

NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

Recovery and
Peace Building Assessment

Volume II
Component Report



THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

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This Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) for North-East Nigeria is a collaborative product by the Federal Government of the Republic of Nigeria and the State Governments of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. The assessment was prepared with support from the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB).

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PREFACE

Acknowledgements

The North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) was undertaken by the Federal Government of the Republic of Nigeria, led by the Office of the Vice President and the State Governments of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. The assessment was supported by the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and The World Bank (WB).

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PREFACE

Acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
BTS	Base Transceiver Stations	NPVRN	Nigeria Political Violence Research Network
CIMIC	Civilian and Military Coordination	NSRP	Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force	ONSA	Office of the National Security Adviser
CM-COORD	Humanitarian Civilian Military Coordination	O&M	Operations and Maintenance
CP	Community Platforms	PCNI	Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organizations	PHC	Public Health Centres
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix	PINE	Presidential Initiative for the North-East
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency	PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War	PRC	Project Management Consultants
ESA	European Space Agency	PWD	People with Disability
EU	European Union	RPBA	Recovery and Peace Building Assessment
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network	RPBS	Recovery and Peace Building Strategy
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria	RRR	Repairs, Rehabilitation and Replacement
FMOH	Federal Ministry of Health	RUWASSA	Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency
HDI	Human Development Index	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	SARC	Sexual Assault Referral Centre
ICT	Information and Communication Technology	SBMC	School-Based Management Committees
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons	SEMA	State Emergency Management Agencies
IED	Improvised Explosive Device	SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
IGR	Internally Generated Revenue	SME	Small and Medium Sized Enterprise
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission	SMEDAN	Federal and State Ministries for Industry, Trade and Investment
IOM	International Organisation for Migration	SWTWSSA	Small Town Water Supply and Sanitation agencies
IS	Islamic State	SWM	Solid Waste Management
ISWA	International Solid Waste Association	TVET	Technical Vocational Education and Training
LGA	Local Government Areas	UASC	Unaccompanied and separated children
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies	UN	United Nations
MNJTF	Multi-National Joint Task Force	UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
MRRR	Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement	UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
MTN	Mobile Telephone Network	USIP	United States Institute of Peace
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation	USWA	Urban State Water Agencies
NEET	Not in Education, Employment or Training	UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency	VAT	Value Added Tax
NERC	North-East Reconstruction Project	WASH	Water and Sanitation
NEST	North-East States Transformation Strategy	WB	World Bank
NDHS	Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey		

Overview

1. Background

The conflict in North-East Nigeria has cost over 20,000 human lives, significantly destroyed physical infrastructure, disrupted social services and damaged social cohesion among its people. Economic and social activities in the region have been disrupted, and fear and mistrust among the population is widespread. 1.8 million people have been internally displaced from and within the conflict affected states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe and an additional 170,000 have fled across the border into Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The influx of displaced persons into urban areas of the above states as well as Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba has exacerbated pressure on service delivery mechanisms and local economies that were very weak to start with. Addressing the needs and impacts in the six states derived from the Boko Haram conflict to bring about recovery and build peace in the North-East is a significant challenge.

2. Objective and Structure of the Assessment

The Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) is a joint endeavor between the Government of Nigeria and the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB), to support the Government in its efforts towards peace building and sustainable recovery in the North-East. The assessment was conducted across three interlinked components:

- **Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion** examines the needs emerging from the conflict around the issues of: (i) safe and voluntarily return and resettlement of displaced populations; (ii) reconciliation, peace building and community cohesion; (iii) local governance and citizen engagement; and (iv) community security, justice, human rights, mine action and small arms control.
- **Infrastructure and Social Services** examines the impacts and needs in 12 sectors: agriculture; education; energy; environment; health and nutrition; housing; information and communication technol-

ogy; private enterprise; public buildings; social protection; transport; water and sanitation.

- **Economic Recovery** examines the conflict-related economic impacts and recovery needs for: (i) macroeconomic and fiscal management; (ii) finance, trade and private sector development; and (iii) livelihoods, employment, and poverty.

Volume II of the RPBA presents the data collected and analysis made by this assessment for each component. The component reports presented follow the same structure with the presentation of: (i) component objective and methodology; (ii) pre-crisis conditions and impacts of the crisis on sectors/subcomponents; (iii) component recovery strategies, including costing of recovery needs and implementation and institutional arrangements and; (iv) cross-cutting issues.

While presented in three components, the assessment should be understood as an intertwined platform for a single recovery and peace building framework based on a social cohesion approach that cuts across all sectors. Beyond distinctive emphases and tailored methodology which is outlined at the beginning of each component report, the linkages between components, particularly the interconnected nature of impacts and needs, are clearly demonstrated throughout the report and highlighted wherever possible. Box 0.1 discusses how the social, physical and economic recovery strategies need to be interconnected for recovery and peace building in the North-East.

3. Assessment Scope, Methodology and Approach

Scope: Spatial and temporal boundaries were applied to the assessment. The assessment covers states directly affected by the conflict and the resulting displacement: Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, as well as the North-East states which have been largely affected mainly by displacement: Gombe, Taraba and Bauchi. It focuses on needs related to factors directly attributable to the Boko Haram crisis, but does not include impacts and needs arising out of other causes of displacement



and physical impact. In terms of timeframe, the assessment uses 2010 as the pre-crisis baseline year for comparative data analysis. This is based on the assumption that the conflict with Boko Haram worsened significantly in 2011.

Methodology: Existing literature on this conflict and its impacts was reviewed and data collected by the states was utilised to analyse the impact of the conflict on infrastructure and social services, social cohesion and economic impact. Remote sensing was employed using a combination of satellite imagery, social media analytics and information received from partner networks, to fill in information gaps and validate data, particularly for sectors and locations where information is scarce or access is limited due to insecurity. This included the sectors of agriculture, education, environment, health and nutrition, housing, transport and private sector. Building on the impact analysis, a detailed needs analysis was conducted.

Government Leadership: The assessment has been led by the Government of Nigeria, under the leadership of the Office of the Vice President, and has been particularly State-driven, with State focal points guiding the coordination of assessment efforts and designating focal points for all sectors/ subcomponents covered in this assessment. Across the six States, more than 100 sector and subcomponent focal points assisted in providing damage/impact and needs related data. Through a series of consultation and validation processes, all levels of government as well as key civil society stakeholders have played a critical role in the provision of qualitative and quantitative data as well as contributing perspectives on the associated recovery strategies and needs.

Consultation process: As mentioned above, a multi-staged consultation process has been followed for the development of the assessment methodology, collection and validation of data and progressive

corroboration of results. This process involved a large number of stakeholders, including Federal and State Governments, traditional and religious authorities, communities in conflict and displacement affected States, IDPs, international and local NGOs, and as well as humanitarian and development partners. This entailed:

- (i) The September 2015 scoping mission to agree on the geographic, sector, and temporal scope of the assessment;
- (ii) Inaugural workshop in January 2016 to agree on the methodology and data collection templates with the State Governments;
- (iii) Field visits over February 2016;
- (iv) Consultations over sector recovery strategies between sector teams and discussions over preliminary findings with State focal points in a combined technical meeting in February 2016, and;
- (v) Validation and consensus building workshops with a wider range of stakeholders over March-April 2016. Consultation and validation of the RPBA findings took place throughout the process and culminated in a workshop from 31 March-1 April 2016. The event brought together State and Federal Government authorities and civil society representatives, the private sector and other stakeholders in Abuja. The purpose of these efforts was to facilitate early validation of the results of the RPBA, and to refine the prioritisation of proposed actions based on a more granular understanding of inter and intra-State differences.

Application of the Human Rights Based Approach: The assessment and the proposed strategies have been guided by a human rights based approach which anchors the proposed strategies on human rights standards while prioritizing the application of the human rights principles of equality, non-discrimination, participation, accountability, and the rule of law. Across all three components, the recovery strategies seek to further the realisation of human rights of the vulnerable groups arising from the Boko Haram related violence, strengthening the recovery and reconstruction process by identifying inequalities, redressing discrimination, ensuring meaningful participation of the most affected populations, and strengthening accountability between them as rights holders and duty bearers.

Security and Displacement Scenarios: The security situation in the North-East differs within and between the six States. While in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, the security situation remains fluid, Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba remain mostly secure. The security situation will be key in determining the possibilities for return and resettlement of displaced persons, which is in turn instrumental in determining an

estimation of needs and activities under a recovery strategy for this component. Phasing and prioritisation of activities should therefore:

- (vi) follow the return patterns; and
- (vii) include approaches to working in highly insecure contexts and areas where there is expected to be continuing displacement.

Taking into account the trend and patterns to date with regard to return, and feedback provided by displaced population (through tools such as the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) and agencies active on the ground), variables were selected to estimate return scenarios including those that have influenced new displacement, and which affect the capacity and willingness of individuals and families to return and resettle. Variables include:

- (1) Security in place of origin, as the single most important factor influencing new displacement and preventing return;
- (2) Vulnerability, as a factor that conditions the capacity of people to move;
- (3) Intention of return; and
- (4) Other factors that impede the capacity of people to complete return processes.

Based on observed trends for conflict and displacement two scenarios for analysis are proposed for planning purposes under the RPBA:

- (i) Status quo: Boko Haram retains the ability to periodically stage attacks in the North-East and occasionally further South. While return and resettlement of IDPs and reconstruction is possible in some areas, the threat of local attacks continue to undermine the revival of the North-East region. This scenario is not a stable one, since it is relatively easy for Boko Haram to regroup and adapt.
- (ii) Best-Case Scenario: The frequency and intensity of Boko Haram attacks in the North-East is limited and the return and resettlement of IDPs is successful, allowing for reconstruction and development interventions and the restoration of economic activities throughout the North-East;
- (iii) Worse-Case Scenario: Boko Haram is resurgent, as the government is unable to address weaknesses in its response to the conflict. This causes further disillusionment of the population, from which Boko Haram benefits. The government again loses control of parts of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, and launches attacks in areas of Nigeria further South, leading to a vicious circle of violence and insecurity.

BOX 0.1 **How social, physical and economic recovery strategies are interconnected for reconstruction and peace building in North-East Nigeria**

Starting from an economic perspective, the damages and losses incurred to the physical environment and human lives have negatively affected the productive capacity, employment and livelihoods of over six million people in the North-East. Consequently, output of the region has plummeted, thereby increasing prices and food insecurity. Material destruction and increased sense of insecurity have also led to forced displacement of 1.8 million people, while an estimated three million people are trapped in insecure and thus inaccessible areas. Trade has long been strong in the North-East but has been significantly disrupted as mobility of humans and goods and services is curtailed by damaged infrastructure as well as by increased insecurity. For example, business activities and commercial banks closed down or left Maiduguri, the capital of Borno and Potiskum town in Yobe, that were both previously important centres for cross border trade between North-East Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Porous borders have facilitated the emergence of illicit trade of weapons, cross-border raids, killing and kidnapping.

Close linkages between social, physical and economic impacts of the crisis require an integrated approach to addressing them. With careful design across all domains, the potential for a holistic recovery can increase. For instance, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure can introduce labour-intensive construction technologies, which in turn may generate local employment particularly in the case of sub-district and community infrastructure. It is recommended that the government introduce social protection and cash-for-work schemes that can target the more vulnerable segments of the affected populations particularly IDPs and host community population. Similarly, the equitable, consistent and harmonious provision of basic services across host and IDP populations will improve social cohesion and help restore citizen trust, if built on a culture of consensual decision-making, thus contributing towards longer-term peace building objectives.

Sources: IOM/NEMA, 2015, DTM Round VII; UNOCHA, 2015, Humanitarian Needs Overview

4. Recovery Strategy

Recovery strategies for all three components are formulated within basic principles of the RPBA, some of which were identified during the joint scoping mission in September 2015. These principles include:

- (1) **Restoring social cohesion and trust** as the most critical precondition to recovery and peace building. Recovery strategies formulated under the three components seek to enhance social cohesion and trust among people and between people and Government.
- (2) **Recovery strategies with a conflict lens.** Recovery strategies are formulated by realistically considering drivers of the current crisis and the risks of new emerging conflicts (communal clashes, land acquisition disputes and disputes between both farmers and herders and IDPs and host communities).
- (3) **Integrated and holistic approaches** are necessary to address multiple needs. The impacts of the crisis are multiple and affect every aspect of the lives of conflict-affected and displacement-affected populations and host communities. This is reflected by the interconnectedness of damage and impacts across the three components and the recovery strategies prioritise holistic and integrated approaches.
- (4) **Building back better and smarter.** The recovery strategies provide an opportunity to improve on the pre-existing situation. In doing so, innovative approaches are included while building upon existing successful initiatives.
- (5) **Context specific approaches** are applied in proposing recovery strategies, which take into consideration the security situation, the extent of the human and physical damages faced by the population and the specificities of each state. In doing so, the different components detail differentiated strategies for recovery tailored to the states' differentiated needs.
- (6) **Local ownership and community participation** in recovery process should form the basis of decisions made in key areas. Across all the recovery strategies, community mobilisation and participation as well as consultation with key stakeholders and beneficiaries are integral parts of the design and implementation phases to make sure that strategies adopted address their needs and are sustainable.
- (7) **Build upon existing successful initiatives.** The proposed recovery strategies also build on and propose the scaling up of

existing successful initiatives by communities, government or international agencies, and take into account different systems of operation to ensure multi-stakeholder participation and avoid duplication.

- (8) **Targeting the needs of vulnerable populations.** The proposed recovery strategies support vulnerable groups within the displaced (including actual and potential returnees) and host communities including youth, women, children, persons with disabilities and older people.
- (9) **Provide capacity development at the Local level and foster coordination.** The proposed recovery strategies also include capacity development to strengthen the institutional framework and the respective roles and responsibilities at Federal, State and Local Government levels, while also fostering coordination among different stakeholders within and between affected states.

Many of these principles are underlying recovery strategies and recommendations in this report and are explicitly referenced whenever applicable. Recovery strategies across the three components are further structured into two phases of stabilisation and recovery, focusing on short to medium term needs. These phases can be overlapping and non-linear. It is crucial that recovery strategies take into consideration and build on ongoing humanitarian interventions. To the extent possible, it is recommended that state recovery and peace building strategies coordinate with current successful projects funded by development organisations and NGOs for their long-term sector development needs.

5. Consideration of Cross-cutting Issues

A cross-cutting issue is one that dynamically interacts with all or a substantial number of sectors/subcomponents and therefore requires a multi-sector approach. The RPBA has taken gender, human rights, youth and explosive remnants of war as cross-cutting issues, and advocates that the RPBA recovery strategies be developed further and implemented with continuous review from the perspective of all of these cross-cutting issues.

5.1 Gender

Gender constitutes one of the determinants of wealth creation and the experience of poverty. Rights and entitlements of men and women to opportunities, resources and decision-making are based on so-

cio-cultural norms rather than on human rights or the capabilities of men and women. Comparing women's and men's experiences during the crisis in the recovery process will help identify existing gender inequalities and disparities, and possibly aid recommending appropriate measures for closing the gaps.

The Boko Haram crisis has severely impacted women, men, boys and girls in the North-East. Women and girls have become more vulnerable due to the conflict, further exacerbating existing inequalities regarding access to basic services including education, right to dignity and rights to acquisition of land and property. As a consequence of the crisis, some women and girls have been reportedly forced into marriage or used as sex slaves or subjected to sexual violence. The conflict has impacted negatively on women's economic situation, limiting their access to livelihoods and increasing the number of women-headed households. Men and boys also confront a range of threats within the context of the conflict, including gender-based violence, abduction and forceful recruitment and detention on suspicion of sympathies with the different armed actors involved in the conflict. Loss in assets, combined with lack of access to education, skills training, and opportunities to earn an income, leave men and male youth unable to fulfil often-exacting norms of manhood and masculine identity as protectors and providers. High rates of trauma compound these vulnerabilities, manifesting in a range of often negative coping behaviours including depression, addiction and/or aggression. Rates of intimate partner violence frequently increase under such conditions, as men seek outlets for feelings of frustration or dislocation. Others often engage in illicit behaviours, such as crime and violence, and are more vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment into armed groups such as Boko Haram.

5.2 Human Rights

The crisis has been characterised by alleged abuses and violations under international humanitarian law, committed by all actors involved in the conflict. There is a lack of information on the abuses and violations committed, as they are often unreported or not fully addressed, in turn fostering a climate of impunity. A comprehensive human rights based response, which addresses the root cause as well as impact, is therefore imperative for the restoration of society. In doing so, the recovery and peace building response focuses on supporting measures to promote and protect the civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights of those who are most affected, marginalised,

excluded, and discriminated against as a result of the conflict with Boko Haram. The human rights principles informing this response (including equality and non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, and accountability and rule of law) will contribute to addressing recovery and peace building complexities holistically, taking into consideration the connection between the populations and systems of authority/power expected to respect, protect, and guarantee human rights, and creating dynamics of accountability. A recovery strategy should broadly address the capacity and knowledge gaps resulting in and linked to weak national promotion and protection systems and their users, and establish a monitoring and reporting system for enhancing accountability and addressing conflict-related violations.

5.3 Youth

Youth (defined in Nigeria as those aged between 18 and 35) in the North-East have been profoundly affected by the Boko Haram crisis. Youth have suffered from psychological trauma and are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, while also lacking the tools to access support. Large numbers of young people have been deprived of education or training opportunities and have few employment prospects. Supporting youth is a key element of sustainable recovery and peace building in the North-East. The RPBA response strategies need to be designed with the input of young people and include initiatives addressing young men's and women's needs and concerns; promote inter-generational dialogue and youth involvement in the arts and sports to enhance social cohesion; promote youth participation in local and national governance processes and policy making; and address livelihoods and vocational training for young people.

5.4 Explosive Remnants of War

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and victim-activated IEDs, also considered as land mines in this context, has been widespread in the context of the crisis with Boko Haram. Military activities have also employed aerial bombardment and the use of artillery, mortars and rockets, which inevitably leads to widespread contamination by unexploded ordnance (UXO). This situation affects possibilities of return of IDPs and puts under risks the lives of local populations in areas affected by the crisis. To address these issues various initiatives will need to be undertaken, including Emergency Risk Education campaigns, a systematic survey coupled with risk education and explosive ordnance disposal/demining and medical/rehabilitation and psycho-social care for those affected by IEDs/UXOs.

6. RPBA as an Ongoing Process

This report must not be seen as a definitive end to the process of damage/impact and needs assessment; but rather as the beginning of a continuous process and mode of assessment. For example, sectors such as housing, transport and environment require further data collection particularly in areas with active conflict. Given the unpredictability and uncertainty of the situation, it is expected that the Government of Nigeria will continue to play a key role in regularly updating this assessment. This may require incorporating the data template and analysis methodology employed for the RPBA into the Government's pre-existing systems. Such institutionalisation will help create a temporal, sectoral and geographical damage and needs database, comprising actionable and comparable information. This will contribute towards more systematised and time-sliced recovery planning to meet the unprecedented challenges and requirements posed by an ongoing conflict. RPBA partners aim to continue providing active technical support to the Government in this effort.

Component: Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion

1. Introduction

Nearly 15 million civilians have been affected by the crisis related to *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad*, also known as Boko Haram, and the resulting military operations in North-East Nigeria since 2009. The violence has left widespread devastation on a level unprecedented since the civil war of 1967-1970, with an estimated 20,000 dead, nearly 2 million people displaced internally or across international borders, and at least 2,000 missing persons.¹

A far reaching effect of the conflict with Boko Haram is that the social fabric in the North-East has been deeply damaged, eroding social relations between citizens and government, ethnic groups, communities and even within extended families. The rapid deterioration of the conflict and limited effectiveness of mechanisms to contain and control violence along with the dynamics of forced displacement, have resulted in widespread levels of suspiciousness, mistrust and stigmatisation along ethnic, religious, political and geographical lines. Economic, ethnic, religious, political and geographical divisions have hardened, affecting the way in which any recovery effort is perceived. Subsequent divisions have emerged as the conflict altered the social, gender and demographic order in households and communities, giving place to new grievances. Restoring social cohesion and trust is the most critical precondition for recovery and peace building but is the most challenging. All recovery and peace building actions should carefully assess and account for its impact on social cohesion and trust.

The crisis has also resulted in a significant level of forced displacement. As assessed in December 2015, 1.8 million people from the North-East have been internally displaced as a direct result of the conflict with Boko Haram.² People have also fled across borders to neighbouring countries and Cameroon, Niger and Chad have

absorbed over 170,000 Nigerian refugees.³ Also over 20,000 refugees have been returned to Nigeria from neighbouring countries under circumstances falling short of international standards and then become IDPs. Forced displacement has severely impacted every aspect of the lives of those who are forced to move, including their access to food, shelter, education, health care and their livelihoods, and their psycho-social wellbeing and their community life are damaged. Communities hosting IDPs are also under pressure as the people share their limited resources and also the large influx of displaced population negatively impacts the local economy and service provision systems. This can fuel tension between host communities and IDPs over scarce resources and limited access to labour and finances.

Even under the conditions caused by the conflict, the resilience of communities and capacity for support to others in the North-East has been strong: families in North-East Nigeria have supported displaced households for extended periods of time, showing that despite the circumstances, there are conditions to sustain peace building in a structural and long-lasting way.

1.1 Role of the Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion Component

The peace building, stability and social cohesion component of the RPBA considers how to address the effects of conflict on the social fabric, local governance and on the provision of justice, with particular attention to the effects of the conflict on displaced populations and host communities. This report on the component assessment of needs also summarises the component approach to recovery and peace building implementation, and sets out recommended interventions with estimated costing. Effective responses to the challenges addressed under this component will be the critical foundation for sustainable recovery and for successful recovery and peace building strategies under the other components.

The component has four sub-sectors:

- (i) Safe and voluntary return and resettlement of displaced populations;
- (ii) Reconciliation, peace building and community cohesion;
- (iii) Local governance and citizen engagement; and
- (iv) Community security, justice, human rights, explosive remnants of war and small arms control.

While these sub-sectors are inter-linked key peace building, stability and social cohesion issues, as well as the recovery strategies proposed, are grouped under these sub-sectors. Cross-cutting issues of gender, human rights, youth and explosive remnants of war are also discussed. This component draws on lessons from other conflict and crisis contexts. These include the importance of rapidly addressing issues of reconciliation, peace and tolerance building, access to justice, citizen security and psycho-social recovery as fundamental elements of a sustainable recovery process.

1.2 Relationship with other RPBA components

This component constitutes the backbone and lays the foundation for the effective implementation of other aspects of recovery, such as infrastructure rehabilitation, restoring social services and revitalising economic activity. Recovery and peace building require more than reconstruction of damaged buildings, livelihood, jobs, basic services and return to physical security. Rebuilding trust and cohesion, and processes to address grievances are also essential for restoration of services and reconstruction, and for developing economic opportunities and livelihoods. Addressing the threat of explosive remnants of war (ERW) is a precondition for any return and recovery process under all components of the RBPA.

1.3 Assessment Scope and Methodology

The assessment comprised a desk review of existing primary and secondary data, and semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. Key informants and focus group discussion participants included government counterparts at the Federal, State and Local levels, including the Vice President's Office, Ministries of Education, Finance, Health, Justice, Local Governance and Chieftaincy Affairs, Youth and Sports, Women Affairs, the State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMA) and State Attorney Generals. International NGOs, local non government organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs) and faith-based organisations (FBOs) were also inter-

viewed. Field teams visited the six states, meeting formally and informally with affected people and stakeholders, including government officials, traditional and religious authorities, service providers, IDPs, IDP camp staff, international and local NGOs, local CSOs, Faith-Based organizations (FBOs), volunteer groups, academic institutions, and host/resident community members.

1.4 Key Assumptions and Limitations

This component used the RPBA geographic area, time period covered and population assumptions. One of the biggest limitations of the assessment under this component was the availability of data on indicators of social resilience. Although the impact of the crisis on various social aspects including social cohesion, reconciliation, peace building, community security, and issues related to the needs of IDPs and host communities is evident, the nature of these social elements, as well as the lack of comprehensive data, limits an accurate quantification of damages. Understanding the impact of the conflict in these areas would require an intensive and dedicated period of time allocated to gather both qualitative and quantitative data. While this assessment was conducted within the timeframe of the RBPA, a wider-ranging exercise would be required to design and implement any initiatives aimed at addressing impacts on social cohesion, peace building and resilience. Robust monitoring systems will also be needed to collect and analyse relevant data in order to inform and adjust programmes both in the North-East and at the Federal level. Data systems should be gender and age disaggregated to permit better analysis and improve targeting of interventions.

2. Overview of Pre-crisis Conditions

Despite its status as the economic giant of Africa, social and economic indicators in Nigeria are very low, and those in its North-East region are generally the poorest. The country ranks 152 of 187 in the Human Development Index (HDI), which is well below the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Nationally, 46 percent of the population is below the poverty line while in the North-East, the figure is 70 percent, which increased between 2012-2013. Access to education is also very low; 52 percent of children are out of school in the region. Even considering those who attend school, 72 percent are unable to read after completion of grade 6. In Borno, with the lowest literacy rates of any state in the country, only 35 percent of female and 46 percent of male adolescents are literate (compared to 98 percent for both genders in Imo State in the South-East). Under-five mortality rates in the North-East are as high as 160 deaths per 1,000. The region also lags behind the rest of the country in terms of nutrition, vaccination coverage and antenatal care.

Economic infrastructure in the North-East is limited, and the industrial base of Northern Nigeria, which was mostly located outside the North-East region in Kano and Kaduna, has largely collapsed in recent decades. Rural livelihoods in agriculture, pastoralism and fisheries, have been badly eroded, exacerbated by limited government support, poor management and limited access to new technology and inputs. The lack of employment and livelihood opportunities is one of the major causes of frustration and discontent with government, and a possible “push factor” in the recruitment of individuals to violent extremism.

The natural environment in North-East Nigeria is fragile, especially in the area immediately surrounding Lake Chad. This fragility undermines food security and drives environmental out-migration. Climate and weather variability play a part in this environmental degradation, exacerbated by man-made stressors such as irrigation and dam construction. For herders and pastoralists, the scarcity of surface water has added to the difficulties of watering animals, causing them to encroach on agricultural resources. Meanwhile, agriculture has expanded into areas previously used for grazing, rendering remaining herding sites increasingly exposed to overgrazing. In addition, the reduction in the size of Lake Chad, and associated water-flow reduction have had considerable negative impacts on small-scale fishing throughout the Basin. Overall, the diverse and interdependent livelihood systems

that make up the productive sector in the Lake Chad Basin are faced with increasingly inadequate supplies of water and are under strain.

North-East Nigeria has been characterised by low levels of governance, constituting a cause of poor development outcomes, a driver of conflict and a constraint on effective responses to both conflict and displacement. North-East states, given their weak economies, tend to have few means of generating internal revenue, and are thus particularly dependent upon transfers from the centre. States have wide responsibilities in the fields of service delivery, including education, health and infrastructure. State Governments across Nigeria have faced challenges in financial management and limited transparency. Low capacity and autonomy at the LGA level is also highly prevalent. This leads to uneven performance between states regarding governance and service delivery.

Religion – specifically Islam – has for centuries been central to the identity of the states in Northern Nigeria. Much of present-day North-East Nigeria (and adjacent segments of Chad, Niger and Cameroon) was the territory of the Kanem-Bornu Empire, which adopted Islam in the 10th century, and long after its decline and incorporation into Nigeria, continues to be a revered centre of Islamic learning. In the region religion has been used as source of political legitimacy, which has led to a history of (sometimes violent) religious radicalism challenging the State. The internationalisation of violent radicalism, combined with these conditions, allowed it to take root in the North-East.

3. Impact and Damage Assessment

The conflict with Boko Haram in the North-East has had devastating impacts. According to the UN, 14.8 million people in the North-East have been affected by the crisis since 2009. Massive displacement both internally and cross-border to Chad, Niger, and Cameroon continues. Vulnerability of displaced people and host communities is deepening. Impacts have been felt at all levels of society: on individuals, families and communities. Shelter, food security, water and sanitation (WASH), education and health have been identified as the most urgent needs of displacement affected persons. At a deeper and structural level, this population is also in need of psycho-social support, gender specific programming and livelihoods support.

The conflict has varied in intensity and nature. The people of the North-East, and Borno and Yobe in particular, remain exposed to multiple forms of violence and human rights abuses including those allegedly perpetrated by Boko Haram, and in some cases, also by armed forces deployed to combat Boko Haram.⁴ The proliferation of cheap and easily available small arms and light weapons (SALW) has fuelled the violence, facilitating the formation of self-defence groups, including the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), which have also reportedly perpetrated abuses against the civilian population, and seem to be increasingly targeted by Boko Haram. There is evidence that in some areas there has been a breakdown of law and order and security, including the destruction of police stations, although the presence of armed forces and the police is being progressively restored. Whilst there is evidence of the return of displaced population in some areas, insecurity is still prevalent and prevents return on a larger scale. The presence of mines and undetonated explosives further increases the dangers. In the above context, there are signs that tensions based on ethno-religious, social and other divisions, including between displaced persons and hosts in some areas may be emerging, putting co-existence at risk.

The situation in the North-East is notable for the resilience and dignity demonstrated by those affected, and for approaches to peace building led by communities and civil society, including women's and interfaith groups. However, conflict and displacement have eroded, and in some cases ruptured, the bonds and relationships between and within groups and communities. Intra-communal structures and processes that traditionally regulated violence and resolved conflicts have been weakened.

Among the 2.2 million identified IDPs nationally, 53 percent are women and 57 percent are children (under 18 years old). Adolescent and youth populations (aged between 6 and 17) account for 29 percent (15 percent female and 14 percent male) of the displaced population. As such, women, children and youth bear the brunt of forced displacement in Nigeria, accounting for nearly 80 percent of affected populations. (Based on IOM's DTM Round 7 data)

The current conflict has worsened pre-existing issues of underdevelopment and weak governance, which were drivers of the conflict. As mentioned, the North-East region has the lowest socio-economic outcomes in Nigeria, creating a sense of social deprivation, injustice and marginalisation. Weakness in governance and provision of justice and security by the State due to the conflict currently constrain effective responses to conflict and displacement at the Local level.

3.1 Contribute to the Safe and Voluntarily Return and Resettlement of IDPs


3.1.1 Damages and Impacts

Forced displacement has amplified pre-existing vulnerabilities and caused significant detrimental development impacts among the displaced and in host communities. Currently the North-East hosts over 1.8 million IDPs displaced by Boko Haram-related violence. Neighbouring countries also host a number Nigerian refugees who have fled from the conflict, estimated to be: Cameroon - 64,000; Niger - 93,343; and, Chad - 7,868. It is important to note that due to the regional aspect of the conflict these countries also have internal displacement, with IDP numbers of: Cameroon - 158,316; Niger - 47,023; and, Chad - 66,639.⁵ (UNOCHA 2015 HRP)

IDPs are disproportionately concentrated in some states. Borno, at the heart of the crisis, hosts 66 percent of all IDPs, with an estimated 1.6 million IDPs in Maiduguri alone. Yobe and Adamawa also share large burdens of IDPs: Adamawa (136,000; 6.3 percent) and Yobe (130,000; 6 percent).⁵ The majority of IDPs, 92 percent, live with host communities.⁶ Only 8.5 percent live in camps and camp-like settings. The exact scale of displacement in large parts of Borno is unclear due to the continuing instability and inaccessibility but it is estimated that there could be up to three million people displaced in inaccessible insecure areas.

FIGURE 1.1

Overlap of forced displacement dynamics, poverty, and Boko Haram incidents



Regardless of location of displacement, living conditions and the socio-economic well-being of displaced populations are significantly lowered and impaired due to sudden loss of assets and a lack of access to basic needs. DTM data from December 2016 showed that while 64 percent of the displaced population reported having regular income before displacement, only 12 percent of the displaced have regular income after displacement. In host communities and informal camps such as collective centres or transitional centres, where less targeted assistance is provided than compared to that provided in formal camps, IDPs compete with local community members over livelihood opportunities and other basic survival resources. Compared to conditions before displacement, the majority of IDPs reported to be worse off in terms of housing conditions, water and sanitation and hygiene (WASH), food security, access to education and healthcare; and this is especially true for IDPs displaced to host communities and informal camps. Forced displacement also creates a range of secondary effects,

including physical and psychological trauma and increased levels of SGBV.

The current displacement situation in the North-East occurs within a context of impoverishment, with significant overlaps of conflict, scale of displacement, and level of poverty in the affected states (*See Figure 1.1 for details on dynamics of forced displacement in the North-East*). Host communities have also been negatively affected as result of over stretched social amenities and infrastructure. In North-East Nigeria, forced displacement will further perturb the socio-economic development of the region, creating tension within the civil society and thus potentially triggering further conflicts and continuous displacement. If not properly addressed, forced displacement could become an important element in the vicious cycle of escalating conflict in the future.

Key Statistics of Displacement of Population from North-East Nigeria due to Conflict with Boko Haram

People affected by the conflict: 15 million

People killed in conflict: over 20,000

People in need: 7 million

An estimated 4 million people in need of humanitarian assistance are receiving some form of assistance. An estimated 3 million people in need are in locations that are not regularly accessible to humanitarian partners

Number of people displaced from this conflict across Nigeria: 2.2 million

IDPs living in formal camps: 400,000

IDPs living with host communities: 1.8 million
(approximately 92 percent of IDPs are hosted by low-income vulnerable communities)

Number of Nigerian refugees in neighbouring countries: 165,000

Of the IDPs, 53% are women, 57% are children under 18.

Sources: IOM/NEMA, 2015, DTM Round VII; and UNOCHA, 2015, Humanitarian Needs Overview.

3.1.2 Identified Needs

Displacement in the North-East has affected every single aspect of people's lives. Individuals and families have lost all their productive assets, homes, and possessions, casting most of them into conditions of extreme poverty overnight. Traditional livelihoods have been destroyed, making them food insecure and dependent on external support to cover all their needs, from shelter to food, health care and education. Services previously available in their places of origin have also been affected, limiting access of entire communities to health, education, justices and other social services. In the process of displacement, families and communities became separated, severing crucial social ties and safety nets, and translating to an increased level of vulnerability to unaccompanied children, women heads of household and

elders. By entire communities being forced to displace themselves, community social support was lost, limiting the availability of coping mechanisms for affected people.

The characterisation of needs under this sub-sector should take into consideration three broader categories of population: (i) displaced population unable to return; (ii) population willing and able to return and resettle; and (iii) host communities and communities in areas of return. Recovery strategies under this subcomponent should address the different needs – in the short and mid-term – of these specific populations. In doing so, the main needs have been identified as follows:

Basic Needs: Food, Shelter, WASH, Education and Health

Displaced populations experience limited access to basic services particularly food, shelter, WASH, education and health. Both the DTM and the UNHCR Protection Monitoring Report show that food, shelter, and water were identified as the main needs for IDPs and host communities. Borno and Yobe have a humanitarian emergency and increasing food insecurity resulting in displaced people adapting their livelihoods to any opportunities available. However access to land is very limited for IDPs, often from independent farming communities, in both camps or camp-like setting and host communities.⁷ Vocational or professional skills transferrable to an urban setting are often limited.

In a similar trend, conflict and forced displacement in the North-East has led to and further amplified the challenges relevant to access to health services. The destruction or damage of health infrastructure and lack of trained health care workers and medical supplies have resulted in an urgent need for integrated primary health care services for 3.7 million IDPs and members of host communities. As of December 2015, 60 percent of health centres have been partially or completely damaged in Borno.⁸ In terms of education, in the areas affected by displacement, children have very limited access to education opportunities, in part because Boko Haram specifically targets schools for destruction, and many schools have been taken over to shelter IDPs.⁹ Borno is most affected in terms of loss of access to education: three out of five schools are closed and one out of five schools is either destroyed or occupied.¹⁰

Psycho-social Health

Psycho-social support is one of the most prominent needs in both IDPs and host communities. Exposure to the shocking effects of vi-

olence in the conflict-affected areas is widespread in the North-East. The UNHCR Protection Monitoring Report¹¹ notes that of 17,534 vulnerable IDP households surveyed (both in camps and host communities), 3,476 had witnessed killing/violence to others. Like other indicators, this varies widely from state to state, with 41 percent in Borno, to 6 percent in Gombe. Currently, there is no comprehensive survey that determines the extent to which the population in the six states has been affected by trauma. Particularly vulnerable groups within IDPs and host communities such as women, widows, older people and children (including unaccompanied children) are populations identified as those with higher need for psycho-social support.

Such widespread psycho-social needs, especially when left unaddressed, can have serious impacts on health and nutrition, wellbeing, employability, and the emergence of new patterns of violence, including domestic violence, as well as SGBV, long after the current period of violent conflict has ended.

The current response to trauma is fragmented and limited. There are only three mental health facilities in the region and no referral mechanisms to link the affected population to these facilities. A few initiatives are currently underway among professionals, civil society and government to develop a framework and standards for trauma provision, yet these remain limited in terms of the needs of the population.

Child Protection

Children have been disproportionately impacted by the crisis and have been subject to grave violations of their rights. They are also exposed to heightened risk of sexual violence and physical abuse as a result of displacement and separation from or loss of their families. In July 2014 Boko Haram was listed in the United Nations Secretary-General's 13th Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict (S/2014/339) for two grave violations of children's rights: killing and maiming of children and attacks on schools and hospitals.

Child protection among IDPs is an immediate humanitarian and human rights challenge. The DTM in December 2015 reported that 55.7 percent of the IDPs are children and 28.13 percent are five years old or younger.¹² Beyond education and other basic needs, recent reports highlight the vulnerability of IDP children, particularly those orphaned or unaccompanied, to abuse, child labour and other violations. Girls are vulnerable to exploitative arrangements including early marriage in an effort to assure families of some form of economic or social security.

Gender-specific Vulnerabilities

SGBV appears to have increased among IDPs, although social stigmatisation hampers reporting. Surveys and evidence from humanitarian agencies suggest that sexual abuse of women and children, not only perpetrated by Boko Haram, is an important, yet largely unregistered problem, magnified by the vulnerability of displacement, economic desperation, and the breakdown of normal social protection mechanisms. This is especially the case within IDP camps where men and women are segregated, and where law enforcement is absent. Social stigmatisation and lack of responsiveness by law enforcement bodies ensure that few women or children report such abuse. Further information on the impact of conflict on women and girls is provided in section 3.5 Cross-Cutting Issues.

More broadly, vulnerability along gender lines is also visible when looking into the income situation of IDPs before and after displacement. As per DTM data, the situation before displacement was very similar across different vulnerability types. Yet, after displacement, female and child-headed households constitute the group with the lowest rate of regular income, falling from 57 percent in regular employment to 0 percent.

Socio-economic Vulnerabilities

Within the already fragile socio-economic environment in North-East Nigeria, one of the biggest challenges that IDPs and host community members face is rebuilding their livelihoods. Across the North-East, agriculture and animal husbandry are two major livelihoods. The Boko Haram related conflict and the resulting displacement situation have contributed to the loss of critical assets including lands, property and other productive assets, rendering both displaced population and members in the host communities vulnerable to food insecurity.

Since host communities have very limited resources to share with IDPs, to cope with the macro impacts of forced displacement, on the individual level, displaced populations have adapted their livelihoods to any opportunities available in the host communities. Petty trading becomes one of the main occupations for IDPs, especially for women. As forcibly displaced migrants have usually had to leave all their belongings behind, they are initially completely dependent on support systems in the displacement sites. In camp or camp-like settings in the North-East, IDPs at least have access to basic amenities (even if intermittently) to which host communities may not have access, and a more or less regular access to in-kind assistance. Access to land is

however very scarce for IDPs in both camps or camp-like settings and host communities.

Conditions for Return and Resettlement

The vast majority of the displaced appear to wish to return home. In one intention of return survey, 94 percent expressed the intention to return.¹³ However, the current security situation and physical infrastructure are not yet conducive to this. IDPs and local governments expressed the fear of landmines/explosive remnants of war (ERW) as an obstacle to safe return and taking up livelihood activities in the most affected LGAs in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. A strong mine action response will be essential to ensure safe access to mine/ERW-affected LGAs and to address fear among IDPs of explosive devices.

Among the IDPs surveyed through the DTM, 80 percent of those who want to return home identified security as the main condition to return, while 17 percent placed the improvement of the economic situation in their area of origin as the main factor for their return. In Borno, where most IDPs originate, return is currently minimal due to ongoing insecurity. In Adamawa, it has been reported that many of the IDPs have begun to return to areas of origin. They report finding devastation of homes and infrastructure, pollution of water sources with dead human and animal bodies, and the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance. Similarly, they are unable to fully settle as they lack the resources and conditions to restore their livelihoods, and access to basic services.¹⁴ Discussion of safe and voluntary return also needs to be considered along with discussions for safe resettlement of IDPs. While most of IDPs have expressed their desire to return home, a closer look by age shows that the willingness to return varies among age groups. While adult and elderly IDPs expressed their intention to return with assurance of safety being secured, younger IDPs (aged 20 and under) suggested that they would prefer to stay in the urban areas where they have been displaced, as they have become used to the urban settings and want to pursue urban livelihood opportunities. These dynamics are more pronounced in states such as Gombe and Bauchi where the state government have already put in place initiatives oriented to the integration of IDPs and provision of basic services, such as shelter. There are special needs for the displaced population that lived under Boko Haram control for long periods of time. Their basic needs are likely to be acute and unmet, while at the same time, they suffer stigma as some other communities have expressed a fear of returning and living amongst populations who they believe may have been radicalised during the period of living under Boko Haram control.

Return of refugees is conditioned by different legal frameworks to be agreed on a tri-partite-base including UNHCR as well as the relevant governments. At this point it remains unclear when the conditions for their safe return will be met, increasing the chances of this becoming another protracted displacement situation. But a solution is not just about return and resettlement. As clearly articulated in the Kampala Convention which Nigeria has signed, local integration is the third element of any solution, and resources should be used, not only to secure return, but also to fund projects that support IDPs integration in local communities as part and parcel of economic initiatives.

Affected Populations

In the context of needs, some groups within the IDP face more severe and particular risks than others, such as older people, the chronically sick, people with disabilities, female- and child-headed households, unaccompanied and separated children, adolescent boys and pregnant women.

Host communities have been also highly impacted. Living space is over-stretched, and reserves of food and other resources are exhausted. Already-poor host communities have been sharing resources for more than 12 months with little support, and are now relying on negative coping strategies, such as selling livestock or property or reducing meals, after savings and assets have been depleted. This exhaustion of household and community resources has caused fatigue and sometimes resentment on the part of host communities, which could lead to secondary displacement of IDPs and in some cases conflict. The pressure is particularly intense in Maiduguri where a majority of IDPs are located. Simultaneously, the State has struggled to provide basic services such as healthcare, nutrition and sanitation for the suddenly enlarged population, the lack of which is negatively affecting both host and IDP services. Tensions have also arisen when IDPs receive assistance and the host communities do not.

In terms of addressing the needs of the conflict affected population, at present, over 60 humanitarian organisations are operating in North-East Nigeria in support of a Government humanitarian response, led by the National and State Emergency Management Agencies (NEMA/SEMA).¹⁶ This includes 27 international NGOs; 19 national NGOs; 11 United Nations offices, agencies funds and programmes; three Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Organisations; and one inter-governmental organisation. However, the State and National level humanitarian sector coordinators need additional capacity: many have multiple responsibilities and lack information

management (IM) capacity, which prevents a well-informed humanitarian response. The diversity of approaches among development and humanitarian actors further stretches the coordination response. Led by the Humanitarian Coordinator the UN is currently developing a joint coordination funding strategy to ensure that a coordination mechanism is immediately established with an associated information management platform.

Around 20 national CSOs and NGOs operating in the North-East play a critical role in the delivery of assistance, especially in areas where international actors have limited access. While the number of humanitarian partners has tripled since March 2015 from 19 to 62, the overall humanitarian response is still limited in the face of the needs, and lacks rapid response capacity.

3.2 Reconciliation, Peace Building and Community Cohesion

3.2.1 Overview of Damages and Impacts

The Government of Nigeria has made significant progress in recovering areas previously controlled by the Boko Haram armed group. Yet, continued attacks and insecurity are limiting the return of IDPs and Nigerian refugees from neighbouring countries. In addition to physical damages and casualties caused by the conflict, protracted armed conflicts also disturb any peace building processes in the region and hamper efforts made towards social cohesion and reconciliation.

Human security is at stake in the region. In fact, the crisis has resulted in violations of a range of human rights and humanitarian law, including death, injuries, sexual violence, detention, disappearances, forced displacement and forced recruitment. As the Nigeria military and security forces expand their operations within the regional Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), Boko Haram has increasingly relied upon asymmetric warfare tactics, including the use of suicide bombs, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) and coordinated attacks. Simultaneously, the continued role and emergence of self-defence vigilante groups (especially the CJTF) has added to the number of armed non-State actors, further threatening community-level security and stability. If not managed properly, there are severe risks to peace building associated with these groups.

The length and uncertain nature of the conflict, coupled with unpredictable population movement and displacement, have led to the

erosion of trust and fragmentation of society along religious, ethnic or other cultural fault lines. A culture where violence is increasingly common has become entrenched, with criminal activities expanding. The conflict has particularly contributed to the rise in targeted violence against women and children. Emerging in part in response to government detentions of women and children associated with the armed group in 2012, Boko Haram has increasingly targeted women for abduction and violence. Protection challenges include abduction, rape, torture, forced marriage and forced conversion.

More widely, conflict, combined with longer-term social processes, has undermined gender norms and child rights and created a power shift between generations. Conflicts and the resultant displacement situation have broken communities and families, throwing up large numbers of 'nonconventional' households (e.g. those headed by females, children and the elderly) and new community leadership structures. There are serious implications for future stability as the human capital of upcoming generations is compromised. It is estimated that during the conflict 600 teachers have been murdered, 19,000 teachers displaced, and 1,200 schools damaged or destroyed. This has resulted in 600,000 children losing access to learning since 2013.¹⁷ Children have been disproportionately impacted by the crisis and have been subject to grave violations of their rights. They are also exposed to heightened risk of sexual violence and physical abuse as a result of displacement and separation from or loss of their families.

3.2.2 Identified Needs

• Restoring Social Cohesion and Trust

As outlined earlier, the situation in parts of the North-East remains insecure. In this context where Boko Haram violence and response by security agencies and non-State armed groups continues in some areas, and where large-scale displacement continues, social and conflict dynamics can change. Many areas in the region remain highly insecure. This means that mechanisms to manage and resolve tensions and conflict at community level are important.

A dynamic of social fragmentation is emerging in some areas, evidenced by a decrease in social cohesion and trust, and increasing tensions between groups within society. While a full analysis of social cohesion and community dynamics is needed, the assessment undertaken in the North-East identified some general patterns. Some relate directly to Boko Haram violence; others are also linked to pre-existing factors or wider social trends. They include incidences of fragmenta-

tion and tension along religious and ethnic lines; tensions between host communities and the internally displaced; and stigmatisation of individuals perceived as associated with Boko Haram. There are also challenges related to reintegration of former combatants and return of IDPs.

IDPs and host relations vary. In many cases IDPs are hosted by family members. There is limited data on relationships between host and displaced communities, however during focus group discussions on the RPBA field missions concerns were expressed in Borno, Bauchi and Gombe over increasing tensions. Highlighting the variation between areas of the North-East, anecdotal findings suggests that tensions between IDPs and hosts appear to show radically different patterns in Adamawa compared to Yobe, probably due to closer ethnic and religious ties.

There are areas in the North-East where tensions along sectarian and religious lines are evident. In several states, some stakeholders reported that there is a pattern of fracturing, mistrust and decreased integration between Muslim and Christian communities. Trust in government and other institutions is reportedly weak, and in the context of the movement of communities, there is mistrust and fear that individuals may be Boko Haram members. This emanates perhaps from that initial Boko Haram attacks seem to have targeted churches, although mosques subsequently also became subjects of attacks as the conflict evolved.

Children associated with and/or recruited by Boko Haram are often stigmatised and rejected upon return into their communities. Girls who have experienced sexual violence perpetrated by Boko Haram are particularly stigmatised, especially pregnant girls, together with their children who are also at risk of rejection and violence. The widows of suspected Boko Haram fighters also face stigmatisation from their communities. Many of them are unwilling to return to their communities, fearing that they will bring their family dishonour and be rejected or even attacked by their communities.

Traditional institutions, extended family networks and local associations have continued to underpin social solidarity and encourage trust between citizens of the North-East, providing conflict resolution and sensitisation campaigns. Many disputes continue to be resolved through traditional methods. However, the authority of conflict mitigating institutions has been weakened through a combination of

conflict, decreasing legitimacy of traditional authorities and changing generational dynamics.

The response to inter-communal conflict now includes a range of civil society initiatives including those implemented by women and youth groups. There are localised initiatives, in addition to larger programmes. Some of the approaches used include peace groups, sports for peace, and community sensitivity and dialogue mechanisms.

- **Countering Violent Extremism and Addressing Mobilisation of Non-State Armed Actors**

Individual motivations and ‘pull factors’ for joining Boko Haram vary and may include personal (allegiance to charismatic leaders), political, material and economic opportunities and ideological conviction. Evidence from de-radicalisation interventions suggests members often have rigid, linear belief systems. Thus, one can break Boko Haram down into an ideological, criminal, opportunistic and perhaps political group. Some members were forcibly recruited and find it very difficult to leave: former members have reportedly been killed for attempting to do so. Unless and until Boko Haram can be demobilised and brought within a peace framework, the security situation will remain unstable. However, demobilisation and reintegration of Boko Haram represents a particular challenge, and does not call for conventional processes, but rather learning from the innovative approach of de-radicalisation programmes implemented in Nigeria and elsewhere. Responses need to reflect that there are non-combatants and victims of kidnapping, and other abuses with Boko Haram, including women and children.

Locally recruited vigilante groups have played a critical role in the response to Boko Haram in the North-East. They have been accused of human rights violations, including summary executions. Exact figures for the mobilisation of vigilante groups in the North-East are unclear. Indications are that members of these groups may find it difficult to accept the return of Boko Haram to their localities, given the level of atrocities committed against the population. Inclusive community dialogue and attention to the livelihoods of ex-combatants from all forces will be critical in the rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation planning.

According to recent analysis, the number of ‘defectors’, ‘disengaged’, or ‘surrendees’ from Boko Haram to the Nigerian military and its allied forces from neighbouring countries is on the increase.¹⁸ In order to reduce the level of mistrust, risk and threats associated with

the treatment and handling of defectors, it is important to consider having in place clear legal, policy and screening procedures. It is also crucial for the future stability of Nigeria and for the well-being of states affected by the conflict to provide aid and on-going support for both victims and defected perpetrators of Boko Haram. Without this aid and de-radicalisation efforts, the result will be a generation of damaged and fragile citizens, deficient in education, and Nigeria will lack the civic population it needs to maintain economic, political, and social stability. A wide process of dialogue and a tailored approach with consideration to the ethic and cultural priorities of the population in the North-East should be considered in any measures adapted for de-radicalisation and reintegration of defectors and children who have been captured by armed forces.

