et l'équipe de la MIEC se tient à disposition des rédacteurs de la stratégie pour ces travaux d'approfondissement.	Voir Chapitre 6, pp. 38-40
Page 45 : paragraphe 117, corriger l'erreur matérielle et écrire « Vision Mali 2025 » en lieu et place de « Vision Mali 2015 » ;	Le point est bien noté. L'erreur a été corrigée dans le rapport final.	Voir chapitre 6, p. 39
Page 47 : clarifier le contenu des items pour faciliter la compréhension des évaluations. Exemple : dans le volet RSS une rubrique investissement et une rubrique infrastructure se suivent : que contiennent elles chacune pour avoir une idée de la justesse des montants qui leurs sont associés ?	Nous partageons cette observation. Toutefois, nous n'avons pas obtenu d'informations détaillées sur les questions de défense.	Voir Annexe 1, p. 43
Pages 47 et 48 : plusieurs indicateurs ne semblent pas pertinents ou doivent être explicités. Exemple : 5000 combattants pour le cantonnement et activités programmatiques DDR puis 5000 combattants par année pour la gestion stocks et la destruction armes ;	L'observation est pertinente. Les indicateurs sont donnés à titre indicatif, et méritent d'être précisés au moment de la mise en œuvre. Le programme de DDR étant en cours de préparation, les indicateurs pourront être précisés plus tard.	Voir Annexe 1, pp. 43-44
Page 49 : au niveau du tableau « Pilier prioritaire », insérer une colonne « Financements acquis » avant celle relative au gap de financement, pour faciliter la lecture et la compréhension du tableau ;	Le financement acquis tout comme le gap de financement sont donnés à titre indicatif. Ils se basent sur un mécanisme d'auto-déclarations des bailleurs de fonds et ne reflètent pas nécessairement toute l'envergure de l'engagement international dans les domaines prioritaires identifiés. Pour cette raison, nous n'avons pas rajouté une colonne qui alourdirait le tableau (le financement disponible pouvant déjà être calculé en déduisant le gap de financement du total des coûts).	Voir Annexe 1, pp. 43-87
Page 52 : quelle est la différence entre les activités « VBG », pour pouvoir les évaluer séparément ?	Nous mettons à votre disposition la note thématique consacrée au genre, qui précise ces questions.	Voir Annexe 1, pp. 49-51

Commentaire	Réponse	Référence dans le rapport final en français
<p>Page 53 : la clarification des ADR est évaluée à 500 millions alors que les appuis aux ADR le sont pour 300 millions de FCFA. Quel est le contenu indicatif qu'on leur donne pour justifier cela étant entendu que les appuis en général demandent plus de moyens que la clarification du concept ou des rôles ?</p> <p>Par ailleurs, le renforcement de la présence de l'État est prévu et évalué pour 83 milliards de FCFA. Quel est son contenu indicatif ? Cela est d'autant plus important qu'il est prévu en d'autres endroits le renforcement de certaines administrations déconcentrées (voir page 68), comme si celles-ci ne font pas partie de l'État ;</p>	<p>Pour les ADR, un montant global de 800 millions a été prévu. Il est possible de prévoir une autre répartition entre la clarification des ADR et les appuis, si nécessaire.</p> <p>Le chiffre de 83 milliards a été repris du document distribué lors de la Conférence de l'OCDE à Paris (« Bâtir un Mali émergent », p. 23). Là où des renforcements spécifiques et conséquents de certains services étaient particulièrement importants, ils ont été comptabilisés en sus, à l'image de l'exemple de la page 68.</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 1, pp. 51–52</p>
<p>Page 83 : mieux expliciter le contenu du Tableau A2.2 « Pourcentage des ménages ayant exercé une activité dans un secteur particulier » ;</p>	<p>Le point est bien noté. Le tableau (nouvellement Tableau A3.2) a été complété d'une légende (<i>Le tableau donne le pourcentage de ménages impliqué dans une activité d'un secteur particulier au cours des 12 derniers mois.</i>).</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 3, p. 91</p>
<p>Page 84 : préciser les unités de la Figure A2.1 « Principaux chocs subis suite à la crise » ;</p>	<p>Le point est bien noté. La figure (nouvellement Figure A3.1) a été complétée d'une légende.</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 3, p. 93</p>
<p>Page 86 : le nombre moyen d'animaux avant et après la crise a sensiblement augmenté dans la région de Kidal alors qu'il a diminué dans les autres régions : cela mérite une explication claire et pertinente ;</p>	<p>L'enquête de perception (« Evaluation de la Situation Socio-Economique des Populations du Nord Mali et leurs Priorités ») qui fait l'objet de l'Annexe 3, rapporte des faits constatés sur le terrain, et des priorités telles qu'exprimées par les populations.</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 3, p. 93</p>
<p>Page 89 : de notre point de vue, il ne peut pas y avoir d'opposition (ou conflit) entre les préoccupations des populations et les priorités de développement dans les Régions du Nord définies au niveau national : les PDSEC prendront en charge les initiatives de base et le document SSD/RN mettra l'accent sur les projets/programmes structurants et intégrateurs figurant à l'annexe 3 de l'Accord. Il s'agira de créer tout simplement les complémentarités et synergies nécessaires entre les deux niveaux de planification ;</p>	<p>L'Annexe 3 traite des besoins et priorités tels qu'exprimés par les populations. Elle révèle des différences de priorités entre les populations et les autorités. Il est vrai que cette différence doit être relativisée dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre sectorielle (par exemple, il faut à la fois construire des infrastructures et travailler sur la qualité des services pour offrir des services de bases efficaces, ces deux points se renforçant mutuellement). Toutefois, il n'en reste pas moins que dans un contexte de limitation des ressources, il faut tenir compte des priorités réelles des populations pour la hiérarchisation des besoins.</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 3, p. 96</p>
<p>Pages 110 et 111 : la création de capacités de mise en œuvre durables pour les Autorités locales apparaît comme la condition sine qua non au relèvement et au développement des Régions du Nord du Mali. Par conséquent des propositions concrètes, dans ce sens, doivent être esquissées dans le Rapport final de la MIEC, en direction de tous les Acteurs : État central, Collectivités territoriales, Autorités traditionnelles, Secteur privé, Société civile.</p>	<p>Le rapport de la MIEC souligne l'importance fondamentale du renforcement des capacités des autorités locales, mais aussi de l'administration régionale, des services déconcentrés et des simples citoyens.</p> <p>Le rapport esquisse certaines pistes sur la manière de renforcer ces capacités. Dans le cadre de la stratégie spécifique, l'équipe de la MIEC se tiendra à disposition pour continuer à apporter sa contribution sur ce thème.</p>	<p>Voir Annexe 5, pp. 116–117</p>



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