3.3 Local Governance and Citizen Engagement

3.3.1 Damages and Impacts

The Local Government Area (LGA) is the lowest of the three-tier governance structure in Nigeria and the tier closest to the people. It is where the State connects with society, and where government policies interface with the aspirations of the people. In principle at least, there are only 112 LGAs in the North-East with an average population of a few hundred thousand people often scattered across close to 50,000 square kilometres: accordingly, local governments are often remote from most of their constituents. Local governments therefore play an important role in the recovery and peace building process in the North-East; they are critical in identifying and meeting quickly evolving needs on the ground, in rebuilding and strengthening the social contract where it is severely damaged, and in building social cohesion where fractures are most acute. Local governments are crucial in monitoring the ‘pulse’ of the population at the grassroots and anchoring interventions in local contexts. They are also critical to ensuring local ownership of processes designed to achieve the short-term recovery goals and build the long-term resilience of communities and of institutions at all levels.

Significant challenges however impede the role of local governments as frontline agents of recovery and peace building in the North-East. The conflict has weakened the human, financial, and institutional capacities of the local governments, with devastating impact on their ability to carry out core functions, beginning with provision of services under their jurisdiction (e.g., civil registry, primary and adult education, health care, environmental protection, and public

Violent extremism is an affront to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It undermines peace and security, human rights and sustainable development. Violent extremism is a diverse phenomenon, without clear definition. It is neither new nor exclusive to any region, nationality or system of belief. Nevertheless, in recent years, terrorist groups such as Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL), Al-Qaida and Boko Haram have shaped our image of violent extremism and the debate on how to address this threat. These groups’ message of intolerance – religious, cultural, social – has had drastic consequences for many regions of the world.

Report of the Secretary-General, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Seventieth Session, UN General Assembly, 24 December 2015

sanitation).¹⁹ In areas where attacks targeted public institutions and officials as well as traditional and religious leaders, damage to public infrastructure and to administrative capacities have been extensive (among the public buildings most affected by the conflict are local government buildings and police stations). These damages, along with threats to their lives, have forced local governments to operate from makeshift facilities or, as in Borno and Yobe, to flee to and operate remotely from the State capital. Many local governments have been detached from their constituencies for some time.

The long-standing challenge of inadequate resources faced by local governments has been aggravated by the conflict. A large number of health facilities are considered non-functional across the six states (health services have been systematically targeted by the armed group’s attacks), and hundreds of schools have been severely damaged or destroyed (most schools still open are noted to operate in highly restrictive conditions, while many in safer areas are being used to house IDPs). In areas with local governments in place and hosting IDPs, the strain on already scarce financial and natural resources is significant, further weakening their capacities and generating tensions between IDPs and host communities.

Large-scale damage to critical socio-economic infrastructure has adversely affected the internally generated revenue of local govern-

ments, further straining resources that were noted to be insufficient prior to the outbreak of the conflict. Fiscal transfers to local governments from the Federal account, diminished since the financial crisis of 2009, and were further strained since the outbreak of violence in 2011. Local governments, for instance, have reportedly been asked at certain points to substitute for the inability of other public entities to fund operations and to complement the budget particularly for local police stations and the military. The breakdown in public expenditure channels since the outbreak of the conflict has wide ramifications; it is important therefore to underline how public administration at the local level had been weakened during the conflict. Some local governments in the conflict affected areas have been either displaced to the State capitals in Borno and Yobe, and operate remotely from there, or they have to cater to a population significantly increased by IDPs (Maiduguri, the capital of Borno, has a nearly doubled population since the last population census in 2006).

Alongside these challenges are governance deficits that have been noted as drivers of the conflict in the North-East. Public trust in local government had been weak, this being one of the reasons cited for weak collection of tax revenue, which is understood to be effectively raised but not remitted by tax collectors. This has not only increased local governments' dependency on fiscal transfers from the Federal account, but also damaged trust in local taxpayers and communities.

In most states affected by the conflict, local council elections have not been conducted for many years (except in Yobe in 2013). In the absence of elected councils, State Governors have filled posts with appointees that have eroded the legitimacy of the local authorities, and has contributed to public perception that they do not hold themselves accountable to local constituencies. Weak or lack of mechanisms for citizen engagement in and monitoring of public decision-making processes reinforce a perception of ineffectiveness and lack of transparency.

The engagement of stakeholders who are key in ensuring inclusive, responsive and accountable local governance is severely hampered. Political parties and traditional leaders that have been significant in representing needs and aspirations of population scattered across large areas may have been dispersed, or their relations with constituencies fractured due to the divisions and violence that attended the conflict. Civil society and CBOs such as women's groups, trade unions and professional organisations, that have stepped in to provide certain ser-

vices in some cases, also suffered losses during the conflict, as well as security forces (including vigilante groups) that have sometime substituted for civilian authorities, and traditional leaders. Young men and women who comprise a large portion of local population and who could be critical agents of change, face extensive challenges. They have not had access to education and gainful employment for a considerable period, are targeted for recruitment by the militant group, lack role models in public life, face trauma and suffer injuries, and are marginalised or excluded from public decision-making processes by both officials and traditional leaders.

3.3.2 Identified Needs

Improving local governance is a critical part of the recovery and peace building strategy: particularly to restore and improve the social contract between the population and the government, to strengthen formal and informal conflict resolution mechanisms, and ensure legal security of the population and property. Efforts will require reactivation and ensuring safe return of the displaced local governments; rebuilding the capacity of local governments (beyond the reconstruction of public facilities); enhancing fiscal and human resources to enable effective provision of public services; supporting local governments of host communities to cope with IDPs, in financial terms and in managing tension between host communities and IDPs; and, enhancing citizen engagement in local governance to build trust in and enhance legitimacy of public institutions.

A coordinated effort is necessary to ensure that local governance structures (formal and informal) are improved and have necessary capacities to play a critical role in recovery and peace building processes. The objective is not to reinstate local governance to the pre-conflict level, but to strengthen it, firstly by enhancing the effectiveness of local governments to manage the recovery process and effectively fulfil core functions, specifically for effective and equitable delivery of basic services and social cohesion. Rebuilding the capacities of local governments to restore services is key as it provides the foundation for achieving other recovery objectives; local governments will need to undertake the basic reconstruction functions including peace building. Strengthening local governance also requires enhancing the transparency and accountability of local governments, by enabling citizen engagement in public decision-making processes and supporting mechanisms that will help enhance their representativeness and responsiveness.

Strengthening the Effectiveness of Local Governments

The disruption in or pressures on local government functions caused by the conflict need to be urgently addressed to resume service delivery and advance the recovery process. There needs to be an assessment of technical assistance required by diminished public administration capacities (from destroyed public administration offices, equipment and systems, as well as loss of personnel due to displacement, injury or death). The cadre of local government civil servants need to be supported; the return of those displaced (wherever feasible) needs to be planned, organised, and funded, and the provision for their housing addressed alongside reconstruction of public facilities. Capacities of local governments in areas hosting IDPs should be buttressed financially as well as administratively. Pressures brought on by influx of huge numbers of displaced population on natural resources such as water and land, and on services such as health, nutrition and sanitation, need to be managed effectively. Local actors involved in service delivery chain, such as local entrepreneurs or contractors and the private sector, are also affected by the conflict; livelihoods and small business assistance programs therefore should be synchronized, with particular attention to enhancing opportunities for women and youth.

Strengthening the capacities of local governments also requires significant improvements in their financial and administrative capacities, beginning with revenue generation and tax administration. In most Nigerian States, local governments are not autonomous from the State Government; their jurisdiction under the 1999 Constitution is narrowly limited to the provision of few services and public facilities, and their core financial resources are derived from the Federation account (20 percent of total revenue accruing to the account are earmarked to LGAs). Local governments raise on average 10 percent of State level internally-generated revenue (IGR), from a range of local taxes (such as from market fees and licensing fees for vehicles, radio and television). However, in areas affected by conflict and the dwindling of commercial activities, this source of revenue had been seriously affected. Building the capacities of local governments therefore should also explore decentralisation alongside efforts to enhance closer coordination across all levels.

Also, the perception among tax collectors that financial management systems are weak point to considerable seepage of revenue, and contribute to people's lack of trust in local authorities. Financial man-

agement at the Local level is seen as less robust than upper-tiers of government; local governments are expected to submit audited accounts to the State each year, but it is unclear how effectively this process ensures accountability as state audit reports are not made public. These point to a need for greater coordination between Local and State Governments on revenue mobilisation and allocation. The simplification of the local tax system initiated by the Joint Tax Board and initiatives such as the harmonisation of accounting standards across all three tiers of government (launched with UNDP and other development partners for instance) could help enhance local capacities and accountability. More needs to be done, particularly to address lack of public trust. Concrete efforts addressing mismanagement of public resources at frontline point of delivery (schools, health facilities, etc.) need to be part of recovery programs. Community participation in the development of recovery plans as well as oversight of implementation will help ensure transparency and build trust.

Enhancing Inclusive and Responsive Local Governance through Citizen Engagement

Strengthening local governance is a prerequisite to the recovery and peace building process, and efforts could begin by rebuilding and enhancing public trust in the local governments and traditional leaders through meaningful citizen engagement. Enabling the engagement of local communities and key stakeholders particularly in planning and implementation of recovery and peace building efforts will be particularly crucial, as this ensures buy-in as well as direct relevance of efforts to actual needs, thus building the legitimacy of these efforts. Mechanisms for government-citizen engagement had been noted as weak prior to the conflict, and engagement among communities has been damaged by the conflict; they now require even greater support and investments to address exclusion and accountability issues.

Of immediate concern is the need to support mechanisms that enable local communities, including IDPs, to voice their needs and to monitor responses to those needs by local governments and traditional leaders. These mechanisms should include channels for grievance redress and conflict resolution, as well as channels for addressing perceptions of inequitable access to support and services during the recovery process. This is particularly crucial in areas where competition between IDPs and host communities over services and livelihood opportunities is causing friction, and where tensions along sectarian lines persist. Mechanisms should aim therefore to ensure equitable

opportunities for stakeholders, ensuring a focus on the distinct challenges faced by youth, women, and people with disabilities.

Citizen engagement efforts should also aim to reduce political exclusion and discrimination to address deficits in lack of representativeness in local institutions. The recovery and peace building efforts therefore present opportunities to advance inclusive and responsive governance. They need, however, to be aligned with existing, traditional mechanisms that have been weakened by the conflict, including conflict mitigating actors and institutions in the North-East such as traditional leaders, extended family networks and local associations.

3.4 Community Security, Justice, Human Rights, Mine Action and Small Arms Control

3.4.1 Damages and Impact

Community security encompasses all forms of threats to personal and group security, hence is interlinked with justice, human rights, and control of small arms/light weapons (SALW). Human rights abuses have been committed not only by armed actors involved in the conflict. Weak access to justice, accountability and oversight mechanisms facilitate impunity for such violations and leave the population vulnerable. This also limits the ability to deal with ethnic-religious, economic and social tensions. The resulting low level of human security has been one of the structural drivers of the conflict. The fact that these issues are both outcomes of, and drivers of conflict, means that it is essential to integrate human security into all aspects of recovery and peace building.

The capacity of law and security institutions to deliver efficient services and the ability of the population to access them has historically been low across the North-East. These structural weaknesses include poor infrastructure concentrated in a few urban centres inaccessible to much of the rural population, under-funding, insufficient staff and weak capacity.²⁰ This has led to large case backlogs, and long delays in court hearings, which have resulted in a lack of trust in the system. Despite the displacement crisis, there has been no concomitant increase in law enforcement provision in the wider host community and the police are absent from most IDPs camps, leaving law enforcement to military, ad hoc groups of camp inhabitants and untrained camp authorities (with no legal mandate).

The severe strains caused by the destruction of police stations and posts, court buildings and the absence of key personnel have been compounded

Community security is a concept that goes beyond physical security and “seeks to operationalize human security, human development and state-building paradigms at the local level”. A community security approach drives both the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of this component.

by the emerging challenges arising directly related to displacement. As already noted, SGBV is believed to be high and the provisions for reporting and prosecution are not responsive to the social stigmatisation and shame many victims feel. For example, complaints are usually recorded and statements taken in rooms with no privacy, and courts rarely provide separate waiting areas for victims and witnesses, while hearings are rarely heard in camera. The lack of specialist trained law enforcement (especially of trained female officers) is another barrier to effective reporting.

Many IDPs are also unable to access legal support services as they lack documentation to register. While this is the responsibility of the LGA, amendments to the legal framework for the emergency situation would facilitate registration for IDPs while increased access to legal advice and assistance urgently needed.

The cost, inaccessibility and poor perception of and lack of public trust in the formal system mean that the overwhelming majority of people in the North-East do not even report crimes to the police. Traditionally, the vast majority of people use alternative mechanisms (customary, sharia, familial or other) to resolve disputes but conflict and displacement has in many places disrupted traditional community leadership structures. More often, these mechanisms do not always operate according to due process and human rights standards. In the context of inter-communal tensions, the legitimacy and effectiveness of even those structures have broken down in some places leaving a vacuum for peaceable dispute resolution. Without effective mechanisms to resolve disputes peacefully, there is increased recourse to violence.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has played a major part in fuelling the conflict. SALW are cheap and easily available, especially in border areas, where illicit cross-border trafficking is rife. SALW are also used by vulnerable communities to protect themselves from attacks by Boko Haram and other armed groups. These groups have also been responsible for attacks on civilians and other unlawful acts of aggression using small arms.

3.4.2 Identified Needs

Rebuilding, Retooling and Equipping Key Justice and Security Institutions

Boko Haram attacks have targeted police stations and court buildings, destroying the infrastructure necessary for service delivery. These circumstances disrupt the accessibility of effective justice and security, and tarnish the legitimacy of the institutions responsible for delivering these services during and after the crisis. The absence of key data and information on the state of rule of law institutions in the North-East undermines effective response in re-establishing rule of law, thereby undermining the very foundation on which lasting peace and order can be built. A mapping on rule of law service delivery capacities and levels of trust in institutions is needed to provide relevant information for the delivery of justice and security services.

Increasing Access to Justice for the Most Affected Groups Including Women, Girls, and IDPs

Restoring rule of law services in North-East Nigeria will be needed to ensure both formal and informal justice providers are available, accessible, accountable and making quality decisions in the interests of their entire community, and ensuring the rights of women, children, and IDPs are respected – all of which are key to re-establishing community safety. Support measures to make legal and justice services available through mobile courts and community-based paralegals will increase access to timely and quality justice for the groups most affected by the conflict and human rights violations.

The conflict has exacerbated the plight that women and girls in North-East Nigeria historically face. SGBV, including among displaced communities, has emerged as a human rights, justice, and security concern needing attention particularly where women and girls are concerned, and will be a crucial element of recovery efforts in North-East Nigeria, to be addressed through legal means as part of a multi-sectoral response. Consistent with the Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1960 (2010), efforts to address impunity will mean that there should be improved access to justice including legal aid services for the survivors, while also invoking community level prevention efforts that seek to raise awareness and mobilise men to advocate against marginalisation of and discrimination against women.

Returnees are likely to face multiple challenges in accessing their property and land rights, which often results in disputes over land ownership, particularly where justice mechanisms are underdeveloped or not functioning well. This adds further uncertainty, with the most vulnerable members of society (e.g. widows and orphans) who are at greatest risk of being denied their rights, rendering it impossible for them to rebuild their livelihoods. It will be essential to mitigate the potential for disputes over land ownership by making available formal legal mechanisms such as courts, and involving traditional clan structures in order to avoid parallel processes, and by providing greater public information about citizens' land rights, especially for women and child-headed households.

While the vast majority of people in the North-East, like other Nigerians, rely on alternative justice mechanisms, studies have shown that their failure to follow due process and comply with human rights standards undermines the quality of justice they dispense. Interventions that seek to improve the quality of decision making, particularly as it relates to women and children, strengthen accountability/oversight through recording of decisions as well as increase the coordination between them and the formal justice sectors, which will make the system less patriarchal and arbitrary, and enable it to comply with human rights standards. Also, poor public perceptions and mistrust in the formal justice system will need to be addressed by increasing the levels of public knowledge and understanding about their rights and where in the justice system they can seek redress.

Restoring Citizen and Community Security

The on-going conflict with Boko Haram and inter-communal violence continues to inhibit recovery in the North-East and undermine citizen and community security, which is intended to allow for safe and peaceful coexistence among communities. Citizen and community security will need to be established to help secure a safe environment for returnees, and help restore trust in basic services by reintroducing policing in LGAs as the situation allows, in order to transition from military to civilian policing control, including where feasible, ensuring a balance of female officers. Interventions will need to further ensure that the police are properly prepared to assume control from the military; including being properly equipped and trained on technical policing functions and police management in a conflict setting.

Of equal importance will be support measures, which build confidence and relations between local police and communities as well as the IDPs so that police services are accessible and acceptable to the communities it serves. To this end, support in strengthening both community security and community policing which incorporate gender and child friendly issues will be key in rebuilding trust, and should embed a special emphasis on getting local authorities and community representatives to promote participatory processes and conflict mitigation, to analyse security risks, and design and implement community based plans.

Given the high potential for inter-communal violence, priority should be given to activities which promote inter-faith dialogue, cooperation between traditional leaders of different communities and faiths and training on mediation and reconciliation skills.

Ensuring that oversight and accountability of the police is strengthened through support of the Human Rights Commission, the Committee against Torture, and civil society organizations, should be considered. The introduction of a model police in which policing with a rights based approach should be piloted and scaled up.

Sustained Monitoring of Human Rights Violations

While human rights violations are often a root cause of conflict, they are always an indispensable element in achieving peace and reconciliation. Human rights monitors are well placed to function as early warning mechanisms to flag risks of violations of civil, political, economic and social human rights, as well as risks of intolerance, all of which are necessary to help diffuse tensions at an early stage and take early action to prevent an escalation into conflict. State party reporting to international and regional human rights mechanisms such as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), treaty bodies and in reports of UN special procedures should enable stakeholders to hold government and key stakeholders accountable for improving the human rights situation on the ground.

Small Arms Control

Porous borders result in the free circulation of SALW and thus facilitate activities by illegal armed groups, enabling them to launch attacks into and from neighbouring countries. Therefore, a regional, cross-border approach to addressing SALW proliferation is critical. The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising units from Nigeria and its neighbouring States (Benin, Cameroon, Niger,

and Chad) is a recognition of the regional aspect of the conflict and the need to coordinate responses across borders. The capacity of the MNJTF will need to be further enhanced if it is to play an effective role in preventing the illicit cross-border movement of arms and Boko Haram fighters.

The priority areas for the SALW in the immediate emergency recovery phase will be to provide sustainable alternative livelihood options for key actors (CJTF, other vigilantes groups) whose livelihoods have revolved around the use of SALW over the period of the crisis. It will be imperative to also establish a training and capacity needs assessment of CJTFs both organised and independent groups, and thereafter provide support to the formalisation of these recognised CJTFs into cooperative groups. Community participation on security/SALW awareness and reduction in the North East will also need to be enhanced through advocacy and sensitisation on the dangers of SALWs and their role as a part of the community security mechanism.

Community resilience and security will have to be fostered through the development of a comprehensive early warning mechanism/database, commencing with the detailed profiling of all community vigilantes and CJTFs in all North-East states. Through this mechanism, selected border community members including IDPs will be engaged as early warning agents. This activity will be carried out in collaboration with CBOs, faith groups and Human Rights Monitors etc. Inter-faith sensitisation for a peaceful co-existence as well as joint cross-border sensitisation programmes on the influence on conflict and SALW proliferation on livelihoods would be explored.

Finally, the legal and regulatory frameworks required for sustained fight against SALW will have to be established with a view to promoting the harmonisation of national laws in line with the ECOWAS Convention on SALW and the United Nations Programme of Action.

3.5 Cross-cutting Issues

3.5.1 Gender

Boko Haram-related activities have worsened the situation of the population in the North-East, particularly for women and girls who have become more vulnerable due to the armed conflict. Prior to the Boko Haram-related violence, the rights of women and girls were grossly undermined owing to socio-cultural and religious beliefs which do not define and appropriate their rights on an equal footing with men and boys. This manifested in the sharp inequality between

women and men with particular reference to social needs, education, right to dignity and right to acquisition of land and property.

Exacerbating their plight, the armed conflict has been marked by the systematic use of violence against women and girls. The UN SRSG on Sexual Violence described the Boko Haram armed group as “*waging war on women’s physical, sexual and reproductive autonomy and rights*” by repeatedly raping their female captors and treating them as vessels for producing children for fighters. In this context, sexual violence is not merely incidental, but integral, to their strategy of domination and self-perpetuation.²¹

The current situation has seen women and girls being forced into marriages or becoming sex slaves, denying them the rights to education and free will as to who should be their life partner. Meanwhile, a proportion of women die prematurely owing to sexual abuse, which may also result in sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/STD. In some parts of the region, there are now large numbers of women-headed and child-headed households.

Using data extrapolation DTM Round VII in December 2015 reported that 52 percent of IDPs are women and girls. Addressing their situation requires the mainstreaming of the rights of women and girls in whatever policy and intervention that is designed for the North-East. One factor in the recovery process will therefore be the extent to which discrimination and violence against women is addressed, and women empowered to fulfil their potential to contribute to economic, social and political life.

Men and boys also confront a range of threats including: gender-based violence; abduction and forceful recruitment by Boko Haram; recruitment by security forces and vigilante groups; and, detention on suspicion of Boko Haram sympathies. They are frequently targeted from both sides, being specifically selected for killing due to the belief that they are allied with the different parties involved in the conflict.

Interventions to respond to SGBV are detailed in section 4. Recovery Strategies. Key elements of the response to SGBV, which requires an integrated inter-agency and multi-sectoral response to both SGBV and SGBV related trauma include:

- Comprehensive programming on SGBV, including immediate attention to SGBV survivors and incidents, as well as preventive initiatives;
- Available and accessible mental and medical services with specialised personnel trained to address cases of SGBV to provide immediate as well as follow-up attention to SGBV survivors and effective referral mechanisms;
- Comprehensive mapping of available services and services that could be potentially adjusted to address SGBV related issues;
- Safe spaces and confidential systems to reach out to SGBV survivors;
- Strengthening capacity of national/state institutions and improved monitoring and data collection;
- Legal and social protections for people affected by SGBV, especially vulnerable groups such as women and children; and
- Community engagement to address negative perceptions of victims/survivors and to promote family and community support for those that do report.

3.5.2 Human Rights

The violent conflict has been characterised by allegations of human rights abuses and violations under international humanitarian law committed by Boko Haram, including killings, the use of children in hostilities, abductions, SGBV including rape, forced marriages, torture and ill-treatment. There have also been reports of heavy-handed military operations (both by the Army and by affiliated CJTF militias), including against civilians. Allegations have also been made of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by security agents, including extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and detentions. However, the lack of information on the human rights situation, and the fact that abuses and violations either go unreported or are not fully addressed, in turn, fosters impunity.

The Boko Haram conflict has its roots in a long history of human rights violations and bad governance that alienated the majority of the population by denying them access to goods and services. If respect for human rights is not addressed, the distortions in society will remain, or be further exacerbated, making it more likely that individuals will resort to violence. Durable solutions, which are community-driven and pay attention to and prioritise the most affected and marginalised, are essential to eliminating recourse to violence. Reconciliation and sustainable peace in the region can only be achieved when a human rights based approach is applied as a guiding principle in addressing the root causes of the conflict as well as its impacts.

As such efforts arising from this RPBA should consciously aim to further the realisation of human rights. Moreover, national capacity development should therefore focus on: i) enhancing government institutions with frontline responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights with a view to strengthening their capacity as duty bearers to fulfil their obligations; ii) enhancing the capacity of citizens and civil society as rights holders to claim their rights; and (iii) strengthening the accountability between them through effective mechanisms for systematic monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation, with particular focus on the most vulnerable and at risk populations, and on the functioning rule of law institutions to address conflict-related violations and disputes.

3.5.3 Youth and Children

Understanding and meeting the needs of children and young people represents a defining challenge for Federal and State authorities. Nigeria faces a demographic challenge, which is particularly acute in the North-East. According to the National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria's population reached 167 million in 2012, of which around 50 percent are youth, of whom only half have a primary school education or none at all.²² The median age of the population is 17.9.²³ The demographic bulge presents the significant challenge of ensuring that there is work for this large population of young people. When asked to rate the gravity of access to employment in an online survey, 86 percent of respondents viewed it as a very serious problem.²⁴ In 2005, the Education Sector Analysis (ESA) for 2004 reported that, out of the 130,000 youths that graduate from Nigerian universities annually, only about 10 percent are able to secure paid employment.

Unemployment rate in the North-East is around 40 percent. The figure is even higher amongst the youth. This is partly due to the poor economic state of the North-East, but also due to the low levels of educational attainment and standards in the region.

Against this backdrop, the conflict has had specific impacts. It has involved targeted attacks by Boko Haram on schools and school children as part of its ideological attack on Western education. Since the conflict started, more than 600 teachers have been killed, hundreds of pupils kidnapped or killed, and over 1200 schools have been destroyed or damaged.²⁵ Schools in large parts of the North-East have not been functional for up to three years. Many displaced children have been unable to access education for successive school years, while the quality of education of children in host communities has

suffered as local schools struggle to cope with increased numbers. This has caused untold impact on the futures of over one million children in the North-East, with the effect of further weakening the future prospects for a stable recovery. The issues are further elaborated in the Infrastructure and Social Services Component.

Girls and young women have a particularly difficult time as they are taken out of school earlier, and marry earlier. The average marriage age of a Nigerian woman is under 18, while the average man marries in his late twenties.²⁶ The average literacy rate among women in the North-East is 20 percent, and is likely to fall further in the current generation of girls, whose education has been considerably disrupted, as well as with the apparent increase in young girls engaging in transactional sex or other coercive arrangements to support themselves and their families.

Children and adolescents have suffered disproportionately from psychological trauma and are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, while also lacking the tools to access support. Large numbers of such young people are growing up without education or training and with few educational prospects. Unless this is recognised and built into the recovery strategy, they will grow up to be marginalised and vulnerable to radicalisation and criminality, perpetuating present insecurity into the next generation.

Young men and women have few role models in public life and opportunities to articulate their concerns or participate in peace and security policymaking. The traditional leadership and political class excludes young people, hence their ability to influence policy is low, and they lack a political voice. With most youths in the North-East now unemployed or underemployed, they are further marginalised, and the risk of continued conflict and destabilisation is high. It is particularly important therefore that the design and implementation of recovery strategies makes space to listen to their voices and plan for their needs.

Young people can be agents of change, and indeed game changers for the North-East if their potential is harnessed by creating opportunities for their meaningful participation. Opportunities should be made available for youth, including boys and girls, to take part in the peace building and reconstruction process building on existing successful initiatives. Social change should be endogenous, that is, embedded within local communities where young people live, go to school, work and plan for their futures.

Integration of youth concerns and participation in sub-sectors, plus stand-alone youth-focused programmes are needed, such as:

- Engagement with educational institutions;
- Support of young people's peace building initiatives, with involvement of hard-to-reach young people, including those disproportionately affected by conflict (from marginalised, minority and indigenous groups);
- Intergenerational dialogue, including with religious and traditional leaders;
- Development of young people's skills in leadership, mediation, negotiation, conflict resolution, to provide life skills and positive social norms;
- Improved technical and vocational training as an entryway to income generation;
- Youth-led initiatives in arts, culture, music, social media and sports to foster social cohesion and mediation;
- Setting up a youth peace and reconciliation fund or award for the North-East to recognise and support innovative youth projects;
- Institutionalisation of youth participation and representation in local and national governance processes and policy making; and
- Protecting environments for the lives of children and youth in post-conflict and returnee settings.

3.5.4 Explosives Remnants of War

The threat from explosive devices in Nigeria's North-East, particularly in Borno, stems from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which have been used both for attacks and as victim-activated devices emplaced in the ground. As victim-activated IEDs maim and kill indiscriminately, they can be considered as 'landmines'. Some factory-made mines may also have been used, but the available information is very limited to date. In addition, military activities have employed aerial bombardment and the use of artillery, mortars, rockets, etc., which inevitably leads to widespread contamination by unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) and IEDs can be found on roads, in abandoned houses and buildings (including schools), and in agricultural fields; it is also possible that water sources were 'mined' by the armed group. To access areas in the North-East, roads have to be assessed and de-mined and areas need to be surveyed prior to initiating a safe return process. Cleaning up rubble and debris and burning waste can be extremely dangerous and an ERW-risk reduc-

Explosives Remnants of War

Activities, which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of mines, and explosive remnants of war (ERW) including unexploded sub-munitions. The objective of mine action is to reduce the risk from landmines and ERW to a level where people can live safely; in which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine and ERW contamination, and in which the victims' different needs can be addressed. Mine action comprises five complementary groups of activities: (i) risk education, (ii) survey and clearance, (iii) victim assistance, (iv) advocacy and (v) stockpile destruction.

tion mechanism needs to be in place. To allow for a safe return, an emergency Risk Education campaign needs to reach all IDPs and the local population as well as those working temporarily in potentially dangerous areas. A systematic survey coupled with risk education and explosive ordnance disposal, working LGA by LGA, will provide the required data and response to the North-East of Nigeria.

A mine action programme in line with international standards does not exist in Nigeria. Joint undertaking of the government, the security forces and development partners, is required to address the threat of mines and ERW through a mix of emergency actions and capacity development. Setting up an institutional and operational framework as well as basic legal and policy framework to allow such activities will require a concerted effort. A team to coordinate mine action is planned, possibly based at Maiduguri.

Data on mine/ERW victims (deaths and injuries), on war-injured, and persons with disabilities are scarce in general. Many of those injured from the conflict will remain chronically disabled. Medical/rehabilitation and psycho-social care are the most pressing needs. Mine action activities can help to identify, educate and refer survivors and family members of the deceased to existing service providers. The specific needs of under-18s are to be taken into consideration for MRE and victims assistance.

4. Recovery Strategy for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion

4.1 Objectives

The recovery strategy identified under the peace building, stability and social cohesion component has the following objectives:

- (i) Identify initiatives that enhance long-lasting and sustainable peace building in North-East Nigeria while considering the different state dynamics as well as the different needs of the populations in these states.
- (ii) Identify durable solutions to displacement, which ensures that returns are voluntary and conducted in secure and dignified manner. For those IDPs who prefer to be resettled, identify durable solutions for dignified and secure resettlement. Durable solutions should address the most immediate and basic needs of IDPs (food security, shelter, WASH, education and health), the need for psycho-social support, gender specific programing and livelihoods support. Addressing the threat of ERWs is a precondition for any return and recovery process. Identified vulnerable populations should be specifically targeted to generate sustainable recovery.
- (iii) Identify initiatives that help to restore the social fabric in the North-East, by nurturing and enhancing trust and social cohesion – with communities, between groups and between citizens and government.
- (iv) Prevent conflict and violence including gender-based violence at community level.
- (v) Reduce violence in context of Boko Haram related violence through reducing Boko Haram mobilisation and human rights violations by armed forces.
- (vi) Increase access to effective justice and redress.
- (vii) Increase a culture of human rights respect at community level.
- (viii) Strengthen local governance to support service delivery and accountability.

4.2 Contribute to the Safe and Voluntary Return and Resettlement of Displaced Populations

A sound recovery strategy that enhances safe, dignified and voluntary return and resettlement of IDPs should be formulated in an integrated and holistic manner. Such strategy should be embedded in interlinked and integrated programme responses that address the

different identified needs while in the meantime, the strategy should also recognise and account for differences in state dynamics and the particular needs of populations affected by displacement (new IDPs and those unable to return; host communities; and IDPs already returned).

At a broader level, a recovery strategy regarding return and resettlement of IDPs should include a policy and operational framework that provides guidance on how return and resettlement should take place in a safe, dignified and voluntary manner. While a signatory country of the Kampala convention, this legal framework has not been domesticated and sanctioned within Nigeria. As such, the country lacks the necessary coordination across agencies and more importantly, a defined set of roles and responsibilities with attached lines of accountability that allow for a comprehensive and holistic response to the needs and challenges of forcibly displaced populations. As a consequence, responsive efforts to IDPs related issues tend to be scattered, uncoordinated and inefficient, and do not comply with international standards. Most of the burden of displacement, such as managing resources and providing additional services, is in fact carried by communities. Consequently, there are increased social tensions and deepened sense of abandonment by the Government within IDPs host communities, undermining peace and stability efforts. Also, prospects for return and resettlement will be determined by physical conditions, in particular security environment. Those who are willing to return and resettle should be properly assisted, once safety is guaranteed. Ensuring that the areas where IDPs are going to return or resettle are safe would also imply working in coordination with humanitarian actions to undertake a mine action response to ensure safe access to mine/ERW affected LGAs, and to address the fear among IDPs and local communities of explosive devices.

To address the needs of populations affected by displacement (new IDPs and those unable to return; host communities; and IDPs already returned), existing initiatives that mostly focused on humanitarian support to ensure adequate provision of food, emergency shelter, and the restoration of basic services such as education, health and nutrition, and water and sanitation, may need to be scaled up, and in some cases adapted. This will be particularly important in addressing the needs of new IDPs, in case new waves of displacement occur. Adaptation and these existing services will be required to facilitate the transition of IDPs back to their places of origin, including the provision

of food aid to allow them to survive during planting and harvesting seasons.

Besides humanitarian support, there is also increasing need for initiatives that facilitate the transition of IDPs in the processes of return or resettlement. Some agencies have started the provision of support in priority areas such as psycho-social support, livelihoods and SGBV prevention. Due to the dimensions of the crisis however, these efforts remain limited and thus needs are largely underserved. To effectively address these needs, programmatic, holistic and integrated approaches should be preferred. Such approaches should not only address basic needs, but also include initiatives on livelihoods support and provision, psychosocial support and specific programming to address SGBV. It is key that these holistic initiatives pay special attention to vulnerable populations, including women, widows, elderly, youth and children including UASC, for whom family reunification programmes should also be included.

Given that the security conditions remain volatile in parts of the North-East, the displacement dynamic in relation to this crisis remains highly fluid, with new waves of displacement being continuously registered (as per assumptions and displacement scenarios detailed in this document). Therefore, and as mentioned above, the recovery strategy proposed to ensure safe and voluntarily return and resettlement of IDPs should be formulated by taking into account the particular needs of different displaced groups (new IDPs and those unable to return; host communities; and IDPs already returned).

For new IDPs and those unable to return, efforts should focus on addressing basic needs (food, water and sanitation, and emergency shelter); access to basic services (education and health), and support for early recovery, including livelihoods and psycho-social support. Attention should also be directed to addressing particular vulnerabilities, including reunification/protection of unaccompanied children, widows, the elderly and SGBV survivors.

For people willing and able to return and resettle, the aforementioned policy and operational framework for safe, voluntary and dignified return and resettlement is instrumental. A central consideration in the elaboration of such framework is the restoration of social cohesion between those who are returning/resettling and those who never left/host community residents. It will be important to establish mechanisms for managing tensions that are likely to emerge from the process, including land and property disputes, mistrust in both for-

mal and informal institutions, social stigmatisation towards specific groups, and reckoning. For this group of the population, it is also key to enhance community based and participatory approaches to restore livelihoods, reactivate local markets, re-establish access to social services and facilitate the reintegration of IDPs into local communities. This may include the provision of food support and agricultural/productive inputs in exchange for reconstruction works, and support for the initiation of new livelihood activities in areas of resettlement. Creating safe spaces for women and unaccompanied children to reduce safety risks, and continued psycho-social support are also key priorities for this population. By the same token, gender-inclusive livelihood stabilisation and local economic recovery efforts are also key in the North-East, given the high number of female household heads who have little to no experience in the labour market. Also, given that increasingly more young IDPs are willing to seek livelihood opportunities in urban areas, there may be an operational opportunity for the provision of marketable vocational skills training to IDPs displaced in urban settings.

Finally, for host communities and communities in areas of return, it is imperative to alleviate pressure on services such as water and sanitation, health and nutrition, and education. The most effective approach to host and return communities is treating IDPs as equal partners alongside the local population, by drawing on their skills and other available resources to solve common problems. IDPs are potential partners and important contributors to the local economy, and community development projects may be a good starting point for matching needs with skills and resources of both the permanent and temporary residents. Efforts along this line are key to restoring social cohesion as they: (i) alleviate immediate tensions over access to employment between affected communities, host community individuals, and displaced individuals; (ii) help IDPs cover their increased living costs; (iii) provide immediate, visible community benefits via the rehabilitation of socioeconomic community infrastructure; (iv) boost the purchasing power and revive the local markets in the host communities, increasing the overall economic absorption capacity and resilience of host communities to support IDP inflows; and (v) support more diversified livelihoods opportunities, enterprise recovery, and skills development for communities, including the most vulnerable groups.

4.3 Reconciliation, Peace Building and Community Cohesion

This subcomponent recovery strategy will aim to restore and strengthen the social fabric in the North-East to prevent and resolve conflict and increase cohesion. Priorities will differ between insecure areas where populations remain displaced, and areas where return occurs. In some areas, the priority will be addressing tensions between IDPs and hosts, in others, processes of reintegration or reconciliation. A core implementation strategy will be to develop community level platforms, either new ones, or building up on existing peace building structures. The strategy also includes support to civil society initiatives and the development of capacity of civil society, particularly womens groups, youth groups and traditional authorities. It is also key to promote inter-faith dialogue.

Preventing and addressing violent extremism requires a dedicated, tailored and integrated approach, based on the lessons of the Office of National Security Advisor (ONSA) programme and on research and evidence. This should encourage defection of Boko Haram members by offering safe treatment and detention conditions, and making clear which categories of detainees will be held accountable through formal justice processes, and which might receive alternative treatment. Evidence based de-radicalisation programmes are suggested. Needs of victims should be understood and addressed, and reintegration of former combatants should be supported where communities are willing to receive them. Priorities include:

- Legal framework to outline how Boko Haram members will be treated if they defect or are captured, outlining categories who will be tried, or might receive alternative treatment;
- Encourage Boko Haram defection through offering safe corridors and safe detention conditions;
- Register and assess detainees to ensure response according to legal framework, and ensure provision for women and children, and those who are victims;
- Accountability: peace must be anchored on justice. Formal justice processes and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms may be required. Due process and human rights standards for fair trials should be observed;
- Evidence-based de-radicalisation programmes for both those who convicted and those who are processed through other channels, based on best practice from the ONSA programme;

- Community level support to reintegration, and means to ensure community safety such as tracking of returning former Boko Haram followers, ensure the safety and wellbeing of those reintegrated;
- Measures to prevent violent extremism including strategic communications and community level capacity building, with capacity at state and targeted LGA levels;
- Reintegration efforts for former Boko Haram followers, including livelihood, psycho-social support, (including tailored support for under-18s) and necessary community sensitisation; and sensitisation to support their safe return;
- The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of vigilante groups is another area highlighted by assessment. Priorities of this process include facilitating dialogue between the parties, establishing a policy framework, ensuring accountability, developing livelihood opportunities and providing psycho-social support (taking into account the specific needs of under-18s). Approaches have been developed to date including by Bauchi State Government and Adamawa Peace Initiative.

Response to conflict related trauma should build on existing initiatives, and includes enhancing capacity of state health providers and civil society organisations, establishing referral mechanisms for populations affected by trauma.

Gender and SGBV programming should incorporate holistic, multi-sectorial interventions to mitigate and address the consequences of SGBV and broader exposure to violence. Interventions should build on international guidelines and good practice for addressing SGBV in complex emergencies and conflict-affected environments. All interventions, including associated assessments, should uphold international ethical and safety standards that are age, gender- and culturally-sensitive and mindful of requirements to maintain anonymity and confidentiality of affected populations. Design of interventions should further take into consideration the extent to which the safety and security risks of affected populations are addressed, and activities seek to minimize potential exposure of populations to further violence.²⁷

Mechanisms for support for survivors of violence should advance an integrated, multi-sectoral approach to service provision for survivors, including support for holistic provision of care and for referral pathways related to: (1) medical support; (2) mental health and psycho-social care; (3) legal support; (4) opportunities for livelihoods

and economic empowerment; and (5) follow-up for survivors within their respective communities. While identification or establishment of referral centres providing one or more services may be explored, consideration will necessarily be given for connecting these services with existing institutions (e.g. hospitals or health centres), to ensure their sustainability in the longer-term. Ensuring confidentiality of survivors seeking care, both to encourage support-seeking behaviour and to minimize the potential for stigmatisation, will also be a priority. Community awareness raising and sensitisation activities will also be explored as a means to reduce potential stigmatisation of survivors and to promote community reconciliation.

A community or stakeholder-mapping exercise should be conducted to identify what services are currently available and at what scale, where critical gaps lie, and where there are opportunities to strengthen or build further access to sustainable support services and care. While there are likely stand-alone initiatives specifically addressing needs of survivors, opportunities and entry points for activities to be embedded within relevant sectors (e.g. health and nutrition, education, social protection, water, livelihoods and economic empowerment, etc.) should also be explored.

While prevention of Boko Haram related violence may fall outside the scope of this initiative, activities should identify opportunities to support awareness building and advocacy activities to promote gender equality, behaviour change, and violence prevention, working with men, women, boys, and girls at the community level to shift attitudes and norms and reduce violence. Communications and sensitisation activities that attempt to reduce stigmatisation of survivors of S/SGBV and reduce the potential for rejection of or violence towards children born out of Boko Haram's sexual violence should also be explored and, where feasible, embedded within reconciliation and peace building initiatives.

4.4 Local Governance and Citizen Engagement

Interventions will aim to improve local governance in order to restore the social contract between the population and the government, and rebuild citizens' trust in public institutions. The objective is to encourage broader participation and citizen engagement in order to increase representativeness of local government, and establish social accountability, as well as build capacity of local institutions for effective service delivery.

Key intervention strategies will focus on:

- accompanying the return of displaced local governments and supporting local governments hosting IDPs to meet the immediate needs;
- enhancing fiscal and human resources of local governments to enable them to effectively contribute to the provision of public services, and to the protection and safety of their constituents;
- establishing social accountability mechanisms, through budget monitoring and transparent contract awards and taxation systems and the re-establishment of their grievance redress mechanism
- strengthening the existing community mobilisation mechanism, in particular conflict resolution mechanisms and legal security;
- ensuring that local governance structures (formal and informal), and traditional rulers are engaged and capacitated to actively participate in the peace building process; and
- strengthening governance structures at settlement level (villages in rural areas, neighbourhoods in urban areas, IDP camps).

Recovery and peace building should provide immediate mitigation of the most critical symptoms of weak governance, which could potentially fuel further conflict, e.g. newly arising tensions between host and IDPs communities.

The effectiveness of local governments remains an issue of utmost importance in Nigeria, and while the crisis in the North-East offers an opportunity to redeem and resuscitate local governments in a more systematic and structured way, it should not aim at their immediate empowerment beyond the existing legal framework. Improving local democracy may require changes in state policies but should be done in a coordinated manner.

For example, strengthening political participation through local democratic elections of Local Councils can only be contemplated in the long run. In the absence of elected Local Government Councils in most North-Eastern states, the existing formal and informal structures at ward (village) level need to be empowered and mobilised for recovery and peace building, and to reach out to targeted beneficiaries.

In a context of narrowly limited while scattered (and often competing) institutional capacity, the recovery and peace building strategy needs to mobilise and promote coordination among all stakeholders (state and non-state, formal and informal).

In scarcely populated (including when deserted by the population) areas or in overpopulated ones (under the influx of IDPs), recovery and peace building calls for a particular focus on and effort in strengthening governance at the settlement level (villages or IDPs camps) in order to meet the actual service delivery needs of both IDPs and host communities.

4.5 Community Security, Justice, Human Rights, Explosive Remnants of War and Small Arms Control

Effective peace building must strengthen formal justice and law enforcement mechanisms and increase oversight and accountability, but also allow mechanisms to ensure abuses and weaknesses are monitored and corrected. At the same time, traditional methods of dispute resolution will play a critical complementary role. Increasing the capacity, speed and responsiveness of the relevant state institutions, and building more localised mechanisms (such as community policing) are essential to increasing trust in the justice system, which will in turn increase access to justice. This is especially the case as regards gender-based crimes and crimes against children. This will require mainstreaming the roles of women, youth, traditional and community leaders, religious leaders and civil society organisations in the entire process.

Structural conflict drivers such as poor governance and weak rule of law will not be addressed unless community needs and participation are embedded in recovery programming. Strengthening accepted grievance redress mechanisms, with appropriate capacitation to ensure that the rights of women, children and marginalised groups are respected, are key to re-establishing community safety. Increasing the availability of all forms of grievance redress should start with an assessment of all entry-points (district courts, traditional rulers, informal conflict resolution mechanisms, etc.), and mobilisation and capacitation should occur based on effectiveness locally.

Education and awareness campaigns and attitudinal change programmes should aim to enhance the capacity of the population to understand how and where redress and justice services can be found.

Dealing with ERW is a key element of recovery and strengthening and scaling up existing mine/ERW/IED risk education initiatives by the military, civil defence and various emergency management agencies at the local level is needed. To achieve this the government should embark on committing to the Convention on the Prohibition of Use,

Stockpiling Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction ('Ottawa Convention') and undertake clearance activities to international standards. This must provide coherent and effective safety messaging that specifically addresses children and other at-risk groups.

There will be the need to train and equip integrated mine action teams according to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), who can survey the ERM risk and provide risk education, targeted explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)/clearance, identify victim needs, provide EOD levels I-III+ and mine clearance training, as well as regular refresher training to demining/EOD operators.

Support on small arms control shall be provided in accordance with national and international instruments, Conventions and Standards, including the national laws, ECOWAS Convention on SALW, the United Nations Programme of Action and the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS).

5. Implementation Strategy and Institutional Arrangements

The RPBA implementation will happen in context of 'on-going conflict' and asymmetric warfare in parts of the North-East. The Government of Nigeria, with the support of neighbours in the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) continues to combat Boko Haram. While the Government of Nigeria has announced that Boko Haram has been largely decimated, as of February 2016, the movement continued to launch isolated but deadly attacks and suicide bombings in localities in Borno, including on IDPs camps. In other parts of the North-East there is greater security and areas where return is underway but there remains a large number of IDPs who cannot return to insecure areas.

Resettlement and reconstruction is not possible in some areas, and should only take place when security is restored. As such, RBPA will have to be responsive and adaptive to different situations. While this will require an approach tailored for each state, the operating context will include the following:

- (i) Insecure, continued displacement, significant return not possible in near future.
- (ii) Areas where return and reconstruction become possible.

Considerations

- Transparent communication over the RBPA through community radio stations and programs;
- Restoring and supporting conflict resolution mechanism at grass-roots level. An anchor of the recovery should be strong mechanism and processes for reconciliation and healing of the past. Well supported and funded local peace infrastructures can build cohesion and resilience capacities;
- Evidence based design and implementation. RBPA should establish clear baselines and ensure evidence is gathered on the impact of interventions;
- Conflict sensitive programming: In order to prevent future conflicts and uphold the principle of do-no-harm, factoring conflict prevention in programming is needed;
- Inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination (by ethnic group, religion, gender, physical ability and age) in prioritisation of projects, distribution of resources, appointments to positions of responsibility at all levels, and overall implementation. Exclusion has been

a core factor for emergence of violent conflicts, including in the North-East;

- Take into consideration the seasonal factors (such as rain and drought) and related constraints for recovery when planning the functional implementation framework.

Mechanisms for Implementation

- (3) National level policy reform in key areas including the legal framework for responding to displacement and treatment of Boko Haram detainees. Additional areas where policy work may be required are the response to trauma, transitional justice, and mine action;
- (4) Providing technical assistance at Federal, State, and Local level;
- (5) Supporting inter-governmental coordination mechanisms at Federal and State level;
- (6) Empowering communities through community mobilisation platform and tools: it is foreseen that a range of activities can be supported through community level structures, including reconciliation, conflict management, community security, and engagement with local government where sufficient trust is present within communities;
- (7) Establishing grievance and conflict management mechanisms at settlement level;
- (8) Direct funding for civil society organisations participating in the process; and
- (9) Institutionalising social accountability.

Figure 1.2 shows institutional arrangements for the implementation of this component, which is anchored at the community level.

Priorities and Phasing

Table 1.1 shows planning for implementation of peace building, stability and social cohesion recovery strategies under both security related contexts.

Insecure areas, continued displacement, significant return not possible in near future. Priority interventions (stabilisation):

- Reduce dynamics of conflict through counter extremism measures which encourage Boko Haram defection, improved protection of civilians, and increasing trust by reducing human rights abuses by armed groups and CJTF;
- Manage current displacement through support to IDPs and host communities which meet immediate humanitarian, protection,

and basic services needs, and reduce pressure on land and resources. This also includes addressing psycho-social support, and specific programming on SGBV;

- Increase trust by enabling community engagement and hold accountable those responsible for abuses;
- Manage and mitigate tensions that emerge within communities through community level dialogue processes; and
- Empower people for eventual return with viable livelihood support.

Areas where security improves and return becomes possible:

- Demining and debris removal;
- Demand driven planning for reconstruction with community engagement; and
- Community based reintegration and reconciliation processes.


TABLE 1.1

Planning for implementation

Returns take place, displacement on decrease States: Adamawa, Gombe, Bauchi, Taraba	Returns unlikely or limited, significant concentration of IDPs States: Borno, Yobe
<i>Recovery scenario</i>	<i>Emergency/Stabilisation scenario</i>
Engagement at Federal and State level	
Agree institutional framework and intra-governmental coordination mechanism	
Engage with key players at local and settlement level	Mapping of key stakeholders active in displaced and host communities
Identify existing or establish community mobilisation platforms at settlement level	
Provision of immediate assistance to displaced and host communities in the current locations	Rapid needs assessment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • in displaced and host communities • minimum conditions required for safe and voluntary returns in liberated areas
Development needs assessment at settlement and local level	Revise Service Delivery Plans and financial allocations in host communities in order to address the actual needs
Long term Recovery and Development Plans	Provision of immediate assistance to displaced and host communities in the current locations
Implementation and M&E	Survey on safe and voluntary returns – intention, needs and anticipated patterns Evidence based planning for returns and recovery in liberated areas Needs assessment at settlement and local level in the liberated areas Long term Recovery and Development Plans Implementation and M&E

FIGURE 1.2

Institutional Arrangements for Implementation of the Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion Component



6. Costing Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion Component

The costing of the implementation of the suggested activities under this component has been calculated based on a number of assumptions. These include:

- (i) Overlapping costing items among the three components (i.e. physical infrastructure and humanitarian support needed to address the immediate needs of IDPs) were not included as costed items in this component;
- (ii) costing for this component does not include project management costing. The only costing as ‘personnel’ is for technical staff; and
- (iii) ‘Support to community cohesion platforms’ is included under sub-component 3 but it is a mechanism put in place to support all subcomponents as per the implementation model in Figure 1.2.


TABLE 1.2

Costing of needs for the peace building, stability and social cohesion component, by State and sub-component

<i>Recovery Intervention</i>	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Regional/ Federal</i>	<i>Total</i>
Safe and Voluntarily Return of IDPs	9,017,100	11,321,100	7,481,100	5,177,100	7,097,100	8,633,100		48,726,600
Reconciliation, Peace Building and Community Cohesion	3,651,263	4,694,480	2,955,784	1,912,566	2,781,914	3,477,393		19,473,400
Local Governance and Citizens Engagement	9,288,090	11,941,830	7,518,930	4,865,190	7,076,640	8,845,800	150,000	49,686,480
Community Security, Justice, Human Rights, Mine Action, Small Arms Control	5,587,370	9,823,038	4,550,597	1,670,581	2,476,606	2,959,333	5,555,375	32,622,899
Total	27,543,823	37,780,448	22,506,410	13,625,437	19,432,260	23,915,625	5,705,375	150,509,379

FIGURE 1.3

Costing of needs for the peace building, stability and social cohesion component, by State and sub-component



7. Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion – Recovery Framework

See following pages.

TABLE 1.3

Detailed Needs Analysis and Implementation Strategy for Contribute to Safe and Voluntary

<i>Impact (Why)</i>	<i>Recovery Strategy (how/results)</i>	<i>Interventions (what)</i>
Needs of new displaced population, and population unable to return due to security constrains in the short to medium term		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food security, emergency shelter, WASH, health and nutrition, and education. • Support voluntary safe and dignified return. • Widespread protection risks and psychosocial trauma to civilians including children and women • Widespread incidence of SGBV and SGBV. • Lack of means of livelihoods (particularly problematic to female- and child-headed households), affecting IDPs and host communities. • Large numbers of unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) and child headed households • Needs of elderly mainly associated with care and isolation. 	<p>Holistic and integrated programmatic approach that address in an integrated manner the identified needs. Programmatic approach should target IDPs and host communities at the same time to avoid appearance of conflicts</p> <p>Priorities:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Land mines, 2) Security; 3) LGAS return back to community; 4) Community leaders return; 5) Communities return 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop and implement a policy and operational framework to determine how and when IDPs can be supported to return. • Apply and enforce existing international legal frameworks regarding safe, dignified and voluntarily return and resettlement. • Enhance institutional arrangements at the international level to ensure safe, dignified and voluntarily return and resettlement. • Broader access to basic needs and support of IDPs to ensure provision of food, shelter, WASH, education and health and nutrition. • Develop and implement protection interventions focusing on providing psychosocial support to affected population, including IDPs and host communities. • Develop and implement interventions focused on livelihoods provision and skills paying special attention to vulnerable populations (women, widows, elderly, youth, and UASC). • Develop and implement protection interventions to address SGBV. • Scale up existing livelihoods initiatives in camps, camp-like sites and host communities particularly those focused on vulnerable populations (i.e. widows, elderly and women) and privilege community based initiatives in the areas of psychosocial support, SGBV, and livelihoods provision.
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support government to adopt and implement a detailed policy framework with clear criteria for voluntary and secure returns. Operational and policy framework for safe return, including conditions in place of return -security, livelihoods, access to services, including availability of buildings and services in place. • Promote and implement international standards relevant to return of IDPs such as the African Union Convention on the Protection of and assistance to IDPs and the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement • Working closely with mandated international agencies, establish a regional mechanism/ Tripartite arrangement to facilitate a safe, dignified and voluntary return of Nigerian refugees from neighbouring countries • Support the deployment of human right monitors and legal aid counsellors • Monitor and ensure civilian character of IDPs camps and settlements and establish mechanism that promotes the involvement of IDPs • Carry out security assessment and intention surveys involving IDPs • Profiling and verification of spontaneous returns or settlements • Coordinated provision of emergency assistance (food, shelter, health and education) to IDPs, new IDPs and those populations unable to return • Strengthen prevention and response mechanisms in camps, camp-like settings and host communities, ensuring services provided in integrated manner (i.e. links to and nutrition, education, etc.) • Mapping and assessment of existing initiatives for scaling up regarding SGBV and psychosocial support, livelihoods means provision, paying particular attention to those initiatives that focus on vulnerable populations such as widows, women, UASC, elderly • Develop mechanisms of identification of cases of trauma, PTSD, SGBV and enhance service referral to specialised care (counselling, psychotherapy or psychiatric care) • Strengthen the capacity of local health institutions in responding and providing effective mental health and psychosocial support such as training of trainers, supervision and monitoring of services for quality control • Develop community-based and group-based strategies for providing psychosocial support to affected populations, including survivors of SGBV • Creation of “safe spaces” in camps and communities for females to communicate, seek services, interact and, if necessary, find refuge against acts of SGBV (including forced marriage) • Adhere to the IASC guidelines of MHPSS interventions in complex humanitarian settings • Regarding UASC, support family unity including through tracing program and extend existing emergency services to include UASC • Awareness campaign, communication and sensitization at local level including on SALW and Mine risk education (see 2.4) • Strengthen capacity of IDPs and host communities to apply prevention strategies using local social mechanisms (train local leaders, teachers, female empowerment programs, etc.) • Strengthen prevention and protection against sexual assault including establishing Sexual Assault Referral Centres (see 2.4) • Targeted cash transfer program • Vocation skills (see Component on Economic Recovery) • Life skills training including conflict resolution skills • Strengthen child protection mechanisms including on UASC • Strengthen referral pathways and ensure provision of basic needs • Support interventions to UASC will be sensitive to psychosocial needs and will identify and refer cases for Tailored psychosocial support • Extend existing emergency services to include UASC. • Scale-up reunification and enhance capacity of local authorities to provide registration and reunification services • Establish temporary caregiver programs. • Mapping of trauma (nature/type/scale, etc.) in affected population and provide trauma/PTSD counselling for those affected by the violent crisis • Support family unity including through tracing program. • Programs at camps, camp-like setting and host communities to provide continuous care • Safety net programs for adults over 60 and widow headed households • Specific programs for physically challenges persons (me, women, children) • Special attention and response on food security, health and provision of tailored community-based psychosocial support services for elders • Extend existing food, health services to include elderly and address specific needs • Establish livelihoods programming in camps, camp like sites and host communities, focusing on vulnerable populations (i.e. widows, SGBV survivors, former members of Boko Haram) • Marketable vocational trainings • Support to establish economic associations

<i>Impact (Why)</i>	<i>Recovery Strategy (how/results)</i>	<i>Interventions (what)</i>
Population willing and able to return/resettle		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IDPs overwhelmingly wish to return provided security and other preconditions are in place. • Lack of coordination between humanitarian and development actors; and the need to involve affected population and civil society organizations in decision making • Returnees face challenges including lack of tools, seeds, destruction of homes and infrastructure. • Mechanisms to address possible conflicts resulting from return movements, particularly those related to land, housing and property. • Widespread protection risks and psychosocial support to civilians including children and women, elderly, UASC. • Children in the environment of return should be supported with family reunification initiatives • SGBV initiatives for those returning and those who stayed behind. • Attention to elderly. 	<p>Holistic and integrated programmatic approach that address in an integrated manner the identified needs. Programmatic approach should target IDPs and local communities at the same time as to avoid appearance of conflicts</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure access to WASH services in areas of return. • Implement protection monitoring in the area of return for vulnerable populations (survivors of SGBV, UASC, elderly, widows). • Initiatives addressing trauma and related acute psychological disorders as well as SGBV. • Establish and implement family reunification
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementing joint strategies between humanitarian and development actors for humanitarian and early recovery activities, planning and programs. • Establish coordination mechanisms that allows coordination between humanitarians and development actors • Carry out capacity building initiatives on how to apply the criteria and assess when a return is safe and voluntary. • Implement capacity building mechanisms including trainings on protection and international standards • Establish livelihoods initiatives for returnees and communities who stayed behind, including market analysis in places of return, provision of skills trainings, cash transfers and specific activities for vulnerable populations. • Provide materials for construction and rehabilitation of shelters while also providing support to the community to ensure appropriate utilization of available raw material for construction of houses.(see Component on Infrastructure and Social Service) • Implement distribution of start-up kits to help them establish basic farming and domestic life (pans, tools, seeds, etc.) • Support paralegal interventions to promote access to housing, land and property (see subcomponent 2.4) • Promote safety and security of returnees through capacity building of security providers on international standards. • Support the establishment of and strengthening mechanisms for conflict resolution based on local institutions and dynamics (see subcomponent 2.4) • Efforts to replace lost and destroyed personal documentation and other relevant documents necessary to access assistance and social benefits and the full exercise of their rights such as birth registration should be hastened without discrimination in an expedient way and without imposing unreasonable conditions on displaced people to apply for or collect documents • Strengthen child protection mechanisms targeting vulnerable groups, including UASC, child headed households, victims of sexual violence, children born out of sexual violence and children borne out of conflict, including psychosocial support and alternative care and mine action/ERW risk education. • Scale-up reunification and enhance capacity of local authorities to provide registration and reunification services • Strengthen and expand alternative caregiver programs. • Create systems of identification and referral of cases to specialised care to target survivors of SGBV, and those in need of psycho-social support. • Enhance the capacity of health system at the primary level to treat psychological disorders and referral mechanisms. • Create community-based psycho-social and school based psychosocial support promotion and prevention mechanisms with affected communities • Undertake community engagement and dialogue initiatives to reduce stigma and support reintegration of children and women associated with Boko Haram, including girls and women who were subjected to sexual violence and children born out of conflict related sexual violence • Ensure alternatives for social inclusion and reduction of stigma strategies for people suffering of acute psychological distress/disorders • Safety net programs for adults over 60 and widow-headed households • Special attention and response on food security, health and provision of tailored community-based psychosocial support services for elders. • Implement tools and establish local structures that allows direct involvement of returnees and local populations • Implement programs aimed at supporting women and men and fostering equal engagement in decision-making. Response to gender, age and diversity specific concerns and in particular SGBV follow up at community level should be prioritised with increased support to local actors. Diversity should be promoted through community participatory programs • Strengthen protection and human rights monitoring including through strong information management system (see subcomponent 2.4) • Continuous monitoring of security risks returnees and local communities face.

TABLE 1.4

Detailed Needs Analysis and Implementation Strategy for Reconciliation, Peace Building, Community Cohesion and Violence Prevention

<i>Impact (Why)</i>	<i>Recovery Strategy (how/results)</i>	<i>Interventions (what)</i>
Peace-building, reconciliation and community cohesion		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased tensions and social fragmentation threatens peace across the North-East including between IDPs and hosts, and returnees and those who remained. Stigmatisation of individuals and vulnerable groups Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms weakened and sometimes unavailable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support community dialogue and mediation platforms processes, and where appropriate, truth telling and reconciliation; according to local needs and relations between different social, religious and ethnic groups and between generations Support mediation processes between IDP and host communities, and returnees and people who remained. Provide support for CSOs for peace building activities and innovations, in particular focused on youth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop community platforms and structures (see 5.3) Training of key stakeholders (village leaders, religious leaders, teachers, etc.) in villages with high number of host communities and IDPs and in IDP camps, and where returns are likely Micro-credit schemes to support small enterprises and/or allocation of equipment (i.e. sewing machine) to enable small business potential (link to component on Economic Recovery) Support civil society to contribute towards peace building initiatives
Preventing and addressing existing mobilisation for violent extremism		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduce numbers of Boko Haram members and sympathizers by encouraging defection Communities need to be assured that returning Boko Haram members have genuinely renounced violence Communities need a legitimate and trusted mechanism for justice and accountability for wrongs committed by Boko Haram members. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support a coordinated national strategy for combatting radicalization, and policy framework on how Boko Haram detainees should be categorized and treated Establish de-radicalisation programs in affected areas Establish re-integration programmes for children and adults associated with Boko Haram Ensure conditions of detention meet international standards Sensitization of communities to prepare for returns and reintegration Support justice and grievance redress mechanisms to facilitate victim redress, truth telling, and accountability. Monitor reintegration of individuals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workshops and technical advice to security sector to develop policy for 'safe corridors', and for implementation, taking into account the specific needs of under-18s Train and build capacity of prisons, law enforcement on legal framework Policy framework, political preparedness and institutional arrangement necessary for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration taking into account the specific needs of under-18s Review/revise legal and policy framework on treatment of Boko Haram detainees Build capacity of national body to undertake registration process and mobilise staff to North-East Equip and train staff in detention centres to ensure appropriate conditions including for women and children Scale-up prisons de-radicalization initiative and launch new initiatives in 3 North-East States <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Train religious teachers/Imams -Train psychologists -Establish workshops and skills training in 3 States to enable economic reintegration Communications campaign for all six states aimed at local population and potential Boko Haram members Train key stakeholders at ward level (village leaders, imams, teachers, etc.) in six states, who then do local outreach and sensitisation Establish a monitoring mechanism with police and local community security platforms of those who have gone through de-radicalisation programs in prisons.
Demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating CJTF and vigilante groups		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proliferation of unregulated vigilante groups with weapons poses risk to long-term security. Vigilante groups accused of participating in human rights violations Mechanism for justice and accountability for wrongs committed by vigilante groups necessary 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Create policy/legal framework established for reintegration Strengthen justice and accountability mechanisms for those responsible for abuses Community dialogue and support to receive fighters Processes of truth telling, reparation to victims reconciliation through community platforms Livelihood assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consultation with CJTF, security sector and community stakeholders to develop policy framework for safe reintegration program in three States Training of key stakeholders (village leaders, Imams, teachers, etc.) in six States Launch new initiatives in 6 North-East States, with a particular focus on Adamawa, Borno and Yobe; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Train religious teachers/Imams o Train team of psychologists to work with former members o Establish workshops and skills training in 3 States to enable economic reintegration



<i>Impact (Why)</i>	<i>Recovery Strategy (how/results)</i>	<i>Interventions (what)</i>
Responding to trauma		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extensive trauma and PTSD as a result of conflict, suffering and witnessing violence, bereavement, displacement and insecurity: address trauma • Trauma has significant impacts on socio-economic development, and social cohesion. It can lead to potential cycle of violence • Unaddressed, large-scale societal trauma and further trauma. • Developmentally, trauma impacts health, wellbeing, employability at the individual level, and the likelihood of future violence at the community level. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhance capacity of State health providers and civil society organizations who can develop appropriate programs • Establish referral mechanisms for population affected by trauma • Engage with health and mental welfare specialists in Federal, State and Local medical/mental health facilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support existing initiatives including cross agency platform to develop standards for trauma treatment. Provide support such as: Undertake mapping of available services and capacity activity and good practices (all 6 states) • Support government to develop common standards of practice, and establish monitoring systems • Support CSOs to scale-up existing interventions • Comprehensive survey to determine the extent of trauma levels and need for psycho-social support. • Support Government to establish specific psycho-social support programs according to needs including children (including former child combatants) women, youth and children. • Communications campaign to at-risk villages advising them on what services are available, and train health professionals in recognizing and responding to trauma in 6 States • Community-based and family-based sensitisation (local media, radio, town hall meetings, mobilisation of mothers) to convey the messages of life after defection • Initiatives to collect and destroy small arms and weapons in the communities (such as 'weapons for cash' or 'weapons for food' programs) • Create local media programs (i.e. local radio, musical programs) in local languages, to sensitise community member and raise awareness regarding how to readily receive former Boko Haram fighters and former fighters associated with vigilante groups • Conduct registration of defectors in the communities • Community-based and market-based livelihood support for defectors: including thorough market and value chain analysis to map out available livelihood options; vocational skills training based on market analysis (in order to avoid tensions, target beneficiaries can also include community members); life skills training; financial support on setting up economic associations; referral system for employment • Targeted psycho-social support to defectors/children and women associated with Boko Haram: identification of their psychosocial needs; psycho-social counselling and discussion groups; training of local psycho-social support personnel; strengthening the role of local and religious leaders

<i>Impact (Why)</i>	<i>Recovery Strategy (how/results)</i>	<i>Interventions (what)</i>
Improving the response to gender based violence as a consequence of conflict.		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SGBV as tactical feature of Boko Haram; • Kidnapping as preferred tactic of Boko Haram • Rape, torture, forced marriage, and forced conversion to Islam • SGBV and stress amongst the displaced. According to UNHCR Protection Monitoring 2015 2,226 households had survivors of SGBV, comprised of 32% forced or early marriage, 30% of rape or sexual assault and 21% engaging in survival sex (UNHCR, 2015). • The use of female suicide bombers, many of whom have been under the age of 16 (32 suicide bombings were reported in the North East between 1 November 2015 and 15 January 2016, involving 63 suicide bombers, with the majority being female (ACLEDD). • Fear of retaliation by Boko Haram or its adherents persist, contributing to a broader culture of silence that impedes reporting or help-seeking by survivors of violence. • Boys and young men, particularly those unaccompanied by adults, are further vulnerable to forced conscription into armed groups, including both into Boko Haram, and, according to some reports, into state-sponsored militia groups including the Civilian Joint Task Force (iDMC 2014). • Limited health and mental services including specialised personnel who can adequately address cases of SGBV while referral mechanisms are still weak. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comprehensive programming on SGBV, including immediate attention to SGBV survivors; as well as prevention initiatives. • Available mental and medical services with specialised personnel trained to address cases of SGBV to provide immediate attention to SGBV survivors. • Comprehensive mapping of available services. • Safe spaces and confidential system to reach out to SGBV survivors. • Legal and social protections for population, especially women and children, affected by SGBV. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Map and assess capacity of current active medical, psycho-social and health service providers for SGBV survivors and identify successful community interventions for scaling up. • Strengthen referral mechanisms for population affected by SGBV. • Strengthen legal and protection aid programs for SGBV survivors. • Support community based information campaigns on referral pathways where they exist and establish new ones where needed • Support the mobilisation of community actors to mobilise and refer survivors to access services • Train existing local mental health and medical specialists including personnel providing first aid and humanitarian workers to address SGBV. • Establish prevention programming at the community and camp levels (i.e. discussion groups, communication campaigns) to enhance behavioural change and gender roles. NSRP, protecting women and girls from violence through safe spaces. • Strengthen the operations of women friendly spaces and establish new ones where necessary • Support the operation and expansion of the GBVIMS and CPIMS • Design and implement male focused service provision initiatives to address the mental and psycho-social needs of men and boys • Establish male dominated discussion platforms to foster behavior change for the reduction of SGBV • Support the strengthening of platforms a for coordination (women committees, WDCs, etc.) with camp and host communities to ensure adequate delivery of quality services for SGBV survivors • Support capacity enhancement/mobilisation of on PSEA for humanitarian actors and key community stakeholders • Engage in community dialogue and sensitisation to reduce stigma and rejection of victims of SGBV and enhance support, as well as address negative perceptions of children born out of conflict related sexual violence to mitigate against rejection and violence.

TABLE 1.5

Detailed Needs Analysis and Implementation Strategy for Local Governance and Citizen Engagement

<i>Impact (Why)</i>	<i>Recovery Strategy (how/results)</i>	<i>Interventions (what)</i>
Assisting the return of displaced local governments & supporting local governments hosting IDPs		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local governments displaced and forced to operate remotely fiscal and human resources need to be enhanced to enable them to effectively contribute to the provision of public services the capacity of local governments to provide protection and safety of their constituents in displacement needs to be rebuilt IDPs hosted by local governments incur significant expenditure for local governments (for education, health care, etc.) influx of population weigh heavily on scarce natural resources management (water and land) and result in social tensions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase responsiveness of local government to the increasing needs of the population through: Decentralise planning for recovery and reconstruction needs to the local government level Facilitate intra-governmental cooperation of displaced and host local governments, and relevant State institutions Build capacity of local governments to plan, execute and monitor recovery projects Build capacity of local governments to respond to emergencies Improve social protection function of local government to identify vulnerabilities and address social protection needs; IDP's who chose to remain in host communities should be fully integrated and have full rights; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technical Assistance provided by local branches of State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAS) Set up bottom up planning model in cooperation with State authorities Stakeholder mapping – identification of core coordination groups at settlement level, including the most active representatives of communities, informal leaders, and both host and displaced councils and local governments Training on needs assessment and social protection needs assessment for core coordination groups Rapid needs assessment in settlements of IDPs, including camps, and host communities Integration of plans at State level, budgeting and fiscal allocations to inform provision of immediate service delivery needs in current Evaluation of the rapid needs assessment process and review of methodology
Building inclusive governance at the local level		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The poor quality of local democracy Inadequate and unequal access to public resources Critical need to restore and improve the social contract between the population and the government, and to restore citizens' trust in public institutions Need to improve effectiveness, social accountability and representativeness of local institutions Public trust in local government and traditional leaders need to be restored. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support to decentralisation and democratic process through: Enhance representativeness and responsiveness of LGA councils and ruling elites Enable and facilitate citizens' engagement in local institutions Increase political/electoral participation and reduce political exclusion and discriminations Reduce corruption and curtail abuse of power Enhance grievance redress and conflict resolution mechanisms by strengthening political participation and inclusion, Build and strengthen social accountability mechanisms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitating engagement of stakeholders at local (community, settlement) level; Promoting community radios for citizen engagement and conflict resolution; Encourage political inclusiveness at local level Facilitate policy dialogue at state and federal level on decentralization Support policy implementation at local level Engagement with accountability institutions including on corruption
Strengthening local government capacities		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low capacity of local governments to deliver services Local governments have not been effectively granted the resources earmarked to them Host government incurring significant drain on already scarce financial and natural resources Need to ensure the provision of basic services and livelihood beyond their pre-conflict level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve effectiveness of local institutions through: Ensure adequate spatial coverage by public institutions Invest in building capacities of LGAs for effective and responsive governance, Establish more effective interagency coordination Improve IRG, PFM and policy implementation capacity Implement de-concentration of service provision: access to and quality of health and education at frontline service providers level, State and non-State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technical Assistance for LGA level government including: Trainings for local governments on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Budgeting and Planning, Project Monitoring, & Reporting, Mentoring and on-the-job training

<i>Impact (Why)</i>	<i>Recovery Strategy (how/results)</i>	<i>Interventions (what)</i>
Enabling participation to enhance accountability and transparency of local institutions		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of accountability and transparency Communities at local level do not have opportunity to participate in the planning process, or in monitoring and evaluation of programme implementation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build local accountability mechanisms through: Build social and upward accountability of local institutions, Build transparency mechanisms, including budget transparency, capital expenditure and public procurement opened to public scrutiny Strengthen existing community mobilisation mechanisms Enable community participation in the drafting of recovery plans Involve communities and civil society in oversight of the implementation Mainstream and institutionalize local participation mechanisms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training for core coordination groups on Community Mobilisation Building on the existing structures and through Core Coordination Groups establish broader community platform which will serve as a forum to discuss community needs, grievances and security. Performance Based Disbursement System, including financial and qualitative reporting Preparation of long term and evidence based recovery plans for liberated areas using participatory approach and through applying local needs assessment methods. Training for CSOs on independent monitoring
Restoring security and rule of law at local level		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The conflict has generated multiple sources of tensions and disputes within affected communities. Need to re-establish and strengthen formal and informal conflict resolution mechanisms and legal security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacitate local government to exercise a preventive role for security and to help their constituents affected by the conflict to claim their rights and obtain compensation. (This goes beyond the role vested with local governments under normal circumstances) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Using established community platforms set up regular consultation and information exchange mechanism for security and rule of law Training for local government on referrals and legal aid providers (see 2.4 below)

TABLE 1.6

Justice, Community Security, Control of Small Arms and Mine Action

<i>Impact (Why)</i>	<i>Recovery Strategy (how/results)</i>	<i>Interventions (what)</i>
Security and Rule of Law re-established in all accessible areas		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Absence/weak capacity of justice and security institutions to deliver services drives conflict and insecurity Absence of police and justice institutions and services from camps denies justice to those residing there and increases vulnerability Lack of tools by law enforcement institutions (Courts, prosecution, prisons) to deliver justice due to destruction of infrastructure and equipment by Boko Haram Extensive use of pre-trial detention in poor prison conditions coupled with case backlogs denies justice to accused persons Lack of legal assistance and knowledge denies victims of redress, especially regarding women's property rights, children's rights and SGBV Stigmatisation and poor investigative and judicial response to sexual assault results in discrimination and creates culture of impunity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support police to re-introduce services in areas where they have been absent due to insecurity, and strengthen capacity to deliver services with particular focus on IDPs, and host communities. Establish high visibility justice services in IDPs camps and within local communities Improve prison conditions, and improve capacity to rehabilitate and reintegrate prisoners especially de-radicalisation programmes Strengthen case management and data collection of justice institutions Services for SGBV survivors improved and integrated with health and livelihoods support Carry out advocacy campaigns against SGBV and Boko Haram related stigmatisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detailed localized assessments of needs in all North-East States. Basic policing kits for refurbished police posts services (equipment, laws, ICT, stationary, communication equipment etc) Establish police offices in IDPs camps and areas of high concentration of IDPs Structured training programme for police in North-East States, with heightened focus on Borno, Adamawe and Yobe. Training for prisons staff Support legal aid provision for prisoners, survivors of SGBV and returnees with land disputes Coordinate with PVE and livelihoods components to establish pathways to reintegration Construct gender sensitive and purpose built courts to replace those that were destroyed (link to infrastructure) Retool, equip and provide materials for establishing courts services (stationery, court furniture, law books, forms for court users) Mobile justice hearings in IDPs camps, and locations without a courtroom, focusing on serious criminal cases and clearing backlog Training of judiciary, prosecutors and court staff Support to legal aid providers (NGOs and LACON) to provide free legal aid Case management systems developed to strengthen and speed-up hearings, and improve tracking of cases. Establish 8 x Sexual Assault Referral Centres with trained staff including law enforcement, victim support, medical and psycho-social counseling providing integrated justice and other services for SGBV survivors. At least one per state, 2 in areas with highest need (including Borno) Establish 1 x Model Police Station in each state to incorporate gender friendly policing, strengthen the connection with communities and increase accountability.
Fair, effective and accessible dispute resolution systems in local communities		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Absence of legitimate, fair and effective grievance redress mechanisms increases chances of violent conflicts. Lack of gender and human rights awareness undermines realization of rights 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen community security infrastructure and implement community policing Strengthen traditional forms of dispute settlement to comply with human rights standards and due process; Education on civic rights and responsibilities; Increase levels of knowledge and awareness on human rights 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish/train multi-agency community security platforms (using existing structure where possible) that enable community members to regularly liaise with police. Train traditional leaders, Sharia judges and others in human rights and gender sensitive dispute resolution Support coordination between informal and formal mechanisms Train/capacitate women community leaders & strengthen women and youth participation and voice in informal grievance redress. Training and outreach to vigilante group members
Human rights abuses and misconduct monitored and punished		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of accountability and oversight allows impunity for abuses and undermines rule of law and public trust. Drives public mistrust and conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen justice and security sector oversight and accountability through both internal and external mechanisms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance capacity of NFP's Internal Affairs Section, and the Police Services Commission. Strengthen oversight bodies eg the Human Rights Commission and Committee against Torture, NGOs. Support judicial inspection mechanisms to oversee judicial conduct. Support inclusion on the State of North East in State party reports to international and regional human rights mechanisms Support human rights monitoring at community level

<i>Impact (Why)</i>	<i>Recovery Strategy (how/results)</i>	<i>Interventions (what)</i>
Knowledge and awareness of rights increased and victimization reduced		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poor knowledge and awareness of rights especially rights of women and marginalised groups prevents access to justice, allowing impunity for abuses. Stigmatisation of SGBV and persons abducted by Boko Haram 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Outreach and information campaigns against stigmatisation and discrimination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct KAP study on violence against women and children Develop/implement behavioural change training on violence against women and children Grants for Civil Society to implement pilot programs to strengthen community security and human rights. Pilot free reporting and advice line with Legal Aid Council/NGOs Outreach campaign engaging schools, religious and community leaders and through mass media
Control access to Small Arms and Light Weapons		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SALW are the weapons of choice of Boko Haram, who amassed a large stockpile of arms and ammunition from Libya following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, and who use them to carry out attacks against civilian, police and military targets. Small arms have been widely dispersed among the civilian population (CJTFs) for use in self-defence against Boko Haram, which has also led to their misuse by unregulated vigilante groups. Illicit trafficking of SALW continues to supply Boko Haram and fuel violence, facilitated by porous borders and inadequate cross-border cooperation with Nigeria's neighbours The ability of communities to build resilience through their participation in SALW reduction is imperative, while bearing in mind the related imperative of not increasing the vulnerability of communities to attacks by Boko Haram. Effective recovery of arms from unregulated CJTFs and the provision of alternative livelihood options is critical to sustaining violence prevention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimise the impact of the widespread availability of SALW by sensitising communities to the dangers associated with them and promoting the safe and secure storage of arms and ammunition that are already legally registered and in civilian hands, in order to reduce risks to communities. Support vulnerable communities in the development of community security plans in cooperation with available security service providers, including armed forces, law enforcement agencies and civilian joint task forces, as relevant. Enhance community participation on security / SALW awareness and reduction through targeted advocacy and sensitization programs Strengthen community resilience and security through the development of a comprehensive Early Warning Mechanism/Database. Provide sustainable alternative livelihood options for key actors (JCTF, other vigilantes groups) whose livelihoods have revolved around the use of SALW over the period of conflict Support cross-border coordination, cooperation and information-sharing between Nigeria and neighbouring States in order to curb the illicit cross-border movement of SALW. Enhance the capacity of the security forces to identify and trace SALW captured from Boko Haram, in order to gather information on sources and trafficking routes of illicit SALW. Enhance the capacity of the security forces to destroy SALW captured from Boko Haram in order to demonstrate tangible progress and prevent such weapons from re-entering the illicit market Support for SALW control should be guided by international and regional instruments such as the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) (www.smallarmsstandards.org), the UNPoA, and the ECOWAS Convention in order to ensure compliance with international best practice and protocols. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engage and sensitise selected border community members including IDPs to form early warning agents (work with CBO, HRMs etc...) Organise joint cross border sensitization programs on the influence on conflict/SALW proliferation on economic livelihoods. Support the formalization of recognized CJTFs into cooperative community security agents and provide alternative livelihood options. Provide equipment/agricultural support for identifiable groups including IDPs in selected border communities in response for arms collected. Community based awareness-raising on the dangers associated with SALW (in conjunction with awareness raising on mines, ERW and IEDs. Community-led solutions for the safe and secure storage of legally licensed small arms already in the hands of civilians (e.g. locally produced locking mechanisms, communal storage of small arms, etc.) in order to reduce risk. Build the capacity of local NGOs to lead the inclusive development of community security plans in cooperation with available security service providers. Training to security services on the identification and tracing of SALW captured from Boko Haram. Needs assessment of the Multinational Joint Task Force with regard to cross-border cooperation to prevent illicit trafficking in SALW.

<i>Impact (Why)</i>	<i>Recovery Strategy (how/results)</i>	<i>Interventions (what)</i>
Mine action – Risk education; Survey & Demining; Victim Assistance		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Undertake mine action survey and clearance to address fear of mine/ ERW-infested/roads/ houses/ wells/fields among the population trapped in the North East, IDPs and refugees leading to increased and long-term displacement and lack of access for government and humanitarian actors Increasing number of deaths and violent injuries leading to lasting impairments as a consequence of accidents from explosive devices and landmines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Create preconditions for safe return and access for humanitarian support Population living in areas affected from fighting need to be able to identify explosive devices/ landmines and how to stay safe and protect others from getting injured or killed. Boys and young men are expected to be most at risk. Surveillance and reporting capacities on explosive devices and blast injury are weak among the media, health operators etc. and do not allow for adequate planning and response. Mechanisms at the local and state level that link community reports on landmines/ERW with the relevant actors capable to assess and remove explosive threats within 24 hours. Weak capacity among first aid responders at the local level increases the risk to die from violent trauma or to sustain more severe and long-lasting impairments. Weak capacity among health and rehabilitation service providers increases the risk of sub-standard care and of secondary impairments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Set up mine action coordination mechanism to undertake risk education, survey and clearance Provide risk education, survey and humanitarian demining in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Strengthening and scaling up existing mine/ERW/IED risk education initiatives by the military, civil defense and various Emergency Management Agencies at the local level aiming to provide coherent and effective safety messaging that specifically addresses children and other at-risk groups. Agreeing on a common mechanism to monitor (injury surveillance), report and respond to incidents related to mines/ERW and its victims at the community, LGA and State levels. Defining SOP on mine/ERW-reporting and response among Army engineers and others authorized to engage in Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and local government structures. Systematic mine/ERW survey, LGA by LGA, coupled with risk education, EOD and victim identification Ensuring health and rehabilitation sector training includes blast injury/trauma specific training that is age- and gender specific Undertaking a victim needs assessment and setting up a case management system for conflict victims and persons with disabilities including mine/ERW victims

Component: Infrastructure & Social Services

1. Introduction

1.1 Role of Infrastructure and Social Service Delivery towards Recovery

The key objectives of the Infrastructure and Social Service Component are to:

- (1) Characterise and estimate the impact of the crisis on the physical infrastructure and social services of the affected region and;
- (2) Propose preliminary strategic options and scenarios for the restoration and recovery of infrastructure and service delivery.

With the proposed strategic Recovery Framework and the guiding policies by the Government, sector teams have also attempted to identify, quantify, and cost the corresponding transitional recovery needs. The Recovery Framework for this component is presented at the end of this chapter and summarizes the recovery needs in all sectors.

The sustainable restoration and improvement of infrastructure and social services is crucial to societal normalisation and stabilisation in the crisis-affected areas, as well as for creating conditions for eventual IDPs returns or smooth integration into host communities. Efficient and effective recovery of infrastructure and service delivery will not only help ameliorate the suffering of the affected populations, but substantively catalyse the restoration of citizen trust in the State. Hence paying immediate attention to addressing critical service delivery disruptions and shortcomings caused by the conflict is not a choice but an imperative. For example, recovery strategies in the agriculture sector are critical to ensuring food security in the region and restoring livelihoods of affected families. Similarly, the housing sector in the region experienced significant damage, and reconstructing housing units is one of the key elements in restoring people's sense of normalcy and is a first step towards reactivating the productive economy. Repair and reconstruction of damaged transport infrastructure

can promote mobility of goods and services and people. Destroyed facilities such as local government offices, ministry offices, and police stations need to be prioritised in the recovery efforts so that governance and security management function more effectively.

In the directly affected states, in addition to the 'brick-and-mortar' damage to infrastructure, the loss of equipment, the exodus of employees, and a drop in staff capacity are challenges that need to be addressed. In indirectly affected states service provision has been considerably strained by the influx of displaced populations, and work needs to be done to ensure satisfactory provision of social services. For example, many schools have exceeded standard enrolment capacity; the road network is suffering from increased usage; and water and sewage systems are stretched to handle increased demands in some states with a large IDPs population.


1.2 Relationship with other RPBA Components

As discussed in the Overview, while the assessment of damages and needs as well as suggested recovery strategies are presented under three components, they should be understood as critical, intertwined elements of a single recovery and peace building framework that adopts a social cohesion approach cutting across all sectors. All infrastructure and social services efforts are subject to a careful assessment of their social impacts, and should be designed in such a way that they promote reconciliation, social cohesion, trust and peace building. As an integral part of daily life of conflict-affected people and communities, infrastructure and social services are critical parts of comprehensive responses necessary to attend the needs of the populations and communities affected by the conflict.

1.3 Assessment Scope and Methodology

Sectoral Scope of Assessment: As agreed between the Government and RPBA partners, the current scope of the Infrastructure and So-

FIGURE 2.1

Methodology for assessing damage and needs

cial Services Component covers: *Agriculture; Education; Energy; Environment; Health and Nutrition; Housing; Information and Communications Technology (ICT); Private Enterprise; Public Buildings; Social Protection; Transport; and Water Supply and Sanitation.*

Administrative and Temporal Scope: The assessment primarily focuses on crisis impacts and recovery related to public sector assets, with the exception of some sectors, such as energy, housing, education, and ICT, where private sector-run public services have also been included. Since the private sector is providing vital public services such as electricity and ICT, the Government may want to consider private sector facilitation measures.

Use of Improvised, Locally-adapted, and Context-specific Methodology: The methodology developed for this assessment brings together a blend of conflict and post-disaster needs assessment tools, as well as building on local knowledge and state and national systems for damage characterisation, classification, and quantification.

Damage and Impact Classification: The impact of the conflict on each sector has been evaluated in terms of *Direct Damage* and *Recovery Costs*. Direct Damages refers to the monetary value of replacing com-

pletely or partially destroyed assets, and movable assets like goods, furniture, machineries and inventories. Indirect losses have not been the emphasis of this assessment. Importantly though, impact analysis has factored in disruption in service delivery in the directly affected areas and also has taken stock of the additional burden on services in areas hosting IDPs.

Classification and Quantification of Recovery Needs: Recovery needs are the costs of recommended interventions that include the reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged and destroyed infrastructure and equipment. These costs have been calculated using the replacement value of assets and infrastructure, plus additional differentials for building-back-better. Recovery needs also include capacity building and operational costs for service delivery that are necessary for the implementation of interventions over the next four years during the stabilisation (years 1–2) and recovery periods (years 3–4).

The assessment methodology is summarized in Figure 2.1, which illustrates it as an on-going process. The assessment process begins with the estimation of physical damages, and moves towards developing recovery strategies and implementation, with the option of updating damages and needs over time.

Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): The key objective of ensuring the equitable delivery of infrastructure and social services to IDPs and their hosts in conflict-affected areas has been incorporated in the needs assessments. Further recommendations to mainstream IDPs issues into the recovery agenda include the following: (i) ensuring schools, health care facilities, water and sanitation systems, for instance, are rebuilt to accommodate new demand associated with the presence of IDPs; (ii) ensuring equal and adequate access by IDPs and host populations to rehabilitated services so as not to engender conflict between IDPs and hosts in areas with high concentrations of IDPs; (iii) involving both IDPs and hosts in the process of identifying rehabilitation priorities in communities from the beginning of the recovery process; (iv) weighing in IDPs return options, surveying return intentions and needs of IDPs to discern return intentions and triggers in order to prioritise the rehabilitation of infrastructure and social services that will enable and sustain return, and; (v) avoiding neglecting IDPs skills such as in public works, and adequately employing these skills during the recovery process.

Data Collection and Validation: The key source of information for damage and needs was data provided by state sector focal points through customized sector templates. This was supplemented by independent secondary data collection by the RPBA team from other sources. Data validation techniques included field inspection visits, interviews with relevant stakeholders such as civil society, and desk reviews. Remote sensing data was used to analysis damages in education, environment, health and nutrition, housing, transport, and private enterprise, both for data gap filling and corroboration. Further validation of data was performed using process verification techniques and empirical plausibility checks.

1.4 Key Assumptions, Constraints and Limitations

Several key assumptions, constraints and limitations are applicable to all sectors under the Infrastructure and Social Services Component. These include:

- Where possible, the analysis of damages and needs is disaggregated at the State level, and collated from the Local Government Authority (LGA) level.
- As a result of limited access to some of the heavily affected areas for data gathering and verification, the sector teams used relative to baseline analyses where inventory based damage data was not avail-

able. In addition, where available, validity of primary data was established through use of secondary sources such as remote sensing.

- To facilitate focused scope for the RPBA, the assessment takes stock only of damages and impacts created by the crisis since 2010, with a cut-off point of 2015. This is notwithstanding that the conflict continues to evolve and the associated damages and needs continue to accrue. There is a need to periodically update the damage and needs analysis.
- The damage classification criterion for fully and partially damaged infrastructure was adopted to generate analysis of primary data. This approach was consistent across different sectors.
- An important aspect of estimating reconstruction needs was inclusion of security premiums. The security risk premiums were not factored in the final cost estimates with the understanding that these may be added based on government's decision for implementation planning and resource allocation.

2. Overview of Pre-crisis Conditions of Infrastructure and Social Services

This section provides a consolidated overview of sector characteristics and conditions prior to the crisis. This is important to contextualise and frame sector damages and needs. For each sector, baseline conditions reviewed include: (i) brief profile of sector; (ii) inventory of infrastructure assets; (iii) status of service delivery; (iv) costs of service delivery; and (e) sector developmental challenges.

2.1 Agriculture

Overall, about 80 percent of the population in the region was engaged in either crop farming or animal rearing. The livelihood zones in the region are highlighted in the table below.

TABLE 2.1
Livelihood Zones by North-East States

<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Yobe</i>
NG zone 5	NG zone 10	NG zone 10	NG zone 10	NG zone 5	NG zone 11
NG zone 6	NG zone 11	NG zone 12	NG zone 11	NG zone 6	NG zone 12
NG zone 9	NG zone 12	NG zone 13		NG zone 7	NG zone 13
NG zone 10				NG zone 9	

Key

NG zone 5: *Niger and Benue river floodplain rice and fishing*

NG zone 6: *Central plain yam and cassava*

NG zone 7: *Mambilla Plateau cattle, cocoa and tea*

NG zone 9: *North-East highland maize, cocoyam, potatoes, and livestock*

NG zone 10: *North Central maize, sorghum and cotton*

NG zone 11: *Northern floodplains irrigated rice, wheat and vegetables*

NG zone 12: *North-East millet, cowpea, and sesame*

NG zone 13: *Sabel mixed cereals and livestock*

Ownership of land and/or livestock, access to agricultural inputs, capital and mechanized agriculture, are the major determinants of wealth in the sector. The majority of the farmers (at least 80 percent) practice rain-fed, subsistence agriculture on two to four hectares of land, with


inadequate access to high quality seeds, fertiliser and efficient production practices. The resulting yields in the region are low, averaging 20 percent of the world's highest yield. Increasing population and climate change have further exacerbated the challenges of poor, small-holder farmers. With the short rainy season in most of the regions, only one cropping season is attained during the year. Irrigated land is less than one percent of the cultivated area, and is located mainly in the Hadejia-Nguru wetlands, which receive their water from the Komadougou-Yobe River which flows into Lake Chad. In the areas with developed irrigation facilities or where flood plain farming takes place, there are usually two cropping seasons in the year, during the rainy season and with irrigation during the dry season. Irrigation water is applied mainly to wheat, rice, vegetables, and sugarcane, for enhanced yield. For example, while the average yields for rice and tomatoes during the rainy season are 2.2t/ha and 6.4t/ha, they are 3.5t/ha and 10t/ha, respectively under irrigation. In the 2003-2004 season, irrigated production accounted for only 0.9 percent of total grain production and 2.3 percent of total vegetable production.

The primary shocks to livelihoods in the region are droughts or floods, depending on the livelihood zone. More than half of the wetlands have been lost due to drought and upstream dams along the Hadejia and Jama'are rivers, which meet to form the Komadougou River. Expansion of irrigated crop production in the fadama lands has also contributed to the lowering of the water table in some areas. The chart below shows a seasonal calendar for a typical year in the North-East.

The pre-crisis situation regarding the inventory of infrastructure and functionality of service delivery varied from state to state in the region. Borno State, for example, had an inventory of over 560,097 infrastructures and a fairly functional service delivery system prior to the crisis. However, the quality of service delivery in the agricultural sector in the North-East, as in the rest of the country, had started dwindling before the crisis. In response, from 2010, the Federal Government instituted a number of interventions to improve the provision of subsidised inputs to farmers, especially fertilisers and seeds, and increase the access of farmers to credit facilities, agricultural equipment and irrigation facilities. These initiatives took off just before the crisis heightened in the region and therefore, have not any shown any impact in the region. In December 2011, nationwide under the Growth Enhancement Support Scheme (GESS), 17 fertiliser suppliers had been identified to feed about 4,280 certified agro-deal-

FIGURE 2.2

Seasonal calendar for a typical year in the North-East



Note: All the major crops are grown during the rainy season except wheat which is usually grown under irrigation in the dry season.

ers; 600,000 farmers had been captured at the GESS data centre; and only 15 states had written to commit to participate in the GESS. Regarding the provision of credit to farmers, in December 2011, the Federal Ministry of Finance had only signed MOU with the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the participating banks for the provision of guarantee on 70 percent of the credit provided by the banks. Pilot demonstration of the e-wallet technology platform was planned to start in January 2012.

2.2 Education

Basic education in Nigeria is provided predominantly by States and/ or local government authorities (72 percent of enrolment), followed by the private sector (20 percent), Federal schools (five percent), and religious schools (four percent). Private education is more prevalent in the South and is dominated by children from wealthier families. By contrast, religious schools are more prevalent in the North, and their enrolment is slightly higher among children from poorer families. In the North-East, 42 percent of children attend religious schools only while 34 percent attend formal and religious schools. The majority of religious schools do not integrate core education subjects into the instructional schedule.

To establish the 2010 baseline data for education, information was collected by the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) on early childhood development (ECD) centres, primary schools and junior secondary schools in the North-East. Though this data does not include senior secondary schools, it does allow for a higher level of consistency of measurement across the states. Across the six states of

Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe, a total number of 9,191 primary schools (including those with ECD centres) and 1,687 junior secondary schools existed in 2010.

Girls’ participation in education remains below that of boys’ across all levels of education, and the gender gap is significantly more pronounced at the upper secondary level. Education sector access indicators are particularly dismal for the North-East: whereas all southern States achieved basic education GERs close to 100 percent in 2013, the North-West and North-East registered a GER of 66 and 63 percent at the primary level and 54 and 42 percent at the lower secondary level, respectively. Furthermore, Nigeria has an estimated 13.2 million school-age children (6-14 years old) not in school – the largest out-of-school population in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 13.2 million, 95 percent (12.6 million) are in the north of the country, and the numbers of out-of-school children actually went up between 2010 and 2013 in the North-West and North-East.

Despite having established teachers’ minimum qualification criteria in basic education at the national level, a large proportion of recruited teachers were and still are unqualified, especially in the North-West and North-East. In 2010, on average, 32 percent of teaching staff in pre-primary education were unqualified, 40 percent in primary education, and 15 percent in junior secondary education. Qualified teachers tend to be in the South, in urban areas and private schools. Important hurdles to the effectiveness of teaching remain unresolved in basic education, including inadequate school facilities and a lack of instructional materials. However, total public spending on education


(at all levels) has hovered around 1.7 percent of GDP and increased marginally from 10.2 to 12.5 percent of total public spending over the 2009-2013 period. As such, Nigeria's education spending is lower than the averages for sub-Saharan Africa (4.6 percent of GDP and 17 percent of total public expenditure).

2.3 Energy

Historically, power supply in Nigeria was provided by a vertically integrated government monopoly that generated, transmitted and distributed electricity. Reform began in 2001 with the adoption of the National Electric Power Policy, followed by the Electric Power Sector Reform Act (EPSRA) in 2005. In accordance with EPSRA, the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) was unbundled into six generation companies (GenCos), one transmission company (TransCo), and 11 distribution companies (DisCos). These were to operate as separate companies in preparation for eventual privatization (DisCo coverage areas are illustrated in Figure 2.3. EPSRA also mandated the creation of an independent regulator and so the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) was formed in 2007. The Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN) remains government-owned but has been placed under a management contract awarded to Manitoba Hydro International (MHI).

In the North-East region, two DisCos cover the six states: Yola covers Borno, Adamawa, Taraba and Yobe, while Jos covers Bauchi and Gombe. Baseline conditions of 2010 reflect an already challenging situation for electricity delivery, with inadequate infrastructures and load wheeling capacity. Allocation of energy from the grid to the northern DisCos is less than 37 percent of the energy supplied; and structural and operational issues with the grid typically mean that the northern DisCos receive much less energy than what has been allocated to them. For example, in 2009, the energy consumption for Jos and Yola was only 4.9 percent and 1.8 percent of the total energy supplied respectively. In 2010, resources across the six States consisted of 9,649 km of transmission lines (4,336 km of 33 kV; 1,008 km of 11 kV; and 4,305 km of 415-230 V) connecting 92 33/11 kV substations, 1,844 11 kV/415 V substations, and 948 33 kV/415 V substations. A large percentage of the distribution substation transformers were overloaded and in need of reinforcement. Many customers were not metered and others received estimated bills – resulting in customers either being over- or under-billed. Since the 1980s, the available power has not significantly increased in the region; thus industrial

FIGURE 2.3
Distribution Company Coverage Area



customers depend primarily on diesel generators and the comparatively high cost has forced the shutdown of many factories particularly in the textile industry which used to be a major employer of labour.

2.4 Environment

The environment sector consists of three main sub-sectors: Ecological Assets, Solid Waste Management and Debris Management and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

Ecological Assets: The North-East is predominately a hot and dry environment with a typical Sudanian Savanna vegetation and less than 200mm of rainfall per year. The region is part of two major river basins and endowed with vast wetland and savannah forest areas providing an important livelihood for the communities. These livelihoods include grazing livestock, orchard farming, medicinal herb harvesting, and firewood collection.

Solid Waste Management: The solid waste management sector is currently poorly regulated through a fragmented framework of institutions and regulations. At a Federal level, the National Environmental Standards and Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA) is mandated to monitor compliance with national and international laws; however no specific State-wide regulation or implementation plans currently exist in the North-East. Waste management is therefore provided as a municipal service in urban agglomerations only, with management decisions made at a Local level, based solely on immediate

locally visible requirements, and a lack of strategic future-proof planning. As a result, the investment in this sector has been exclusively on rolling stock, with little to no investment made in disposal or recycling processes, nor on human soft skills. An informal sector is active and focuses on the recovery of valuable metals and plastics from the value chain. Most materials are brought to processing sites as far away as Lagos or Kano. Many other sub value chains (paper, cardboard) are currently not fully valorised, leaving a livelihoods opportunity deficit.

Debris Management and ERW: As a sector, debris management was non-existent pre-crisis. The construction sector is expected to contain some valuable skills required for the large scale management of debris, however there are still many lacunae, especially in safe demolition practices, large scale accountable logistical management, hazardous waste management and most notably, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) management.

2.5 Health and Nutrition

The Northern geopolitical zones of Nigeria have lower coverage rates of key services such as immunisation and skilled birth attendance. The nutritional status of children and women of childbearing age is another concern, and reliable figures on effective treatment of acute malnutrition at primary care facilities are lacking (SMART Survey III, 2011). Despite large investment in the health and nutrition sector in the last two decades, Nigeria did not meet the millennium development goals (MDG) for health. The health system remains fragile and under-performing, with outbreaks of infectious diseases such as cholera, measles and meningitis often reaching epidemic proportions. Widespread malnutrition – about half of all children under five in the six states are stunted – contributes to almost half of all childhood deaths. Service delivery, especially for maternal and child health interventions, showed no improvement in the last three decades. Table 2.2 shows some key health indicators for each state and the national average.

The pre-crisis number and distribution of facilities were considered adequate, but infrastructure is poor and hard for remote communities to reach. Although local government areas usually have at least one secondary hospital, access to comprehensive Primary Health Care (PHC) is restricted by the fact that the majority of first line structures focus on preventive care, with a limited capacity for diagnosis and treatment of common diseases. Most PHC personnel are Community Health Extension Workers, with few nurses, and shortages of

TABLE 2.2
Pre-crisis Health Service Delivery Indicators by State for the North-East (Source: MICS, 2011)

<i>State</i>	<i>Full vaccination 1-2 years</i>	<i>Deliveries with skilled birth attendants</i>
Adamawa	34.2	37.3
Bauchi	18.3	7.9
Borno	7.7	19.2
Gombe	31.3	21.7
Taraba	25	17.6
Yobe	10.1	20.5
Nigeria	22.9	48.7

midwives, pharmacists and laboratory workers. Medical doctors are available in larger facilities and hospitals. Private healthcare is important although underdeveloped in the North and 70 percent of health expenditure is out-of-pocket.

Sector development challenges include: constrained and inefficient State budgets with preferential allocation to secondary and tertiary care, shortages of skilled personnel and essential drugs, insufficient operations budgets, low quality of care, low public sector utilization and limited private health sector in the North-East, weak management and limited accountability.

2.6 Housing

In 2010, the estimated total number of housing units in the six conflict affected states was about 4 million. Along with the largest population size, Bauchi and Borno States have the largest number of housing units, with 908,062 and 977,795 respectively. Based on the construction materials, housing units are classified as permanent and temporary houses. Temporary housing units are informal and traditional houses constructed of temporary building materials such as mud, earth, bamboo, thatched roof, etc. Permanent houses are those using modern and durable building materials for floor, wall and roof. It is estimated that nearly 62 percent of the total housing stock in North-East were temporary units. This is very high compared to the national average of temporary units. In comparison with other states

in the North-East, Gombe and Taraba had the highest shares of permanent houses in 2010, amounting to about 67 percent.

2.7 Information & Communication Technologies (ICT)

In Nigeria, citizens use three types of telecommunications services: (i) mobile phone; (ii) internet (including high-speed internet or broadband); and (iii) fixed line telephony. Of these, mobile phone remains the predominant form of communication in Nigeria, with 91.2 percent of the population in Nigeria covered by a mobile phone signal in 2013. However, mobile phone coverage is heavily centred on larger population centres in Nigeria due to commercial viability. A Universal Service Provision Fund (USPF) is intended to be used to extend the access gap in mobile phone coverage to rural and remote areas. As shown below, coverage of mobile phone is sparse in the North-East States, and particularly in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Across the country, broadband adoption remains low and fixed-line network is not widely available.


2.8 Private Enterprise

The private sector in Nigeria, including enterprises of all sizes, is dominated by services, in particular wholesale and retail trade. Nigeria's largest employers are the agriculture, manufacturing and trade sectors.²⁸ The business environment is generally difficult in all of Nigeria and the country ranked 169 out of 189 in the World Bank's 2016 *Doing Business* report.²⁹ The 2014 Sub National Doing Business Report on Nigeria lists Gombe, Yobe and Bauchi as better performing states on the ease of doing business index, which ranked these three States at 6, 8 and 11 respectively. The report ranked Taraba and Adamawa much lower at 19 and 29 respectively out of 36 States. Note that Borno State was not ranked in this report.

The North-East's economy comprises mainly of micro-, small- and medium-enterprises (MSME) and no large industrial establishments, and a host of informal establishments – all in the non-oil sectors. A survey was carried out jointly by Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority of Nigeria (SMEDAN) and Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2010 on the MSME sector. The survey covered

FIGURE 2.4

Mobile Phone Coverage in Nigeria by States (Source: Open Signal, 2016)



4,300 MSMEs (employing below 200 persons). While all 36 states are reported to be covered in the survey, data is not available for the states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa. This is likely a result of lack of access to these areas at the time of the survey, which took place during the crisis. Table 2.3 shows the relatively small (1.98 million, 5.37 percent) distribution of microenterprises in the three North-East States of Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba against the countrywide total of 36.99 million enterprises. The numbers of SME distribution (4.13 million, 5.68 percent) are also small compared to national distribution in other states.

2.9 Public Buildings

For the purpose of this assessment, the main types of buildings/public assets that were assessed are prisons, post offices, audit offices, police stations, police barracks, cultural and historical buildings, local government buildings, election offices and ministry buildings. Schools and government hospitals are excluded, as they are covered in the education and health and nutrition sectors, respectively. Based on data collected across the six states, the number of pre-crisis public buildings is shown in Table 2.4.

2.10 Social Protection

Social protection constitutes a mix of policies and programs designed for individuals and households throughout the life cycle to prevent

TABLE 2.3
Distribution of Micro-Enterprises and SMEs in North-East States (source: SMEDAN and NBS Survey, 2010)

State	Microenterprises		SMEs	
	(Number)	As % of total 34 States	(Number)	As % of total 34 States
Bauchi	944,503	2.55%	2,066	2.83%
Gombe	527,230	1.43%	1,108	1.52%
Taraba	513,973	1.39%	960	1.32%
Total enterprises in three North-East States	1,985,706	5.37 %	4,134	5.68%
Total enterprises in 34 states	36,994,578		72,838	

and reduce poverty and socio-economic shocks by promoting and enhancing livelihoods and a life of dignity. Social protection programs have proven to be effective in promoting social and economic development, making these programs a key element of national development plans across the African continent. Moreover, as they foster social cohesion and contribute to political stability, they are increasingly being used in post-conflict areas whilst recognised by several international declarations as a human right.

A household profile for the North-East pre-crisis was examined using analysis of the Nigerian General Household Survey (GHS) panel, conducted in 2010-2011, with an emphasis on highlighting the structural differences between the affected States in the North-East and the rest of the country. Table 2.5 presents basic household characteristics in affected states and non-affected states, before the onset of the crisis, showing that households in the North-East lagged behind their counterparts in the rest of the country in various indicators.

TABLE 2.4
Pre-crisis public building stock for selected categories across six states

Category	2010 Building Stock
Prisons	18
Audit Offices	12
Post Offices	18
Police Stations	122
Police Barracks	17
Election Offices	38
Development Office	8
Cultural/Historical Houses ³⁴	190
Local Government Building	531
Ministry Building	159
Other buildings ³⁵	80
Total	1,193

A poverty analysis of the GHS panel also shows that prior to the conflict there is considerable variation in the poverty incidence across regions, with a poverty incidence of 47.1 percent in the North-East, compared to 21.2 percent in the South-West, and a national incidence of 35.2 percent. Moreover, the rural poverty incidence of 46.3 percent stands in contrast to the urban incidence of 15.8 percent.

Due to lack of data on existing social protection schemes in the affected states prior to the crisis, it was difficult to establish an accurate baseline. Given that across Nigeria, coverage of social protection is already low, coverage is expected to have been even lower in North-East. National health insurance figures give an indication of the access and the share of national health insurance contributors is lower in the North-East than in the rest of the country, with 0.7 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. Similarly, the GHS dataset 2010-2011 reveals that per capita assistance received by households that benefit from the different cash, food and in-kind transfer programs, is lower in the North-East than in the rest of the country.

2.11 Transport

TABLE 2.5

Household characteristics in affected and non-affected states, pre-crisis

<i>Household characteristics</i>	<i>Affected States</i>	<i>Non-affected States</i>
Households in urban areas	0.167	0.568
Households in rural areas	0.833	0.432
Number of children per household (mean)	5.5	3.6
School attendance of children under 18	0.637	0.818
Education expenditure per household member (mean)	310 Naira	3,586 Naira
Immunization of children under 1	0.421	0.559
Health expenditure per household member (mean)	399 Naira	1029 Naira
Rate of National Health Insurance System contributors	0.007	0.015
Food expenditure per household member (mean)	33,258 Naira	44,635 Naira

Nigeria relies heavily on road transport and over 90 percent of surface transport of goods is by road. Ownership of roads in the country is three-tiered, namely: Federal, State and Local Government. The road network also includes community roads and village tracks and paths. Its total length amounts to 200,000 km, of which about 40,000 km are paths and village tracks. 32,000 km of the national road network are Federal roads while the rest are shared between the States and LGA, with a greater percentage for the LGA. The total length of paved roads is estimated at a little over 60,000 km.

Undue bias towards new road construction and rehabilitation at the expense of maintenance over the last three decades has led to severe under-funding of road maintenance which has in turn resulted in heavy road maintenance backlog. Performance of the road infrastructure has been a challenge, as reflected in the condition of large percentage of the road network in poor condition, especially at both State and LGA levels. Available estimates of the annual cost to maintain the existing road infrastructure, assuming it is in maintainable condition, are between US\$ 2.5 and 3.5 billion for all levels of roads combined, split between routine and periodic maintenance. These estimates are unreliable in the absence of a robust road asset management system that tracks the condition and use of the road network in Nigeria. There are no updated and reliable estimates for the cost of construction and rehabilitation for all classes of roads in Nigeria.

2.12 Water & Sanitation

Nigeria ranks third and fourth globally in the number of people without access to improved water supply and basic sanitation, respectively.³⁰ With a current national average of 59.6 percent and 34 percent access to water supply and sanitation respectively,³¹ Nigeria is not on course to achieving the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) -6 if the current trend persists.

Access to water supply in the North-East is far below the national average and comes across as the lowest among the six geopolitical zones. Access to WASH facilities in Yobe State has been on the decline; access to improved water supply dropped by 6.6 percent (50.3 to 43.7 percent) between 2008 and 2013 (NDHS), while access to sanitation equally dropped slightly (31.4 to 31 percent). Equally, open defecation practices in Borno and Yobe States increased significantly by 3.5 percent (19.2 to 22.7 percent) and 5.5 percent (34.4 to 39.5 percent) respectively, from 2007 to 2011 (MICS). Open defecation practice

in the North-East is one of the highest, at 34 percent with national average being 28.5 percent.

Currently, as a national average, less than 40 percent of urban residents get water from State Water Agencies and the rest get water from other sources including formal and informal service providers as well as self-supply. Urban growth is out-stripping new water connections and with the current trend, the service coverage may drop below 30 percent within 10 years, and only 20 percent of the urban residents will have a direct water connection. While this data is from 2011, 2012 and 2013, it gives a picture of the situation pre-crisis in the North-East.

Based on data provided by the North-East States, typical water facilities include protected wells (nearly 30 percent); hand pump, motorised, and solar powered boreholes (nearly 70 percent); and others such as piped scheme (less than 1 percent) in the directly affected LGAs. The sanitation infrastructure is largely based on on-site sanitation facilities, predominantly comprising of pit latrines in households as well as in institutions and public places. Pour flush latrines exists in very few institutional settings. In urban areas, centralised sewerage systems with sewer networks and treatment plants do not exist, even in cities in the North-East. Faecal sludge management is not organised and regulated and services are largely provided by private informal and formal providers.

Persistent challenges to the water and sanitation sector cut across a weak and divergent policy framework including:

- a lack of political will for policy implementation with most states yet to develop state-specific WASH policies;
- low autonomy of WASH institutions and lack of accountability framework;
- lack of harmonized approach for planning, budgeting and investment mobilisation;
- weak institutional arrangements, especially at the sub-national levels with absence of statutory WASH institutions in about a quarter of the states whilst LGA WASH Departments exist in only six states across the entire country;
- coordination mechanisms are weak (both for development and emergency programming);
- participation of non-government actors (private sector and civil society organizations) is still nascent;
- inefficient subsidies from states and poor cost recovery;

- inability to provide affordable service to the poor, low involvement of users in planning and implementation;
- low priority and under funding of sanitation and hygiene promotion interventions;
- poor data management system and overall weak mechanism for sustainability of services.

3. Impact and Damage Assessment

3.1 Background

This section provides a summary of the direct and indirect impacts of the conflict in the sectors assessed. Impact on physical infrastructure and associated ability to provide social services can be divided into two broad categories: (i) damages caused by the Boko Haram related violence; and (ii) damages to service provision and supply infrastructure preventing services from reaching the affected population.


Total damages to infrastructure and social services are estimated at around US\$ 9.2 billion, with the Agriculture and Housing sectors accounting for over three quarters of the total damage estimates. Table 2.6 shows the sector damages by state.

3.2 Agriculture

(US\$ 3,728.72 million in damages)

The prolonged violent attacks, particularly in the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, have had devastating consequences on agriculture in the region. In these directly affected states, government agriculture related structures such as agriculture offices, stores, and veterinary

FIGURE 2.5
Agriculture sector damages by State (US\$)



facilities have been destroyed. Farm and store buildings on subsistence and other farms were likewise destroyed, as were irrigation facilities, agriculture machinery and equipment, and agriculture inputs. Large numbers of people fled these affected areas or were killed, leaving their farmlands fallow. There is reduced availability and mobility of labour due to threats of attacks on farmers on their way to the field. As access to fertilisers, herbicides and improved seeds reduced,

TABLE 2.6

Summary table of damages to infrastructure by sector and state (US\$ millions)

	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Federal</i>	<i>Total</i>
Physical Sectors								
Energy	31.9	16	4.3		7		129.5	188.7
Environment	1.2	2.9	0.6	0.2	0.8	<0.1		5.7
ICT								25.1
Transport	73.8	306.1	116.9	29				525.8
Social Sectors								
Education	58	143.8	47.3	2.1	10.2	11.6		273
Health/Nutrition	21.1	59	32.9	0.4	6.5	27.8		147.7
Housing	25.8	3179	118.3	2.9	2.8	1.2		3,329.9
Public Buildings	2.3	15.3	14.5	1.1		2.3		35.5
Social Protection				N/A				
Water & Sanitation	7.3	35	3.6					46
Productive Sectors								
Agriculture	457.9	2377.7	868.7	4.9	12	7.6		3729.7
Private Enterprises	149.8	763.6	<0.1	2		<0.1		915.4
Total	828.9	6898.5	1207.2	42.5	39.2	50.5	129.5	9221.5

farmers applied lower amounts of the inputs. Furthermore, service providers including extension workers and financial institutions, amongst others, discontinued services and fled the area. Livestock in the conflict-affected areas were eaten by the armed group, deliberately killed or left to fend for themselves (which resulted in the deaths of many animals from starvation).

In LGAs that received IDPs across all six states there have been serious negative impacts on agriculture and consequently on food security. In displacement-affected states, government-owned farmlands have been converted to camps for IDPs. It is estimated that 104,650 persons will require food assistance for six months over the period 2016-2019 in Bauchi, 44,850 in Gombe and 74,750 in Taraba because of the damages. Land preparation and planting activities for the main

TABLE 2.7
Damages to the agriculture sector across six states (US\$)

	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Total</i>
Peasant farms/ farmland	144,382,000	1,680,000,000	295,485,974	2,362,680	11,722,800	7,500,000	2,141,453,454
Gardens		11,056,500	7,612,684				18,669,184
Irrigation and drainage systems		37,800,000	255,213,232				293,013,232
Agricultural machinery and equipment	13,920,000	14,462,500	4,198,629				32,581,129
Storage and other buildings	82,177,500	68,150,000	125,048,960	110,000	50,000		275,536,460
Plantations		46,129,500	6,714,144				52,843,644
Seeds	240,000		35,894,354	107,087	200		36,241,640
Inputs/agrochemicals	3,142,550	9,000,000	24,881,681	139,500	45,000		37,208,731
Heavy duty machine		10,575,000					10,575,000
Poultry	8,101,980		165,156	1,500	4,875		8,273,511
Cattle	171,928,500	318,750,000	71,154,652	9,750	101,250	58,500	562,002,652
Fisheries	307,293		15,000				322,293
Sheep and goats	23,310,045	125,000,000	14,402,150	6,025	16,700	4,050	162,738,970
Markets	3,625,000		14,257,893		7,500		17,890,393
Transportation services	18,000		7,403,428				7,421,428
Agroprocessing services	2,066,750		5,818,478				7,885,228
Marketing services							
Training services			276,089				276,089
Implements such as disc harrows, ploughs, knapsack sprayers, water pumps etc.		2,143,000		12,000			2,155,000
Veterinary clinics and abattoirs	150,000	29,750,000					29,900,000
Farm roads		10,912,500		153,000			11,065,500
Boreholes	5,000	14,000,000	37,380		22,500		14,064,880
Pigs	3,601,780						3,601,780
Horses & Donkeys	823,875						823,875
Processing industries	4,380						4,380
Poultry farms	50,000			27,905			77,905
Cattle feed & vaccines/drugs				772,500			772,500
Sheep/goat feed & vaccines/drugs				770,000			770,000
Poultry feed & vaccines/drugs				412,500			412,500
Stock route			138,000				138,000
Total	457,854,653	2,377,729,000	868,717,883	4,884,447	11,970,825	7,562,550	3,728,719,358

harvest, starting in October, have been minimal, which will result in a third consecutive year of below-average harvests. The situation is aggravated by forecasts of poor rainfall in the North-East through October. Fear of attacks and the need to be prepared to flee on short notice, have prevented households in some communities from farming. Arable land which could have been used for agriculture is being used to provide shelter for IDPs and farmlands have become even more fragmented than before, because of host communities leasing some of their land to IDPs to farm. There has been an increased demand (without commensurate increases in supply) on food, agricultural inputs and irrigation facilities, leading to high prices and generally lower purchasing power. The demand for services such as extension, market, and transport services has also increased, leading to low coverage and poor quality of service delivery. Market access – for both the sale and purchase of agricultural products – has declined and become more uncertain. In addition, not only is access to agricultural inputs a challenge, the use of fertiliser for agriculture has been restricted in the most conflict affected states, because fertilisers are being used for the production of IEDs. Similarly, there have been restrictions on the planting of maize and sorghum (important food crops in the region) because of the height that these crops attain, which make them hide-outs for the armed group.

All the six states recorded varying degrees of agriculture infrastructural damage, loss and impact on service delivery. The vast majority of damage was sustained in Borno State (64 percent), followed by Yobe (23 percent) and Adamawa (12 percent). Across the six states, damages to farmlands, buildings, equipment and livestock account for a majority of the damage.

TABLE 2.8

Damages to the education sector by type, and across six states (US\$)

	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Total</i>
6-classroom block	20,775,848	2,052,417	65,875,000	574,595	3,895,472	20,625,000	113,798,332
Office block	4,469,163	411,387	9,854,599	43,966	785,376	3,085,406	18,649,897
Hand pump borehole	560,000	55,000	1,317,500	65,000	105,000	412,500	2,515,000
Motorized borehole/overhead tank	2,222,500	192,500	4,611,250	195,000	367,500	1,443,750	9,032,500
Latrines (2 blocks, each 3 compartments)	2,800,000	275,000	6,587,500	62,500	525,000	2,062,500	12,312,500
Classroom rehabilitation	3,248,310	5,415,179		277,470	401,853	2,937,352	12,280,164
Pupil seat	1,069,500	985,600	4,806,240	157,500	134,400	982,400	8,135,640
Teacher table & chair	91,560	83,065	609,116	47,000	11,327	82,795	924,863
Perimeter fence	22,738,914	2,093,122	50,139,781	651,359	3,995,960	15,698,414	95,317,549
Total	57,975,795	11,563,270	143,800,986	2,074,389	10,221,887	47,330,117	272,966,444

3.3 Education

(US\$ 272.96 million in damages)

Boko Haram has targeted schools, restricting access to this service, frightening away teachers, and killing more than 600 of them. Increased population density in many urban areas due to displacement has led to greater competition for access to education. Short-term solutions for housing IDPs, like using at least 50 schools to host IDPs in Borno, meant that, while IDPs found themselves in inadequate quarters for longer than expected, host communities have been negatively affected by leaving children without access to learning due to the closure of all schools in the state for one year.

In terms of the damage to the education sector's infrastructure and assets by the end of 2015, the costs across six states totalled an estimated US\$ 272.96 million. Borno had the highest proportion of damages (53 percent), followed by Adamawa (22 percent), Yobe (16 percent), Bauchi (4 percent), Taraba (4 percent) and Gombe (1 percent). The damage costs for each school were estimated based on a set of core infrastructure and equipment, including 6-classroom block, office block, borehole and overhead tank, latrines, classroom, pupil seats (16 per classroom), teacher table and chair (1 per classroom), as well as a perimeter fence surrounding the school. This set is considered to form the essentials for a functioning school. In order to estimate damage costs to the education facilities in the North-East, states were requested to provide the unit cost of the damaged infrastructure and equipment.

FIGURE 2.6
Education sector Damages by State (US\$)





FIGURE 2.7
Energy sector damages by State and Federal level (US\$)



3.4 Energy

Crisis impacts to the power supply sector include damage to medium voltage (MV) and low voltage (LV) assets, managed by the respective distribution companies, and damage to high voltage transmission assets (HV), managed at Federal level by the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN). In terms of State level assets, Borno has the most damaged or destroyed substations (46 percent), followed by Adamawa (14 percent), and Yobe (11 percent). For damage to State level distribution lines, Adamawa reported the highest damage (79 percent) followed by Borno (19 percent), and Yobe (6 percent). The direct damages to the State level distribution sector amounts to around US\$ 56.17 million, with Adamawa the most affected (US\$ 31.85 million), followed by Borno (US\$ 16.03 million), Yobe (US\$ 4.30 million), and Taraba (US\$ 3.99 million). While Taraba reported no damage

to substations or distribution lines, some diesel generators and petrol stations were partially damaged and destroyed. The states of Gombe and Bauchi recorded no direct damage to the energy sector as a result of the crisis. A summary of damages by asset type and state is shown in Table 2.9.

On the transmission side, the assets are owned and operated at the Federal level, and include all equipment and infrastructures with voltages above 66 kV (substations, transmission lines, control building etc.). The estimated cost of damages to transmission (Federal) level is around US\$ 129.54 million. Accounting for 69 percent of the costs, the impact at the Federal level is higher than the impact on the distribution (State) level. This is largely because HV assets are much more

TABLE 2.9
Damages to the energy sector by type (US\$)

	Yobe	Borno	Adamawa	Gombe	Bauchi	Taraba	Federal	Total
Distribution Substations	1,140,000	9,275,000	1,615,000				75,000,000	\$87,030,000
Distribution Lines	2,442,500	6,757,500	30,237,500				54,537,500	\$93,975,000
Solar panels (house/office/boreholes)								
Solar street lighting	712,500							\$712,500
Conventional Street lighting								\$-
Diesel generators						491,250		\$491,250
Petrol stations						3,500,000		\$3,500,000
Contol Building TCN						3,000,000		\$3,000,000
Total	4,295,000	16,032,500	31,852,500			6,991,250	129,537,500	\$188,708,750

Note: Extensive damage to Taraba requires validation

expensive than MV or LV. Significant damages were reported in HV substations and lines in Borno and Taraba States, with almost 300 km of affected lines and thirteen substations. Additionally, one control centre in Borno State was completely destroyed.

3.5 Environment

(US\$ 5.70 million in damages)


Because of the crisis, damages to the environment sector consist of US\$ 4.74 million in damages to ecological assets, and US\$ 0.96 million in damages to waste management infrastructure.

Ecological Assets: Major impacts of the conflict crisis to ecological assets are two-fold: the physical damage to forestry from conflict, as a result of the armed group settling there and battles raging within those areas, and the stresses put on high IDPs areas, through overgrazing, over cropping of firewood, or other ecosystem service related requirements of the displaced population. Damages were obtained from State environmental ministries and agencies, and complemented with a satellite-based study to estimate the impacts to forestry sector for Sambisa Forest Reserve and surrounding areas used as Boko Haram training camps. Damage to ecological assets totalled US\$ 4.74 million, consisting of US\$ 1.19 million to forests, woodlots and wildlife, US\$ 1.80 million to economic tree and orchards, and US\$ 1.75 million to protected areas and national parks. Just over half of these took place in Borno State. Damages related to forests and protected areas are based on the estimated value of their products, e.g. fuel wood.

Solid Waste Management: Waste collection vehicles in areas of fighting have been damaged, destroyed and sometimes stolen, which has impacted on states' abilities to provide basic service of waste collection. The total damage to waste management infrastructure

FIGURE 2.8

Environment Sector Damages by State (US\$)



is estimated at US\$ 0.96 million across the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. More notably, the impact of population movement on solid waste management is intense, especially where individuals have moved from rural to urban areas. IDPs bring with them their waste generation patterns, which puts a substantial stress on the local collection, recovery and disposal systems. The city of Maiduguri for example is now expected to manage up to 45 percent more waste than before the crisis. This issue directly impacts all six states, correlated directly with the presence of IDPs.

Debris and Explosive Remnants of War: The extensive physical damage to the housing stock is shown to have created unprecedented quantities of debris. It is expected across the six states that a total of 7.3 million cubic metres of debris have been generated. This material is currently lying in areas where it impedes access and reconstruction and will require processing and haulage as a priority. Complicating the management of this material, it is expected that many areas are contaminated with ERW. The nature and concentration of this con-

TABLE 2.10

Damages to the environment sector by type (US\$)

	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Total</i>
Forest /Woodlots/Wildlife	206,441	179,117	20,174	291	1,210	777,813	1,185,046
Economic Tree/orchards	1,130,250	127,725	447,400	23,310	17,220	56,963	1,802,868
Protected Areas/National Parks	1,300,581	229,438	54,376	168,877		1,211	1,754,482
Waste Management Infrastructure	260,000	625,000	75,000				960,000
Total	2,897,273	1,161,280	596,950	192,478	18,430	835,986	5,702,396


tamination is still not clearly assessed due to the lack of access and specialised skills required. Note that debris and ERW do not have a coinciding damage cost, as they represent a need, which is quantified in Section 4.

3.6 Health and Nutrition

(US\$ 147.70 million in damages)

The comparatively poor health and nutrition situation described in the baseline conditions has been aggravated by the conflict, showing higher rates than average of child mortality and malnutrition.³³ According to the HNO 2015, the North-East Zones recorded more than 35,000 cases of cholera in 2014, and more than one-third of the country's cases of measles. The crisis has also had a negative impact on childcare, contributing to poor infant and young child feeding practices. The coverage of nutrition services prior to the crisis was minimal and limited to the few areas where the health system had the required capital and human resources to integrate nutrition into the services they delivered. The cases of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) treated in the six states increased. In 2009, a total of 1,701 SAM

FIGURE 2.9
Damages to the health sector by state (US\$)



cases were admitted compared to almost 110,000 in the North-East in 2015. The nutrition sector estimates that 20 percent of the national caseload or 318,733 children between 6-59 months who require treatment of severe acute malnutrition in 2016 are in the six states.

Health facilities have been systematically targeted by violent attacks, leading to destruction and damage incompatible with proper service provision. Damage costs of facilities and equipment exceed US\$ 147 million, of which the highest proportion are in Borno (40 percent), followed by Yobe (22 percent), Bauchi (19 percent), Adamawa (14 percent), Taraba (4 percent), and Gombe (1 percent). Out of 788 reportedly damaged facilities, including 21 hospitals, 45 percent were destroyed. In Borno and Yobe, almost half the PHC network was damaged. As a result, health and nutrition service coverage is extremely low. In Adamawa, damage and destruction of facilities was considerable, though less extensive. In states less directly affected by the conflict (Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba), service indicator trends have also shifted downward. Health and nutrition services are un-

TABLE 2.11
Damages and destroyed health care facilities by state

State	PHC Facilities		Secondary Hospitals	
	Damaged	Destroyed	Damaged	Destroyed
Adamawa	12	57	4	2
Bauchi	257	-	3	0
Borno	2	186	3	6
Gombe	3	-	-	-
Taraba	6	19	-	-
Yobe	148	77	2	1

Note: Reported damage to 257 facilities in Bauchi requires validation

TABLE 2.12
Damages to the health and nutrition sector by type (US\$)

	Adamawa	Borno	Yobe	Gombe	Taraba	Bauchi	Total
Health Posts	4,276,800	6,336,000	17,661,600		475,200	13,464,000	42,213,600
PHC Centres	9,590,400	39,160,800	8,391,600	399,600	3,330,000	11,455,200	72,327,600
Comprehensive Health Centres			3,283,200		2,667,600	205,200	6,156,000
Secondary Hospitals	7,200,000	13,500,000	3,600,000			2,700,000	27,000,000
Total	21,067,200	58,996,800	32,936,400	399,600	6,472,800	27,824,400	147,697,200

derused (user rates <1/person/y). Financial and security barriers remain.³⁴

Destruction of facilities and targeting of and nutrition workers, of whom at least 48 were killed and over 250 injured (more than half in Borno State), led to the fleeing of the most qualified ones. Low-skilled staff provides much of the healthcare. Supply chains have been destroyed in Borno and part of Yobe and the Health Information System (routine collection and analysis of data relevant for management) has been disrupted. IDPs in formal camps or camp-like settings are entitled to free services, but user cost is unclear for vulnerable IDPs living among communities, and for host families. A significant challenge exists with service provision in places where IDPs are concentrated.


3.7 Housing

(US\$ 3,329.87 million in damages)

Across the six states, the baseline housing stock for 2015 was calculated in this assessment to be 4,607,130. The following assumptions were made to calculate the housing stock. First, the LGA level housing stocks given in the housing census of 2006 were projected for 2015 based on national population growth and changes in the regular household size adjusted for regional household formation. Second, the algorithm used for validating the base year housing stock is based on housing densities and housing typologies captured in the LandScan data for 2010. The total housing stock for 2015 is done using the population projection provided by the State Nigerian Government Bureau of Statistics. The baseline housing stock for 2015 is estimated based on the average of projected housing stock and the

FIGURE 2.10

Damages to the housing sector by state (US\$)



estimated number housing stock based on population densities captured through remote sensing data analytic.

The total number of damaged houses in the six affected States is 431,842 units, constituting 68 percent fully damaged/destroyed (not liveable) and 32 percent partly damaged (liveable) units. Table 2.13 shows the housing damage across the six states, while Figure 2.10 shows the distribution of damage to housing across Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. The State of Borno, the heart of the crisis, shared about 95 percent of the damaged housing stock, and hence becomes the primary state for any rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. Although, Yobe and Adamawa States are affected by frequent violent attacks, the magnitude of housing damages in these states is minimal compared to Borno. It is important to highlight that nearly 40 percent of the housing stock of Borno is damaged and 27 percent destroyed. A large part

TABLE 2.13

Housing Damage in Six Conflict Affected States in North East, 2015

States	Total Housing Stock, 2015	Reported Total Number of Damaged Houses	Total Number of Fully Damaged Houses	Total Number of Partly Damaged Houses	% of Housing Stock Damaged, 2015	% of Fully Damaged Units	% of Partly Damaged Units
Borno	10,35,370	409124	275301	133823	39.51	67.29	32.71
Yobe	5,60,666	16209	12156	4053	2.9	75	25
Adamawa	7,57,619	5134	4237	897	0.68	82.53	17.47
Gombe	5,58,070	525	513	12	0.1	97.71	2.29
Bauchi	11,23,233	200	200	0	0.02	100	0
Taraba	5,72,172	650	621	29	0.11	95.54	4.46
Total	46,07,130	431842	293028	138814	9.37	67.86	32.14

of the damage has taken place in cities and urban centres. Generally, housing damages are caused by bomb blasts, shelling and fire, and the nature of damages varies from urban to rural areas.

The housing sector has incurred significant economic loss due to damages to houses and assets. Economic impacts of housing damage were calculated based on the average values of permanent and temporary houses, and average value of household assets provided by the various state agencies. For each state, the average value varied across LGAs. For example, in the State of Borno, the average value of permanent houses ranged from N600,000 to N5,500,000, temporary houses ranged from N100,000 to N800,000 and the average value of housing assets ranged from N160,000 to N850,000. Based on the values provided by states, the direct financial loss due to housing damage is estimated at US\$ 3,329 million across the six states (Figure 2.10). While not included in the damage, additional expenditure has been incurred by a large percentage of IDPs for rental costs.

3.8 Information and Communications Technology

(US\$ 25.1 million in damages)

In 2011, in response to the conflict, the National Communications Commission (NCC) required all mobile phone subscribers to register their subscriber identity modules (SIMs). During March 2011-January 2012, NCC registered SIMs, and required unregistered SIMs to be deactivated. In subsequent months, conflict heavily targeted telecommunications infrastructure, particularly base stations (or base transceiver stations, or BTSs) used for creating a mobile phone network. In 2012, attacks were reported on base stations in four North-

FIGURE 2.11

Estimated damages to the housing sector in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, based on remote sensing and data collection from states, 2016




TABLE 2.14

Mobile base stations in the NE by operating company and state

State	Operator				Total in State	% of Total in Country
	MTN	GLO	AIRTEL	EMTS		
Adamawa	147	87	97	62	393	0.013
Borno	138	101	123	78	440	0.015
Yobe	90	45	63	31	229	0.008
Gombe	100	63	68	38	269	0.009
Taraba	139	77	87	44	347	0.011
Bauchi	187	99	126	82	494	0.016
NE Total	801	472	564	335	2172	0.072
Nigeria Total	12557	6677	6186	4758	30178	1

TABLE 2.15

Estimated number of damaged base stations in the North-East by operator

	<i>MTN</i>	<i>GLO</i>	<i>AIRTEL</i>	<i>EMTS</i>	<i>Total in NE</i>
Number damaged base stations	177	104	125	74	480

East states—Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, and Kano. In 2012 alone, 150 base stations were damaged due to conflict.³⁵

In addition to direct damages to infrastructure, the conflict has had other impacts to the ICT sector. In the summer of 2013, the Nigerian military, as part of its operations against Boko Haram, shut down GSM mobile telephones in the three North-East States of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe.³⁶ Mobile phone networks were shut down between 23 May and 12 July 2013. While the impacts of this have not been costed, lack of ICT access disrupted patterns of social living.

Table 2.14 shows a summary of total infrastructure (namely base stations) for mobile phone service in the country, as provided by NCC. Currently, 7.2 percent of the total infrastructure for mobile phone service in the country is deployed in the North-East. Table 2.15 shows the number of base stations across all six states that are projected to be damaged, based on information obtained on actual damages from some mobile operators. Roughly 480 base stations, or 1.6 percent have been reported as damaged. This represents an estimated cost of US\$ 25.1 million.

3.9 Private Enterprise

(US\$ 915.42 million in damages)


Damage to private sector infrastructure and equipment was provided by State focal points, and covered shops, industry, markets, banks, petrol stations, hotels, and restaurants and other tourism related activities. In the case where data gaps existed, a combination of the following was used to estimate damage: (i) desk-based approach of reviewing the secondary information for baseline validation; and (ii)

TABLE 2.16

Damages to private enterprise across states (US\$)

	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Total</i>
Total	763,646,543	2,282	149,768,558	39,955	1,960,662	915,418,001

FIGURE 2.12

Damages to Private Enterprise by state (US\$)

percentage based (instead of inventory based) damage assessment using proxy indicators.

The total number of damaged and destroyed business units is estimated to be 1.3 million. The vast majority of the costed damages have been sustained by small shops and petrol pumps, which together account for nearly 97 percent of all damages to the sector (Figure 38). In line with the concentration of violence, the private sector of Borno has suffered the most damages, with total damage costs amounting to nearly US\$737 million (83 percent of the total damage). Within the private sector of Borno, most destruction targeted the shops followed by markets. No damages were reported for the State of Taraba.

Note that while damage to the private sector has been accounted for within this component, the needs and recovery strategy are covered under component on Economic Recovery.

3.10 Public Buildings

(US\$ 37.6 million in damages)

The conflict has damaged nearly 700 public buildings, amounting to approximately 60 percent of the baseline stock. Of this about 94 percent are fully destroyed and not functional. The remaining 6 percent are functional, but require repair/retrofitting. The highest proportion of public buildings that have been damaged or destroyed is in Borno (66 percent), followed by Adamawa (20 percent), Yobe (8 percent), Bauchi (5 percent), Taraba (5 percent), and Gombe (2 percent).

The main public building categories affected by the conflict are local government buildings, cultural/historical buildings, police stations, and ministry buildings. These four categories share nearly 82 percent of the total damage. Also, key to note is that prisons, police stations, cultural/historical houses and other buildings all have over 80 percent of the baseline (2010) stock damaged.

Due to the paucity of the State level economic and employment data related to disruptions of government activities, it is difficult to estimate the economic loss due to loss of workforce and disruptions in public administration and decision making, as well as additional expenditure incurred by the State and Local Governments for operating from makeshift facilities, etc. For example, many LGA offices have moved to the State Capitals due to lack of office spaces and they work in makeshift arrangements.

FIGURE 2.13
Damages to public buildings by state (US\$)




TABLE 2.17
Distribution by building category of destroyed and damaged public buildings in the North-East

Category	2010 Building Stock	Buildings Destroyed		Buildings Damaged		Total Buildings Destroyed/Damaged		% of Baseline (2010) Stock Destroyed/Damaged
		#	%	#	%	#	%	
Prisons	18	10	1.51	5	11.36	15	2.12	83.33
Audit Offices	12	3	0.45	2	4.55	5	0.71	41.67
Post Offices	18	3	0.45	1	2.27	4	0.57	22.22
Police Stations	122	101	15.26	5	11.36	106	15.01	86.89
Police Barracks	17	8	1.21	2	4.55	10	1.42	58.82
Election Offices	38	21	3.17	1	2.27	22	3.12	57.89
Development Office	8	6	0.91	0	0	6	0.85	75
Cultural/Historical Houses ⁴³	190	155	23.41	6	13.64	161	22.8	84.74
Local Government Building	531	232	35.05	13	29.55	245	34.7	46.14
Ministry Building	159	62	9.37	4	9.09	66	9.35	41.51
Other buildings ⁴⁴	80	61	9.21	5	11.36	66	9.35	82.5
Total	1193	662	100	44	100	706	100	59.18

TABLE 2.18

Damages to public buildings by type (US\$)

	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Total</i>
Prisons	64,500	268,000	82,500		27,500		442,500
Audit Offices	60,000	285,280	15,000		15,000		375,280
Post Offices	269,000	250,318			\$-		519,318
Police Stations	909,900	1,548,250	95,750	676,500	910,250	125,000	4,265,650
Police Barracks		749,417	90,875	265,500	86,600		1,192,392
Election Offices	2,176,450	774,320					2,950,770
Development Area Office			167,500				167,500
Cultural/Historical Buildings	310,500	1,290,000	415,399		800,000	1,960,000	4,775,899
Local Government Building	6,335,099	7,350,000	305,000		114,250		14,104,349
Ministry Buildings	3,618,900	1,506,501	3,750				5,129,151
Other Buildings	1,525,000	496,095	1,091,850	160,000	382,000		3,654,945
Total	15,269,349	14,518,181	2,267,624	1,102,000	2,335,600	2,085,000	37,577,754

3.11 Social Protection

In this sector, damages are measured in terms of the households' well-being. A comprehensive profile of household characteristics in-crisis was developed using a second wave of the GHS panel, conducted in 2012-2013. The focus shifts from comparing affected and non-affected states to primarily a comparison of pre-crisis and in-crisis conditions in the affected states. Table 2.19 summarizes the changes recorded from pre- to in-crisis for selected indicators. This shows that the school attendance rate of children under the age of 18 dropped slightly from 64 percent to 60 percent, yet the average education expenditure per household member increased to 1,273 Naira. Further, the rate of child immunization increased by one percentage point to 43 percent in the North-East, while during the same period the rate increased by five percentage points in the rest of the country. This development stresses that the affected states not only lag behind in various developmental indicators, but also that they advance at a slower pace. Similarly, the share of contributors to the National Health Insurance Scheme grew slower in the North-East than in the other states, with a growth of 0.7 percentage points and 1.5 percentage points, respectively. Health expenditure per household member increased to 630 Naira, while food expenditure decreased to 29,855 Naira compromising household food and nutrition security situation.

TABLE 2.19

Household characteristics pre-crisis and in-crisis in affected states

Source: Author's calculations based on GHS panel 2010-2011 for pre-crisis & GHS panel 2012-2013 for in-crisis

<i>Household characteristics</i>	<i>Pre-Crisis</i>		<i>In-Crisis</i>
School attendance of children under 18	0.637		0.604
Education expenditure per household member (mean)	310 Naira		1,273 Naira
Immunization of children under 1	0.421		0.434
Health expenditure per household member (mean)	399 Naira		630 Naira
Rate of National Health Insurance System contributors	0.007		0.014
Food expenditure per household member (mean)	33,258 Naira		29,855 Naira
Per capita assistance in beneficiary households (mean)	389 Naira		78 Naira

TABLE 2.20
Poverty incidence based on per capita food expenditure for selected groups

Source: Author's calculations based on GHS panel 2010-2011 for pre-crisis & GHS panel 2012-2013 for in-crisis


Household characteristics	Pre-Crisis		In-Crisis
Poverty incidence	0.469	▲	0.499
Urban households	0.169	▼	0.15
Rural households	0.525	▲	0.571
Households with children	0.474	▲	0.506
Households with elderly	0.555	▲	0.579
Households with limited labour capacity ⁴⁵	0.521	▲	0.535

The poverty analysis conducted by the World Bank on the second wave of the GHS panel 2012-2013, reveals that the poverty incidence of the North-East increased by more than three percentage points to 50.4 percent. An examination of the poverty incidence for specific groups in the North-East, allows for a more detailed analysis of the pre-and in-crisis situation. A substantial increase in the poverty incidence can be observed for rural households. With 49.9 percent, the in-crisis poverty incidence is significantly higher than the pre-crisis incidence of 46.9 percent.

A more in-depth analysis of the poverty incidence of various groups reveals that the poverty incidences of households with children, households with elderly, and households with limited labour capacity increased, by two to four percentage points each.

While positive developments have been recorded for some indicators such as education expenditure, others have deteriorated from pre-crisis to in-crisis. However, these negative developments cannot only be attributed to the crisis, as some of these indicators have worsened in the non-affected states as well. Nevertheless, one can confidently assume that the crisis has had a negative impact on the well-being of the households.

FIGURE 2.14
Damages to transport by state (US\$)



3.12 Transport

(US\$ 525.84 million in damages)

The various road assets damaged during the conflict are (i) bridges, culverts, retaining and slope protection structures; (ii) potholes and ditches in pavements due to shelling or IEDs; (iii) roads damaged due to bombing, fire, movements of tanks and heavy armed vehicles; and (iv) damaged pavements due to temporary blockages of the roads. The total road network reported to have damage in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and Gombe States is about 40386 km. Of this, nearly 60 percent of damage is to Federal roads, owned by the Federal Government. The remaining damage is to State and LGA roads. For the purpose of this assessment, the damage to Federal roads was placed under the State where the damage occurred (see Table 3.16).

Boko Haram have attacked and mined trunk roads and destroyed main bridges to disrupt movements of armed vehicles. Since Boko Haram controlled a large part of LGA roads, it is observed that the level of damages to them is relatively low. It is reported that about 11262 square meters of bridges are damaged in these four states and 50 percent of the damaged bridges need to be reconstructed. The conflict has gutted nearly 5574 buses, 11347 cars, and 142 trucks in these states over the past five years seriously affecting mobility in the conflict affected local areas. The conflict also damaged heavy vehicles such as bulldozers, pavers, asphalt plant, and stone crushers, etc.

The total damage cost to the transport sector is estimated at US\$ 508 million, with road damage constituting nearly 72 percent of the total impact. Damage to bridges is estimated at about US\$ 31.5 million, sharing about 6 percent of the total loss.

TABLE 2.21

Damages to transport by type (US\$)

	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Total</i>
Federal Roads	84,898,000	60,588,000	32,300,000		177,786,000
State/LGA Road	150,120,000	15,540,000	10,350,000	24,900,000	200,910,000
Bridges	2,189,824	7,920,000	17,820,000	3,563,000	31,492,824
Bus	22,425,000	13,422,500	383,500		36,231,000
Car	36,225,000	13,936,500	900,000	265,500	51,327,000
Asphalt Plant		4,445,000			4,445,000
Stone Crusher		1,000,000			1,000,000
Truck	1,530,000		555,000	45,000	2,130,000
Bull Dozer	5,000,000		2,000,000		7,000,000
Paver	1,000,000		1,000,000		2,000,000
Excavator	2,000,000		1,000,000		3,000,000
Tractor	750,000		7,500,000		8,250,000
Culverts				270,000	270,000
Total	306,137,824	116,852,000	73,808,500	29,043,500	525,841,824


3.13 Water and Sanitation

(US\$ 46.02 million in damages)

Water supply, sanitation and hygiene services are critical determinants for survival in displacement as people affected are generally much more susceptible to illness and death from communicable diseases related to inadequate sanitation, inadequate water supplies and inability to maintain good hygiene. Insecurity and the resulting displacement have aggravated the low levels of WASH access that existed prior to the crisis. Low coverage, coupled with the practice of open defecation, heightens the risk of waterborne and communicable disease and worsens malnutrition. This is further exacerbated by lack of knowledge and poor hygiene and sanitation practices. The inadequate capacity and low funding of WASH sector institutions to deal with the massive influx of IDPs poses a major challenge, as does the hydrogeology in some areas of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, which requires very deep boreholes.

The conflict has seriously damaged water and sanitation infrastructure, particularly in the States of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Both water and sanitation have sustained damages to community and institutional (schools, health facilities, motor parks, market places, etc.) facilities. The majority of damage taking place in Borno (75 percent), followed by Adamawa (17 percent), and Yobe (9 percent). While no direct damages are reported for the States of Bauchi, Taraba and

FIGURE 2.15

Damages to water & sanitation by state (US\$)

Gombe, the increase in population due to inflow of IDPs has placed additional burden on already strained water and sanitation facilities. This is further discussed in the Section 4 addressing sector needs. Additionally the damage to WASH infrastructure inflicted in Schools, Health Centres and Public buildings have not been considered, as they have been included under Education, Health and Housing sectors respectively.

TABLE 2.22

Damages to water and sanitation by type (US\$)

	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Total</i>
Water Facilities	26,862,000	1,273,000	4,384,000	32,519,000
Sanitation Infrastructure	8,160,000	2,340,000	2,994,000	13,494,000
Total	35,022,000	3,613,000	7,378,000	46,013,000



4. Overview of Recovery Strategies and Needs

This section provides an overview of costed strategic options and scenarios for transitional recovery and reconstruction strategy. This will include a qualitative assessment of infrastructure, service delivery, capacity, and human development needs as well as quantification of resources required to reconstruct needed infrastructure and restore social services.

Sector needs estimates build upon the damages reported to infrastructure to additionally cater to: (i) the reconstruction of impacted infrastructure to improved standards; (ii) the restoration of service delivery to individuals residing in the six North-East States and replacement of facilities; and (iii) the provision of social services to IDPs due to Boko Haram conflict and host communities they are residing with. Figure 2.16 shows the process for implementing recovery, from the transitional recovery strategy to the needs quantification to the implementation options.

As shown in Table 2.23, the total recovery needs for the Infrastructure and Social Services Component are estimated at US\$ 6.04 billion. In terms of cost estimates, needs are highest in the housing, agriculture, education and health and nutrition sectors. The distribution of the needs across states is also shown in Table 2.23.

FIGURE 2.16

Implementation of recovery: from recovery strategies to project implementation




TABLE 2.23

Summary table of needs to infrastructure and service delivery by sector and state

	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Regional / Federal</i>	<i>Total</i>
Physical Sectors								
Energy	31.9	15.9	3.3		3.4		92.5	147
Environment	10.6	235.9	15.9	15.6	34.4	2.7		315.1
ICT							272.1	272.1
Transport	74.5	337.5	126.7	37				575.8
Social Sectors								
Education	83	513.6	77.1	6.8	17.4	23.5		721.4
Health & Nutrition	50.6	481.7	86.2	4	12.7	29.3	2.2	666.7
Private Housing	15.7	1097.4	46.6	1.8	2.2	0.7		1164.4
Public Buildings	40.3	295.9	22.7	2.7	5.8	6.7		374.1
Social Protection	93.8	180.3	69.6	34.3	30.6	91.1		499.5
Water & Sanitation	25.9	115.3	17.2	3	4.7	5.8		171.9
Productive Sectors								
Agriculture	141.1	485.4	170	18.5	29.7	36.6		881.4
Contingency								
Community Infrastructure	27.4	174.4	33	5.4	4.1	6.5		250.8
Total	594.9	3933.3	668.3	129.1	144.9	202.9	94.7	6040.1


4.1 Agriculture and Irrigation

(US\$ 881.37 million)

The stabilisation and recovery needs for the agriculture and irrigation sector include the following objectives: to ensure food and nutrition security in the short term (March-August 2016) through food assistance; to achieve both food security and sustainable agricultural livelihoods in the medium term; to create jobs and regenerate wealth in the region; and to rebuild damaged/destroyed infrastructures and re-establish or strengthen service delivery channels. Some of these recovery needs, such as job creation and wealth regeneration, are discussed in more detail in the Economic Recovery Component, under the livelihoods and employment recovery sub-component.

In terms of direct damages, the abandoned farmlands would need extensive clearing (including partly mine clearance) and preparation before crop production can commence. There is a need to reconstruct the damaged structures for livestock production, and to gazette and enforce livestock grazing areas. Support is especially needed for dry season and irrigated farming, supply of animal feed, and food processing/preservation techniques. To facilitate effective and efficient production, training of farmers on best agricultural practices is crucial. There is also a need to re-establish trade routes and rebuild markets.

FIGURE 2.17

Agriculture sector needs by state (US\$)

Although hundreds of personal agricultural property were damaged or destroyed as a result of the violence, there are no immediate plans to repair or reconstruct these until the affected LGAs are safe and people can return to their communities of origin. Hence, immediate repair and reconstruction plans will focus on institutional infrastructure. The reconstruction of institutional buildings is expected to be

staggered over the stabilisation/recovery period, based on the security situation in each LGA and on the relative importance of the facilities.

Displaced people who are yet to return to their communities of origin need support for crop and livestock production only if they have access to land. Hence, the need for food and nutrition assistance for a prolonged period will be greater amongst such people. IDPs with access to land, as well as those who have returned to their communities of origin, need food assistance in the short term, as well as assistance for crop and livestock production. In about two planting seasons, these returnees are expected to produce at least sufficient food for subsistence. Vulnerable host communities will generally require support for increased agricultural productivity to cope with the ad-

ditional demand from the displaced persons, while extremely food insecure members of host communities will also require immediate food assistance. Based on FAO's experience in food distribution, unit cost for food assistance is estimated at N 26,000 per person per year or N 2,200 per person per month.

The needs are significantly concentrated in Borno State, which accounts for over half of stabilisation and recovery needs. Adamawa and Yobe States, also directly affected by the crisis, each represent roughly a fifth of the needs. Across all states, the needs consist of food assistance, livelihood assistance, extension services, household support for food and livestock production, reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, and purchase of agricultural equipment.

TABLE 2.24
Agriculture sector needs by type (US\$)

		<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Total</i>
Peasant farms/ farmland	Operational							
Gardens	Operational		11,056,500	302,003				11,358,503
Irrigation and drainage systems	Capital		37,800,000	64,103,072				101,903,072
Agricultural machinery and equipment	Capital	13,920,000	14,462,500	1,407,000				29,789,500
Storage and other buildings	Capital	80,927,500	68,150,000	15,489,915		50,000		164,617,415
Plantations	Operational		46,129,500	41,927				46,171,427
Heavy duty machine	Capital		10,575,000					10,575,000
Markets	Capital							
Implements such as disc harrows, ploughs, knapsack sprayers, water pumps etc.	Capital		2,143,000					2,143,000
Veterinary clinics and abattoirs	Capital	525,000	29,750,000					30,275,000
Farm roads	Capital		10,912,500		262,500			11,175,000
Boreholes	Capital	5,000	14,000,000			22,500		14,027,500
Processing industries	Capital							
Transportation services	Operational							
Agro-processing services	Capital and Operational	2,066,750						2,066,750
Earth dam	Capital				155,000			155,000
Food Assistance	Operational	9,327,500	136,500,000	45,500,000	2,960,100	4,933,500	6,906,900	206,128,000
Supplementary food assistance for 4 months of food around lean season	Operational	9,471,000	32,340,000	15,477,000				57,288,000
Extension Services	Operational	3,068,493	13,501,076	4,078,431	592,593	888,889	1,230,769	23,360,251
Input support in host communities		8,444,493	29,726,337	11,223,843	8,457,481	12,686,222	17,565,538	88,103,916
Dry season vegetable support		3,860,548	13,589,916	5,131,176	1,188,611	1,782,917	2,468,654	28,021,822
HH support for small-scale food processing & preservation		301,374	900,143	356,203	64,815	104,938	128,205	1,855,679
Support for sheep production		704,795	2,481,020	936,765	136,111	204,167	282,692	4,745,550
HH support for goat production		551,370	1,940,934	732,843	106,481	159,722	221,154	3,712,505
HH support for poultry production		2,694,521	9,485,262	3,581,373	520,370	780,556	1,080,769	18,142,850
Crop production support for returnees		5,241,346		1,667,764	4,043,426	8,086,852	6,718,308	25,757,695
Total		141,109,690	485,443,689	170,029,316	18,487,489	29,700,262	36,602,990	881,373,435

4.2 Education


(US\$ 721.38 million)

Education needs were calculated by considering both the financial resources necessary to reconstruct, rehabilitate, and refurbish education facilities damaged in the North-East, and the education needs of IDPs and the host communities they reside with. The total needs comprise of US\$ 272.97 million in reconstruction costs, and US\$ 448.41 million to meet the educational needs of IDPs and host communities across the six states.

Costs of recovery for damaged schools were previously detailed in Section 3.4, and consisted of core infrastructure and equipment; including a 6-classroom block, office block, borehole and overhead tank, classroom rehabilitation, pupil seats (16 per classroom), teacher table and chair (1 per classroom), as well as a perimeter fence surrounding the school. This set is considered to form the bare essentials for a functioning school, and recovery needs for damaged infrastructure across the six states using this methodology were estimated at US\$ 272.97 million. A second alternative was also explored, which includes additional infrastructure and equipment in order to secure a suitable learning environment for students. This additional infrastructure and equipment includes a science lab, clinic, computer library and computers, library books, and hostels for students and/or teachers. Unit costs for such facilities were provided by the states. Should such an alternative be implemented, the total recovery needs

FIGURE 2.18

Education sector needs by state (US\$)



for damaged infrastructure would increase from US\$ 272.97 million to US\$ 625.18 million. It should be noted that standard unit costs were applied across each of the states. However, once reconstruction and rehabilitation begins, it is expected that contractors might choose to charge a security premium for certain LGAs. This potential premium has not taken into account in the unit cost.

The analysis also addressed the recovery needs of the education sector for IDPs and host communities. According to the December 2015 DTM report, there are currently over 1.8 million IDPs displaced as a result of the Boko Haram related violence. The majority of IDPs are

TABLE 2.25

Education sector needs by type (US\$)


	Adamawa	Bauchi	Borno	Gombe	Taraba	Yobe	Total
Core infrastructure and equipment							
6-classroom block	20,775,848	2,052,417	65,875,000	574,595	3,895,472	20,625,000	113,798,332
Office block	4,469,163	411,387	9,854,599	43,966	785,376	3,085,406	18,649,897
Hand pump borehole	560,000	55,000	1,317,500	65,000	105,000	412,500	2,515,000
Motorized borehole/overhead tank	2,222,500	192,500	4,611,250	195,000	367,500	1,443,750	9,032,500
Latrines (2 blocks, each 3 compartments)	2,800,000	275,000	6,587,500	62,500	525,000	2,062,500	12,312,500
Classroom rehabilitation	3,248,310	5,415,179	-	277,470	401,853	2,937,352	12,280,164
Pupil seat	1,069,500	985,600	4,806,240	157,500	134,400	982,400	8,135,640
Teacher table & chair	91,560	83,065	609,116	47,000	11,327	82,795	924,863
Perimeter fence	22,738,914	2,093,122	50,139,781	651,359	3,995,960	15,698,414	95,317,549
Additional Burden on Service Delivery							
Capital costs for IDP education services	19,971,000	9,510,000	295,285,500	3,804,000	5,706,000	23,775,000	358,051,500
Recurrent costs for IDP education services	5,040,000	2,400,000	74,520,000	960,000	1,440,000	6,000,000	90,360,000
Total	82,986,795	23,473,270	513,606,486	6,838,389	17,367,887	77,105,117	721,377,944

in Borno (close to 67 percent), followed by Adamawa (six percent), and Yobe (six percent). Close to 56 percent of IDPs are children, and over 28 percent are five years old or younger. The number of school-age IDP children by state over the 2014-2019 period amounts to between 550,000 and 600,000 (this is based on the number of IDPs by state, projected into future years on the assumption that the situation remains unchanged). The overwhelming majority of IDPs are with host communities, and in many instances IDPs children attend school with host community children, if not during the regular shift, then often during a second afternoon shift. However, there are often instances where schooling facilities are not available for IDPs children, and have to be provided either in the form of tents or mobile classrooms. In addition, IDPs children are often taught by IDPs teachers on a voluntary basis. This situation is not sustainable and serious consideration must be given to providing teachers of IDPs children with compensation and to additional capital costs associated with their instruction. Capital costs were calculated on the assumption that while 50 percent of them might be integrated into existing education facilities, 30 percent are taught in tents, and the remaining 20 percent in mobile classrooms. The resulting costs for IDPs related teacher compensation and capital investments over the four-year recovery period total an estimated US\$ 448.41 million.

The above cost estimates focus on restoring damaged infrastructure and equipment and addressing the needs of IDP children. Clearly, restoring education service delivery to the North-East is primarily a question of restoring the teaching force and the student body. For this to occur, the first requirement will be a secure environment for the population to return to its normal life. In addition, given the historical disadvantage of North-East in terms of education, it will not be sufficient to return to the pre-crisis state of affairs. Instead, additional

recruitment and redeployment of teachers will likely be required, as well as strong outreach and other measures to ensure that children attend school. While these issues are crucial for the improvement of education outcomes in the North-East, they are beyond the scope of the present report.

FIGURE 2.19
Energy sector needs by state (US\$)



4.3 Energy

(US\$ 146.98 million)

The overall cost of reconstruction and rehabilitation of the power sector are summarized in the table below. The cost of restoration is close to US\$ 147 million, of which US\$ 54.5 million are at State level and the remaining US\$ 92.5 million are at Federal level.

TABLE 2.26

Reconstruction priorities for the energy sector

State	Priority actions	Involved entities
Adamawa	Restoring distribution substations 33/LV and 11/LV and MV and LV lines.	Yola disco Adamawa State
Borno	Restoring transmission lines and substation (132 kV) In parallel, the MV and LV infrastructure can be developed, but the energy has to be provisionally generated from diesel groups.	Yola Disco Borno State TCN
Taraba	Restoring transmission lines and substation (132 kV) In parallel, the MV and LV infrastructure can be developed, but the energy has to be provisionally generated from diesel groups	Yola Disco Taraba State TCN
Yobe	Restoring distribution substations 33/LV and 11/LV and MV and LV lines.	Yola disco Yobe State

The strategies for the sector recovery will depend on the situation of each state. While the less affected states can focus on reconstruction of medium and low voltage infrastructure immediately, the most affected states (Borno and Taraba) should first restore the big transmission infrastructures. Obviously, without these infrastructures in proper condition, there will not be power flow to the distribution substation and, therefore, no power delivered to the population. As mentioned, these infrastructures are owned and managed by TCN at Federal level, so a common agreement and timeline has to be achieved between State and Federal Governments in order to coordinate the efforts and to reduce the impact of reconstruction in the population. Table 2.26 synthesizes the priorities for each state with reported damages.

4.4 Environment


(US\$ 315.1 million)

It is recommended to take a phased approach to the recovery strategy of the environment sector, entailing: i) Securing lives with the safe removal of ERW and clean-up of polluted areas and hazardous waste; ii) Restoring livelihoods and clean up with debris removal, waste management and woodlot rehabilitation; and iii) Long term environmental restoration with sustainable waste management and protected area management.

Ecological Assets: To recover livelihood generating potential of ecosystems in the damaged and over-utilised areas of the North East, the needs identified are the restoration of community wood lots to provide communities with fuel wood and other essential services from

FIGURE 2.20

Environment sector needs by state (US\$)



forest resources, restoration of protected areas (fencing, cleaning of sites, reforestation activities and cleaning of water bodies and pollution control). Across the six affected states, the total needs for ecological assets estimated at US\$ 315 million, of which 65 percent are required for Borno State.

Solid Waste Management: Needs include providing displaced and host populations with a reliable, safe, sustainable, and livelihood generating solid waste management service as well as state wide management plans, improved collection, storage, disposal and recycling capacity, and integrated livelihood generation. The total estimated needs for solid waste management is US\$ 34.7 million.

TABLE 2.27

Energy sector needs by type (US\$)

	Yobe	Borno	Adamawa	Gombe	Bauchi	Taraba	Federal	Total
Distribution Substations	1,140,000	9,226,000	1,615,000				55,000,000	66,981,000
Distribution Lines	1,465,500	6,712,500	30,237,500				34,477,500	72,893,000
Solar panels (house/office/boreholes)								
Solar street lighting	712,500							712,500
Conventional Street lighting								
Diesel generators						491,250		491,250
Petrol stations						2,900,000		2,900,000
Contol Building TCN						-	3,000,000	3,000,000
Total	3,318,000	15,938,500	31,852,500			3,391,250	92,477,500	146,977,750

TABLE 2.28

Environment sector needs by type (US\$)

	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Total</i>
Forests, Orchards, Wetlands and Protected Areas	97,266,481	2,677,640	2,107,291	13,611,160	223,737	32,115,150	148,001,459
Solid Waste Management	20,677,399	3,977,053	3,294,764	1,986,869	2,516,027	2,251,448	34,703,558
ERW Risk Reduction	9,963,600	1,913,600	2,392,000				14,269,200
Debris Management	108,008,315	2,006,014	8,086,106				118,100,435
Total	235,915,794	10,574,307	15,880,161	15,598,029	2,739,764	34,366,598	315,074,651

Debris Management and ERW: In order to provide safe access to damaged areas for returnees and reconstruction activities at the lowest possible human and environmental cost, there needs to be Mine Risk Education (MRE), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), state wide debris management plans, ERW identification and clearing, labour intensive debris clearing, transport, disposal and recycling opportunities, and capacity development. This is specifically targeted at areas heavily affected by the conflict, and the needs total US\$ 132.37 million across Borno (89 percent), Yobe (8 percent) and Adamawa (3 percent).

4.5 Health and Nutrition

(US\$ 666.78 million)

The recovery strategy for the health and nutrition sector is composed of two complementary approaches, ensuring access to essential health and nutrition services for target groups, and restoring critical health system functions. Estimated costs by strategic component are: health and nutrition service provision (US\$ 443.80); infrastructure and equipment (US\$ 176.39); governance, which includes the re-operationalization of LGA health teams currently non-functional and the setting up of Early Warning and Response Systems (US\$ 22.93); health systems to restore health information and supply chain systems (US\$ 16.85); and risk mitigation, which includes increasing community involvement in identification of health risks (US\$ 6.80).

Approximately two-thirds (64 percent) of the estimated recovery costs, of which 84 percent are in Borno, are aimed at service provision. Primary Health Care (PHC) services that should be free of charge include integrated Maternal, Neonatal and Child Health

(IMNCH) care, including immunisation and management of common childhood diseases, nutritional promotion, and in cases of severe malnutrition rehabilitation, malaria prevention and treatment, and safe delivery with referral of complications. Management of SGBV and trauma care should also be free. Priority for Anti-Retroviral Treatment in HIV/AIDS and for tuberculosis treatment is given to people already on treatment. Voluntary HIV counselling, testing, and treatment of pregnant women and high-risk groups needs to be resumed. Continuous management of non-communicable diseases is important for previously identified patients. Skills in mental healthcare and rehabilitation of disabled people need to be enhanced.

Infrastructure and equipment costs amount to 26 percent of needs. In residential areas with a high IDPs workload, existing permanent structures can be upgraded and complemented by temporary structures. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of permanent buildings

FIGURE 2.21
Health sector needs by state (US\$)




TABLE 2.29

Health sector needs by type (US\$)

		<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Federal</i>	<i>Total</i>
Health Care Facilities/Infrastructure & Equipment	Capital	22,916,400	71,830,400	53,168,000	527,600	7,464,800	20,486,000		176,393,200
Service Provision (operational)	Operational	22,176,000	327,888,000	26,400,000	2,816,000	4,224,000	7,040,000		390,544,000
Service Provision (capital)	Capital	3,024,000	44,712,000	3,600,000	384,000	576,000	960,000		53,256,000
Health System Restoration (capacity building)	Capacity Building	352,800	5,216,400	420,000	44,800	67,200	112,000	200,000	6,413,200
Health System Restoration (operational)	Operational	529,200	7,824,600	630,000	67,200	100,800	168,000	1,120,000	10,439,800
Governance & Early Warning Systems (capital)	Capital	378,000	5,589,000	450,000	48,000	72,000	120,000		6,657,000
Governance & Early Warning Systems (operational)	Operational	882,000	13,041,000	1,050,000	112,000	168,000	280,000	737,500	16,270,500
Risk Mitigation (capital)	Capital	75,600	1,117,800	90,000	9,600	14,400	24,000		1,331,400
Risk Mitigation (operational)	Operational	302,400	4,471,200	360,000	38,400	57,600	96,000	145,000	5,470,600
Total		50,636,400	481,690,400	86,168,000	4,047,600	12,744,800	29,286,000	2,202,500	666,775,700

needs to respect FMOH standards and plans, adding appropriate protection. Construction priorities need to consider population density, range of required services and security. In insecure areas and informal camps, mobile teams stationed nearby in a permanent referral facility can opportunistically deliver a selective package of services. Places with improving unstable security and formal camps can be served by temporary structures. Secondary referral structures are a priority in safe areas and can be built in a modular way according to needs.

The health system needs to restore managerial support for human resources (e.g. incentive packages), supply management (from quantification of necessary medicines to their distribution and utilization) and the health information system (routine collection and analysis of data relevant for management), and enhance governance (proper planning which includes recovery interventions). Resilience can be strengthened through surveillance and early warning systems, emergency preparedness and epidemic response, referral and coordination between levels of care. Risk mitigation includes community outreach and public awareness campaigns to involve communities in identifying the health risks introduced by conflict and displacement, and to make them participate in the management of services provided.


4.6 Housing

(US\$ 1,164.41 million)

The total investment need for housing recovery is estimated at US\$1,164.41 million. The unit cost for reconstructing a fully damaged house is assumed as N700,000 (US\$ 3,500, i.e. US\$ 100 per square meter) and for repairing a partly damaged house is assumed at N200,000 (US\$ 1,000). The total investment need was calculated by multiplying these unit costs by the total number of destroyed and damaged housing units (431,842 and 293,028, respectively) across the six states. The financial cost of reconstructing damaged units is therefore estimated at US\$ 1,025 million, while that of repairing partially damaged housing units is estimated at US\$ 138.81 million. Based on these financial cost estimates, the project would replace about 35 percent of the damage to the housing sector. As shown in Figure 2.22, Borno State represents nearly 95 percent of the estimated need.

Experiences from conflict-based assessments suggest the actual housing needs, and thus the financial cost, would come down significantly after field level damage assessments and differential payments for urban and rural reconstruction. The housing recovery program, if

FIGURE 2.22

Housing sector needs by state (US\$)

implemented in total, would rehabilitate nearly 3.15 million people affected by the conflict. Besides the multiplier economic impacts of the huge housing recovery program, the program would directly improve the household savings by N 4.53 billion (US\$ 22.65 million) and improve the purchasing power of the people and boost the local economy.

The regional diversity in terms of social and economic vulnerability of affected families, capacity of government and non-government organizations, institutional constraints in attracting private sectors in the reconstruction process, and varying social customs and preference for type of housing, etc., demand multiple and parallel reconstruction responses. The homeowner driven housing reconstruction model and resettlement models are described below.

Homeowner driven housing reconstruction model: Experience from a large number of conflict response driven housing reconstruction

programs indicates that, to whatever extent possible, the most feasible and sustainable option is in-situ reconstruction managed by affected households assisted by a combination of cash grants and access to affordable loans. Nigerian experience in rebuilding nearly 600 housing units in conflict affected communities through a homeowner driven approach in Bauchi State (Moraraba Liman Katagum in Bauchi LGA; Baram, Sabon Gari Narabi and Magama Guamu in Toro LGA; and Boto in Tafawa Balewa LGA) indicate that the approach is workable and preferred by local communities. Based on the cultural preferences, families will manage the pace and content of their house rebuilding process, though under the 'Build Back Better' guidelines they will be provided with relevant information on possible housing type, construction costs and techniques, as well as access to demonstration units.

Resettlement model: Considering the special land ownership conditions and practice of issuing occupation certificates to build houses in Nigeria, marketable land titles could be a potential issue while implementing the homeowner driven program. To ensure that houses built under the program are legally tenable, there may be an opportunity for states to appropriate tracks of public lands through a resettlement plan to rehabilitate vulnerable families. Moreover, the rehabilitation of families living in rented houses would be a serious issue due to land ownership issues. The assessment has observed that nearly 20 percent of the affected families were tenants prior to their displacement. The guiding principles in such situations will be, to whatever extent possible, to keep affected communities intact. In addition, renters and families without tenure should be treated on par with owners who have clear titles. Eligible families who prefer to build houses their own in the resettlement sites could be supported under the housing reconstruction scheme.

TABLE 2.30

Housing sector needs by type (US\$)

	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Total</i>
Reconstruction of Damaged houses	133,823,000	4,053,000	897,000	12,000		29,000	138,814,000
Reconstruction of Destroyed houses	963,553,500	42,546,000	14,829,500	1,795,500	700,000	2,173,500	1,025,598,000
Total	1,097,376,500	46,599,000	15,726,500	1,807,500	700,000	2,202,500	1,164,412,000

4.7 Information and Communication Technology

(US\$ 272.11 Million)

As summarized in Table 2.31, it is estimated that refurbishing damaged infrastructure for mobile phone base stations and towers would require US\$25.2 million of capital expense across the six North-East states. The damage to telecommunications infrastructure entails an added cost of US\$248 million due to disrupted mobile phone service.

In addition to refurbishing telecom infrastructure, the North-East states would require an upgrade and modernisation of telecom infrastructure in order to allow easily available, affordable high-speed internet and high-quality mobile phone service. The upgrade and modernisation would require another US\$30-50 million of investments, in conjunction with the private sector.

TABLE 2.31
ICT sector needs by type (US\$)

<i>Cost of Damaged Infrastructure</i>	
Mobile Operators	24,687,632
HTN Towers	262,065
IHS Nigeria	149,250
<i>Cost of Disruption of Service</i>	
Mobile Operators	247,013,514
Total	272,112,461

4.8 Public Buildings

(US\$ 374.1 million)

The economic loss due to damages to government and police systems is significant and affects the governance and security management in these states, especially in Borno. As described in Section 3.3 of the Peace Building Stability and Social Cohesion Component, it is critical to restore and improve the social contract between the population and the government. Thus, damaged government facilities should be restored at the earliest. Facilities such as local government offices, ministry offices and police stations should be prioritised in all states.

The investment needs are estimated for all damaged buildings using a standard unit cost that includes construction cost, cost of furnishing and fixtures (assets), and a premium for ‘building back better’. The premium for ‘building back better’ is assumed as 10 percent of the total estimated construction and asset cost. The investment costs provided by various states are reviewed based on market rates and a relatively higher rate is considered due to the high construction cost incurred in the northern parts of Borno State. The total cost of US\$374.1 million includes basic construction cost plus a ‘building back better’ premium, totalling US\$ 291 million and a project management cost of US\$ 29 million. The total cost includes provisions for physical and price contingencies.

It is important to note that due to the changing functional and operational modalities of some of the public institutions such post offices, election offices, police stations, etc., they cannot be reinstated in their

FIGURE 2.23
Public Building sector needs by state (US\$)




TABLE 2.32

Public building sector needs by type (US\$)

	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Total</i>
Infrastructure Reconstruction							
Public Building Category							
Prisons	115,000	250,000	357,500		305,000		1,027,500
Audit Offices	288,750	144,375	144,375		144,375		721,875
Post Offices	433,125	144,375					577,500
Police Stations	9,491,625	2,734,875	1,876,875	965,250	1,769,625	195,000	17,033,250
Police Barracks		160,875	965,250	321,750	160,875		1,608,750
Election Offices	2,734,875	804,375					3,539,250
Development Area Office			866,250				866,250
Cultural/Historical Buildings	15,675,000	618,750	16,087,500		643,500	4,410,000	37,434,750
Local Government Buildings	157,080,000	7,012,500	5,610,000		618,500		170,321,000
Ministry Buildings	45,581,250	721,875					46,303,125
Other Buildings	2,475,000	5,362,500	5,981,250	825,000	1,650,000		16,293,750
Project Management	23,387,463	1,795,450	3,188,900	211,200	529,188	460,500	29,572,700
Physical Contingencies	25,726,209	1,974,995	3,507,790	232,320	582,106	506,550	32,529,970
Cost Contingencies	12,863,104	987,498	1,753,895	116,160	291,053	253,275	16,264,985
Total	295,851,401	22,712,443	40,339,585	2,671,680	6,694,222	5,825,325	374,094,655


original forms, and may warrant improved designs and construction methods. The high construction cost and ‘building back better’ premium provisioned in the costing have considered these innovative investment needs. During the project design stage, the costing would be reviewed based on detailed technical specifications.

4.9 Social Protection

(US\$ 499.51 Million)

Based on the household and poverty profile of the affected states, various needs can be identified. Poverty incidence has increased in the North-East from pre-crisis situation to in-crisis situation. The most substantial increases in the poverty rate (and gap) can be observed for households in rural areas, households with children, and households with limited labour capacity. These developments suggest that interventions targeted at households with children and elderly should be developed. In order to address these needs and to better equip households to cope with disasters, the implementation of various social protection interventions is recommended. These recommendations are linked to the changes in the households’ well-being due to the crisis, and also lay the foundation for addressing structural differences

FIGURE 2.24

Social protection sector needs by state (US\$)

between the North-East and the rest of the country. Additionally, it is considered crucial that the social protection sector recovery strategy is linked to other sectoral strategies, including education and health, as simultaneous improvements in supply-side infrastructure and services unlock the true developmental potential of demand-side targeted social protection programs.

TABLE 2.33

Summary of sector needs

<i>Parameters</i>	<i>Year 1</i>	<i>Year 2</i>	<i>Year 3</i>	<i>Year 4</i>	<i>Cumulative cost</i>
Expansion of National Social Safety Nets Project					
Total cost (in million Naira)	5991	10723	14220	16505	47438
Total cost (in million USD)	30	54	71	83	237
Public employment scheme					
Total cost (in million Naira)	1969	4069	6305	8686	21029
Total cost (in million USD)	10	20	32	43	105
Old-age and disability allowance					
Total cost (in million Naira)	1889	3904	6050	8334	20176
Total cost (in million USD)	9	20	30	42	101
Subsidy for Community-Based Social Health Insurance Program ⁴⁶					
Total cost (in million Naira)			3673	7589	11262
Total cost (in million USD)			18	38	56
Capacity building course					
Total cost (in million Naira)	36				36
Total cost (in million USD)	0.18				0.18
Total cost (in million Naira)	9885	18695	30247	41113	99940
Total cost (in million USD)	49	93	151	206	499.51
Total cost (% of GDP)	0.01%	0.02%	0.03%	0.04%	

Firstly, it would be advised to expand the coverage of the affected states in the North-East under the NASSP, which will be implemented as part of the Federal social protection umbrella scheme. In order to adequately provide support to the crisis-affected households in the North-East, it is proposed to disproportionately expand coverage for the region, to reach the poorest 10 percent of the households within the affected states. In addition to expanded coverage, it is recommended to consider making the top-up benefit of 5,000 Naira unconditional for all households in the North-East, given that the underdevelopment of supply-side infrastructure and services might hinder beneficiaries from meeting any attached conditions. Nevertheless, it is important that the cash transfer remains outcome-linked and will be implemented in line with sensitization campaigns, aimed at linking benefit receipt with the program's intended outcomes in health and education. Lastly, it is recommended to design an IDPs-sensitive beneficiary selection system, for instance by establishing an interface with the Displacement Tracking Matrix database, and integrating IDPs status into the targeting selection criteria. Next to the cash transfer component, the forthcoming Federal Social Protection Program will

implement a national school-feeding program. For implementation of this program in the North-East, it is recommended procurement should be designed in a decentralised manner, and allow for the employment of IDPs to support the program locally, for instance by procuring, preparing, and serving the food.

Given the strong need to rebuild and improve infrastructure and service delivery, a public employment scheme is recommended, which complements the measures foreseen to rebuild infrastructure in other sectors. Persons with disabilities resulting from the crisis constitute a vulnerable group in the post-crisis context. As interventions such as public employment exclude individuals without labour capacity, it is important to address their vulnerabilities through different interventions. Therefore, the introduction of an old-age and disability allowance would be advised, targeted at elderly aged 65 years and above, and at persons with disabilities (PWDs). To address the challenge of barriers preventing access to health care and utilization of services, a targeted subsidy for the Community-Based Social Health Insurance Program is also recommended should be provided. In light of the NHIS's former focus on providing free access specifically for mothers

and children, and in line with best practices across the continent, the subsidy could be targeted at children under the age of five, lactating mothers, and pregnant women. Finally, to tackle the low institutional capacity in terms of implementing social protection schemes, capacity building of policy- and implementation-structures is strongly recommended.

The costs for the recommendations to address sector needs were estimated for a four-year period, assuming a two-year stabilisation period, followed by a two-year transition period. The cost provided for the different recommendations assume a phased, linear roll out plan for all interventions, increasing from 25 percent of the targeted coverage estimate in year one, to 100 percent in year four, as capacity and infrastructure constraints are expected to hamper a full implementation from year one onwards. Furthermore, a maximum take-up of 80 percent is assumed given that in reality implementation is likely to be imperfect, as not every individual or household that is an eligible beneficiary, will enrol in the program. Additionally, 15 percent administrative cost are included for all programs, except for the expansion of the NASSP. Here, 10 percent administrative cost are estimated, given that it is an expansion of a forthcoming scheme, so that lower administrative cost due to economies of scale and scope can be assumed. Over the four year period, the cumulative costs total US\$ 500 million, ranging from 0.01 percent of national GDP in year one, to 0.04 percent in year four.


4.10 Transport

(US\$ 575.77 million)

The recovery strategy for the transport sector should primarily aim to promote mobility of goods and services and people. Since ERW/IEDs can be found on roads, as a first step, these will have to be assessed and demined to initiate a safe return process (refer to the Peace Building,

FIGURE 2.25

Transport sector needs by state (US\$)



Stability, and Social Cohesion Component – Section 3.5.4). The restoration of vehicles on the road will take some time depending upon the economic recovery of the people in these regions; however, it is assumed that some of the main trunk roads and critical bridges, and all roads requiring repairs and rehabilitation of public transportation, would be prioritised during the stabilisation stage. In the absence of information on the road networks in terms of local area based length of actual damages and connectivity/linkages to towns and cities, it is assumed that all damaged roads and bridges damaged would be taken up for rehabilitation and the rest could be planned for the recovery phase.

The total basic investment cost for rehabilitating and reconstructing damaged roads and bridges and rehabilitation of bus transportation, including transport to IDPs camps, is estimated at US\$ 432 million. Note that the costing for the transport sector does not include the safe removal of ERW, as these needs were costed within the environment sector (Infrastructure and Social Services Component – Section 4.4).

TABLE 2.34

Transport sector needs by type (US\$)

		Borno	Yobe	Adamawa	Gombe	Total
Federal Road	Capital	84,898,000	60,588,000	32,300,000		177,786,000
State/LGA Road	Capital	150,120,000	15,540,000	10,350,000	24,900,000	200,910,000
Bridges	Capital	2,189,824	7,920,000	17,820,000	3,563,000	31,492,824
Public Transport	Capital	22,425,000	13,422,500			35,847,500
Project Management & Contingencies	Operational	77,889,847	29,241,150	14,061,000	8,538,900	129,730,897
Total		337,522,671	126,711,650	74,531,000	37,001,900	575,767,221

Nearly 63 percent of the transport sector’s costing is estimated for Borno. About 55 percent of the total cost is required for repairing and rehabilitating damaged road and bridges in these States. Cost of rehabilitation of public transportation is estimated at US\$ 35.8 million in Borno and Yobe States. Including additional costs for project management and physical contingencies and capacity building, the total cost of the transport sector investment needs is estimated at US\$ 525 million.

4.11 Water and Sanitation

(US\$ 171.85 million)


Water and sanitation sector recovery needs entail: (i) reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged water supply infrastructure in communities and public places; (ii) reconstruction, repair and rehabilitation of damaged sanitation infrastructure in public places; (iii) increasing the capacity of water supply to accommodate IDPs in host communities and return areas as well construction of sanitation facilities in public places; (iv) engaging IDPs and host communities in sanitation and hygiene promotion; and (v) institutional support and capacity development support. The needs distributed across the six states total \$171.85 million.

The overall reconstruction and rehabilitation costs are estimated at US\$ 62.53 million. About 1.4 million beneficiaries in communities would benefit from access to improved water sources from the above rehabilitation/replacement work in the three North-East States (Borno – 0.9 million; Adamawa - 0.28 million, and Yobe - 0.22 million). In addition, people accessing the public places and public buildings will benefit from access to improved water sources and sanitation facilities.

Provision is made for additional water facilities, as well as water and sanitation infrastructure in public places in directly affected communities and in under-served communities hosting IDPs over a long period. The total cost is US\$ 46.52 million and an additional 1.49 million people benefit from access to improved water sources from the above interventions in addition to access to WASH in public places. The costs for sanitation infrastructure only covers the costs of provision of sanitation facilities in public places (motor parks, market places, places of worship, recreation centres, etc.) Sanitation infrastructure does not include provision of household toilets, as it is already costed under the housing needs assessment. Similarly it does

FIGURE 2.26

Water and sanitation sector needs by state (US\$)



not include the cost of sanitation infrastructure in schools and health centres, as this is covered under education and health sectors.

Sanitation and hygiene promotion will involve implementation of community led total sanitation, development and distribution of information, education and communication (IEC) materials, hygiene promotion campaigns and formation, and training of community based structures for implementation and monitoring of sanitation and hygiene promotion activities. Behaviour change aimed at improving sanitation and hygiene practices will be spread over a larger population covering the IDPs who will be returning to their communities; population in communities hosting IDPs and a provision (at 25 percent over and above the estimated total population) to account for the population in affected communities. The sanitation and hygiene promotion at an estimated cost of US\$ 28.9 million is expected to reach over 4.8 million people in the six North-East States.

Institutional support and capacity development aims at facilitating the transition from the relief response to a State-led and development oriented response. Institutional support in the form of technical assistance for improved planning, design, implementation, monitoring and management of water and sanitation infrastructure is extremely important to State Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of the 6 states, including at the LGA levels in the three most affected states to ensure the investments are judiciously made and adequately maintained for long term sustainability. This will also include capacity building and optimization of existing organization structures. . One-time capital support is envisaged to MDAs and affected LGA

(including those hosting IDPs) to procure vehicles, tools & equipment, to improve ICT, and to beef-up office infrastructure. Resources for operational expenses, including fuelling of vehicles, purchase of chemicals, operation and maintenance of equipment and facilities, is also foreseen over a four-year period. The total cost for institutional support and capacity development is estimated at US\$ 33.90 million. Technical assistance would be also provided in two keys areas:

- for designing and implementing sustainable management systems and sustainable cost recovery mechanisms for water supply and sanitation facilities;
- for developing faecal sludge management systems in urban areas.

Overall water sector needs is estimated at US\$ 171.85 million, benefiting nearly 2.9 million people with access to improved water sources, and another 4.8 million people benefiting from sanitation and hygiene promotion, in addition to the access to water and sanitation infrastructure in public places and public buildings. Borno State has a share of 67 percent of the estimated total cost followed by Adamawa State at 15 percent, and Yobe State at 10 percent. The remaining 8 percent of the total estimated cost is shared between the remaining three states – Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba.

The overall recovery strategy will involve structured and staged interventions in areas of return, (both communities and public places, excluding schools and health facilities) as well as addressing the infrastructure need amongst populations hosting IDPs. The recovery strat-

egy will gradually move from stabilisation phase through early and medium term recovery and thereby transit from emergency to medium-term development leading to the eventual attainment of SDG-6 targets in 2030. The recovery strategy will comprise the following key elements: (i) provision of immediate relief through Repairs, Rehabilitation and Replacement (RRR) of partially and completely damaged WASH Infrastructure; (ii) bridging of infrastructure needs in affected communities and addressing infrastructure deficits in communities hosting IDPs; (iii) building back better and smarter by ensuring that most appropriate and adaptive technology options are used and built to standard; (iv) comprising a mix of hardware and software interventions to address the water and sanitation infrastructure deficits as well as the prevailing poor sanitation and hygiene practices among the affected population; and (v) institutional and systems development support for service sustainability.

4.12 Needs and Cross-cutting Issues

For recovery and peace building outcomes in the infrastructure and social service development in the North-East, it is critical to mainstream the capacities, needs and priorities of women, men, boys and girls into RPBA recovery strategies. Also key is that RPBA implementation mechanisms must be designed to ensure equal participation of men, women, boys, girls and people living with disabilities, and reporting mechanisms need to be structured to allow for regular feedback on how the interventions are working.

TABLE 2.35

Water and sanitation sector needs by type (US\$)

		<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Total</i>
Water infrastructure in communities, institutions and public buildings	Capital	35,580,479	3,691,800	7,575,379	165,000		345,000	47,357,658
Sanitation infrastructure in institutions and public buildings	Capital	9,166,700	1,512,150	3,978,563	165,000		345,000	15,167,413
Water infrastructure for host communities & provision for IDP return areas	Capital	29,131,787	2,732,463	3,402,994	337,813	645,063	965,950	37,216,070
Costs for water & sanitation infrastructure in public places	Capital	7,282,947	683,116	850,748	84,453	161,266	241,488	9,304,018
Sanitation & Hygiene Promotion in IDP return areas, host communities and Institutions	Capacity Building	24,061,148	1,492,440	1,782,870	203,543	676,298	691,058	28,907,357
Total cost of damages to institutional sanitation infrastructure	Recurrent	10,100,000	7,100,000	8,300,000	2,000,000	3,200,000	3,200,000	33,900,000
Total		115,323,061	17,211,969	25,890,554	2,955,809	4,682,627	5,788,496	171,852,516

To summarise how the cross-cutting issues of gender, youth, human rights and mines were considered by component sectors, they are examined under the heading of physical sectors, social sectors, and productive sectors.

Physical sectors covered are energy, environment (including solid waste management and debris), information and communications technology (ICT) and transport. Receding Lake Chad, severe deforestation, and lowering water table are often cited as some of the drivers of the present conflict. In a post-conflict situation, youth can be engaged as green brigades in large-scale tree planting (similar to the green wall project in the North-West), of rapidly growing trees for firewood and to erect/check dams to store the runoff. Production of energy efficient clean cooking stoves by young entrepreneurs and their wide use can reduce the use of firewood, and reduce the time women need to source firewood. In the absence of reliable grid connection, youth can be trained in the assembly and installation of solar lighting for houses and public lighting, and this will provide additional security for women and girls. The restoration of roads can also utilise the labour of young people, and restoring roads and transport links will support women to reach markets and basic service centres.

Social sectors include education, health and nutrition, housing, public buildings, social protection, and water and sanitation. There are gender-specific differences in health relating to different biological constitutions. Women are more vulnerable to vitamin and iron deficiencies and thus malnutrition, while they tend to sacrifice their own food intake to provide food for their households. Health and nutrition sector interventions take into consideration the specific needs of men and woman, also focusing on the needs of pregnant and lactating women. The design and distribution of food assistance and any non- food items must ensure access for women and girls. More female health care workers need to be trained as some women in the region are culturally and religiously constrained from being cared for by male attendants. Health facilities should include services that address the psycho-social and mental health of women, men, boys and girls with gender sensitive counselling services and medical employees must be trained to protect the confidentiality of female patients, particularly around access to reproductive health options and treatment of SGBV injuries.

Education response strategies will address the pre-existing reasons for low enrolment of girls and high drop-out rates as well as enhancing

security, providing water and sanitation facilities, and tackling sexual harassment with policies, teacher training, and by raising student awareness. Information and education communications materials under sectors including health and nutrition, water and sanitation, social protection, and mine risk education will consider gender and youth perspectives in their design and use.

There is a need to emphasize the urgency of training artisans, especially within the youth from the region, to provide a critical mass of skilled labour force to carry out the needed reconstruction exercise. Training youth in building and construction skills and deploying them to ‘build back better’ houses and infrastructure will also give them and the community a notion of ownership, as well providing them with marketable skills, which could in turn provide income and dignity.

The North-East States have among the lowest school enrolment rates among girls in the world. This cannot be attributed to cultural factors alone. Revisiting the schooling system in the post-conflict environment will be important. Making the school curricula relevant to job opportunities, providing a mid-day meal at school, and having toilets and water in schools are some quick wins that should be attempted. Vocational training and training in skills to match the market demand are also useful, both in the short and medium term.

While the 1999 Constitution and Land Tenure Systems (Land Act) provide for men and women’s ownership of land and property, in practice, prevailing practices, attitudes, religious and cultural norms, prevent equal access to and control over land, housing, and property by women. Women tend to face constraints accessing land as in many situations access is mediated through the men according to gender social norms. Provision of housing aids and low credit rates for women will enhance women’s capacity to own property and address restrictions in accessing housing credit. There is a possibility for more conflict around ownership when IDPs return to claim land and property, and pre-existing structures and cultural context will disadvantage women. Recovery plans should include mechanisms to ensure equality and equity in property restitution to returnees and IDPs, which are not dependent solely on existing titles.

Productive sectors include agriculture and private enterprise

The breakdown of infrastructure, markets and services complicates daily life, and endangers and impoverishes lives. Access to credit and

TABLE 2.36

Provisions for Community Infrastructure and Non Formal Services by State (in US\$)

	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Total</i>
Education	8,298,680	51,360,649	7,710,512	683,839	1,736,789	2,347,327	72,137,794
Health and Nutrition	5,063,640	48,169,040	8,616,800	404,760	1,274,480	2,928,600	66,457,320
Public Buildings	4,033,959	29,585,140	2,271,244	267,168	582,533	669,422	37,409,466
Transport	7,453,100	33,752,267	12,671,165	3,700,190			57,576,722
Water and Sanitation	2,589,055	11,532,306	1,721,197	295,581	468,263	578,850	17,185,252
Total	27,438,433	174,399,402	32,990,918	5,351,538	4,062,064	6,524,199	250,766,554

agricultural inputs is limited and this will remain a problem after the conflict ends. Without access to resources, women are economically dependent on their husbands or relatives, and thus made more vulnerable, by death, divorce, desertion or separation. Reparations for loss of property must take into consideration that women are historically impoverished and disadvantaged (owning only 4 percent of the land in the North-East) and must be included when resources are being disbursed regardless of past ownership history. Support for the CSOs working to improve women's financial inclusion and literacy will help more women access existing credit facilities for agriculture and build capacity in managing finances. Gender considerations will also be key in the design of private enterprise and livelihood interventions.

Many youth in the North-East fall under the Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEET) category. Sectors including agriculture, private enterprise, environment and housing will look to provide cash for work opportunities to young people.

Community Infrastructure and Non-Formal Services

Community infrastructure and non-formal services are important for local communities, but yet challenging to make exact estimation of needs. Therefore a contingency has been added to cater for community infrastructure and non-formal services, which is particularly relevant for the education, health and nutrition, public buildings, transport, water and sanitation sectors. This accounts for example for non-formal or traditional education and schools as well as locally managed community infrastructure, such as community centres or local pathways, which are not yet specified in the assessment. It also accounts for a security premium, which for example relates to higher costs for construction material due to security premiums charged by

traders. The contingency is estimated as a ten percent premium over the above-mentioned sectors. The total needs to cater for community infrastructure and non-formal services is US\$ 250.8 million, whereof Bono takes the largest share with US\$ 174.4 million (see Table 2.36).

5. Implementation Strategies and Institutional Arrangements

5.1 Agriculture

The proposed recovery interventions for the RPBA are closely in line with the Government's agricultural policy framework. The declared aims of Nigeria's national agricultural policy are to: (i) attain food security; (ii) increase production and productivity; (iii) generate employment and income; and (iv) expand exports and reduce food imports, thereby freeing resources for critical infrastructure development and delivery of social services. The last Government's Agriculture Transformation Action Plan (ATAP) launched in August 2011 sought to develop the value chain of five key commodities, i.e. rice, cassava, sorghum, cacao and cotton. This entails reforming the input supply regime, a targeted region-specific increase in the output of the five priority commodities, post-harvest systems development, a strong orientation towards agri-business and promoting value-addition in the product chain. The impact of ATAP has not yet been evaluated, as effective implementation did not start until late 2012.

Other elements of policy that could be helpful in revamping the agricultural economy of the North-East include: (i) greater collaboration among Federal Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) involved in agriculture, global development partners, private sector donors, NGOs and CBOs, in interventions such as the Growth Enhancement Support Scheme (GESS), Agricultural Mechanization Program, and Staple Crops Processing Zones; and (ii) attracting investors into products such as rice, maize, cotton, groundnut, millet, wheat, sorghum, sugarcane, onions, and cassava in which the region has comparative advantage.

5.2 Education

In order for the reconstruction and recovery of the education sector to occur as efficiently as possible, a concerted effort across Federal, State and Local Government actors will be necessary. At the Federal level, the Ministry of Education and the UBEC (which is responsible for basic education) are key. Other actors at the Federal level include NEMA, which has been instrumental in responding to IDPs needs to date, as well as the Presidential Committee for the North-East (PCNI), whose role is to coordinate interventions in the North-East across the different sectors. At the State level, the State Ministry of

Education and State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB – the State-level arm of UBEC) are the main actors, in collaboration with the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA – the State-level arm of NEMA).

Experience in restoring education services in conflict-affected areas show that community level empowerment and engagement is critically important. It will be of paramount importance to ensure sufficient community involvement in any reconstruction and rehabilitation effort. In Nigeria, the suitable institution exists by law and often in practice: the school-based management committee (SBMC). These committees include members of school staff, parents of children, as well as community figures, and are as such very well suited to spearhead the reconstruction and recovery effort. Given the prevalence of IDPs in certain settings, SBMCs should include representation from the IDPs population to ensure that the needs of IDPs children as well as host community children are addressed.

5.3 Energy

Effective energy sector recovery is expected to constitute a complex mix of public sector-led implementation and regulation and facilitation of private sector recovery interventions. The government structure responsible for coordinating recovery efforts in the North-East will need to significantly reinforce its staff, skills and capacity, to coordinate across public and private sector recovery. It will have to work in close cooperation with Yola Distribution, Jos Distribution, Transmission Company of Nigeria, affected states and Local Governments.

5.4 Environment

Ecological Assets: It is recommended that recovery implementation for ecological assets are coordinated with the Ministry of Environment across Federal, State and Local levels. To promote ownership and active involvement, it is important that local communities be involved in discussions and decision making on key issues, and be provided with job opportunities through environmental rehabilitation work to whatever extent possible (such as reforestation projects, waste clean-up operations, etc.).

Solid Waste Management: This is best implemented through the formulation of state-specific strategic solid waste management plans to clarify the most cost-effective approach of dealing with the changing population and consumption patterns. These should be made by the relevant environmental authorities, usually referred to as Environ-

mental Protection Agencies (EPA), in consultation with a number of industry and private sector partners. They will cover strategic aspects of the recovery, and will ensure that a standardised approach will be used throughout each state. They will also define very specific institutional actors, who are not yet defined in the North-East, to be responsible for implementation of each of the different aspects of those plans. In particular, collection, safety and processing protocols can be set within these documents, as well as selection criteria for contractors, partners and livelihood beneficiaries. These strategies will also enable the State as a whole to benefit from economies of scale through the implementation of multi-LGA improvement projects and sharing of larger assets such as disposal facilities.

Debris Management and ERW: Similarly to the waste management situation, each state needs to have its own debris management plan to determine the exact institutions involved and their particular tasks. This management plan will also need to include the specific interaction with the army and the police, in particular during cases of ERW management, but also if there is the potential to support efforts logistically through specialised equipment for debris management.

5.5 Health and Nutrition

Planning for recovery needs to be at the three levels of governance reflected in the Nigeria health care system: Federal, State and Local Government. The State Primary Health Care Development Agency (SPHCDA) coordinates and facilitates PHC service provision in the states, and handles procurement and distribution of recurrent supplies. The LGA PHC department is responsible for disease surveillance and reporting, supervision, collation of health management information, and relations with the traditional structures and community members. The State Health Management board is responsible for secondary care. Tertiary specialist hospitals are governed by the FMOH which also oversees line-funded programs on AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. All three tiers administer the Expanded Program on Immunisation.

Where humanitarian needs are urgent, platforms including all stakeholders can enhance coordination, with military logistic support. The FMOH and States determine the role of not-for-profit private actors. Secondary facilities can act as a managerial hub for temporary and mobile PHC services. PHC services include the broad set of health, nutrition and HIV services.

The bulk of Public Health financing is allocated from Federal accounts to States and LGAs, with some additional VAT and local tax based revenue. Attracting and retaining qualified personnel is a major problem. Benefit packages and salary adjustments assume availability of skilled workers. Training will be necessary to deal with identified shortages. State-based institutions could develop fast-track training with pilot implementation. Improving the functionality and accountability of LGAs is crucial.

Proposed indicators include: (i) percentage LGAs with operational public health teams; (ii) percentage of wards with functioning PHC centre; (iii) number and skill mix of health workers per facility and per 10,000 inhabitants; (iv) total number of consultations per facility by age and gender and user rates by target group; (v) percentage of total (expected) deliveries with skilled birth attendance; (vi) percentage of children aged 12-23 months fully vaccinated according to EPI schedule; (vii) percentage of children started on treatment for SAM who successfully completed treatment (cured); (viii) HIV patients on treatment (number and proportion of HIV+ diagnosed persons); and (ix) number of insecticide-treated bed-nets distributed and household usage.

Longer term reforms should be aligned with the Nigerian health strategy. Strengthening overall management and medical supply management are long term objectives, as is coordination within and among governance tiers. Human resource needs planning and training is an unmet requirement. Financial protection of vulnerable users will contribute to increases in service use. An upward accountability mechanism is advisable.

5.6 Housing

The regional diversity in terms of social and economic vulnerability of affected families, capacity of government and non-government organizations, institutional constraints to attract private sectors in the reconstruction process, and varying social customs and preference for type of housing require multiple and parallel reconstruction responses. Since nearly 95 percent of the damage has occurred in the Borno State, the institutional capacity of the State Government and Local Government agencies should be assessed, and the housing recovery strategy and investment plan should be structured and phased accordingly. Considering the institutional issues and security concerns, it is desirable to stagger the implementation plan temporally and spatially.

Efforts to respond to the reconstruction and repair of nearly 431,842 housing units damaged during the conflict should be guided by the rehabilitation and reconstruction policy announced by the Government of Nigeria. The Government can finance housing reconstruction through the transfer of a cash grant of Naira 700,000 (US\$ 3500) for fully damaged and Naira 200,000 (US\$ 1000) for a partly damaged house. After the detailed field level damage assessments, the cash grant could be differentiated between urban housing and rural housing, and could be structured as part of operational guidelines and gazetted. The program would transfer the cash grant to the selected household in instalment, based on the physical progress of reconstruction.

Experience from reconstruction efforts from previous conflict reconstruction in other countries and consultations with civil society suggest that the following core principles are key to a successful implementation of housing recovery strategy: comprehensiveness, inclusiveness, participatory, transparency and sustainability.

Considering the large size of the housing recovery needs and inadequate institutional capacity of States to design and implement the program, it is desirable to phase the needs based on LGA level impacts and social needs. For practical purposes, it would be desirable to design the housing reconstruction projects in two stages: (i) Phase 1 for 25 percent of the total needs targeting the most vulnerable families and critical housing needs during 2016-2020 periods; and (ii) Phase 2 for an additional 25 percent of the housing target for Borno depending on the Phase 1 progress and improvements in security conditions in the state. The program can start in those LGAs that are free from conflict and where security and safety of citizens are ensured.

The Phase 1 of the operational plan would target nearly 107,960 damaged units. Based on the success and security situations, the recovery operational program could be rolled over. The Borno State Government has taken the first step of forming a separate Ministry of Reconstruction and the Ministry could be empowered to detail out the operational plans compatible with its capacity. The operational cost for Phase 2 is not detailed, but it could be another Naira 800 billion (US\$ 400 million) for the Phase 2 housing reconstruction project.

The estimated cost of rehabilitating and reconstructing damaged houses is large and it would be difficult to finance the recovery pro-

gram without financial participation of multi-lateral institutions and partnerships with Federal and State Governments.

5.7 Information and Communication Technology

The availability and affordability of high-quality telecom services, including broadband and mobile phone, is seen as a necessary precondition for economic development, job creation, recovery and peace building. The telecommunications infrastructure forms the baseline from which innovative digital applications and local IT industry can be developed.

The 2003 Nigerian Telecommunications Act vests regulatory responsibilities over the ICT sector in the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC). To develop the telecommunications sector of North-East States, the Government may consider the following interventions:

- **Strengthening the enabling environment:** A supportive policy and regulatory environment is necessary to provide relief and incentives to the private sector to invest in telecommunications infrastructure in North-East and conflict-affected states. Legislation may be considered for protecting critical infrastructure. The use of Universal Service Provision Fund (USPF) and output-based aid (OBA) may help address the access gap for telecom services in remote and rural parts of the North-East States. Building policymaking and regulatory capacity at the Federal and State levels would be important in strengthening the enabling environment.
- **Developing telecommunications infrastructure:** consider supporting the refurbishment and modernization of telecom infrastructure in North-East States, in partnership with the private sector. The development of telecom backbones (such as with fibre networks or microwaves) can help provide high-speed internet to communities in North-East States and to link the under-developed areas with major metropolitan centres of the country. The development and use of internet exchange points (IXPs) can help aggregate and route internet traffic, improving efficiency and availability of internet services. Greater adoption and use of mobile phones and internet can support economic and social development in the North-East States.

Further research and analytical work will be necessary to build on the work done as part of this report and to conduct a more thorough investigation in order to refine and design possible interventions.

5.8 Public Buildings

As the capacity of the various public works departments to design and implement reconstruction of damaged buildings is limited, it is assumed that State Governments would establish a project, i.e. a North-East Reconstruction Project (NERP), and tender construction projects to competent companies. Under this project, the governments could appoint project management consultants (PMC) to prepare request for proposals (RFP), tender documents, technical specifications of the various reconstruction projects based on 'build back better' principles, evaluate technical and financial proposals, and recommend competent companies to the Government for awarding contracts. Depending upon the program management structures accepted by the Government and partner organizations, the structure and form of the program management would be revised.

Implementation of a public building recovery strategy would be undertaken at two stages. First, the government would formulate a policy to establish NERP and PMC for program management and accept basic 'build back better' principles to ensure that repaired and reconstructed public buildings would meet high technical standards. Second, since the primary objective is to reinstate the local administration and security systems, the recovery strategy should aim to repair all damaged local government and ministry buildings and police stations during the first two years, and continue the reconstruction of fully damaged buildings in phases. During the stabilisation stage, the program would establish the institutional structure for implementing the program by setting up NERP and PMC, and preparing operations manuals for efficient program management.

5.9 Social Protection

Given the lack of institutionalised targeting and delivery mechanisms, and the time required to set-up such mechanisms, it is recommended that the social protection interventions be targeted geographically. Priority should be given to areas with a high number and density of IDPs, ensuring that first and foremost crisis-affected households and individuals are targeted. Keeping in mind the particularly high poverty incidence for household in rural areas can help to effectively target the programs. Categorical targeting is also recommended as the analysis has shown that specific groups of households, such as households with children, elderly and other households with limited labour capacity, tend to be poorer in terms of extent and depth of poverty. Another crucial feature in designing the targeting mechanism is clear

eligibility criteria, defining who is eligible and who is not. A critical component in ensuring effective targeting and delivery is the use of a unique identifier to enable various programs to map and assess overlap of coverage; therefore, efforts to set-up a social protection system should be accompanied by initiatives to extend the provision and coverage of unique identifiers, such as the National ID card.

The institutional arrangements for implementation of the sectoral recovery strategy for social protection are recommended to be linked to the delivery unit under the Vice President's office, which will be set up in line with the launch of the Federal Social Protection Program. The forthcoming social protection delivery unit will be responsible for the implementation of the schemes under the Federal umbrella program. The recommendations on expanding the cash transfer and integrating IDPs into the procurement of the national supplementary feeding program are additions to the forthcoming programs, and should therefore be embedded within the delivery unit's directive policy making. Moreover, all programs should aim to work towards the objectives specified in the National Social Protection Policy, which is hosted by the National Planning Commission, and currently in the process of verification and adoption. Such an integration and streamlining of policies will help to minimise overlap and foster cooperation.

Concerns regarding service delivery and the availability of essential infrastructure, including health and education services, as well as financial services such as banking for the poor, are key challenges to the implementation of the identified recommendations, and even for longer term development of the social protection system in the country. The division of roles and responsibilities among the Federal, State and Local levels entails that services at the LGA level are provided with logistical support from the State Government. This division of responsibilities means that the local governments, the government tier with the least financial and human resources is in charge of establishing and providing basic services. While social protection policies focus on reducing demand-side barriers, there is an urgent need for improvements on the supply-side, and strengthening the LGAs delivery capacity, to enable beneficiaries to utilise their benefits, such as health insurances.

5.10 Transport

The recovery strategy of the transport sector requires involvement of the Ministry of Transport at all levels, as Local, State, and Federal roads have all been affected by the crisis. The process of full transport

sector reconstruction will not be quick, and thus requires prioritisation. Major roads should be dealt with first, with local roads to follow. Any towns or villages that are cut off should have temporary access reconstructed for them. While the departments of roads and bridges of various State Governments can initiate the rehabilitation works during the stabilisation phase, it is important to set up a dedicated institution to design and implement reconstruction of roads and bridges.

5.11 Water and Sanitation

The overall recovery strategy will involve a structured and staged interventions in areas of return, (both communities and public places, excluding schools and health facilities as these are covered in their respective sectors) as well as addressing the infrastructure need amongst populations hosting IDPs. The recovery strategy will gradually move from stabilization phase through early and medium term recovery and thereby transit from emergency to medium-term development leading to the eventual attainment of SDG-6 targets in 2030. The recovery strategy will comprise the following key elements: (i) provision of immediate relief through Repairs, Reconstruction and rehabilitation of partially and completely damaged WASH Infrastructure; (ii) bridging of infrastructure needs in affected communities and addressing infrastructure deficits in communities hosting IDPs; (iii) building back better and smarter by ensuring that most appropriate and adaptive technology options are used and built to standard; (iv) comprising a mix of hardware and software interventions to address the water and sanitation infrastructure deficits as well as the prevailing poor sanitation and hygiene practices among the affected population.

Sector responsibilities are shared among tiers of Governments. Institutions and the key institutional players, at state level are: State Ministry of Water Resources (stand alone or combined with other sectors e.g. Rural Development) is responsible for formulating and monitoring policies and planning for water services across the State; Urban State Water Agencies (USWA) are responsible for establishment, operation, quality control, and maintenance of urban and semi-urban water supply; Local Governments are responsible for the establishment, operation and maintenance of rural water supply schemes and sanitation facilities in conjunction with the benefiting communities and for establishing Water and Sanitation Departments to coordinate and support WASH activities; and Rural and Small Town Water Supply and Sanitation agencies in some states (RUWASSA and STWSSA)

have been established in many States for coordinating and monitoring all activities in the rural sub-sector. Institutional and systems development support for these institutions would be key for service sustainability and preparing the transition towards future development lead by the respective states.

6. Infrastructure and Social Services – Recovery Framework

Below is the consolidated Recovery Framework for the Infrastructure and Social Services Component, which combines individual sector frameworks into a cohesive whole. This provides the baseline conditions, performance indicators and implementation sequencing of various sectors at the level of individual interventions. This could prove to a useful tool for future intra- and inter-sectoral prioritisation and sequencing of recovery needs, as well for monitoring, evaluation, and subsequent readjustments and course corrections to the recovery program.

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline Present State (Dec 15)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery</i>	<i>Stabilisation Years 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Years 3-4</i>	<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
Subcomponent 1: Agriculture and Irrigation					
Reconstruction or rehabilitation of Agriculture and Irrigation facilities	- 60-100% destroyed by the crisis	- % of Agriculture and Irrigation Facilities reconstructed	-40%	-60%	Federal/State Government/ Development Partners/ other stake holders
Strengthening Agriculture and Irrigation Related Services Value Chains for increased food security and agricultural productivity	- Significant reduction in human mobility thus limiting access to extension services and productive inputs/assets	- % of farmers/IDPs with access to agricultural inputs and extension services	-60%	-40%	Federal/State Government/ Development Partners/ other stake holders
Food Assistance					
(i) General food assistance for populations in emergency and famine phases of food insecurity	- Borno 600,000, Yobe 200,000, Adamawa 41,000	- % of IDPs and host community population in food insecurity provided food	-86%	-14%	Federal/State Government/ Development Partners/ other stake holders
(ii) Supplementary food assistance for most vulnerable for 4 months	- Borno 420,000, Yobe 201,000, Adamawa 123,000	- % of most vulnerable provided supplementary food	-86%	-14%	
(iii) Short term food assistance (for 6 months) for less directly affected states	- Bauchi 70,000, Gombe 30,000, Taraba 50,000	- % of IDPs and host community populations in food insecurity provided food during the lean period (March-August)	-89%	-11%	

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline Present State (Dec 15)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery</i>	<i>Stabilisation Years 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Years 3-4</i>	<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
Subcomponent 2: Education – Reconstruct/rehabilitate education facilities in six Focus states					
Complete assessment of facilities damaged in six Focus States		Survey completed with precise estimates of rehabilitation/ reconstruction needs (building, furniture, equipment, learning materials, textbooks)	100%		Complete assessment of facilities damaged in six Focus States
Reconstruction or rehabilitation, refurbishment and re-equipping of educational facilities		% of facilities rehabilitated, reconstructed, re-equipped	30%	70%	Reconstruction or rehabilitation, refurbishment and re-equipping of educational facilities
Support service delivery					
Establishment of temporary learning space during reconstruction		Number of temporary learning spaces established	100%		State Universal Basic Education Board
Compensation to teachers of IDP students/ hardship allowances for teachers returning to conflict-affected areas		Number of teachers of IDPs students; number of teachers returning to teaching	50%	50%	
Cash transfer/scholarship to address financial barriers to enrolment	0	Number of boys/girls who receive cash transfer/scholarship	50%	50%	State Universal Basic Education Board
Provide psycho-social support to affected children		Percent of affected children who receive support	100%		State Universal Basic Education Board
Capacity development					
Train in psycho-social support and peace building to teachers and head teachers to support children and parents affected by the conflict	0	Percent of teachers/ head teachers trained	100%		State Universal Basic Education Board
Develop capacity of SBMCs, e.g. to conduct enrolment drives, monitor enrolment	0	Percent of SBMCs that conduct enrolment drive and monitor enrolment	50%	50%	State Universal Basic Education Board
Subcomponent 3: Energy					
Energy delivered in the six states	Not available	GWh/year	450	500	
Electricity consumption per capita	Not available	kWh per capita	40	50	
Reconstruction of distribution substations	28% destroyed	Number of substations	60%	40%	
Reconstruction of distribution lines	29% destroyed	km of lines rehabilitated	60%	40%	Yola and Jos Disco State Governments
Reconstruction of transmission substations	16 substations destroyed	Number of substations	60%	40%	TCN FGN State Governments
Reconstruction of transmission lines	257 km of lines destroyed	km of lines rehabilitated	60%	40%	TCN FGN State Governments

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline Present State (Dec 15)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery</i>	<i>Stabilisation Years 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Years 3-4</i>	<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
Subcomponent 4: Environment					
Reduce Risks Related to Explosive Remnants of War	N/A	Hectare handed over as safe to the local government Information on suspicious items correctly reported by affected population (behaviour change indicator)	100%		TBD – Army not capable according to humanitarian mine action standards.
Formulate debris management plans for each of the conflict affected States	- No institutional framework for the management of debris	No. of debris management plans formulated and adopted by State Governments to frame the management of debris in their jurisdiction	100%		State Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Clear Debris from Areas where it Hampers Access or Reconstruction	- 290,000 fully destroyed housing units, 135,000 partially damaged housing units	Number of Structures cleared of debris, ready for reconstruction	100%		To be defined by State Level Debris Management Plan. Most likely State level EPA, potentially the Army in logistical support.
Remove debris aggregations from areas of human settlement	Up to 7.3 million m3 of debris generated from damage to the housing sector	M3 of debris removed from areas of human settlement	100%		As defined by debris management plans above, most likely EPA.
Recycle, reuse, or reprocess as much debris as possible, especially through sustainable SMEs	Not quantifiable, some informal sector recovery occurring, as well as direct reuse on site	M3 of debris diverted from the disposal route through reuse or processing for recycling	50%	50%	EPA, private sector
Safe disposal of unusable debris	Current disposal sites are unmanaged and uncontrolled	Number of livelihoods supported in the process of recycling and % of disposed debris which is disposed in a safe site, as described by International Solid Waste Association (ISWA) standards.	100%		EPA
Formulation of State wide solid waste management plans	No waste management strategy available at the State level	Number of states with a formulated and adopted SWM management plan	100%		EPA
Replacement of lost SWM infrastructure	15 vehicles destroyed and 8 damaged directly by the conflict	Number of vehicles replaced	100%		EPA
Provision of SWM collection service to displaced populations	2 million people displaced, a large majority not received SWM collection	Number of people with regular (once a week min.) waste collection service within 100m of their home (according to international standards)	100%		EPA
Reinforcement of existing waste management and resource recovery livelihood sector	Unquantified number of SMEs informally supporting municipal SWM system through resource recovery activities	Number of livelihoods created within the SWM and DM resource recovery sector	50%	50%	EPA

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline Present State (Dec 15)</i>		<i>Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery</i>	<i>Stabilisation Years 1-2</i>		<i>Recovery Years 3-4</i>		<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
Subcomponent 5: Health and Nutrition								
Reconstruction or rehabilitation of PHC facilities	PHC facilities damaged by State		% of PHC facilities reconstructed/ rehabilitated	Adamawa	32%	Adamawa	75%	
	Adamawa	7%						
	Bauchi	27%						
	Borno	46%						
	Gombe	1%						
	Taraba	3%						
	Yobe	46%						
Reconstruction or rehabilitation of referral facilities (secondary hospitals)	Hospitals damaged by State		% of secondary hospitals reconstructed/ rehabilitated	Adamawa	33%	Adamawa	100%	
	Adamawa	33%						
	Bauchi	14%						
	Borno	21%						
	Yobe	25%						
	Bauchi	67%						
	Borno	40%						
Gombe								
Taraba								
Increased availability and utilisation of essential services: Deliveries attended by skilled personnel	Skilled deliveries per state		% of deliveries attended by skilled personnel	Adamawa	50%	Adamawa	65%	
	Adamawa	38%						
	Bauchi	26%						
	Borno	29%						
	Gombe	47%						
	Taraba	33%						
	Yobe	9%						
Increased availability and utilisation of essential services, particularly provided through non-permanent structures: Coverage of DPT3/ Penta3	Coverage of DPT3/Penta3		% children of 23 months or below immunised with DPT3/Penta3	Adamawa	60%	Adamawa	80%	
	Adamawa	45%						
	Bauchi	15%						
	Borno	32%						
	Gombe	24%						
	Taraba	26%						
	Yobe	8%						
Bauchi	50%							
Borno	50%							
Gombe	45%							
Taraba	55%							
Yobe	25%							

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline Present State (Dec 15)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery</i>	<i>Stabilisation Years 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Years 3-4</i>	<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
Restoration of health system functions	None of the CHEWs has been trained in the provision of the essential package	% of facilities with CHEW trained for the essential package of service	20%	60%	
Restoration of governance and resilience functions restored	None of the LGA/States has an operational EWARs	% of LGA with operational Early Warning & Response System	10%	40%	
Risk mitigation initiated	No activities of awareness	% of LGA with budgeted plan for awareness campaigns	20%	70%	
Subcomponent 6: Housing					
Rehabilitation (Repair) and Reconstruction of Damaged Houses	431,842 of the housing stock damaged during crisis	25% Percentage of Total Damaged Houses (107,960 units) Repaired and Reconstructed in Damaged Affected LGAs as part of Operation Plan	25% of the Operation Plan Target Fully Damaged Units and 75% of Partially Damaged Units	100% of the Fully and Partly Damaged Targeted Units Reconstructed. Phase 2 of the operational plan for 107,960 units kick starts based on the Phase 1 progress and conflict situations (US\$ 400 Million)	Establish a North-East Housing Reconstruction Project Unit /State Governments/ Ministry of Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Establishing Mechanism to Implement the Housing Reconstruction Program through Home Owner Driven Processes	Establish North-East Housing Reconstruction Project/ Gazette Operations Guidelines to Design and Implement Home Owner Driven Housing Recovery Program	Open Bank Accounts by Beneficiaries and Share at least 10% of the cost in cash and kind	Publish the List of Beneficiaries based on detailed assessments and Open Bank Accounts by 100% Beneficiaries	Establish Material Coordination Teams to Ensure Easy Access to Building Materials by People	Establish a North-East Housing Reconstruction Project/ State Governments/ Lead Commercial Banks /Lead Micro Credit Institutions/ Chamber of Commerce
Establishing a Community Based Grievance Redress Mechanism	Establish LGA Level Beneficiary Identification and Grievance Redress Mechanism	Establish Village Rehabilitation Committees to Monitor Housing Assistance Delivery Mechanism	Establish Beneficiary Auditing and Technical Auditing Teams	Quarterly Auditing/ Supporting up Uncompleted Housing Units to Complete	Establish a North-East Housing Reconstruction Project/ State Housing Ministry
Subcomponent 7: Information and Communication Technology					
Refurbishing damaged infrastructure for mobile phone base stations and towers	Approximately 480 base stations damaged across six states	Number of repaired base stations and towers	60%	100%	Relevant Ministry at State and Federal Level; private sector entities such as: MTN, Glo, Airtel, Etisalat
Subcomponent 8: Public Buildings					
Repair and retrofit partially damaged public buildings	706 public buildings are damaged; 44 partly damaged (functional) and require repair/retrofitting	All partly damaged public buildings are repaired and made functional	All partly damaged local government (13) and ministry buildings (4), police stations/ barrack (7) and election office (1) are repaired and made functional; (57% of total partly damaged buildings)	Remaining partly damaged building (19) are repaired and made functional; 100% of the partly damaged public buildings restored	Public Works Departments/ State Governments

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline Present State (Dec 15)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery</i>	<i>Stabilisation Years 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Years 3-4</i>	<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
Reconstruct/rebuild fully damaged public buildings Establish North-East Reconstruction Project to design and implement the recovery program	662 public buildings are completely destroyed (non-functional) and need to be rebuilt	NERP established All fully damaged public buildings are reconstructed and made functional	25% of the total fully damaged local government and ministry buildings, police stations and barracks are rebuilt and made functional	100% of all fully damaged public buildings reconstructed and made functional	Establish a North-East Reconstruction Project (NERP)/ Project Management Consultants (PMC)/ State Governments
Establish Project Management Consultants (PMC) to prepare RFP, tender documents and project monitoring and quality controls	Policy decision to reconstruct public building as per 'build-back-better' principles	Prepare RFPs/ Tender Documents and Contract Awards	Prepare retrofitting guidelines for restoration of partly damaged units. Award contracts for the reconstruction of 25% of the fully damaged buildings	100% fully damaged public buildings reconstructed and completion certifications awarded	Establish a North-East Reconstruction Project (NERP)/ Project Management Consultants (PMC)/ State Governments
Subcomponent 9: Social Protection					
Expansion of coverage of forthcoming National Social Safety Nets Program, unconditional top-up for first 2 years	Poverty incidence: 49.9%	Output indicator: Number of households covered; Ratio of IDPs to non-IDP beneficiary households Outcome indicator: Poverty incidence and poverty gap; Household income/ expenditure	50%	50%	
Employment of IDPs in procurement of forthcoming national school feeding program		Output indicator: Number of IDPs employed; Number of meals served; Number of public school children that received meals	70%	30%	
Public employment scheme	Poverty incidence: 49.9%	Output indicator: Number of households covered; Ratio of IDPs to non-IDPs beneficiary households Outcome indicator: Poverty incidence and poverty gap; Household income/ expenditure	50%	50%	
Old age and disability allowance	Poverty incidence of households with older persons: 57.9%	Output indicator: Coverage of older persons aged 65 years and above and PWDs, in terms of absolute numbers and share of total older persons/PWDs Outcome indicator: Poverty incidence and poverty gap	50%	50%	

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline Present State (Dec 15)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery</i>	<i>Stabilisation Years 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Years 3-4</i>	<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
Targeted subsidy of Community Bases Social Health Insurance Program for children under 5, lactating mothers, and pregnant women	Immunisation of children under 5: 43.4%	Output indicator: Number of total individuals covered; Individuals covered as share of total population in the North-East; Health expenditure per individual/ household; Child immunisation rates	0%	100%	
Capacity building	Low institutional capacity to implement social protection schemes	Output indicator: Number of LGA-level implementers receiving training	100%	0%	
Subcomponent 10: Transport					
Rehabilitate Federal roads	878 m2 of Federal road damaged	Square meter of rehabilitated roads and bridges	80%	100%	Federal /State Ministry of Transport
Rehabilitate State infrastructure (roads and bridges)	3326 m2 of State/LGA road damaged	Square meter of rehabilitated roads	80%	100%	Federal /State Ministry of Transport
	11262 m2 of bridges damaged	Square meter of rehabilitated bridges			
Restore public transport		Restored Public transport assets	60%	100%	Federal /State Ministry of Transport; Public Transport Corporations of Borno and Yobe
Subcomponent 11: Water and Sanitation					
Repair/Rehabilitation and Replacement (RRR) of Damaged WASH Infrastructure					
RRR of all damaged water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered) boreholes in communities and of piped schemes in small towns and urban centres		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of water points restored • Number of schemes rehabilitated • Number of beneficiaries 			Ministry in charge of water, Water Board, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
RRR of all damaged water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered) boreholes in public places (excluding schools and health facilities)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of water points restored 			Ministry in charge of water, Water Board, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Replacement of all damaged protected dug wells with hand pump boreholes		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of water points restored • Number of beneficiaries 			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Replacement /Rehabilitation of damaged sanitation infrastructure in public places (excluding schools and health facilities)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of water points restored 			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline Present State (Dec 15)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery</i>	<i>Stabilisation Years 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Years 3-4</i>	<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
Bridging of WASH Infrastructure need in affected communities and in under-served host population: Population in affected communities and in host communities in need of new water points to bridge the water supply infrastructure deficit within in addition to water and sanitation infrastructure deficits in public places					
Construction of new water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered boreholes) and network extension in small towns and urban centres in affected areas as well as in select host communities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of new water points; • Additional population served by Piped schemes • Number of beneficiaries 			Ministry in charge of water, Water Board, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Construction of new water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered boreholes) and sanitation infrastructure in public places in the affected areas as well as in select host communities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of new water points; • Number of new sanitation facilities 			Ministry in charge of water, Water Board, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion: People in affected areas as well as in host communities engage in high risk sanitation and hygiene practices					
Implementation of community led total sanitation approach in rural areas		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of people in communities meeting international standards 			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Conduct of hygiene promotion campaigns including distribution of IEC materials to the affected areas plus the host communities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of people reached with hygiene messages 			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Formation and training of community based structures for implementation and monitoring of sanitation and hygiene promotion activities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of communities with structures for hygiene and sanitation promotion 			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Institutional and Systems Development support to local institutions at State and LGA levels: Weakened WASH institution at the State level with low capacity and near absence of WASH structures at the LGA level with resultant poor and stretched capacity for project planning, implementation, and coordination with limited funding for project and operational activities.					
Establishment / strengthening of Local institutions (MDAs) at the State and LGA level		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of States Institutions strengthened • Number of LGAs with WASH Units/Dept. established and operational 			Federal/State Government and ESAs (WB, EU, UNICEF)
Technical assistance for initial assessments, strategic planning and capacity building on project management		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment report and capacity building plan available 			Federal/State Government and ESAs (WB, EU, UNICEF)
On time provision of equipment and logistics support (Vehicles, office equipment, furniture, ICT infrastructure, etc.)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of supplies delivered 			Federal/State Government and ESAs (WB, EU, UNICEF)
Operational support for fuelling of vehicles, purchase of chemicals, working tools and office expendables		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of functional WASH facilities 			Federal/State Government and ESAs (WB, EU, UNICEF)
Strengthening systems at community level for improved management of water and sanitation facilities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of communities with active structures • Number of communities with water safety plans 			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline Present State (Dec 15)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery</i>	<i>Stabilisation Years 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Years 3-4</i>	<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
Community Infrastructure and Non-Formal Services					
Rehabilitation of Community Infrastructure and revival of non-formal services: Communities in affected areas have rebuilt their community infrastructure, while non-traditional services are reinstated by the communities.					
Construction of community infrastructure (small pathways, cultural centres and meeting places) in affected areas as well as in select host communities		• Number of community infrastructure rebuilt and rehabilitated			Federal and state level ministries responsible for education, health, public buildings, transport, water and sanitation
Provision of non-formal services, such as non-formal and traditional education and community health facilities		• Number of non-formal services provided / reinstated			Federal and state level ministries responsible for education, health and nutrition, public buildings, transport, water and sanitation

Component: Economic Recovery

1. Introduction

1.1 Role of Livelihoods and Economic Recovery towards Recovery

The objectives of this chapter on Economic Recovery are twofold. First, it assesses the economic impacts of the Boko Haram related conflict on local macroeconomics (output, price and fiscal) on key sector activities (trade, finance, and private sector), and on people's livelihoods, employment, and poverty. The assessment of impacts includes both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Second, the report will make recommendations that will facilitate short term economic stabilisation as well as assist State and Local Governments to sustain economic recovery in the medium term, together with the cost of proposed interventions and implementation arrangements.³⁷ The recommendations will therefore focus on rebuilding sustainable livelihood systems and strategies in order to recover from the current crisis situation, reducing the risks associated with subsequent conflicts. This second action-oriented part will support the Federal and Local Governments, civil society organisations, and communities to develop and implement livelihood and economic recovery programmes and strategies.

1.2 Relationship with Other Components

It should be highlighted here that any recommendation related to youth empowerment should take into account their future role in local and democratic governance, and economic development.

1.3 Assessment Scope and Methodology

The methodology used for estimating macroeconomic impact on output, price and fiscal, is based on the comparison of the actual situation with counterfactual scenario. It is found that the average macroeconomic trend for all 36 states is an appropriate method to derive a counterfactual macroeconomic trend, as the required data is available for the simulation of a counterfactual. The method calculates differences between the actual

macroeconomic trends for the North-East and the counterfactual macroeconomic trend (an average macroeconomic trends for the six states) for both pre-crisis and in-crisis periods. Subsequently, the averages of the differences for both periods are computed. Finally, the macroeconomic impact of the conflict is the difference between the average difference for post-crisis period and the average difference for the pre-crisis period (see Annex 1 for detailed methodology).

The impact assessment of the conflict on trade, finance, and the private sector will be quantitative where data is available, or else qualitative using anecdotal evidence collected through field visits to the six states or from secondary sources.

1.4 Key Assumptions and Limitations

Quantitative analysis is severely constrained by the limited availability and poor quality of statistics at the State and Local Government levels. Macroeconomic statistics at the State and Local Government levels are extremely scarce, often not available; and the existing data tends to be incomplete or inconsistent, largely due to the lack of demand for statistics for evidence-based policy making as well as limited technical capacity. State level GDP (aggregate and sectoral contribution) is not calculated; consumer price indices for relevant non-food items (rent, fuel, transport, etc.) are not available at both National and State levels; and the disaggregated employment data by sector and by state is not available. Budget data for some 600 Local Governments (out of the total of 774) cannot be consolidated into the State Government budgets. The team mitigates the data shortfall by utilising historical data and secondary sources of data provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Central Bank to estimate State level GDP and to simulate the impact of the conflict on output. However, the results should be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, lack of detailed GDP at the State level by expenditure component and sector hampers the estimation of the impact of the conflict on poverty and income distribution in the North-East region. The lack of full coverage of 774 local government administrations also limits the analysis of the fiscal impact on the State Government.

2. Economic Impact Assessment

2.1 Macroeconomic Pre-crisis Condition and Impact of the Conflict

Over the 2005-2010 period, Nigeria as a whole experienced robust macroeconomic performance characterised by a high economic growth rate, strong fiscal position and external balance, and a stable exchange rate. Growth averaging 8 percent per annum was driven by an increase in international oil price as well as rapid growth of non-oil sectors (agricultural, mining, industry, and service). Despite a decline in oil output during this period, overall GDP growth remained strong, reflecting the expansion in the non-oil sector (especially the service sector), accounting for nearly 70 percent of GDP. Fiscal performance improved significantly, benefiting from the introduction of a reference oil price for budget estimates in 2003 and debt relief, as well as increased international oil prices.³⁸ The current account remained in surplus during the period but slightly deteriorated as a result of declining oil exports caused by the 2009 global financial crisis. Inflation remained above 10 percent per annum and the Naira depreciated because of external shocks in 2009-2010, but remained stable.

2.1.1 Pre-crisis Macro Economic Trends in the NE Region

The North-East region holds the potential for contributing to Nigeria's economic development through economic diversification. The region spanning over 275,677 square kilometres (30 percent of Ni-

geria's landmass) accommodates 19 million population (14 percent of Nigeria's total population) according to the NBS projection for 2007 and 2016. The local economy was dominated by agriculture including cash crops (cotton and groundnut), food crops (rice, maize, millet and yam), livestock and fisheries. This was followed by the service sector (trade, transport, financial, telecommunication and real estate) that benefited from trading within and between regions, and also from cross border trade with neighbouring countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and Niger). The contribution of trade to GDP was especially pronounced in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. The manufacturing sector, mostly agro-processing industries (grain and rice mills, cotton ginneries, oil, meat processing, leather, etc.), catered to the domestic markets as their expansion was constrained by the lack of infrastructure and long distance to markets. With the mix of agriculture, mining, non-petroleum natural resources and abundant labour, the region had the potential for economic diversification.

However, performance of the North-East economy had continuously lagged behind the national average prior to 2010. Economic growth in the North-East was led by non-oil sectors; notably agriculture, services, and retail trade. Anecdotal evidence and available indicators point to the weak growth of this non-oil sector in the North-East compared to the national average reflecting significant challenges in the region, including the distance from markets, inadequate infrastructure and an unfavourable business environment, leading to a

TABLE 3.1

Nigeria - Impact of Boko Haram related Crisis on North-East State Output and Prices 2011-2015 by Year

Year	GDP (Naira billions)	Inflation, all prices (percent)	Inflation, food prices (percent)
2011	-174.68	4.81	0.36
2012	-464.32	0.83	8.09
2013	-239.61	-0.35	-0.42
2014	-447.13	-0.09	-1.09
2015	-335.11	0.18	0.53
Accumulation 2011-15	-1660.84	5.37	7.47

Source: World Bank staff's estimate

TABLE 3.2

Nigeria - Impact of Boko Haram Related Crisis on North-East State Output and Prices 2011-2015 by State

<i>State</i>	<i>GDP (Naira billions)</i>	<i>Inflation, all prices (percent)</i>	<i>Inflation, food prices (percent)</i>
Adamawa	-314.0	10.4	9.0
Bauchi	-86.3	-4.5	22.6
Borno	-708.2	10.0	11.3
Gombe	-280.9	12.7	46.3
Taraba	-49.1	-2.9	0.0
Yobe	-222.3	6.6	0.7
Primary affected States	-1244.5	27.0	21.1
Secondary affected States	-416.3	5.3	23.8
Accumulation 2011-15	-1660.8	5.4	7.5

Source: World Bank Staff's estimate

high cost of doing business, rapid population growth and increased poverty. These factors constrained the development of the private sector, and the economic activities in the region have been predominantly characterised by small agricultural farms, large informal markets operated by petty traders, and micro and small enterprises. They created jobs and employment that require basic skills; thus adding limited value to total output. In parallel, the public sector including State and Local Governments that are responsible for providing social services (health, education and social protection) and public infrastructure has become one of the local drivers of economic growth. They provide employment and income to public sector employees (civil servants, teachers, and health care workers), while suppliers and contractors provide goods and services to the governments.

2.1.2 North-East Region Macroeconomic Impact and Damage Assessment

Economic performance during 2011-2015 weakened, reflecting the impact from both internal and external shocks. Growth slowed down but remained at the average rate of 5 percent per annum, thanks to the strength of non-oil sectors (manufacturing, and services including wholesale and retail trade). The rebased GDP in 2014 has made

Nigeria the largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Inflation fell from 11 percent in 2011 to a single digit of 7.9 percent in 2013, and stabilised thereafter. However, fiscal performance deteriorated, reflecting a decline in oil revenue, a combination of lower production caused by oil thefts and pipeline sabotage during the earlier years, and sustained international oil price shocks in 2015. These events led to the depletion of the Excess Crude Account (ECA) reserve that fell to US\$2 billion at end 2015. The current account surplus continued declining throughout the period and the balance turned to a deficit in 2015.

To evaluate the impact on output, the State level GDP was estimated using a regression analysis.³⁹ It is important to note that the estimated impacts should be viewed as proxies, as their precision is undermined by estimation errors caused by limited information. The annual impacts of the Boko Haram related conflict on output and price in the North-East were simulated between 2011 and 2015. It is estimated that the region suffered an accumulated output loss of N1.66 trillion between 2011 and 2015, with a significant loss registered in 2012 and 2014, N464.32 billion and N447.13 billion respectively (Table 3.1).

The primary affected states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe⁴⁰ experienced significant output loss accounting for 75 percent of the accu-

mulated output loss in six states, with Borno experiencing the greatest loss during 2011-2015. While Borno, Adamawa and Yobe are the primary targets of the Boko Haram group, the loss suffered by the three other states is, to a large extent, attributable to the influx of IDPs and the fear of conducting economic activities in locations that are close to primary targets of the armed group.

The crisis appears to have put upward pressure on prices for all items including for food items in the North-East. At the regional level, prices for all items rose by 5.4 percent annually during 2011-2015 while prices for food items rose by 7.5 percent annually (Table 3.2). Prices for food and for all items rose in four states, except in Bauchi and Taraba.⁴¹

The crisis severely affected food production and agricultural productivity in the North-East, in particular in the hardest hit states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Limited food availability and restricted access to farms and markets in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa have generated localised food crises of acute food insecurity during the lean period.⁴²

As a result, food insecurity has increased dramatically, among the IDPs, but also within the hosting communities, according to FAO.⁴³

Food insecurity is severe as the ongoing conflict has led to a reduced agricultural production resulting in a critical food shortage. A lower productivity (yields per Ha) of main crops was due to limited access to quality agricultural inputs (seeds and fertiliser) as well as reduced hectares to produce due to abandonment of fields and agro enterprises as people fled from Boko Haram activities. The food insecurity level in the region has been defined as critical and severe. Livestock is significantly reduced following major thefts by Boko Haram as well

as through displacement loss where cattle had to be left behind. Main sources of food for most IDPs in host communities and unrecognised IDP camps in the secondary affected states are distributions from charities, humanitarian partners, the governmental NEMA/SEMA, or donations from host communities, relatives and friends. However, this was not so in the primary affected states where IDPs in host communities are not receiving any support except from relatives and donations from host community members, thus requires urgent attention.

2.2 Fiscal

2.2.1 Pre-crisis Fiscal Trends


The consolidated budget for the North-East region recorded an increasing deficit during the pre-crisis period and subsequently worsened during the crisis. The aggregated fiscal deficit (as percentage of the total revenue) for the North-East region increased rapidly prior to the crisis, largely due to an expansion of the State budgetary expenditure and to some extent, reflecting the impact of the global economic crisis in 2009 (Figure 3.1). The crisis lowered oil revenue and thus statutory transfer from the Federal account to State Governments; however, this was offset by an increase in Value Added Tax (VAT) distributed from the VAT pool account. This, combined with a reduction in capital expenditure, lowered the deficit in 2009, but this trend was reversed in 2010, when both recurrent and capital expenditure rose sharply in the region.

Despite an increase in consolidated revenue during the pre-crisis period, the North-East region was highly dependent on statutory allo-



FIGURE 3.1

North-East Region - Consolidated Revenue and Expenditure (Billions of Naira) and Budget Balance (% of Total Revenue, 2007-2015)



Source: Central Bank of Nigeria

cation transferred from the Federal Government. An increase in total revenue was attributed to increased statutory transfer (gross statutory transfer and VAT), Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) and grant. Statutory transfer accounted for about 60 percent of total revenue, allocated every month to State and Local Governments based on a transparent revenue sharing formula among the three tiers of governments as stipulated in the constitution. Gross statutory allocation from the Federal Account that accumulates oil revenue, corporate income tax, international trade tax and excise tax accounted for 50 percent of total revenue, and transfer from the VAT pool account accounted for the remaining 10 percent. Thus changes in the international oil prices greatly affected the statutory transfer and thereby the total revenue of North-East States.⁴⁴

Given the weakness in the IGR at the State level, changes in the international oil prices directly affected total revenue of the North-East region through a reduction in the statutory allocation from the Federal account. In response to revenue shortfalls, State Governments financed their budgets largely by increased domestic borrowing from commercial banks and to some extent by accumulation of arrears on salary, goods and services and contractors.

At the State level, fiscal performance during the pre-crisis was uneven across North-East States. Table 3.3 shows an average fiscal indicator for each state during the pre-crisis in comparison with the averages for the North-East Region.⁴⁵

2.2.2 Fiscal Impact and Damage Assessment

Fiscal performance deteriorated during the conflict period (2011-15) as indicated in the widening average budget deficit for the North-East region. Following a slight decline in 2011, the aggregate budget deficit for the North-East region increased steadily from 2.8 percent in 2011 to 31 percent of total revenue in 2014 (Table 3.3). Both consolidated revenue and expenditure for the North-East regions accelerated during 2010-2013 but they subsequently declined thereafter. However, the total revenue fell faster than the total expenditure, reflecting the declining statutory allocations, thus significantly increasing the budget deficit in 2013 (Figure 3.2). The deficit fell to 20 percent in 2015, as spending declined. Increased total spending reflected an increase in both recurrent and capital, presumably to mitigate the negative impact of the conflict on the affected population, especially IDPs, as well as to maintain public order and safety.


TABLE 3.3
Consolidated Budget for the North-East Region, 2007-2015

Year	Statutory Allocation	VAT	IGR	Grants	Total Revenue	Recurrent	Personnel	Capital	Total Expenditure	Budget Balance	Total Debt
2007	24.7	5.2	5.8	0.0	44.0	24.2	11.2	34.4	58.7	-14.7	0.0
2008	32.4	6.1	3.7	7.1	61.9	24.6	11.2	34.7	59.3	2.6	5.0
2009	33.7	6.7	6.0	11.8	67.0	29.1	15.4	28.6	57.9	9.2	6.4
2010	37.9	7.4	6.2	0.1	63.0	32.1	17.7	43.3	76.0	-13.0	8.1
2011	37.1	7.3	5.3	0.0	55.4	28.8	19.2	28.8	57.9	-2.5	8.8
2012	26.6	7.5	18.6	0.0	55.5	32.1	7.0	34.0	66.0	-10.5	0.0
2013	23.3	4.1	2.8	0.2	37.5	20.5	8.9	31.6	52.8	-15.3	2.8
2014	33.5	7.0	7.9	3.8	60.6	29.3	14.1	33.9	63.4	-2.8	5.6
2015	167.6	35.0	39.7	18.9	302.9	146.6	70.5	169.4	317.2	-14.2	28.2
Average 2007-10	32.2	6.4	0.7	1.3	28.8	16.0	2.1	10.4	26.5	2.3	0.3
Average 2011-15	57.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of Total Revenue											
2007	56.1	11.9	13.1	0.0	100.0	55.0	25.5	78.2	133.4	-33.4	0.0
2008	52.3	9.8	5.9	11.4	100.0	39.7	18.1	56.0	95.8	4.2	8.0
2009	50.3	10.0	8.9	17.6	100.0	43.4	23.0	42.7	86.3	13.7	9.6
2010	60.1	11.8	9.8	0.1	100.0	50.9	28.1	68.8	120.6	-20.6	12.8
2011	66.9	13.3	9.5	0.0	100.0	52.0	34.6	52.0	104.5	-4.5	15.8
2012	47.9	13.5	33.5	0.0	100.0	57.8	12.7	61.2	118.9	-18.9	0.0
2013	62.1	11.0	7.6	0.4	100.0	54.7	23.8	84.4	140.9	-40.9	7.3
2014	55.3	11.6	13.1	6.3	100.0	48.4	23.3	55.9	104.7	-4.7	9.3
2015	55.3	11.6	13.1	6.3	100.0	48.4	23.3	55.9	104.7	-4.7	9.3
Average 2007-10	54.7	10.9	9.4	7.3	100.0	47.2	23.7	61.4	109.0	-9.0	7.6
Average 2011-15	57.5	12.2	15.4	2.6	100.0	52.3	23.5	61.9	114.8	-14.8	8.4
Percent of Total											
2007	56.1	11.9	13.1	0.0	100.0	41.2	19.1	58.6	100.0	-25.1	0.0
2008	52.3	9.8	5.9	11.4	100.0	41.4	18.9	58.4	100.0	4.4	8.0
2009	50.3	10.0	8.9	17.6	100.0	50.2	26.6	49.5	100.0	15.8	9.6
2010	60.1	11.8	9.8	0.1	100.0	42.2	23.3	57.0	100.0	-17.1	12.8
2011	66.9	13.3	9.5	0.0	100.0	49.7	33.1	49.8	100.0	-4.3	15.8
2012	47.9	13.5	33.5	0.0	100.0	48.6	10.7	51.4	100.0	-15.9	0.0
2013	62.1	11.0	7.6	0.4	100.0	38.8	16.9	59.9	100.0	-29.0	7.3
2014	55.3	11.6	13.1	6.3	100.0	46.2	22.2	53.4	100.0	-4.5	9.3
2015	55.3	11.6	13.1	6.3	100.0	46.2	22.2	53.4	100.0	-4.5	9.3
Average 2007-10	111.8	22.1	2.5	4.7	100.0	60.6	8.0	39.4	100.0	8.7	1.0
Average 2011-15	53.0	11.4	9.6	13.1	100.0	56.8	19.2	41.4	100.0	-12.9	7.1

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria

FIGURE 3.2

North-East Region - Consolidated Revenue and Expenditure (Billions of Naira) and Budget Balance (% of Total Revenue, 2007-2015)



Source: Central Bank of Nigeria

The average budget deficit during the crisis was twice higher than the average budget deficit pre-crisis. When comparing the pre-crisis period with the in-crisis period, the average budget deficit in nominal terms doubled (from N5 billion to N10 billion), driven by a faster rise in the total expenditure especially recurrent spending as compared to an increase in the average total revenue during the crisis. The budget deficit was financed by borrowing mostly from domestic markets.

The conflict severely affected public finance in the North-East States through reduced revenue and increased expenditure. The damage and destruction to the local economy directly lowered total government revenue and increased public spending at the State and Local Government levels. Increased violence and insecurity have hampered business activities such as manufacturing, trade and banks, most of which have been completely closed down or relocated or have operated under reduced business hours, thus undermining the collection of VAT and IGR. On the expenditure side, the on-going conflict and its aftermath necessitated government interventions in strengthened public order and safety, rehabilitation of physical infrastructure (road,

schools, health facilities, markets, etc.), and social assistance to IDPs. Consequently, both recurrent and capital spending increased and thereby widened the budget deficit.

The impact assessment shows that the conflict lowered tax collection but increased expenditure. On the revenue side, IGR and VAT revenue fell while grants increased in all six states. On the expenditure side, total expenditure including both recurrent and capital increased in primary affected states, while total expenditure fell in the secondary affected states as a result of a reduction in recurrent spending. The accumulated loss in tax revenue in the primary affected states was greater than that of the secondary affected states.⁴⁶

The conflict increased public spending in the primary affected states and thus worsened the overall budget deficit. During the crisis period, the conflict increased total public spending by N124 billion, largely due to an increase in capital spending in the primary affected states. This is probably due to the need to rehabilitate physical infrastructure, markets, schools and health facilities damaged by the armed group's attacks.

TABLE 3.4

Fiscal impact of the conflict – accumulation 2011-2015

<i>State</i>	<i>VAT</i>	<i>IGR</i>	<i>Grant</i>	<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Recurrent</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Balance</i>
Adamawa	-9.1	-10.8	91.0	71.1	38.3	31.6	69.9	-17.2
Bauchi	-5.6	-15.2	36.4	15.7	-23.8	30.8	7.1	12.8
Borno	2.5	-35.2	14.5	-18.2	-30.0	41.8	11.8	-8.3
Gombe	-11.2	-11.0	-18.6	-40.7	-9.9	18.9	9.0	12.1
Taraba	-11.9	-6.1	28.5	10.5	-58.0	-26.1	-84.0	14.2
Yobe	-3.7	-16.9	9.1	-11.5	12.8	29.8	42.5	-6.6
North-East Region	-38.9	-95.2	161.0	26.9	-70.6	126.9	56.3	7.0

Notes:

1. Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe

2. Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria and WB Staff's Estimate

2.3 Private Sector

2.3.1 Pre-crisis Conditions

Nigeria has about 37 million enterprises including Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME). About 40 percent are farms, and most of the rest are informal Non-Farm household Enterprises (NFEs). According to the Small Enterprise Development Agency Nigeria (2014), there are about 68,000 small firms (between 10 and 49 employees) and 4,700 medium firms (with between 50 and 200 employees). The private sector, including firms of all sizes, is dominated by services, in particular wholesale and retail trade.⁴⁷

The North-East Region has a relatively large representation of the micro-enterprise sector compared to the formal private sector. According to the 2010 National Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) survey undertaken by the National Bureau of Statistics and the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN),⁴⁸ the total number of MSMEs (employing up to 200 persons) in Nigeria stood at 17.28 million, with 17.26 million micro-enterprises (with less than 10 employees), thus representing 99.9 percent of MSMEs; 21,264 small enterprises (with 10 to 49 employees) and 1,654 medium enterprises (with 50 to 199 employees).

The total number of micro-enterprises in the North-East remains relatively small at the National level. There are around 2.5 million enterprises (out of 17.3 million enterprises in total), accounting for only 14 percent of total micro-enterprises in Nigeria.⁴⁹


The distribution of SMEs by sector in the North-East States shows that they are concentrated in the manufacturing sector, wholesale/retail sector, hotel/restaurants and social services (education, health and other social services). There were about 346 SMEs in manufacturing, 272 SMEs in wholesale/retail, 185 in hotel/restaurants, and 451 in education and health (Table 3.6).

According to the 2009 Enterprise Survey,⁵⁰ firms in five out of the six North-East States (Adamawa, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe) identified that electricity and access to finance are the most important obstacles. Electricity shortage is considered the most important obstacle in all states except Yobe (where firms consider access to finance as the most important obstacle). Other important obstacles are tax rates, corruption and transportation.

The 2010 Sub-National Doing Business report indicated that key doing business indicators in the North-East States were favourable.⁵¹

The report assesses the performance of Nigerian States across four

FIGURE 3.3
Location of manufacturing SMEs at the State level, 2010



Source: World Bank Urbanization Review for Nigeria, 2015v

TABLE 3.5
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in 6 North-East States, Lagos and Kano, 2010

State	Micro	Percent	Small	Percent	Medium	Percent
Adamawa	405,261	2.3	235	1.1	11	0.7
Bauchi	460,186	2.7	497	2.3	49	3.0
Borno	463,009	2.7	131	0.6	37	2.2
Gombe	416,183	2.4	225	1.1	31	1.9
Taraba	360,682	2.1	242	1.1	5	0.3
Yobe	364,806	2.1	150	0.7	5	0.3
Sub-total for North-East	2,470,127	14.3	1,480	7.0	138	8.3
Lagos	880,805	5.1	4,146	19.5	389	23.5
Kano	872,552	5.1	1,740	8.2	69	4.2
Nigeria	17,261,753	100.0	21,264	100.0	1,654	100.0

Source: 2010 National MSMEs Survey, NBS & SMEDAN

indicators: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property and enforcing contracts. In 2010, Gombe was second in terms of ease of doing business; Borno was third; Yobe, sixth; Bauchi, tenth; Taraba, eleventh, and Adamawa, nineteenth. So most North-East States had a relatively good ranking.

NFEs in the North-East demonstrate low productivity. Productivity differentials across regions are in part due to the composition of NFEs, with roughly 44 percent of NFEs in the North-East involved in retail/wholesale, and 15 percent in food compared to a larger share of NFEs engaged in other services in the Southern region. The NFE sector has long been excluded from the jobs agenda and private sector development projects, as only 5 percent of NFEs are formal (i.e. registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission). The informal sector presumably does not generate waged jobs and investing in it can create distortions and discourage informal firms from formalising. Based on two rounds of the General Household Survey (2010/11 and 2012/13); however, this analysis finds that the informal sector actually consists of two types of economic entities—household enterprises (HEs,) operated by a single person, and microenterprises (MEs), which hire workers who are not members of the household.⁵²

TABLE 3.6

Sectoral distribution of SMEs among the North-East States (percent)

State	Agriculture		Mining		Manufacturing		Construction		Wholesale/retail		Hotel/ restaurants		Transport/ communication		Financial sector		Real estate		Education		Health/social		Total	
	Num	%	Num	%	Num	%	Num	%	Num	%	Num	%	Num	%	Num	%	Num	%	Num	%	Num	%	Num	%
Adamawa	18	7.3	4	1.6	41	16.6	7	2.8	22	8.9	37	15.0	0	0.0	20	8.1	21	8.5	17	6.9	60	24.3	247	100
Bauchi	14	2.3	4	0.6	81	13.1	5	0.8	103	16.7	79	12.8	54	8.8	59	9.6	7	1.1	134	21.8	76	12.3	616	100
Borno	5	3.0	0	0.0	61	36.3	2	1.2	29	17.3	11	6.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	1.8	17	10.1	40	23.8	168	100
Gombe	32	12.5	24	9.4	54	21.1	9	3.5	74	28.9	16	6.3	5	2.0	20	7.8	17	6.6	0	0.0	5	2.0	256	100
Taraba	14	5.6	0	0.0	75	30.1	0	0.0	22	8.8	16	6.4	5	2.0	20	8.0	0	0.0	34	13.7	63	25.3	249	100
Yobe	14	8.8	0	0.0	34	21.4	0	0.0	22	13.8	26	16.4	16	10.1	39	24.5	3	1.9	0	0.0	5	3.1	159	100
North-East	97		32		346		23		272		185		80		158		51		202		249		1695	

Source: 2010 National MSMEs Survey, NBS & SMEDAN

2.3.2 Private Sector Impact and Damages Assessment

As reported in the Infrastructure and Social Service Component, the private sector has been significantly affected by the conflict. For example, the Borno State Government reported that estimates for the damage/destruction of 1.5 million shops in the Kukawa LGA amounted to US\$753 million. In addition to direct damage due to the conflict, the private sector is also deeply affected by reduced mobility resulting from the conflict and the interruption of regional trade – due to the conflict affecting Nigeria, but also Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. This impact of the conflict on trade is discussed further in the next section.

2.4 Trade

2.4.1 Pre-crisis Trends

Nigeria enjoys a historical legacy of North-South trading relations dating to the pre-colonial era. In the pre-colonial period, a complex system of trade and urban economies existed in Nigeria, particularly evident in the North. The Hausa States and the Kanem Empire, centred on Borno, were part of a trade network stretching across the Sudan region northwards to the ports of North Africa and on to Europe.⁵³

Trade flows in 2008 were concentrated on selected commodities: livestock, maize and millet. The North-East – and Maiduguri, in particular — is a major regional trading hub for agricultural commodities. Official statistics (National Bureau of Statistics) show that exports from Borno and Adamawa mostly consists of footwear and plastics, while imports mostly consist of agricultural products (sesame, groundnut and groundnut oil), hides and skins, as well as automobile parts. A World Bank report⁵⁴ estimating trade flows between Nigeria and Cameroon highlights that a large share of trade enters at official border crossings, but that the value and volume of trade are significantly under-reported (the report estimates that they are under-reported by as much as a factor of 50). This report also underlines that trade procedures remain extremely non-transparent – demanding multiple formal and informal payments – and actual trade relationships and barriers differ depending on a large number of characteristics. Procedures and barriers differ depending on the location (geographical characteristics of the border area), weather (seasonal variation), time of day, specific border crossing, scale of operation, type of product and personalities involved. They are ultimately determined on a case-by-case basis through negotiations.

BOX 3.1 Gombe Case Study

Gombe State shows a declining number of registered businesses between 2010-2015. This can be explained by a number of constraints as identified in the 2014 Enterprise Survey for Gombe: electricity (with 54 percent of firms considering it as a major constraint), tax rates (52 percent), corruption (52 percent), tax administration (52 percent) and political instability (51 percent). For tax rates, tax administration and political instability, this is far higher than in other parts of Nigeria. Overall, in Nigeria, less than 20 percent of firms consider tax rates and tax administration as serious problems and 22 percent of firms consider that political instability is a serious problem (the survey was undertaken ahead of the 2015 Presidential elections). Another difference to note between Gombe and other parts of Nigeria is that 23 percent of firms of Gombe consider access to finance as a serious problem, compared to 33 percent in the country as a whole.

Between 2011 and 2013, on average, firms reported negative sales growth (average sales growth was -29% and median sales growth was -53%). This is worse than in the country as a whole (-4% and -31% respectively). Although average employment growth was positive

(3.8%), this was also lower than in the country as a whole (9.7%). The Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) reported it has seven members in Gombe State (mostly in the plastics sector). Three of these members closed down their activities, as of 2015, and the remaining saw a sharp decrease in their operations (in 2015 at 50 percent of their 2010 capacity).

Livestock trade has also been affected as highlighted by the graph below. Trade in cattle significantly dropped in 2011 and has continued its decline up to 2015, with 141,500 animals. This drop in trade in cattle was compensated by an increase in trade in sheep and goats in 2011 and 2012. But trade in sheep and goats significantly decreased in 2013, and continues to decrease in 2015, with 179,400 animals. Trade in poultry has seen a continuous slow decline with 215,000 animals in 2015.

Source: Gombe Ministry of Industry and Trade



2.4.2 Trade: Impact and Damage Assessment

The trade routes and markets have been significantly disrupted in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa. Table 3.7 summarises the status of the major trade routes of Borno as of 8 February 2016, and demonstrates that all trades routes from Borno to Niger, Chad and Cameroon are currently closed. As a result of the conflict and of the suspension of regional trade (following the closure of trade routes), the volume of trade is extremely low and traders have been forced to use alternative (longer) trade routes.⁵⁵ While formal trade has stopped (as border posts are not operating), informal trading activities continue.

Customs revenue fell sharply in 2014 as a result of the conflict. It peaked at N44.7 million in 2013 in Borno/Yobe (or equivalent to around US\$224,000). However, customs revenue plummeted to around N6 million (equivalent to US\$30,000) for the six states at the peak of conflict in 2014. Subsequently, it has picked up in 2015, with Adamawa/Taraba now contributing to the bulk of revenues (N31.6 million or equivalent to US\$158,000) due to the use of alternatives trade routes, as highlighted in the above paragraph. Nevertheless, trade flows are significantly under-reported due to prevalent informal cross border trade.


TABLE 3.7

Status of major trade routes in Borno (as of 8 February 2016)

<i>Trade routes</i>	<i>Status</i>
Maiduguri-Bama-Banki to Cameroon	Not accessible
Maiduguri-Bama-Gwoza to Cameroon	Not accessible
Maiduguri-Dikwa-Ngala to Chad	Not accessible
Maiduguri-Mafa-Marté to Chad	Not accessible
Maiduguri-Monguno-Baga to Niger	Not accessible
Maiduguri-Monguno-Abadam to Niger	Not accessible
Maiduguri-Gubio-Mobbar to Niger	Not accessible
Maiduguri-Monguno-Mallam Fatori to Niger	Not accessible
Maiduguri-Dambo-Biu-Gombe	Not accessible
Maiduguri-Biu-Adamawa	Not accessible
Maiduguri-Damaturu-Kano	Accessible

FIGURE 3.4

Customs Revenue, 2010-2015 (Naira)



BOX 3.2 Baga Market, Maiduguri

During its days of glory, the famous Baga Market in Maiduguri, Borno State prided itself as the biggest fish market in the North-East of Nigeria. But persistent attacks by Boko Haram in the last six years have depleted the fortunes of the market and reduced it to a risky area where both buyers and sellers visit with apprehension.

The market was attacked more than 20 times from 2009 to date. In all the attacks, lives have been lost, limbs maimed, vehicles destroyed and merchandise reduced to ashes by raging flames from IEDs. The latest attack was on Monday, 22nd June 2015, when two female suicide bombers stormed the market. At least 35 persons died; most of the victims are traders.

So compromised is the present state of Baga market, most of its patrons have moved to other climes. Gone are the days when fishermen from towns and villages along the shores of the Lake Chad bring their nets out of the waters with sizeable catches and then transport them to Maiduguri for sale. Gone, too, are the days when the market was handy for sizeable consignments of fish, while mongers from all parts of Nigeria and beyond traded there. No longer do cartons of assorted fish get loaded onto dozens of vehicles for onward delivery to Onitsha, Lagos, Aba, Abuja and other parts of Nigeria.

The closure of all the roads leading to Maiduguri due to the currently precarious security situation, has also hit the fortunes of the market hard. After series of clampdowns by Boko Haram arsonists on the Baga road, the Dikwa-Gamboru-Ngala road, the Bama road, and the Damboa road, the economic buoyancy of the market and other business activities was adversely affected.

Dozens of heavy duty trucks that used to ply the highway along Gamboru-Ngala, conveying commodities such as foodstuff and building materials to Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, and parts of Sudan, can no longer do so as armed groups have taken over the road. The only passable route to Maiduguri is through Damaturu, Yobe State's capital. Merchants from the southern part of Nigeria barely venture to Maiduguri, fearing attack.

The same applies to the native fishermen from all the communities in Baga, Kukawa, Monguno, Mallam Fatori, Damasak, and other locations who have access to lakes and rivers which they used as source of livelihood. Most of them have decided to forget their trade and many of them are afraid to come to Maiduguri. Fishermen and traders from Kano, Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, and Niger States have mostly relocated to their ancestral towns, due to fear. Also, prices of fish have skyrocketed, making it difficult for low income-earners to afford. A small carton that sold for N8,000 three years ago is now N20,000. "We have no option but to sell at high prices so that we can recoup our investment. People should be grateful that the fish is even available," said Mohammed Mai Kifi. At present, the visible sights in parts of Baga Market are destroyed, while fish mongers and other traders are living in perpetual fear.

Source: Adapted from North-East's biggest fish market crippled by Boko Haram, by Hamza Idris, Maiduguri, Jun 27 2015. <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/weekly/index.php/new-news/20932-north-east-s-biggest-fish-market-crippled-by-boko-haram>.

Market activities are also significantly affected by the conflict as markets have been regularly attacked. Markets have also suffered from the reduced mobility of the population due to the conflict. The army has also closed some markets for security reasons (to avoid attacks or to disrupt supplies to the armed group).⁵⁶

2.5 Financial sector

2.5.1 Pre-crisis Conditions

In 2010, the financial sector in Nigeria was still recovering from the 2008-2009 banking crisis. Following the crisis, the Nigerian author-

ities took decisive measures to strengthen the banking system. The tenfold increase in the minimum capital requirement for banks in 2005 led to the consolidation of the banking system (from 89 to 24 banks), and rapid expansion of the banks' lending. This lending was undertaken partly to finance the purchase of the banks' new share issuance ('margin loans') and partly in an effort to earn returns for those who had invested in the banks' significantly expanded capital base. With the stall in economic growth and the collapse in share prices in 2008, both the margin loans and new lending contributed to rapid deterioration in the quality of the banks' assets, which resulted in the banking crisis of 2008-2009.

BOX 3.3 Trade disruption in Yobe and Adamawa

As highlighted by the figure below, trade (measured by the number of trucks importing or exporting goods between Yobe and Niger) has been significantly affected in 2014 and 2015. As measured by the number of trucks, imports from Niger to Yobe are more significant than exports from Yobe to Niger: with close to 10,000 trucks in 2013, and down to around 3,600 trucks in 2015. Exports from Yobe to Niger were at the highest in 2010, with almost 2,000 trucks, down to around 700 trucks in 2015. Yobe imports, cattle, cowpea, 'guna' (watermelon), vegetable oil, rice, and spaghetti, mostly from Niger. Exports from Yobe to Niger are mainly grains.

Number of trucks importing goods from Niger to Yobe and exporting goods from Yobe to Niger


In Adamawa, a representative from the oil sector explained that the transport connection to Madagali and Michika have been lost and oil pumps are destroyed. As a result, only 10 percent of transporters are currently working. Before the conflict, there would be 200 trucks of oil per week across the 7 LGAs; now only 2-3 trucks of oil per week.

Similarly, during the dry season, before the conflict, there would have been around 1,000 trucks of fertiliser, now there are only around 150 trucks. For agro-chemicals: before the conflict, there would have been around 500 trucks, now around 10 trucks. During the rainy season, there used to be around 1,500 trucks of fertiliser, now only 50 trucks. There used to be 200 trucks of agrichemicals, now only around 50 trucks.

There were around 1,000 trucks driving from Gombe to Madagali before the conflict, now, only around 70 trucks. In Yola, the number of transporters has been reduced to 25 percent, with a large decrease of number of trucks on the road: before the conflict, there were around 500 trucks in operation; currently only around 50 trucks are operating. In addition, 10,000 achabas (moto-taxis) in operation have been banned (as the conflict has been using motos to carry out attacks).

Source: World Bank, Adamawa –RPBA Mission, February 2016.

Number of trucks importing goods from Niger to Yobe and exporting goods from Yobe to Niger




The 2010 EFINA (Enhancing Financial Innovation and Access) Access to Financial Services survey shows that the North-East has significantly more financial exclusion. In the North-East, 20.5 percent of the adults are formally included (i.e. have access to formal financial services), 11.2 percent of adults are informally included (i.e. have access to informal financial services), and 68.3 percent are financially excluded (i.e. have no access to formal or informal financial services). The national average shows 43 percent of adults are formally included, 17.3 percent of adults are informally included, and 39.7 adults are financially excluded.

2.5.2 Financial Sector Impact and Damage Assessment


Commercial banks have been a frequent target of attacks during the conflict.⁵⁷ As a result, the number of commercial banks has reduced (between 2010-2015). Figure 3.5 shows that Borno experienced the most significant reduction (from 23 to 18), following by Adamawa (from 20 to 18), and Taraba (from 16 to 15). Figure 3.5 also shows that the number of branches of commercial banks reduced in Adamawa (from 62 to 42), Bauchi (from 61 to 50), and Borno (from 75 to 42), with the most significant drop in Borno (with the closure of 33 branches). The number of branches increased slightly in the three other states; Gombe (from 31 to 34), Taraba (from 33 to 38), and Yobe (from 35 to 38).

FIGURE 3.5
Number of commercial banks and their branches operating in six states



Source: Central Bank of Nigeria

FIGURE 3.6

Deposits and credits in six North-East states (Bill. Of Naira)

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria

and Yobe (from 34 to 38). But overall, the number of branches of commercial banks decreased from 296 to 243, with the closure of 53 branches across the six states between 2010-2015.

Total deposits in the six North-East States have increased by 58 percent between 2010-2015 (from N214 billion or US\$1.07 billion to N339 billion or US\$1.69 billion). Figure 3.6 shows that increase in deposits was lower in Borno and Yobe. Similarly, credit has increased by 120 percent (from N61 billion or US\$305 million to N134 billion or US\$ 669 million). Total commercial banks' credit in Yobe State was the lowest across the six states. Deposits and credits have increased between 2010-2015 in the North-East, including in the three states more severely affected by the conflict. However, in 2015, credits in the North-East represent 1 percent of the total credits in Nigeria, while the North-East represents 14 percent of the total population of Nigeria.

Microfinance Banks (MFB) are concentrated in Bauchi and Gombe. With 15 each, Bauchi and Gombe have the highest number of MFBs, followed by Adamawa (9), Borno (5), Taraba (4), and Yobe (2).

The EFInA Access to Financial Services Survey for 2014 shows that formal financial inclusion has improved in the North-East. It rose from 20.5 percent of adults formally included in 2010, to 26.1 percent in 2014. However, the number of adults formally excluded did not improve (68.3 percent in 2010, and 68.4 percent in 2014). This is by far the highest rate of exclusion across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria as a result of lowered informal financial inclusion. It stood at 11.2 percent in 2010, and at 5.4 percent in 2014.

3. Livelihoods and Employment

3.1 Pre-crisis Conditions

The North-East has abundant sources of livelihoods, with agriculture being the backbone of the economy. Prior to the crisis, communities in the region earned a livelihood and income from dry land crop production (mostly grains such as millet, sorghum, maize, and rice; and legumes such as groundnuts and cowpeas, and irrigated as well as non-irrigated horticultural crops such as tomato and onion), livestock rearing and production (cattle, goats, sheep and pigs), nomadic pastoralism, fisheries, and natural resources based enterprises (such as artisanal mining, shea nut and gum Arabic harvesting, and merchandise trade). Farmers in the region also have harvested non-timber forestry products for food security and the market, such as gum Arabic, tamarind, baobab, and dessert palm extraction, as merchandise trade. The region, namely Yobe and Borno States, produces 80 percent of the 8000 MT exported gum Arabic per annum (Table 3.8).⁵⁸ Besides agriculture, other livelihood sources before the crisis included agro-processing, trading, artisanal mining, real estate, public and private sector formal employment, remittances, pension, and donor assistance.

However, productive employment opportunities are fewer. The majority of poor households are engaged in some income generating activities that do not provide sufficient income to lift the households out of poverty. In fact, even the non-poor Nigerians, particularly in the North, live extremely close to the poverty line. Employment in North-East concentrates in the agriculture sector, accounting for 67 percent of total employment in the region, the highest compared to the other regions (Figure 3.7). Given that most Nigerians involved in agricultural work live on subsistence minimum (half of those working in agriculture belong to the poorest 40 percent of the population), they are also vulnerable to shocks.⁵⁹

The labour force participation in the North-East was high in agricultural activities and in the smaller informal sector. According to the General Household Survey 2010/11, 82 percent of the labour force was self-employed in agriculture and non-agriculture activities (Table 3.9). This was attributed to the decline in investment in the manufacturing sector in the North-East, poor infrastructure, and social unrest. Non-family enterprises are the only getaway for the poor to escape poverty and are the most accessible form of income diversification, as the poor working on farms are the most vulnerable to economic and crop shocks.

TABLE 3.8

Solid Minerals, Natural Resources Based and Agro-Based Raw Materials by State, 2015

State	Minerals	Crops / Livestock	Natural Resources
Adamawa	Sand, limestone, salt, clay, granite, marble, laterite, gypsum, clay	Maize, millet, guinea corn/ sorghum, groundnuts, beans/ cowpeas, rice, cassava, yam, cocoyam, melon, potatoes, livestock, fish	
Bauchi	Tin, copper, gemstone, hydro-carbon, columbine, barite, sand, granite, gypsum, mica, clay, talc, zircon	Beans, maize, rice, cassava, sorghum, cotton, wheat, millets, cowpeas, sesame, soy beans, water melons, livestock	Baobab, Gum Arabic, Tamarind
Borno	Iron ore, sand, natural salt, mica, gypsum, granite, aquamarine, clay, bentonite, laterite	Maize, millet, sorghum, ground nuts, beans, rice, cotton, sesame, cowpeas, tomatoes, peppers, cattle, camel, donkeys, sheep, goats, fish	Baobab, Gum Arabic, Tamarind, desert palm, shea nuts, neem, moringa, spring water
Gombe	Limestone, sand, salt, clay, gypsum, diatomite, granite	Beans, maize, millet, rice, sorghum, ground nuts, cotton, wheat, vegetables, livestock	
Taraba	Lead, barites, uranium, rock salt, garnet, tourmaline, sapphire, zircon, gelsena, limestone, laterite, clay	Tea, coffee, cassava, yams, maize, rice, ground nuts, cotton, cattle, sheep, goats, fish, cocoa, cocoyam, potatoes, poultry	
Yobe	Silica sand, diatomite, clay, limestone, gypsum, kaolin, trona potash, bentonite, iron ore, coal, natural salt, granite	Ground nuts, maize, millet, sorghum, rice, wheat, sesame, cowpeas, wheat, tomatoes, red pepper, fish, cattle, goats, sheep, camel, donkeys	Gum Arabic, Tamarind, Desert Palm, Baobab, spring water

Source: Assessment Survey Findings based on data obtained by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Nigeria Solid Mineral Resources and the FAO.

FIGURE 3.7

Structure of employment across regions in Nigeria


Source: World Bank, Mungunsuvd Terbish and Vasco Molini, *Labour Market in Northern Nigeria*,

Agriculture remains the dominant income generating activity, followed by buying and selling, manufacturing and personal services. It has over 55 percent participation by male population in all age groups, and the age group between 5 and 14 has the highest participation rate (89.6 percent), reflecting low literacy rates⁶⁰ and low school attendance. Female participation in agriculture is lower, with the highest reported participation among girls between 5 and 14 (73.9 percent), and lowest among females aged 25-44 (28 percent). Buying and selling is the second most popular source of income in this region. The female part of the population in all age groups dominate this category with the highest participation (30 percent) among women between 25-44 and over 65 years of age, followed by women between 15-24 (24.9 percent). Finally, manufacturing and personal service activities are also very common for income generating. Female participation in manufacturing is much higher than male participation, with as much as 30.6 percent participation by women between 25-44 and 45-59, but only 4.5 percent maximum participation among men in the same category in all age groups.⁶¹

Labour productivity in the North-East remains low. Agriculture continues to be an important sector in the Northern Nigerian economy, employing over 75 percent of the region's farmers. However, the agricultural value chain remains undeveloped and uncompetitive and post-harvest losses are high as appropriate processing and value adding technologies are not readily available.⁶² High participation rates and long hours reflect the prevalence of subsistence work in agriculture. Only four million people work as employees for a private company. Among non-agricultural wage workers, three out of four are informally employed. Further, a misalignment of skills demanded and supplied in the North-East has led to the deficit of workforce with higher level of cognitive, non-cognitive, and job-specific skills that a developing economy demands. Formal education fails to provide sufficient levels of basic skills such as literary and numeracy because of low educational attainment, a lack of appropriate training and job preparation. They continue to work in the low productivity and low earning agricultural sector and informal enterprises.

TABLE 3.9

Distribution of the employed labour force, by employer (For wave 1(2010/11) and wave 2(2012/13))



Source: Estimates based on GHS 2010/11 and GHS 2012/13.



The shortage of productive jobs is the most critical challenge given increasing unemployment in Nigeria.⁶³ Three factors have largely contributed to a high unemployment rate: (i) job creation has not kept pace with the labour force growth as evidenced by phenomenal growth in the number of active population as well as the labour force; (ii) until 2014, the Nigerian definition of unemployment defined an unemployed person as one who worked for less than 40 hours; therefore, the results might best be interpreted as under-employment, rather than unemployment; and (iii) the employment surveys do not capture a large number of workers employed in the informal sector in Nigeria.⁶⁴

Consequently, inclusiveness in the North-East has remained elusive despite Nigeria's global economic progress during 2003-2013. For the same period, Nigeria experienced a decline in poverty rate from 45.3 percent to 33.2 percent, while the poverty rate in the North-East rose from 43.2 percent to 50.4 percent. The North-West and North-East together account for 52 percent of Nigeria's poor.⁶⁵ The share of the population in the lowest 20 percentile of income from the North-East also rose from 11 percent in 2003 to 18 percent in 2013. At the same time, the share of the population in the highest 20 percentile of income from the North-East was reduced from 13 percent in 2003 to 7 percent in 2013.

3.2 Livelihoods, Employment Impact and Damage Assessment

The North-East has a history of marginalisation and chronic under-development, with poverty, illiteracy and youth unemployment all higher than in the rest of the country. A lack of investment to address these inequalities contributed to sparking the cycle of violence and displacement that has continued since 2009.⁶⁷ The conflict in the North-East triggered by attacks of Boko Haram, has further compromised the region's capacity to overcome underdevelopment. Trade of products through the North-East has been disrupted, and more than 1.8 million people have been internally displaced, putting additional pressure on already scarce local resources and collapsed service provision systems.

3.2.1 Impacts of the Conflict on Livelihoods

Widespread infrastructure damage, especially to schools, health facilities, economic structures such as farmland (unknown extend of mining), public and private enterprises, markets, and transport routes

have forced displacement of the population.⁶⁸ In this fragile context, regional insecurity, growing extremism and forced displacement in the Lake Chad Basin add a regional dimension to the present humanitarian crisis, reducing economic activities and weakening the local productive capacities. As some IDPs begin to move back to their communities in Adamawa, they are finding complete devastation of homes and infrastructure, mined communities, and due to persistent fear of repeat attacks, often remain displaced in the closest town. Recent displacement trends show that as the military pushes Boko Haram out, the population that had previously been trapped in that area moves out immediately to urban centres where they are in need of humanitarian assistance. While there is a growing tendency to talk of return, with over 80 percent of Borno's LGAs still considered high or very high security risk for the international humanitarian community to access, unseen aspects to this humanitarian crisis remain.⁶⁹

The on-going conflict and insecurity is affecting rural and urban livelihoods in the conflict affected States. Famine Early Warning Network (FEWSNET)⁷⁰ points out that "the continuing conflict has contributed to limiting agricultural activities in the North-East". In the urban areas, real estate rental has reduced, and most of the houses and buildings have been destroyed during the attacks in LGAs and towns. Most houses and buildings in cities are no longer able to generate rentals for owners, as most people are hosting IDPs who are their relatives or neighbours from the rural areas. Wholesale trading has also been affected negatively by insecurity and loss of goods by owners, some who have now become IDPs themselves. Petty trading has since replaced the interstate and neighbouring countries' countries trade.

Losses of grazing land, livestock and crops in areas affected by conflict have increased food prices and unemployment. Crops have been destroyed in some areas where IDPs used farmland as a route to flee the conflict. Acreage under cropping has also reduced due to limited access to inputs because of damages to input manufacturing companies and inaccessibility, in addition to the migration caused by the armed group. Maize, sorghum and millet were replaced by beans and groundnuts, as the former provide cover for the armed group in case of an attack. As a result of low crop yields and production, food prices have risen because of lower crop yields. The conflict and displacement have also increased unemployment. Many farmers who fled their land are now unemployed. Some of the farmland has been taken over by the IDPs to stay without purchasing. These farmers whose land was

BOX 3.4

IDPs' Coping Strategy in Adamawa

The IDPs in Daware in Adamawa State negotiated access to land with the host communities and set out to plant during the upcoming planting season. They should be able to harvest between September and November depending on what and when they planted. This is a promising coping strategy and it may be worth following up on it to see whether it can be made available to other IDPs. An overview on the lessons learned is presented in the recommendations section.

taken by IDPs for settlements have been deprived from using the land for agricultural purposes. Gombe, once served as the commercial hub for the six North-East States, as well as Cameroon, lost 80 percent⁷¹ in the trade business.

Portions of the economic infrastructure, damaged or destroyed by Boko Haram-related violence, have significantly impeded access to sources of income. In addition to the loss of income faced by farmers currently without access to their land to plant crops and raise livestock, non-agricultural livelihoods are also being affected. Local markets in most LGAs have been destroyed or abandoned because businesses were either forced to close down because of insecurity or business owners migrated to safer states and LGAs as IDPs. According to the RPBA meetings, it was noted that the less than 50 percent of markets that remain operational reported business slowing down (from >N1 million to <N200,000 per day per business unit) because of eroded customer base and limited buying powers or reduced disposable incomes.⁷² The reduced number of operating markets has also seen escalating prices for basic products, thereby reducing the number of persons who can afford these items. The meetings observed that prices went up to 200 percent for some commodities, such as rice, in Borno State, making them out of reach to many. The situation is much harder for IDPs who have limited or no purchasing power, as many left their homes with nothing and remained without a source of permanent income ever since.⁷³

Changes in the income generation pattern are observed.⁷⁴ A shift in livelihood strategies is identified. Prior to the crisis, 36.0 percent and

17.6 percent of the working age population were engaged in crop production and livestock production, respectively. Following the crisis, the labour force participation rate in the North-East shifted from crop production to livestock production, as well as to non-agricultural self-employment.

IDPs and host communities have coped with the situation using different mechanisms. In order to cope with the forcible change in availability of livelihoods and sources of income, IDPs as well as members of the hosting community made adjustments in consumption of food and non-food items. From the assessment, it was noted that some of the coping mechanisms used by IDPs and hosting community members are: sale of livestock, land and/or other property; sending children away to stay with friends and relatives or withdrawing children from school; engagement in some irregular income generating activities (petty trade, daily labour, etc.); friends' and family assistance; taking loans from microfinance facilities or relatives; migration to bigger towns for work while family remained in the IDPs camps or hosting community; advanced selling of harvest; reduced food consumption; and assistance from NGOs or government support institutions (NEMA/SEMA, VSF etc.).

3.2.2 Livelihood Impacts on the Displaced Communities

Most displaced households can no longer pursue their typical livelihoods. IOM, the registration exercise of IDPs noted that about 55 percent of the IDPs households indicated that they had a regular source of income before their displacement. 57 percent of IDPs declared that agriculture was their main source of income before displacement, followed by other small scale businesses (28 percent). 83 percent of IDP households declared that food production was their priority source of income. The recently completed assessment of livelihoods for IDPs in host communities identified that farming, is still the main occupation of IDPs, followed by petty trading, daily casual labour or working for host community households, firewood collection, agro pastoralism (which includes herding livestock and harvesting forest products), and fishing, while some others stated doing nothing and waiting upon relatives to cater to them.

The scenario for the majority of IDPs is likely to deteriorate as their livelihoods worsen and the capacity of the people supporting them decreases. Many IDPs have been displaced for over a year, and lack regular income and access to agricultural land and equipment. Farm-

ing households have no access to their land or any land in their location of displacement, and most households with other sources of livelihoods (traders, shop owners, artisans, etc.) lack access to infrastructure, tools, and most importantly customers. The only IDPs still able to access their income appear to be the LGA employees – their salaries seem to be paid regularly. Many IDPs try to find daily labour opportunities in the host communities to generate some income. In a context with high rural and urban poverty, these opportunities are scarce in the region as a whole, and IDPs often end up competing with locals who are also desperately looking for income. The IDPs who have returned to LGAs of origin are faced with communities that have been devastated. Removal of debris from the destruction of homes and infrastructure will be a prime challenge for any reconstruction activities, while humanitarian actors continue to report new contamination by unexploded ordnance and mines, posing grave risks.⁷⁵

3.2.3 Livelihood Impacts on Host Communities

Large-scale displacement also causes significant stress for the host communities and family members supporting IDPs. Displacement created greater competition for access to basic services and natural resources, as well as disruption to livelihoods and lack of access to markets and agricultural land. Already poor host communities have been sharing resources with one of the largest IDP populations in the world (comparable to Yemen) for more than 12 months with little support, and are now relying on negative coping strategies after savings and assets have been used up. More than 90 percent of IDPs live in host communities with relatives or friends or in accommodations they rent or can use free of charge. Only the remaining few (less than 10 percent) are staying in formal IDPs camps managed and assisted by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and/or the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) or in spontaneous self-made camps within hosting communities. The displacement situation is playing heavily on the situation of host communities, whose generous hospitality is overstretched due to the duration and great numbers of IDPs to host.⁷⁶

The overall economic situation in host communities is in an alarming state. Supplies reach communities only in a reduced manner because of partly inaccessible transport routes due to insecurity or destruction through violent attacks. The cohabitation of IDPs and hosting population is under more and more pressure due to limited resources such

as cultivable land grazing areas, available firewood, accessible water, sanitation as well as basic social services, including health care. Environmental effects caused by increased deforestation for fire wood, overgrazing from age livestock populations on limited grazing areas, and waste accumulations become alarming as pollution is overall showing on communal land and water resources. Tensions may arise over limited resources to be shared between hosting and hosted population. Inequality in access to assistance has led to different patterns of need among displaced communities, but the prevalence of risky livelihoods such as hawking, begging, and child labour indicates an urgent need for basic services and livelihood assistance targeted at men and women to mitigate growing vulnerabilities and protect children from exploitation and violence. This situation, if not addressed, could create difficulties between displaced people and host communities, which could lead to secondary displacement of IDPs.

4. Overview of Livelihood and Economic Recovery Strategies and Costing

The following interventions are recommended over the period of a four-year program (years 1 and 2 contributing to stabilisation, while years 3 and 4 gear into recovery). The outcomes, of this overall approach, to be achieved are economically and environmentally sustainable livelihoods for the crisis-affected people and inclusive economic growth. When achieved this outcome provides good foundation for development and peace building of the North-East, and poverty and inequality reduction.

These interventions aim to stabilise, restore and strengthen the destroyed and disrupted livelihoods, incomes, and productive capacities of the affected community members, hosting communities, IDPs, returnees and vulnerable groups, including youth and women in North-East Nigeria. When implementing livelihood activities, the strategy takes into account social cohesion and gender aspects aiming to include all the community groups in accessing opportunities to ease possible tensions over access to basic services and livelihoods, real or perceived marginalisation, and/or increase mutual understanding among groups. Priorities for the activities will be identified jointly with community members and local partners through a participatory process. This process will also be used as an entry point to support community dialogue and reconciliation.

The success of these interventions will depend on the extent of the engagement with local government, the private sector, and/or local NGO/CBOs in the planning and in the implementation of projects. The involvement of local institutions and actors in implementation will contribute to local capacity development and even state building.

Overall, the livelihoods activities will be implemented using a three-track approach.⁷⁷ All tracks would start as early as possible, but will be implemented under a different time horizon. Track A would consist of livelihoods stabilisation, through emergency employment and/or enterprise recover, which would be optimally implemented over the next year. Track B would involve enterprise development and support in rebuilding enterprises, which would be implemented over the short to medium term horizon. Finally, Track C would support policy formulation and implementation, which would take place in the medium to long term horizon. The main focus for the current program is on Track A and B activities, however will encompass also Track C.

4.1 Track A: Livelihood and Employment Recovery Strategy

During the stabilisation period, the primary focus should be on quick interventions to help stabilise the livelihoods of IDPs, returnees and hosting communities, especially vulnerable groups including women and youth⁷⁸ in affected LGAs in the six states, while the recovery period will focus on laying a foundation of medium to long term development.

During the stabilisation phase, deliberate effort would be made towards the development of a 'spirit of productiveness and inclusiveness' within the affected communities from onset of the stabilisation phase. The aim is to quickly stabilise⁷⁹ displaced and affected persons so that they continue to be active through work and production of their own natural and alternative nutritional supplemental diet, and to address some of their sanitation needs. The immediate interventions include the usual distribution of food, cash transfers for NFIs, and food or cash for work through labour-intensive debris and rubble removal, and repairs of key community infrastructure. Emergency employment opportunities which will be provided through cash for work projects will focus on debris management (clearance of debris and re-use/ recycling of materials to rebuild) as well as rehabilitation of socio-economic community infrastructure. The cash for work projects will have a duration of two to three months, creating short term employment opportunities for returning IDPs as well as vulnerable community members in the receiving communities. Community infrastructure priorities for rehabilitation will be identified in close co-operation with local government authorities, through joint planning exercises. However, early assessments indicate that structures such as town or communal halls, markets, schools, clinics and health posts, recreational facilities, storage facilities or silos for grains, amongst others, have been most heavily damaged, and when repaired, will provide opportunities to support local economic recovery. These should initially be accompanied by the introduction of grant or appropriate technology supported interventions, including low cost, quick return and natural alternative nutritional and sanitation projects such as quail bird farming for quick improved nutrition, moringa tree propagation and processing for multipurpose use, washable sanitary pads making, baobab fruit harvesting and processing, drip irrigation or grey water use in intensive herbal and vegetable production gardens.

The products from these activities will firstly be for household use, with excess for sale as income generation. These activities will also

help reduce stress, build relationships and enable affected persons to settle much faster as they interact with others within similar projects or those community members buying the excess. Subsequent interventions during the recovery phase will pave the way to medium and long term economic development. The aim is to boost the well-being of all those affected by conflict, income generation to reduce exposure and vulnerability, and improve security, through more sustainable use and commercialisation of the available agro-natural resources and solid mineral value chains for broad-based local economic development, improved livelihoods, and smooth re/integration in the case of returnees and IDPs among in the different communities in the six states.

Restoration of livelihoods and local economy. To rapidly restore local economy, various intervention programs could be considered. However, they should be aligned with national policies on economic development and labour, and with reconstruction agendas,⁸⁰ as well as any other relevant becoming national policy (throughout stabilisation and recovery phases). During the stabilisation period, these programs could focus on the following: (i) public rehabilitation effort that promotes job creation and employment;⁸¹ (ii) the restoration of public extension services would increase local productivity and production; (iii) facilitating access to land for IDPs, returnees, host communities, youth and women to increase crop production and sustainable improved household food security; and (iv) support successful SME through establishment of Joint Ventures Partnership and Public Private Partnership as part of expansion and business growth. During the recovery period, government interventions should aim to continued foster employment and rebuilding confidence in the government through continued rehabilitation effort, promoting commercial production and packaging of local crops, and incentivising private entrepreneurs to rebuild their facilities conditional on creation of employment.

Restoration of disrupted and destroyed livelihood and economic assets. The objective is to help rebuild and stabilise livelihoods of the affected community members, including IDPs, whose small family or home businesses were destroyed by the armed group activities. These potential beneficiaries will be verified by local communities, and their businesses assessed to determine the needed support. Once restored, it will also resuscitate the recovery of local economic activities as cash will start circulating within the communities as the small businesses community members and markets interact. The immediate liveli-

hoods support will be done through small grant funding through cash transfers, strengthening the technical and business management skills of the beneficiaries. To ensure beneficiaries get adequate support and guidance, close monitoring will be done initially on a regular basis by technical teams and key stakeholders.

Establishing and strengthening agriculture based value chains and agro processing centres to improve security and reduce vulnerability. The objective is to reduce vulnerability and improve all types of security of the affected communities, including IDPs, hosting communities, vulnerable groups including youth and women, through establishing and developing key agriculture value chains and agro-value addition centres. From a value chain assessment, key agro value chains and enterprises will be selected and gaps identified along the chain where the diverse members of the communities will be able to participate to its development. Their agricultural background should be recognized to enable them to carry out income generation activities through provision of arable plots/land (prior to resettlement), agricultural inputs and extension services (including quality improvement, seed fairs, and storage facilities), as well as training and equipment for food processing, marketing, and transport support (during years 1 and 2 of stabilisation prior and during resettlement wherever feasible). This will not only diversify sources of income and self-employment opportunities, but also contribute to cohesion and stability within the states as different communities and individuals interact within and along the value chains. Platforms for value chain actors to discuss and interact will be created and members will be encouraged to participate on regular basis. Participatory peer or value chain actors review systems will be put in place as the first stage of monitoring. This process will enable value chain actors to monitor each other as well as hold each other accountable for progress or for no progress. In order to ensure increased bargaining powers in the market, bulking and agro processing centres will be established in high production areas of whatever commodity will have been identified as the value chain commodity. Value chain actors can then hold stock, which they can borrow against should they want to fund another operation or grow their businesses.

Development and commercialisation of natural resources based on solid minerals value chains and enterprises for sustainable broad based local economic development. In order to build sustainable livelihoods and a broad based local economy, natural resources and solid minerals that offer great potential will first be identified, and value chain

assessment conducted to ensure maximum benefits will accrue to participating IDPs, the affected communities and across LGAs or States. Value chain actors will be linked to financial institutions for the funding of the enterprises. Value chain actors' capacities will be built in business management, natural resources management and technical processing. As natural resources and minerals are resources that can cut across boundaries, this gives opportunity for social cohesion as these different communities and value chain actors will have to link up for the whole value chain to function adequately and efficiently. It is assumed that more individuals, including IDPs, will be able to earn a living from one activity to another as the chain is developed. Given Nigeria's rich endowment with a variety of solid minerals ranging from precious metals to various stones as well as industrial minerals are yet to be exploited, the Government as well as States should begin with building capacity of the local mining artisans in value addition and beneficiation. Secondly, there should be efforts to attract private sector or foreign investment in the sector so as to create diverse job opportunities and bring development within the local areas of mining, through policy reviews that enforces corporate social responsibilities or community ownership schemes.

4.2 Track B: Private Sector, Trade, and Finance

Sustained economic stabilisation and recovery will require the private sector, trade and financial activities to recover. These activities shall contribute to job creation, employment, income and economic growth in Nigeria. A private sector recovery of both the formal sector (medium and small enterprises) and informal sector (micro enterprises) will require proactive interventions to support the development of high value chains in agri-businesses and solid minerals, as well as youth entrepreneurship in addition to employment promotion schemes focusing also on women and youth. Furthermore, reopening the border and recovering markets will increase trade activities both internal and cross-border, jobs and income of the population. A new trade route with the Southern States should be developed in order to strengthen the national economic cohesion. Finally, improved investment climate and increased access to finance are necessary conditions for a sustained recovery of the private sector (Table 3.10).

Recommendations on economic recovery are premised on an understanding that socio-economic recovery in troubled communities is strongly linked to job creation and economic restoration. Creating jobs and opportunities to earn a decent living is a critical step to en-

sure stability, reduce volatility and protect the social sense of belonging. In the North-East, the negative effects of the Boko Haram armed group can also be effectively mitigated by engendering prosperity amongst members of the affected communities, especially for the vulnerable youth to protect them from recruitment. It is important to note that, similarly to the case in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the mere policy response to youth unemployment is not sufficient, and that decision action to provide youth with the opportunity to contribute to policy formulation and implementation in their communities is needed.

In general, a do-no-arm approach is strongly recommended in all other sectors/components. Most certainly in the field of employment and income generation, the approach will provide a new life perspective in order to overcome conflict drivers while avoiding deepening or creation of dispute or conflict sources. In this regard, the interventions are proposed to stimulate participation of both IDPs and host community population, to avoid disadvantaging the overstretched hospitality of host communities, without disregarding their affected and vulnerable groups in need for support. A multi-ethnic and religious-balanced approach is needed to overcome economic marginalisation, which had contributed to the conflict drivers.

4.3 Track C: Institutional Capacity Building for Economic Recovery Strategy

Over the recovery period, the government could focus on institutional strengthening to remove legal and informational barriers to job seekers and ensure effective developments of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs),⁸² while targeting (i) financial system development, (ii) business enabling environment reforms, (iii) facilitate trade policy, while reducing administrative hurdles, and (iv) promotion of agricultural and non-agricultural value chains.

Develop institutional capacity of State Governments in general. To ensure successful stabilisation and economic recovery in the North-East, economic management capacity for statistics, planning, and implementation, and public financial management at the State level needs to be strengthened. Improved availability and quality of statistics for critical macro-economic data, core sector statistics and poverty data will facilitate evidence-based policy making and monitoring and implementation of interventions programs during the stabilisation and recovery periods. State level planning and implementation capabilities including effective policy formulation, linking strategies,

TABLE 3.10

Proposed Interventions to revise the private sector, trade, and finance in the North-East

<i>Intervention</i>	<i>Rationale</i>	<i>Proposed activities</i>
1 Private sector recovery in the North-East States · Formal private sector: small and medium enterprises; · Informal private sector: micro-enterprises · Increased access to financial services for micro, small and medium enterprises(including agro-based)	Private sector activities significantly reduced because of the conflict (destruction, reduced mobility, reduced trade) 68.4 percent of adults are financially excluded in the North East	· 2,000 small and medium enterprises (including agro-based) receive recovery support (matching grants) · Support to micro-enterprises captured in Livelihoods component · 10,000 micro, small and medium enterprises have received a loan from a financial institution
2 Support to private sector development in high potential value chains: agribusiness and solid minerals	Small formal private sector, with few industries	100 small and medium enterprises receive technical supports in the development agribusiness and solid minerals value chains
3 Support to youth entrepreneurship	Limited youth entrepreneurship and high youth unemployment	500 business plans supported under YouWin initiative
4 Reopening of border stations	Facilitate cross border trade flows	All border stations in Yobe, Borno, Adamawa and Taraba are open
5 Recovery of markets	Market activities significantly affected by the conflict, with markets destroyed and/or closed	All markets in the six North-East States are operational and interconnected
6 Improved investment climate in the six North-East States	Uneven investment climate, as per the 2014 Sub National Doing Business report	Improved investment climate in the six states, as measures by the Sub National Doing Business report (with one positive reform per State per year). Developing a proper investor targeting strategy and easing investment procedures in order to support growth in investment.

plans with budgets, and implementation, monitoring and evaluation of strategic plans are critical for successful stabilisation and economic recovery in the North-East region.⁸³ Finally, strengthening public financial management capacity at the State level will ensure that the government has an absorptive capacity to implement a stabilisation and recovery program, that the available financial resources from the government and donors are spent effectively and efficiently in a transparent manner. More importantly, State Governments urgently needed to strengthen their revenue mobilisation capacity to reduce dependence on Federal transfer, as well as donor assistance that is expected to decline over the medium-term.

Strengthen institutional capacity of State Employment Centres and related institutions. Relevant capacity building and institutional strengthening (review of procedures for employment schemes and job placement etc. in alignment with relevant Federal and State institutions) through national and international trainers will enable adequate performance in view of bringing labour force back into employment. Strengthened State Employment Centres will contribute

to better matching workers to new labour markets, thus increasing (re)employment options (recovery phase years 3 and 4). In doing so, the government needs to undertake a capacity assessment of existing State Employment Centres and related institutions to take stock of existing capacities and facilities while evaluating also the further needs within the six states of Employment Centres for a better matching of employment seekers with the employment offers of public and private enterprises. It is important to map functional public and private enterprises as they will further allow awareness of the scope of the labour market in this regard. To ensure sustainability of State Employment Centres over the medium term, existing facilities should be rehabilitated and possibly expanded through new construction with provision of necessary equipment (including IT and communication facilities). In addition, new staff should be recruited and existing staff should be trained to guarantee an optimal functioning of Employment Centre.

Build the institutional capacity of the National Bureau of Statistics to support the generation of macro and micro level data. Statistics at

the macro level would support the understanding on developments in the economy, as well as on the drivers of economic growth. Statistics at the micro level would provide key insights on the socio-economic conditions of households and firms.

Protect the environment as a means of sustaining livelihoods. Indeed, the environment should be considered as a means of safeguarding food protection, protecting air and water from contamination, sustaining livelihoods, and preserving health, all of which are necessary for sustaining livelihoods.

Build the institutional capacity of local government areas (LGAs) to develop and strengthen diverse relevant skills for self-employment. This intervention seeks to diversify livelihoods among the affected members, including IDPs, returnees, youth and women in the North-East Nigerian region through identification and the building and strengthening of market related skills. The market related skills will be identified from a rapid market skills requirement assessment in the different LGAs and States. The aim is to have the conflict-affected members equipped with relevant skills, which will enable them to quickly earn an income as well as help in the integration of returnees or IDPs in the affected or hosting communities. The trained members will be linked to financing institutions for procurement of their kits and start up materials. This will instil ownership within the loan recipients, as it will be their contribution towards their own development. In order for this to be possible, selected State level and LGA training centres will first be rehabilitated and fully equipped with latest technologies through a grant fund. Additional staff will be hired to complement the existing staffing levels. The existing staff members will undergo refresher technical courses before they can facilitate training of the identified beneficiaries.

4.4 Track C: Skills Development for Economic Recovery Strategy


General Program for Labour Force Skills Development. An assessment of existing and required vocational and professional training facilities as well as of required professional skills shall be undertaken to determine the status and need for an adequate provision of skills development institution to upgrade human capital in order to increase employed labour force. Skills development trainings shall be provided for relevant professions responding to the needs of the labour market, particularly in consideration of the needs for rehabilitating and reconstructing damaged facilities and new facilities.⁸⁴ These

professional training programs shall be enriched by a wider range of additional skills to be obtained in view of literacy and counting catch up classes, life skills (including health and hygiene awareness, human rights issues, as well as SGBV problematics) and peace education. Moreover, aspects of violence prevention and conflict transformation skills as well as building of skills/capacities within communities for mediation (peace committees), conflict analyses and early warning conflict prevention shall be addressed. Provision of skills training shall be undertaken within facilities but also through outreach trainings by mobile teams of trainers to also include labour force population in distanced LGAs.

Vocational Training. Vocational and business skills training, mentorship, BDS (business development services) support, and job placement facilitation in the areas identified by the market assessment. This support will provide target groups with the tools and capacities required for accessing long term employment as well as by supporting them in finding the right employment opportunities. As such, employability of the target populations strengthened by vocational trainings focusing on marketable skills that are directly linked to job placement schemes through job seeker centres and specialised recruitment agencies. Vocational trainings shall be linked to a job guarantee to place graduates in employment with provision of start-up kits and further assistance to get established either in employment, or as an individual entrepreneur, or in a cooperative. Therefore, market analysis and business plan development will be also taught. The various forms and contents of teaching and training (academic, vocational, and life skills), provision of business starter kits, mentoring, and follow-up of the participants, aim at qualifying and equipping youth for employment and self-employment. The program shall contain additionally career counselling, mentoring, various forms of mediating contacts between employers and training institutions, internships, apprenticeships, and systematic information sharing about training and job opportunities via radio and other media. In addition, supplementary cash grants may be provided with basic tools and supplies at the end of training in order to support self-employment on the basis of basic business plans. These measures can be implemented and coordinated with existing national institutions such as SMEDAN and other local agencies in this sector.

Youth Empowerment through Skills Training for Employment. Excluded from making a living through the labour market, young men with low levels of education are particularly vulnerable to being re-

FIGURE 3.8

Matching Labour Supply with Demand

cruited to groups that engage in criminal and violent activities, such as Boko Haram. It is vital for peace building to provide the youth of the North-East States a real option to master their own living and regain a life perspective. Youth re-orientation and de-radicalisation approaches, combined with youth employment schemes, is an imperative for any recovery and rehabilitation intervention as well as the peace building agenda. This shall include professional or vocational trainings with a shorter duration (three to six months), linked to a more rapid job creation scheme for deployment of qualified labour directly into the rehabilitation efforts during the immediate stabilisation phase (years 1 and 2), while linking the program to a longer term, full-scaled Technical Vocational Education and Training Program with (re-) built facilities and well-drafted curricula in alignment to Federal TVET programs in the recovery phase (years 3 and 4). A combination of non-formal and formal education to empower the youth can enrich the labour market.

Women's Empowerment through Skills Training for Employment. The full participation of women as entrepreneurs and workers in the Nigerian economy is crucial to ensure gender equality and women's economic empowerment, as well as to utilise all of Nigeria's human resources to the benefit of households and the country as a whole. When obstacles exist that impede the access of women to entrepreneurship or paid employment - or place them in a disadvantaged po-

sition - removing those obstacles is not only essential to move towards greater gender equality, but also makes economic sense in order to achieve poverty reduction and support economic growth.⁸⁵

Special support shall be given to women who have become heads of households while losing the bread-winner of their family. In the proposed youth employment scheme, women shall also be targeted with professional skills trainings in a non-formal approach, offering adult literacy and counting classes, and further life skills (health and hygiene, legal issues such as access to land/finances/justice, SGBV protection, etc.) in combination with peace education to support conflict transformation on household and community levels. Start-up kits shall be distributed for training graduates aligning with their field of professional interest, accompanied continued assistance for employment identification or while setting up a micro-enterprise with accompanying market analysis and business plan development.

Further women-oriented activities for economic recovery participation shall involve the establishing of revolving funds as a solidarity structure for family-oriented needs and events as well as the development of cooperatives for risk sharing and exchange options (mainly to be planned for years three and four of the recovery phase).

Foster legal frameworks for women to obtain land rights and access to finances by themselves given the increasing number of women-head-

ed households and their driving role for an economic and social recovery (stabilisation and recovery phase, years 1-4).

Bridging from unemployment to making ready for employment through cash transfers. In order to facilitate participation of women and youth in professional trainings, unconditional cash transfers shall be given out to bridge the time lag into employment. This will add value by temporarily injecting the local economy with cash and thereby increased purchasing power (especially in the stabilisation phase of year 1 and 2). Cash Transfer Program, with its advantages and disadvantages can still accommodate preferences and give flexibility/empowerment to beneficiaries (restore /respect dignity); mitigate security risk and provide convenience for both implementing partner and beneficiaries; and improve cost efficiency. A good transfer modality with a certain outreach could easily be modified to support the needs of returnees – provided the context allows market-based solutions.

4.5 Specific Target Groups for Economic Recovery Strategy

Alongside the overall need for employment promotion and job creation for all parts of the labour force population, special attention should be paid to different groups, namely IDPs and returnees, host communities, and vulnerable groups of youth and women. Annex 3 provides a list of interventions targeted at various groups.

- **IDPs in all Camps and Host Communities.** The assessment highlighted the challenges and support being given to IDPs in recognized camps, and but not much is known about the status of IDP camps in inaccessible LGAs and in self-set up IDP camps.
- **Returnees.** As the IDPs return to places of origin or alternative places of choice, it is critical to assist them to restore their livelihoods.
- **Host Communities.** From the assessment, it has been confirmed that hosting communities are overstretched in terms of their resources and that their natural resources are threatened with serious degradation and deforestation as there is competition with IDPs settled in their LGAs. Some of the arable lands have been converted into settlements while grazing is stretched with increased livestock, hence the need to ensure that support is given to these communities who have voluntarily taken in IDPs into their neighbourhood.
- **Women.** The situation of women in the North-East region is marked by low literacy levels and being generally disempowered

by tradition, culture and religion, leading to non-participation in the public arena. Women and girls have been in particular vulnerable targets of Boko Haram's attacks, abductions as well as atrocities through SGBV. Many women have lost their husbands and children to Boko Haram, either through their attacks, or through forcible or voluntary recruitment. The loss of a male head of household has led to a role change for women, having become widows or simply left alone with the undetermined whereabouts of their husbands, but who then need to take up responsibility for their remaining family. Women now need to secure the household income as well as food security and overall well-being of their families. Women now struggle to secure some income, while being exposed to possible abuses and exploitation. The overwhelming need to empower women is obvious, to enable them making a living on their own for themselves and their families.

- **Youth.** Youth constitutes more than 50 percent of the IDPs and host population, with low literacy levels and no technical skills for employability or to start their own income generation activities. This leaves them very exposed to possible recruitment by radical groups such as Boko Harm, or they may join the civilian Joint Task Force. High levels of frustration, readiness to violence and usage of arms, is forming them into a critical mass. Youth is most vulnerable to recruitment and abduction unless real alternative perspectives for income generation and life plans are offered. There is an evident need to enable them to turn to meaningful civilian lives and to empower them through professional skill trainings to make their own living. A change of mindset can only be triggered through accompanying models of peace education and social skills trainings. Economic intervention for youth and the role of the youth in the democratic and development governance should be developed.

4.6 Costing of Identified Needs for Economic Recovery

Total cost of the above-proposed interventions to address the needs related to direct impact and displacement is estimated at about US\$473.5 million. This comprises the cost of interventions to support private sector, trade, and financial activities (US\$245 million), improve livelihoods (US\$ 129.1 million), and create employment (US\$99.3 million).

TABLE 3.11

Estimated Cost of Proposed Interventions*Level 1: Subcomponent Level - Needs Related to Direct Impacts & Displacement**(Official Exchange Rate: \$1 = 200 Naira)*

<i>Recovery Intervention</i>	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Federal</i>	<i>Regional</i>	<i>Total</i>
Subcomponent 3.a : Private Sector, Trade and Finance									
Private sector recovery (formal and informal) in the North Eastern States									50.0
Support to private sector development in high potential value chains: agribusiness and solid minerals									40.0
Support to youth entrepreneurship									20.0
Reopening of border stations							10.0		10.0
Recovery of markets									5.0
Improved investment climate in the 6 North Easter States									20.0
Increased access to financial services for micro, small and medium enterprises									100.0
Sub-Total							10.0		245.0
Subcomponent 3.b : Livelihoods and Local Economic Recovery									
Restoration of Disrupted and destroyed basic livelihood economic assets	15.6	20.0	12.6	8.1	11.9	14.8			83.0
Development, strengthening and diversification of relevant market related skills for self-employment	2.9	3.7	2.3	1.5	2.2	2.8			15.5
Establishment, development and strengthening of Agriculture based Value Chains and Agro Processing Centres	4.4	5.7	3.6	2.3	3.4	4.2			23.5
Establishment, development and strengthening of natural resources based and solid minerals value chains and enterprises	1.4	1.7	1.1	0.7	1.0	1.3			7.2
Creation of Short term employment opportunities through community infrastructure rehabilitation (uncosted need covered in other RPBA components)									
Sub-Total	24.2	31.1	19.6	12.7	18.4	23.1			129.1
Subcomponent 3.c : Employment									
Strengthen Institutional Capacity of State Employment Centers and Related Institutions	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0			5.7
General Program for Labor Force Skills Development	3.0	8.7	2.4	2.1	2.0	4.1			22.3
Women Empowerment through Skills Training for Employment	5.9	17.5	4.8	4.1	3.9	8.3			44.6
Youth Empowerment through Skills Training for Employment	3.5	10.5	2.9	2.5	2.4	5.0			26.7
Sub-Total	13.4	37.7	11.1	9.6	9.2	18.4			99.3
Grand Total	37.6	68.8	30.7	22.3	27.7	41.4	10.0		473.5

5. Economic Recovery – Recovery Framework

Needs	Baseline Present State Dec 2015	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (in % completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
			Stabilisation Years 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
Subcomponent 1: Private sector, trade and financial sector					
1. Private sector recovery in the North-East States • Formal private sector: small and medium enterprises • Informal private sector: micro-enterprises	• Private sector activities significantly reduced because of the conflict (destruction, reduced mobility, reduced trade)	• 2,000 small and medium enterprises receive recovery support (matching grants) Support to micro-enterprises captured in Livelihoods component	30%	70%	Federal and State Ministries for Industry, Trade and Investment; SMEDAN
2. Support to private sector development in high potential value chains: agribusiness and solid minerals	• Small formal private sector, with few industries	• 100 small and medium enterprises receive support in the agribusiness and solid minerals value chains	10%	90%	Federal and State Ministries for Industry, Trade and Investment; SMEDAN
3. Support to youth entrepreneurship	• Limited youth entrepreneurship and high youth unemployment	• 500 business plans supported under YouWin initiative	30%	70%	Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, SMEDAN
4. Reopening of border stations	• All border stations in Borno State are closed	• All border stations in Yobe, Borno, Adamawa and Taraba are open	60%	100%	Nigeria Customs Services, Federal Ministry of Finance
5. Recovery of markets	• Market activities significantly affected by conflict, with markets destroyed and/or closed	• All markets in the six North-East States are operational	60%	100%	State Ministries of Industry, Trade and Investment, National Emergency Management Agency, State Emergency Management Agencies
6. Increased investment climate in the 6 North Easter States	• Uneven investment climate, as per the 2014 Sub National Doing Business report	• Improved investment climate in the 6 States, as measures by the Sub National Doing Business report (with one positive reform per State per year)	50%	50%	State Ministries of Industry, Trade and Investments
7. Increased access to financial services for micro, small and medium enterprises	• 68.4% of adults financially excluded in the North-East	• 10,000 micro, small and medium enterprises have received a loan from a financial institution	20%	80%	Development Bank of Nigeria, Financial Inclusion Secretariat

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline Present State Dec 2015</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery</i>	<i>Expected Implementation Framework (in % completion)</i>		<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
			<i>Stabilisation Years 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Year 3-4</i>	
Subcomponent 2: Livelihoods and Economic Recovery					
1. Displaced vulnerable groups livelihoods stabilised	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most of IDPs and vulnerable groups have lost all sources of incomes Poor nutrition and sanitation of vulnerable groups due to limited access to alternatives Idleness and dependency on host and NGOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number of IDPs and vulnerable groups established low cost, quick return and natural alternative nutrition and sanitation supported activities. 	100	0	Federal/State Government/ Local Government/ Development Partners/ other stake holders
2. Disrupted and destroyed basic livelihood economic assets restored	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 60-100% destroyed by the crisis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No of affected entrepreneurs re-established and functional through grants support 	50%	50%	Federal/State Government/ Local Government/ Development Partners/private sector/ other stake holders
3. Diverse relevant market related skills developed and strengthened for increased production and self-employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mostly farmers and traders but these have been disrupted by conflict Limited livelihood opportunities due to conflict activities Income earning options destroyed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of affected people including youth, men and women trained in new relevant skills with business support packages Number of affected youth, females and males that have started new income generating activities through access to start up package % of income from IG activities going to youth 	80%	20%	Federal/State Government/ Local Government / Development Partners/private sector/ other stake holders
4. Agriculture based Value Chains and agro processing centres established and strengthened	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Significant reduction in human mobility thus limiting access to extension services and productive assets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of returning IDPs, youth, women and affected hosting communities members participating in along agricultural value chains Number of people active at agro processing centres 	60%	40%	Federal/State Government/ Local Government / Development Partners/private sector/ other stake holders
5. Natural resources based and solid minerals value chains and enterprises developed and commercialized for sustainable broad based local economic recovery.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not developed as much before conflict as farming was dominating Limited skills in artisanal mining, natural resource-based production processing (value addition and beneficiation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of community members including youth, women and men active along the developed value chains Number of viable natural resource-based and solid mineral based enterprises established and functional 	60%	40%	Government/Local Government / Development Partners/private sector/ other stake holders

Needs	Baseline Present State Dec 2015	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (in % completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
			Stabilisation Years 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
Subcomponent 3: Employment					
1. Strengthen Institutional Capacity of State Employment Centres and Related Institutions	% of employment centres and related institutions are damaged, destroyed or not functional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> % of employment centres rehabilitated % of employment centre staff trained number of new staff for employment centres recruited number of job seekers placed in new employment 	40%	60%	Federal Government (Ministry of Labour & Employment), State Commissioners for Employment, Reconstruction, etc. Donor Organizations, Implementing CSO (international and national). Community Representatives, Employment Centre Staff (Beneficiaries)
2. Labour Force Skills Development	% of unemployed persons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> number of skills development facilities rehabilitated number of training facilities newly constructed number of trainings conducted in centres number of trainings conducted by mobile teams 	60%	40%	Federal Government (Ministry of Labour & Employment, Ministry of Public Works), State Commissioners for Employment and Public Works, Reconstruction, etc. Donor Organizations, Implementing CSO (international and national). Community Representatives, Beneficiaries
- Rehabilitation of existing facilities and addition of new facilities - Skill development training - Skill development outreach using mobile teams			30%	70%	
			40%	60%	
			30%	70%	
3. Women's Empowerment through Skills Training for Employment	% of unemployed women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> number of women trained for professional skills number of women participating in Adult Literacy number of women attending life skills/peace education number of women placed in employment Start-up Kits distributed women enterprises built up numbers of women cooperatives built up 	40%	60%	Federal Government (Ministry of Labour & Employment, Ministry for Women etc.), State Commissioners for Employment, Reconstruction, and Women, etc. Donor Organizations, Implementing CSO (international and national). Community Representatives, Training Centre Staff, Beneficiaries
- Professional Skills Trainings - Adult Literacy & Counting Education - Life Skills Training/Peace Educ. - Start-up Kit distribution - Employment Identification - Micro-Enterprises Set up - Cooperatives building up			40%	60%	
			40%	60%	
			30%	70%	
			30%	70%	
			30%	70%	
4. Youth Empowerment through Skills Training for Employment	% of unemployed youth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> number of youth trained for professional skills number of youth participating in Catch Up Literacy number of youth attending life skills/peace education number of youth placed in employment Start-up Kits distributed number of youth enterprises built up number of youth cooperatives built up 	40%	60%	Federal Government (Ministry of Labour & Employment, Ministry for Planning, Ministry for Youth etc.), State Commissioners for Employment, Reconstruction, and Youth etc. Donor Organizations, Implementing CSO (international and national). Community Representatives, Training Centre Staff, Beneficiaries
- Professional Skills Trainings - Adult Literacy & Counting Education - Life Skills Training/Peace Educ. - Start-up Kit distribution - Employment Identification - Micro-Enterprises Set up - Cooperatives building up			40%	60%	
			40%	60%	
			30%	70%	
			30%	70%	
			30%	70%	

Macroeconomic Impact Assessment of the Boko Haram related Conflict in Nigeria - Methodology

Introduction

Conflict imposes significant and diverse economic and social costs on an economy; manifested in the form of depletion of a country's stock of productive factors such as human and physical capital. Conflicts have been found to lead to disruption of economic activities, diversion from productive to non-productive activities, displacement and migration, negative spill-over to other regions, and significant dissaving as planning horizons are shortened.⁸⁶ The cumulative impacts of conflict on the macro economy comprise reduction in economic growth, higher inflation, fiscal and current account deficits, loss of foreign reserves, and poor financial system.⁸⁷

Transmission Channels of the Boko Haram Related Conflict on the Economy

Boko Haram related conflict affects the economy of the North-East Nigeria through various channels. These channels can be identified in the organogram of Economic Impact of Conflict Countries adopted from Sab (2014). The evidence of how the Boko Haram related conflict plays under each of the elements in Figure 1 are described below:

- **Disorganisation of production:** Evidence - e.g. how many factories and business closed down; agriculture, crop and livestock, manufacturing, real estate, financial service, and trade
- **Destruction of physical capital:** Evidence - how many infrastructures are destroyed, etc.
- **Dislocation of labour:** Evidence - death, migration, IDPs, host communities, unemployment, capacity building and training, etc.

Proposed Methodology


The direct impact of conflict such as the Boko Haram related conflict can be measured through two approaches; namely, the cost accounting approach and the counterfactual approach. The accounting approach simply adds together the financial value of direct and indirect costs of the conflict. Although this is simple to apply, the challenge often is in determining indirect costs, and identification and measurement of all types of costs under different scenarios. Counterfactual analysis, on the other hand, compares the observed behaviour of some macroeconomic indicators that are affected by the conflict with what their impacts would have been in the absence of the conflict.

Counterfactual analysis provides a more robust measure of conflict costs; but the major challenge is in determining the counterfactual that could be compared with the actual situation. Since the counterfactuals are not directly observable and will need to be approximated with reference to a comparison group or scenario, they can be affected by other factors not directly related to the conflict. Therefore, studies in this area have paid critical attention to how the counterfactuals are estimated.⁸⁸ The methods of generating the counterfactuals include the following:

1. **Forecasts figures:** Forecasts and projections of economic indicators before the time of the crisis can be used as the counterfactuals. Frontier Economics (2015) adopted IMF's and AfDB's projections for the South Sudan real GDP per capita growth as the counterfactual.
- **Historical Trend:** A regression of an economic indicator on time during the peace period is estimated and the resulting regression coefficient is used to estimate the imputed data for the conflict time. This gives the idea of what the indicator would have been had the economy grown at the same rate during the war years as

FIGURE AX.1

Potential Channels of Economic Impact on Conflict Countries



Source: Sab (2014)

it did during the immediate peaceful years. Institute for Economics and Peace (2011) constructed a trend line for US GDP using data of peace time and arrived at what the GDP would have been during war times.

- **Neighbours’ or Regional Average:** The average growth for non-conflict countries in the same region as the conflict country can be used as the counterfactual.⁸⁹
- **Pre-conflict Synthetic:** This method was pioneered by the work of Abadie and Gerdezabal (2003); they argued that since conflict in Basque region did not affect other region of Spain, unaffected regions with ‘similar’ economic fundamentals are then used as artificial counterfactual. Using the fundamentals of these regions, they constructed an artificial region that had the same pre-conflict underlying characteristics as the true Basque Region.


Among the four methodologies for constructing counterfactuals, only Neighbours’ or Regional Average counterfactual is relevant to Nigeria’s peculiarities. There is no macroeconomic forecasts at the State level, thus the forecast figures counterfactual is not feasible. The historical trend counterfactual is also ruled out because Nigeria does

not have State level GDP data; and when estimated, it is for too few years making regression results unreliable. This method also assumes that there are no impacts of other disturbances on output, including policy changes and external shocks.⁹⁰ Thus, adjusting the counterfactual scenario for the impact of these shocks and key policy changes during the 2011-2015 period presents significant challenges. Finally, the pre-conflict synthetic counterfactual is not feasible due to the dearth of large data it requires at the State and Regional level, and also because there is hardly any region in Nigeria that is not affected by conflicts and violence at any point in time.

The approach adopted therefore takes the national average that is adjusted for the pre-conflict difference as the counterfactual. Specifically, the actual trend of a North-East macroeconomic indicator is compared with the average macroeconomic trend for all six regions. It is expected that the difference between the two will be widened during the conflict period (2011-2015) relative to the peace period (2006-2010). An example is given in Figure 2, reflecting that the macroeconomic impact of the conflict can therefore be measured as the difference between the average gaps between the two periods.

FIGURE AX.2

Regional Average Counterfactual



The effect of Boko Haram related conflict can be formally represented as:

$$EY = \frac{1}{5} \sum_{t=2011}^{2015} (Y_t^{NE} - Y_t^{NA}) - \frac{1}{5} \sum_{s=2006}^{2010} (Y_s^{NE} - Y_s^{NA}) \tag{A-1}$$

Where EY is the effect of the Boko Haram related conflict on macro-economic indicator Y , NE is North-East value, NA is National average value, t is the period during the conflict, s is period before conflict and $\bar{\cdot}$ is the average operator. Equation (A-1) is the difference-in-difference formula used in quasi-experimental designs to calculate the effect of a treatment on an outcome by comparing the average change over time between treatment and control groups.

$$EY_t = (Y_t^{NE} - Y_t^{NA}) - \frac{1}{5} \sum_{s=2006}^{2010} (Y_s^{NE} - Y_s^{NA}) \tag{A-2}$$

In order to compute the effect of the Boko Haram related conflict in each of the years between 2011 and 2015, (A-1) is modified to (A-2)

Where t represents each of the years between 2011 and 2015.

ANNEX 2

Results of Macroeconomic Impact Assessment

TABLE AX.1

Nigeria - Impact of Boko Haram related Conflict on North-East State Budget 2011-2015

Year	Gross Statutory Allocation	VAT	IGR	Grant	Total Revenue	Personnel Cost	Recurrent expenditure	Capital Expenditure	Total Expenditure	Overall Balance
Adamawa										
2011	-6.4	-0.9	1.6	27.7	20.0	2.7	12.9	2.2	13.9	6.1
2012	-5.9	-0.9	-3.5	31.1	21.7	1.7	21.3	3.6	25.3	-3.6
2013	-9.4	-1.4	1.1	15.4	4.4	1.1	5.7	0.2	1.5	2.9
2014	-10.0	-1.4	-1.9	8.5	-2.3	0.8	18.7	3.6	22.9	-25.2
2015	-31.7	-4.6	-8.1	8.3	-1.9	1.9	-20.3	22.1	1.7	-3.6
Total 2011-15	-63.3	-9.1	-10.8	91.0	41.9	8.1	38.3	31.6	65.3	-23.4
Bauchi										
2011	-4.6	-0.6	-0.9	35.3	27.0	-2.9	-1.0	9.1	8.0	19.0
2012	-3.8	-0.6	-7.3	44.4	33.0	-5.3	1.9	8.8	9.4	23.6
2013	-6.4	-0.8	6.3	-16.9	-18.7	-6.6	-8.3	9.5	-0.4	-18.3
2014	-6.1	-0.8	-5.3	-15.7	-25.5	-7.5	-3.8	8.9	3.3	-28.9
2015	-20.9	-2.8	-7.9	-10.6	-19.1	4.1	-12.6	-5.5	-18.7	-0.3
Total 2011-15	-41.7	-5.6	-15.2	36.4	-3.3	-18.3	-23.8	30.8	1.6	-4.9
Borno										
2011	4.7	0.5	-3.9	1.5	1.7	4.2	-4.9	3.6	-3.2	4.9
2012	5.5	0.5	-10.4	0.4	-2.7	3.8	-15.0	6.5	-10.8	8.1
2013	3.1	0.1	-7.0	3.2	-0.2	3.6	2.5	-0.5	-1.3	1.0
2014	2.5	0.1	-8.4	4.8	4.2	3.4	-6.8	6.3	-4.3	8.5
2015	15.8	1.2	-5.4	4.6	10.3	-4.2	-5.8	25.9	20.9	-10.6
Total 2011-15	31.6	2.5	-35.2	14.5	13.2	10.8	-30.0	41.8	1.3	11.9

Year	Gross Statutory Allocation	VAT	IGR	Grant	Total Revenue	Personnel Cost	Recurrent expenditure	Capital Expenditure	Total Expenditure	Overall Balance
Gombe										
2011	-7.2	-1.1	2.1	-0.4	-9.1	-2.6	4.5	0.3	3.6	-12.7
2012	-6.8	-1.1	0.8	-0.8	-7.6	-5.2	12.3	3.0	14.5	-22.1
2013	-10.5	-1.5	-2.1	-7.0	-23.1	-6.7	-7.8	-3.6	-10.0	-13.1
2014	-9.2	-1.8	1.2	-5.8	-12.7	-7.6	4.7	2.9	6.0	-18.7
2015	-33.8	-5.6	-13.0	-4.6	-17.9	-1.2	-23.7	16.4	-6.8	-11.2
Total 2011-15	-67.6	-11.2	-11.0	-18.6	-70.4	-23.3	-9.9	18.9	7.3	-77.7
Taraba										
2011	-6.4	-1.2	-0.3	8.4	-1.3	-1.9	-6.6	-11.2	-20.2	18.9
2012	-5.8	-1.2	-6.0	8.0	-4.0	-3.4	-19.0	-8.8	-30.6	26.6
2013	-9.6	-1.8	-1.1	3.1	-10.9	-4.1	-0.6	-14.5	-18.7	7.9
2014	-10.8	-1.8	-4.3	4.7	-9.7	-4.6	-12.4	-8.9	-25.8	16.1
2015	-32.5	-5.9	5.5	4.4	7.0	-12.0	-19.3	17.3	-1.6	8.6
Total 2011-15	-65.1	-11.9	-6.1	28.5	-18.8	-26.1	-58.0	-26.1	-96.8	78.0
Yobe										
2011	1.1	-0.2	0.1	0.6	-0.5	2.0	8.8	4.6	11.5	-12.0
2012	1.7	-0.2	-6.6	-1.2	-5.4	-0.3	19.0	8.2	25.6	-31.1
2013	-1.9	-0.7	3.4	2.2	2.3	-1.5	-7.8	-0.6	-11.9	14.2
2014	-1.9	-0.8	-4.6	3.9	0.1	-2.3	11.9	8.1	17.2	-17.1
2015	-1.0	-1.8	-9.2	3.6	1.8	5.1	-19.1	9.5	-8.9	10.7
Total 2011-15	-2.0	-3.7	-16.9	9.1	-1.9	3.0	12.8	29.8	33.5	-35.3
Total North-East Region										
2011	-18.8	-3.5	-1.4	73.1	37.7	1.4	13.8	8.6	13.5	24.2
2012	-15.2	-3.5	-32.9	81.9	35.0	-8.8	20.6	21.3	33.5	1.5
2013	-34.6	-6.0	0.5	-0.0	-46.2	-14.3	-16.3	-9.5	-40.8	-5.4
2014	-35.5	-6.5	-23.4	0.4	-45.9	-17.9	12.3	20.8	19.4	-65.4
2015	-104.1	-19.5	-38.1	5.7	-19.8	-6.4	-101.0	85.7	-13.4	-6.4
Total 2011-15	-208.2	-38.9	-95.2	161.0	-39.2	-45.9	-70.6	126.9	12.2	-51.4

TABLE AX.2

Nigeria - Impact of Boko Haram related Conflict on North-East State Output and Prices 2011-2015

<i>Year</i>	<i>GDP (Naira billions)</i>	<i>Inflation, All Prices (percent)</i>	<i>Inflation, Food Prices (percent)</i>
Adamawa			
2011	11.24	1.59	-20.49
2012	-88.63	4.06	31.38
2013	-58.39	-0.98	-2.51
2014	-88.51	4.55	0.06
2015	-89.74	1.17	0.59
Acc. 2011-15	-314.03	10.38	9.04
Bauchi			
2011	-6.41	14.87	2.46
2012	-58	-17.55	-10.79
2013	12.75	4.3	-7.39
2014	-71.06	-5.33	-4.42
2015	36.4	-0.8	-2.42
Acc. 2011-15	-86.32	-4.51	-22.55
Borno			
2011	-167.42	16.01	3.33
2012	-133.44	-6.72	1.26
2013	-106.58	-0.71	9.2
2014	-131.99	0.23	-3.46
2015	-168.75	1.2	0.95
Acc. 2011-15	-708.18	10.02	11.28
Gombe			
2011	-54.9	25.35	47.94
2012	-65.75	-16.96	-21.11
2013	-64.63	4.82	11
2014	-44.32	-2.82	0.21
2015	-51.29	2.31	8.29
Acc. 2011-15	-280.9	12.7	46.32
Taraba			
2011	15.92	-7.66	-6.34
2012	-29.22	7.77	9.47
2013	9.23	0.17	2.32
2014	-17.25	-0.74	-2.6
2015	-27.8	-2.49	-2.85
Acc. 2011-15	-49.12	-2.94	0
Yobe			
2011	26.9	-21.33	-24.75
2012	-89.28	34.39	38.36
2013	-31.99	-9.71	-15.15
2014	-94	3.55	3.64
2015	-33.92	-0.34	-1.36
Acc. 2011-15	-222.29	6.56	0.74

ANNEX 3

Proposed interventions for different beneficiary groups

TABLE AX.3

Proposed interventions for different beneficiary groups

<i>Immediate Livelihood Stabilisation to Early Recovery (Years 1 & 2)</i>	<i>Medium to Long Term Recovery including broad based Inclusive Growth and Livelihood Strengthening (Years 3 & 4)</i>
1. IDPs	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Needs assessment in IDPs all camps and host communities - to identify gaps and support requirements in Host Communities, IDPs in self set up camps and hosted IDPs in liberated LGAs • Establish alternative Supplementary Products – to address the issues of malnutrition and nutrition for all children, the IDPs with health issues and household who normally have dry rations with very little protein. This involves establishment and commercialisation of low cost and quick return moringa and quail birds' production as alternative natural food supplements. • Build capabilities and establish alternative means of livelihoods – to enable participating IDPs to be able to establish viable quick return enterprises for income generation in order to meet their other basic household needs including clothing and furniture. Possible IGs include bakery, metal fabrication, traditional cap making, carpentry, tailoring, shoe making, peanut butter making, petty trading, fabrication and selling of energy saving stoves and lighting, etc. • Mobilise start-up grant funding – this is to support IDPs to start up their alternative means of livelihoods and income generation activities as well as put up working spaces for them in their camps • Cash transfers to IDPs especially vulnerable groups to buy NFIs • Food handouts for IDPs in camps and outside the camps based on identified needs • Skills Training in waste management and recycling • Training and establishment of moringa and quail birds production for food supplementation and quick protein source for IDPs and children • Set up grant funds for rebuilding core structures in areas of return • Cash for work or temporary employment in debris removal and infrastructure reconstruction • Relevant market Skills training with a start-up package 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment of areas of return or alternative areas of settlement– to determine needs for safe return of willing IDPs to areas of preference or of origin • Temporary Employment – the labour intensive work for cash is to enable IDPs returning to the areas of origin or preferred settlement areas to earn an income as they settle while at the same time participating in the debris removal, sorting and reconstruction of key community infrastructure such as link roads, clinics, school etc. • Protection and rehabilitation of productive assets – this is to enable returning IDPs to rehabilitate the environment and existing natural resources, including soil conservation for the benefit of their livestock. This involves production of fodder for their livestock, animal health control and management based on available natural resource as well as to promote community-based natural resources based management focusing in natural resources with the potential for commercialisation. • Establish and strengthen producer associations- to ensure production skills are sharpened leading to high yields and quality products. • Commercialise moringa and quail birds products for IDPs markets and commercial public markets • Settling in areas of return by returnees • Development of a North-East Nigeria Regional Humanitarian and Recovery Plan for agriculture , forestry and food security

Immediate Livelihood Stabilisation to Early Recovery (Years 1 & 2)

Medium to Long Term Recovery including broad based Inclusive Growth and Livelihood Strengthening (Years 3 & 4)

2. Returnees

- Food handouts upon arrival and food for work to meet HH requirements to next season
- Distribution of Start-up Gift of livestock to help returning IDPs who have lost all livestock to have start up livestock for breeding; in the form of small livestock such as goats, sheep and poultry or where it applies; cows can be given to youth in pastoralist communities while community bulls can be shared. The startup livestock gift should not be sold nor slaughtered but should be allowed to multiply.
- Agricultural inputs and implements distribution for key crops production for first season including livestock start up package
- Labour intensive work for cash in debris removal and repairs of community infrastructure
- Technical and Business training in agricultural production and agro processing
- Training in relevant market skills such as metal fabrication, masonry, tailoring, bakery
- Construct and equip the processing centres in LGAs for cooperative use
- Access to grant fund to start up enterprises
- Mobilise returnees to harvest and add value to forestry products such as gum Arabica, tamarind, baobab and desert palm
- **Production capacities strengthened** – this is for returnees to acquire new technical production skills to ensure quality production.
- **Diversified Livelihoods supported** – this is where returning IDPs will go through relevant skills training to enable them to have alternative livelihoods upon return and settling in their places of origin. Skills with a package will be given in agribusiness, solid minerals processing and value addition, forestry products value addition to enable them to earn income from available resources. Training will also include skills on demand such as plumbing, borehole maintenance and repairs, metal fabrication, building and masonry, tannery and leather products making, recycling and repairs for mobile phones. These will enable the trained to be employable but also enable them to start their own businesses supported by startup kits.
- **Provision of work space and business units** – this will enable returnees to settle in fast and work from spacious environments. Resources will be mobilised and land acquired for the construction of these processing units which will be equipped ready for use by returnees and community members. This reduces tensions and conflicts as cooperatives including local community members will be formed.
- **Loan Fund Mobilisation** – the trained members will be linked to finance institutions for loans to start up and grow their business leading to local economic recovery.
- **Mobilisation and commercialisation of locally available natural resources** - this is to promote community based natural resources management as communities and returnees together harvest forestry products such as gum Arabica, tamarind, baobab and wild palm as well as solid minerals for the benefit of the community. Joint venture business can be pursued if resources warrant.
- Value chain development of identified commodities in areas of return to create more job and increase production.

3. Host Communities

- **Needs identification for hosting communities** - this is to ensure that only priority needs are addressed thereby building a harmonious community and reducing tensions and conflicts.
- **Labour intensive work for cash or food** - this is to help members of the community whose resources have been depleted because of hosting IDPs. They earn incomes or food from debris removal and repairs of community infrastructure such as roads and markets in order to remove bottlenecks
- **Provision of agricultural Inputs** – this is for community households who also have been overstretched and cannot afford to buy inputs for crop production.
- **Awareness creation and education on waste management and recycling** – this is to empower host communities with information so that they are able to reduce accumulation of waste especially plastic and papers. The biodegradable materials will also be used for organic manure generation which goes back to arable lands.
- Conduct value chain analysis for identified and prioritised agro product for agro processing and value addition to local available natural resources and solid minerals
- Link to Microfinance Institutions.
- Value chain development on selected commodities, natural resource and solid mineral based products

*Immediate Livelihood Stabilisation to Early Recovery (Years 1 & 2)**Medium to Long Term Recovery including broad based Inclusive Growth and Livelihood Strengthening (Years 3 & 4)***4. Youth**

- Labour intensive work for cash in debris removal and rehabilitation of community infrastructure
 - Rehabilitation and equipping of youth skills acquisition centres in all states
 - Review Curriculum for skills acquisition centres to include market relevant skills and linkage with higher tertiary colleges
 - Retrain staff in SAC
 - Set up funds for support to start up by youths
 - Training in relevant market skills to support rehabilitation and construction of community infrastructure
 - Training in market relevant skills required by local private sector and public sector for self-employment and employability – e.g. skills training in metal fabrication, plumbing, borehole maintenance, mobile phone repairs, fisheries, sustainable mining, horticulture production, meat processing and leather products manufacturing
 - Grant fund start-up capital for production units such as energy saving stoves and recycling products
 - Set up commercial nurseries for re-greening areas destroyed by IDPs settlements
- Facilitate exposure visits and participation in expos
 - Set up well equipped youth centres in LGAs
 - Set up joint ventures on successful SMEs for growth

5. Women

- Cash transfer for buying NFI
 - Food handouts including children feeds
 - Quick skills acquisition training in tailoring, poultry and quail birds production, bakeries, knitting, sanitary pad making for women, agro processing – peanut making, tamarind, baobab, Shea butter products, baby foods, etc., including functional literacy with start-up package
 - Set up well equipped women production centres
 - Grant funds for women to start up small enterprises as well as petty trading and mobile phone recharge cards.
 - Open women-operated markets
 - Traditional Cap Value chain assessment
 - Establish women in cap making production cooperatives
 - Train women and girls in gum Arabic grading and value addition
 - Set up gum Arabic grading and processing sheds and warehouses
- Facilitate women to acquire land for businesses, markets, and production
 - Facilitate women representatives to expos and study visit to other states
 - Commercial production and packaging of cap and agro products for local and external markets
 - Establish market for products locally, across the country and for export

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Endnotes

- ¹ IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix Round VII, January 2016
- ² 2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview, Humanitarian Country Team, Nigeria
- ³ One of the largest cattle markets in the whole of West Africa is located at Potiskum town, the headquarters of Potiskum LGA in Yobe State.
- ⁴ According to Human Right Watch, 2014 has been the worst period of Boko Haram attacks. Over 700 people have been killed in attacks on 40 villages in the North-East states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. Most of the attacks are concentrated in these three states (Awojobi, 2014.)
- ⁵ UNOCHA, 2016.
- ⁶ IOM, Round 7,
- ⁷ Conflict and Protection Analysis, UNHCR, October 2016
- ⁸ As this report was being compiled, the Nigerian Army set up a Human Rights Desk to receive and address human rights related violations/issues and also improve the civil-military relations.
- ⁹ Source: IOM DTM Round 7VII
- ¹⁰ IOM DTM Round 7VII
- ¹¹ 61 percent of the IDP registered households through the DTM declared that “food was their primary need while 8percent8 pointed out shelter as their first need” (Displacement Tracking Matrix Round VII). In a similar trend, the UNCHR Protection Monitoring report revealed that in 2015 7,625 vulnerable households reported a lack of access to water, shelter, or other basic needs” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and National Human Rights Commission; North East Nigeria: Protection Monitoring Report, December 2015)..
- ¹² UNHCR, 2016.
- ¹³ IDMC2016.
- ¹⁴ UNHCR, 2016.
- ¹⁵ Dec 2015
- ¹⁶ Source DTM
- ¹⁷ Government and HCT Assessment Report, August 2015
- ¹⁸ UNHCR, 2015
- ¹⁹ Source DTM
- ²⁰ Differentiating the coping mechanisms used by type of host locations shows that most IDPs have received assistance from government (79 percent in camps; 94 percent in collective cCollective enters; 71 percent in transitional centres; 59 percent in host families). As a second option, IDPs have received assistance from family and friends (14 percent in camps; 24 percent in transitional cTransitional enters; 30 percent in host fHost amilies; and 5 percent in collective cCollective enters). DTM Round 6. 2015. http://nigeria.iom.int/sites/default/files/dtm/01_IOM%20DTM%20Nigeria_Round%20VI%20Report_20151031.pdf Accessed
- ²¹ S/2014/339
- ²² Civic, 2015
- ²³ For more details, please see section on Impact and Damage Assessment of this volume.
- ²⁴ UNODC, 2006. ;The Guardian, 2015. <http://www.nguardiannews.com/2015/05/time-to-mend-nigerias-broken-criminal-justice-system-1/>
- ²⁵ <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50981#.VZEpzBuqqko>
- ²⁶ According to the National Youth Policy, a youth in Nigeria is anyone from the age of 18 to 35; UNICEF uses the terms ‘adolescent’ for those aged 10-19, ‘youth’ for those from 15-24 and ‘young people’ 10-24.
- ²⁷ CIA World Factbook.
- ²⁸ PGDA Working Paper No. 62, 2010.
- ²⁹ HRP, p5
- ³⁰ PGDA
- ³¹ Resources to be consulted should necessarily include the IASC Guidelines for integrating Gender-Based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Action: <http://gbvguidelines.org/>. The World Bank’s Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) Resource Guide also presents another important resource for guidance on violence prevention and mitigation considerations across multiple sectors: <http://www.vawgresourceguide.org/>
- ³² Renaissance Capital, (2013). Nigeria Unveiled – Thirty-six shades of Nigeria. Insight Thematic Research, 7 May 2013.
- ³³ World Bank (2016) – Doing Business 2016 – Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency. 13th Edition.
- ³⁴ Cultural and Historical Houses include churches, mosques, palaces, and houses of tribal chiefs, etc
- ³⁵ Other buildings include government filling stations, VC’s Offices, etc.
- ³⁶ WHO/UNICEF JMP Report, 2012.

- ³⁷ National Demographic and Health Survey, 2013.
- ³⁸ Performance Assessment of the Urban State Water Agencies, 2015 ; WSP/WB
- ³⁹ DHS, 2013.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ Jacob, J.U. and Akpan, I., 2015
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Cultural and Historical Houses include churches, mosques, palaces and houses of tribal chiefs, etc.
- ⁴⁴ Other buildings include government filling stations, VC's Offices, etc.
- ⁴⁵ Households with limited labour capacity are defined as having a dependency ratio above three, i.e. more than three household members are unable to generate income. Typically, households with a high number of children and elderly have lower labour capacity.
- ⁴⁶ In the absence of data for the Nigerian context, data from a comparable study conducted in Western Uganda was taken to approximate the cost of providing CBHI. Furthermore, the crude birth rate from 2011-2015, amounting to 40 live births per 1,000 persons a year, as published by the World Bank, was used to estimate the number of lactating mothers and pregnant women.
- ⁴⁷ In terms of key concepts, livelihoods are defined to include the capabilities, assets (both material and social), and activities required for a meaning of living. In addition to income and employment, the concept of livelihoods encompasses any reliable ways that people access food, shelter, health care, education, safe water and sanitation, security and protection. Economic recovery is defined to include market development, strengthening of new and existing enterprises, and job creation in both public and private sectors. This process often involves an umbrella of economic, institutional, legal, and policy reforms, and the reconstruction of infrastructure that facilitates trade and commerce.
- ⁴⁸ As a result, the general government fiscal deficit declined (from 2.37 in 2003 and turned to surpluses for most years prior to 2009) and significant reserve in the Excess Crude Account (ECA), derived from the difference between the price of oil export and the reference budget oil price, was accumulated (from US\$3.3 billion in 2004 to US\$19.7 billion in 2008), further propelled by an increase in international oil price during this period.
- ⁴⁹ National output is determined by explanatory factors such as Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) and wage bill for 36 states and FCT, provided by the state budget data. The resulting coefficients enable the estimation of GDP and counterfactual GDP by state over the pre-crisis and in-crisis periods. The differences between the estimated GDP and counterfactuals are calculated. Subsequently, the impact of the conflict is computed as differences in differences (i.e. differences in GDP and counterfactual during the in-crisis period minus an average difference in GDP and counterfactual during the pre-crisis period).
- ⁵⁰ In this Component Report, Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe are identified as primary affected states; and Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba as secondary affected states.
- ⁵¹ In fact, Bauchi experienced a cumulative decline in both prices, especially for food items. In contrast, Gombe experienced the highest cumulative increase in prices for all items and for food. The second and the third columns of Table 5 shows that the cumulative increases in prices for all items were much higher in the primary affected states, while in the secondary affected states, an increase in the price for food was slightly higher. It is noteworthy that it is significantly higher than a price increase for all items (23.8 percent compared to 5.3 percent).
- ⁵² Africa Growth Initiative Working Paper, 2014.
- ⁵³ FEWSNET, 2015.
- ⁵⁴ IGR collection accounted for about 10 percent of total revenue on average, reflecting the lackluster economic activities combined with weak tax administration. The IGR was slightly over the half of the national average of 17 percent of the total revenue during this period. Grant contributed about 13 percent of the total revenue in North-East region.
- Consolidated expenditure as a share of the total revenue during the pre-crisis period increased, reflecting an increase in both recurrent and capital expenditure. State budgetary expenditures are used for the provision of secondary education, secondary health care, social protection, physical infrastructure, general public services, public order and safety.
- ⁵⁵ The Bauchi's budget was the highest in the region but still lower than the national average. Yobe's budget was the lowest in the North-East region and was only 38 percent of the national average; Borno's budget was the second lowest in the North-East region and was about 50 percent of the national average. The budget size was closely related to the level of gross statutory and VAT allocation. Finally, the primary affected state budget deficits were relatively lower than the secondary affected states. The averages for the pre-crisis budget deficit show that Taraba recorded the highest fiscal deficit, followed by Adamawa. The deficit was the lowest in Borno, while Yobe registered a budget surplus
- ⁵⁶ In the primary affected states, a reduction in IGR collection during the crisis period (2011-15) was greater than a reduction in VAT collection (N63 billion compared to N10 billion). A reduction in IGR collection in Borno was the most significant (N35.2 billion), compared Yobe (N17 billion) and Adamawa (N11 billion) as it is the epicenter of the conflict. The analysis also shows that the secondary affected states experienced greater loss in VAT revenue, more than the primary affected states. This could be due to closed down and reduced business entities caused by the increased violence in these three states. The conflict lowered both VAT and IGR revenue by almost the same magnitude in the secondary affected states, with the highest reduction in VAT revenue recorded in Taraba. However, grant revenue increased in all six states, but an increase was more significant in the primary affected state. Consequently, the primary affected states experienced a net increase in total revenue, while the secondary affected states experienced a reduction in total revenue as the loss in tax revenue (IGR and VAT) was greater than an increase in grant revenue (Table 6)
- ⁵⁷ The World Bank, 2015.
- ⁵⁸ National MSME Collaborative Survey, NBS & SMEDAN, 2010.
- ⁵⁹ Borno represents 2.7 percent of total micro-enterprises in Nigeria; Bauchi, 2.8 percent; Gombe, 2.4 percent; Adamawa, 2.4 percent; and Yobe and Taraba, each around 2.1 percent; while Lagos represent 5.1 percent of micro-enterprises and Kano, 5.1 percent. Regarding small and medium enterprises (SMEs), Bauchi has the highest proportion of small and medium enterprises

among the six North-East States (states accounting for 2.3 and 3 percent respectively), benefiting from its proximity to Kano and Kaduna. Overall, the six North-East states only account for 7 percent of total small enterprises and 8.3 percent of total medium enterprises in Nigeria (Table 7).

⁶⁰ The World Bank, 2011.

⁶¹ <http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reports/Subnational-Reports/-/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Subnational-Reports/DB10-Sub-Nigeria.pdf>

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ The Enterprise Survey, 2014. The Enterprise Survey covered 19 states.

⁶⁴ The World Bank, *Urbanization Review for Nigeria, 2015*

⁶⁵ The World Bank, *Estimating Trade Flows, Describing Trade Relationships and Identifying Barriers to Cross-Border Trade between Cameroon and Nigeria, 2013*

⁶⁶ Via Adamawa (via Mubi, Yola), Gombe (via Gombe), Yobe (via Potiskum and Damaturu), to ultimately reach Maiduguri.

⁶⁷ <http://dailypost.ng/2016/02/10/boko-haram-army-to-shut-down-markets-in-north-east/>

As of December 2015 (Figure 11), most markets in Borno have minimal or no activities (purple dots) or are significantly disrupted with limited activities (red dots). In Yobe, around half of the markets have minimal or no activities and the other half have reduced activities. The situation has markedly improved in Adamawa between October and December 2015, with most markets having normal activities (green dots), except in the North East of Adamawa where markets also face significant disruption (Figure 10).

⁶⁸ For example, in Gombe State, several banks have been targeted by the armed group: FCMB (in Ashaka and Bajoga, in June 2011), Union Bank (in Bajoga and Talasse, in December 2014), UBA (in Ashaka in May 2011), Bank of Agriculture (in Gombe, in January 2015), and Ecobank (in Gombe, in February 2015).

⁶⁹ *Investment Opportunities in Yobe State – The Pride of Sahel*

⁷⁰ World Bank, Vasco Molini: *Labour Market in Northern Nigeria*

⁷¹ NBS 2010: Literacy rates for Adamawa was 55.82 percent; Taraba, 72 percent; Gombe, 29.05 percent; Bauchi, 19.26 percent; Borno, 23.11 percent; percent and Yobe, 7.23 percent.

⁷² National Bureau of Statistics, LSMS, 2010/2011

⁷³ For instance, cereals like rice, maize, sorghum, etc. and vegetables like tomato, onions, pepper, ginger, etc. are not processed for value addition.

⁷⁴ The World Bank, *Drivers of Jobs and Productivity Nigeria, October 2015a.*

⁷⁵ Government of Nigeria, *Mid-term Report of the Transformation Agenda (2011-2013)*

However, in 2014, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) redefined the benchmark of employment and unemployment statistics in Nigeria. The agency adopted the 20 hours a week benchmark, as against the 40 hours used

in the past. The new unemployment methodology shows that unemployment rate among women is 7.5 percent while that of men stood at 5.4 percent in the last quarter of 2014. The Nigeria Jobs Report (2015) found that only 9 million out of 87 million working-age adults are wage workers in either the private or the public sector, while the bulk of the population works in agriculture or is self-employed. Jobs, their number and quality, are critical not just for poverty reduction as the kind of job is also the main factor that contributes to the spatial inequality.

⁷⁶ The World Bank, *Nigeria Economic Report No. 2.*

⁷⁷ The World Bank, 2015c.

⁷⁸ Humanitarian Country Team, 2016.

⁷⁹ World Bank, Vasco Molini: *Brief on Labour in Northern Nigeria*

⁸⁰ Humanitarian Country Team 2016.

⁸¹ FEWS NET, 2015.

2014-2015 main season and off season harvests came in well below average in Borno, central and southern Yobe, and northern Adamawa, the states worst impacted by the conflict. The heavily impacted harvests have contributed to limited household own production stocks as well as low market stocks." FEWS NET further mentions that in March 2015 there was a limited availability of cereals across central and southern Borno, northern Adamawa, and eastern Yobe. Consequently, household incomes have reportedly dropped substantially across all states

⁸² According to the Nigeria Transport Owners during the Assessment Meeting, Its manufacturing sector experienced a decline as the number of functional factories fell from 10 functional factories before the conflict to only 2 factories.

⁸³ RPBA, 2016.

⁸⁴ With regard to the available supplies and prices in Maiduguri's marketplaces, the conflict does not seem to have had any noticeable impact. The IDPs were seen engaging in hula (cap) making which was the major economic activity that provided income for the provision of nutrition to the households. Grains were bought with the proceeds for meals. Shortages of food and food price increases are noticeable. In Yola (Adamawa), the conflict does not seem to have had a severe impact on trade. Markets seem to operate largely as before. Traders have unrestricted access to their suppliers and are said to have the capacity to react to potential demand increases. The only impact the conflict seems to have had is that it restricted the areas in which maize and beans traders source their products. However, the traders added that they had no problem switching to other areas to procure maize and beans, and that the restriction had not caused scarcity or price increases. In Bauchi 80-90 percent of people depend on farming. Due to the conflict, farmers in Darazo, Toro, Gamawa, and Zaki LGAs in Bauchi abandoned their farms.

⁸⁵ Little data could be gathered on the overall or specified damage to private or public enterprises, or regarding currently unavailable jobs and employment opportunities. Furthermore, the accessible data from governmental institutions (Ministry of Labour, National Directory of Employment) as well as the National Bureau of Statistics or Central Bank, does not provide any information on the dimension of reduced economic activities in view of the range of lost or temporarily unavailable employment opportunities.

⁸⁶ *Humanitarian Country Team Nigeria, Nigeria Humanitarian Needs Assessment, 2016*

⁸⁷ *For example, in Maiduguri, most households are hosting about 5-10 families, that it about 50 to 100 extra people in one house to cater for. Food reserves, social services, shelter and much more have been shared mostly without any return in payment. Given the poor living conditions of host families themselves, it becomes clear that their capacities are reaching its limits and their resources are exhausted.*

⁸⁸ *UNDP, 2013; UN 2009.*

⁸⁹ *The youth empowerment component of this output is aimed at reducing risk of (re)recruitments into armed groups. Targeted youth at risk groups will be provided with livelihoods support, used as an entry point for awareness raising, psycho-social support, as well as leadership and engagement in decision making processes.*

⁹⁰ *Cash grant or in-kind support for immediate livelihood assets replacement and livelihoods recovery through agriculture, livestock, fishery and micro-small-medium enterprises based activities support the communities of return, targeting IDPs, particularly women and female-headed households:*

Restoration of the production capacity of the farmers through assets replacement, provision of seeds, farming tools, and other agro-input supplies to assist food production;

Provision of necessary agricultural inputs (seeds, fertiliser, farm tools, pesticides, etc.);

Support for replacement of the lost animals and for the rearing of small livestock (i.e. breeds, housing, feeding, and health care);

Input supports to farming and non-farming households for home gardening (seeds, fertiliser, farm tools, irrigation kits etc.);

Land access will be facilitated through traditional authorities in the various host communities or locations with improved security conditions.

⁹¹ *They include National Employment Policy, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, the Vision 20:20 Economic Transformation Blueprint, Nigeria Youth Employment Action Plan, and the National Action Plan on Employment Creation (NAPEC). Furthermore the Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE), the National Economic Empowerment & Development Strategy (NEEDS), the State Economic Empowerment & Development Strategy (SEEDS).*

⁹² *Examples of programs include removal of debris and waste, waste collection including possible recycling, reconstruction of roads and bridges as well as public buildings.*

⁹³ *See German International Cooperation (giz)/EU program of “Pro-poor Growth and Promotion of Employment in Nigeria Programme (SEDIN).*

⁹⁴ *In Nigeria, only 13 states have established a State Planning Commission. Only 21 states have established a State Bureau of Statistics and no state has established a State Research Institute.*

⁹⁵ *A list of skills to be acquired include: Training of trainers approach (applied methods & didactics), Basic and advanced English skills, English Correspondence, Office Management, Project Cycle Management, Secretarial*

Assistance, Book keeping, Basic and advanced computer skills, Mechanics, Tin Smithery/Metal Works, construction and carpentry, brick making, Tailoring & Embroidery, Painting, Car and Motorbike Mechanics & Repair, Generator Servicing, Radio, TV and Mobile Phone, Electric, Car Painting, Plumbing, road construction, grains farming/ processing, tailoring, poultry, GSM repair, fish farming, motorcycle and tricycle repairs, catering/bakery, electrical installation/ carpentry and joinery, soap and cosmetic making, as well as leather works and shoe making.

⁹⁶ *Federal Ministry of Industry and Trade, Assessment of Investment Climate in Northern Nigeria, 2011*

⁹⁷ *Collier, 1999; World Bank, 2003; Costalli et al, 2014*

⁹⁸ *Sab, 2014; De Groot, 2010*

⁹⁹ *Costalli et al, 2014; Gates et al., 2012; Smith, 2014.*

¹⁰⁰ *Stewart et al., 2001.*

¹⁰¹ *They include the 2012 Flood in Nigeria (PDNA 2012); Oil price shocks (2015); national minimum wage increase (2011); income tax relief (2011-2012). There are many other unidentified shocks and changes at the State level.*



The North-East has suffered tremendously in the past six years. We have all been witness to the destruction of infrastructure, farmlands, businesses and trades, of schools and the loss of school years. Rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating what has been lost or damaged will cost money and time.

...the tasks before us are many and profound but paramount: to fix brick and mortar and to mend hearts and minds damaged by senseless, murderous violence.



– His Excellency, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

About the Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA):

On 21 August 2015, the Government of Nigeria requested assistance in assessing the needs associated with peace building and crisis recovery. Support has been provided in accordance with the 2008 Joint European Union (EU) – United Nations (UN) – World Bank (WB) Declaration on crisis assessment and recovery planning. A Recovery and Peace Building Assessment was initiated and findings are presented in this report.

The Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) informs a collective vision and strategy on peace building and recovery, and provides a framework for coordinated and coherent support to assist conflict-affected people in the North-East. The assessment covers the six States of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba, and Bauchi, and provides an overarching framework for stability, peace building, and recovery.

The RPBA is founded on the recognition that a durable resolution to the conflict in the North-East requires addressing the structural and underlying drivers of violent conflict. This understanding has also underpinned the identification and prioritisation of needs presented in this report.



THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA



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